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PREFACE 
THE HISTORIAN of the Revolution in New York has no 
simple task in writing about his subject because New York 
has occupied an ambivalent position in revolutionary his-
tory. A rebel party did commit the colony to independence, 
but the presence of thousands of loyalists lent credence to 
the idea in a later age that the revolutionaries represented a 
minority. Furthermore, a later generation emphasized the 
Whigs' vacillation in 1775-1776 and attributed it in part 
to a major loyalist reaction. The effect of this interpretation 
was to obscure the general spread of hostility to Great 
Britain. Subsequent historical writing proceeded along these 
lines and tended to perpetuate an illusory description of the 
province. The evidence presented in these pages indicates 
the inadequacy of this view of New York and suggests a dif-
ferent interpretation. A tenable hypothesis which emerges 
from the data is that the Whigs were a decisive majority. 
Associated with this proposition are other relationships 
which yield illuminating insights for the exploration of the 
Revolution. 
This book does not offer a strictly chronological treatment 
of its topic, even though it describes the trend of events 
from 1773 to 1777. Its point of departure is an analysis that 
stresses the strengths and weaknesses of the organization of 
the revolutionary movement. Although the Declaration of 
Independence was a decisive stage in the growth of the Revo-
lution, in New York independence was only one-half of the 
great question. The other half, which was not resolved 
until the spring of 1777, was the nature of the new govern-
ment. However, there was no orderly sequence in these 
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two matters because Yorkers, leaders and general public 
alike, were discussing them simultaneously as interrelated 
problems in the spring of 1776. Therefore, the culmination 
of the Revolution for these people seemed to occur when the 
Convention of Representatives of the State of New York 
adopted the New York Constitution of 1777. 
One of the problems peculiar to this era is that of classi-
fying individuals according to their political behavior. The 
problem is "peculiar" because one of the consequences of the 
friction with Britain was the shattering and regrouping of 
the existing factions into Whigs (often also denominated 
Friends of Liberty, Liberty Boys and Sons of Liberty) and 
Tories (Friends of Government). Historians have usually 
characterized the factions' leaders as radical, moderate, or 
conservative but have not explicitly stipulated the criteria 
by which they arrived at these judgments. A major difficulty 
with the usage of these terms as indicators of political beliefs 
is, for example, that a person who might have been a radical 
in his opposition to the Lord North ministry might have 
been a moderate on the question of the right of suffrage. 
One solution is to employ these three words in relation 
to specific circumstances. Thus, in one context the words 
indicate attitudes toward resistance to British policies; in 
another context they designate positions in relation to con-
stitutional problems in the Convention. The radicals in the 
first context were the men who advocated uncompromising 
resistance to Britain and demanded that nation's complete 
retreat on the disputed affairs. During the winter of 1775-
1776 men of this stripe were publicly contending for sep-
aration from the mother country. The moderates con-
demned the North ministry but kept a sharp vigil for means 
of compromise. Nonetheless, the moderates sponsored poli-
cies that steadily widened the gap between New York and 
Britain. On the question of independence they publicly 
favored delay but privately conceded in June, 1776, the 
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necessity of the separation. Although the conservatives 
opposed ministerial measures, they also rejected vigorous 
opposition to those measures. The conservatives might have 
acquiesced in Lord North's conciliation proposals of 1775 
or the Howe Olive Branch of 1776. When the formal break 
occurred in July, the conservatives discountenanced inde-
pendence. Many men moved from one category to another 
under the pressure of events. Alexander McDougall by the 
spring of 1776 had broken with his radical associates and 
was firmly in the moderate camp. On the other hand, John 
Jay gradually abandoned his conservative position in 1775 
for that of the moderates. 
In the second context the lines of differentiation are much 
less clearly drawn than in the first. The radicals in the Con-
vention sought to obtain a constitution that would allow 
maximum participation of the male citizenry on all levels 
of government. Although the moderates were not ready 
to go this far, their proposals would have given the middle 
and small landholders much greater weight in the govern-
ment than those of the conservatives. An initial objective 
of the conservatives was to minimize political change and to 
preserve the power and influence of the wealthy in the gov-
ernmental structure. However, the exigencies of politics 
compelled both moderates and conservatives to shift ground, 
so that there were occasions when many moderates were 
indistinguishable from conservatives. 
My debts to others are numerous and it is a pleasure to 
acknowledge them. Professor Richard B. Morris, Professor 
Chilton Williamson, and Dean Harold C. Syrett contributed 
indispensable criticism from which I have benefited greatly. 
If the results are not commensurate with their efforts, the 
fault is mine and not theirs. My colleagues, Professors Amy 
Gilbert, Albert V. House and Bernard F. Huppe, took the 
time and trouble to read critically the manuscript. I owe a 
special debt to Professor Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., for his 
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perspicacious comments and encouragement. Naturally all 
errors of omission and commission are mine alone. I am 
grateful to the Research Foundation of the State University 
of New York and the Harpur College Foundation for 
financial assistance. The invaluable help of the library 
staffs of the institutions hereinafter cited is acknowledged 
with gratitude. These acknowledgments would be incom-
plete without mention of the unflagging aid, never-failing 
good humor and encouragement of my wife Marjorie. 
State University of New York 
at Binghamton 
April, 1966 BERNARD MASON 
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Introduction 
f." ~ HISTORY has bequeathed to posterity a strik-
~ ..._}) ingly incongruous image of New York in 
the era of the American Revolution at which later gener-
ations have gazed in some perplexity. Here was a people 
who proposed the Continental Congress because they op-
posed an individual colony's commercial boycott of Great 
Britain but who in that Continental Congress argued against 
an intercolonial stoppage of trade. Here was a people who 
patronized a zealous Whig press but whose largest news-
paper was the most important Tory journal in the colonies. 
Here was a people who cheered tumultuously, and on the 
same day, both George Washington on his journey to assume 
command of the Continental Army and royal Governor 
William Tryon newly returned from England. These were 
the revolutionaries who sent troops to invade Canada but 
who provisioned British warships in New York Harbor. 
These were the rebels whose conservative leaders opposed 
independence but who were publicly discussing independ· 
ence before the publication of Paine's Common Sense) who 
declared their independence of the crown of Great Britain 
but who enlisted in thousands in His Majesty's army, whose 
laboring and "middling" classes argued for democratic re-
form but who accepted a conservative state constitution 
almost without a murmur of criticism. 
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Historians, identifying, scrutinizing, analyzing, and in-
terpreting the events of the Revolution in New York, have 
tended to substantiate this image. A reader who ranged over 
the literature saw a province whose political organization 
was for the most part bifurcated into radicals and conserv-
atives. The radicals were characterized as the spokesmen 
for the masses, the conservatives as spokesmen for the wealthy 
merchants and landlords. The conflict between these two 
political parties was one of the two dynamic forces in the 
Revolution. The other, the drive to cut Britain's leading 
strings, functioned on a minimal level partly because Whigs 
and Tories were nearly equal in strength. One index of this 
political division was the manner in which the colony found 
its way to independence-almost in spite of itself. The 
reader accepted the idea that the Patriots managed the war 
with great difficulty because so many Yorkers were loyalists. 
This image of New York contains major inaccuracies and 
distortions and requires modification and clarification.1 
1 The principal sources of the preceding interpretation are Carl L. Becker, 
The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 
(Madison, 1909), passim; Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York During 
the American Revolution (New York, 1901), passim; Alexander C. Flick, ed., 
A History of the State of New York (10 vols.; New York, 1933-1937), III, 
passim; Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution 
(New York, 1902), chap. v; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The Colonial Merch-
ants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 1939), passim, and 
the same author's New Viewpoints in American History (New York, 1922), 
chap. vii; Wilbur C. Abbott, New York in the American Revolution (New 
York, 1929), passim; Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels: 
New York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948), Pf!ssim; Dorothy 
R. Dillon, The New York Triumvirate: A Study of the Legal and Political 
Careers of William Livingston, john Morin Scott, William Smith, Jr. (New 
York, 1949), chap. vii; Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Merchant on 
the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1935), chap. ix; George Dangerfield, 
Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York, 1746-181] (New York, 1960), 
Part Two; Edward P. Alexander, A Revolutionary Conservative: james 
Duane of New York (New York, 1938), chap. vi: Merrill Jensen, The Articles 
of Confederation (Madison, 1940), pp. 30-35: Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and 
Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule Dur-
ing the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1955), chap. v: Evarts B. Greene, 
The Revolutionary Generation, 1763-1790 (New York, 1943), pp. 190-97, 
233-34· William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), pp. 42-45, 
80-83, 92, 98-104, 125; John R. Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783 
(New York, 1954), p. 88. 
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Any new look at the history of the Revolution in New 
York should start with the problems created by the Tea Act 
of 177 3. Its passage by Parliament in 177 3 punctured the 
bubble of colonial economic recovery and political quies-
cence. The preceding three years, 1770-1773, were a period 
of flourishing trade for New York, a period in which the 
continuing boycott of British tea hardly affected the enter-
ing volume of goods. Although the nonimportation of tea 
was effective, New Yorkers did not cease to consume the 
beverage. They bought and drank large quantities of the 
smuggled commodity.2 Amidst the increasing affluence, an-
tagonism to Britain declined and the provincial political 
kettle simmered mainly in response to local stimuli. How-
ever, the kettle emitted sounds which indicated the approach 
of the boiling point when the colonials learned of the plans 
of the East India Company.3 
The reasons for the colonial excitement were not difficult 
to discern. By shipping its tea to New York consignees, the 
John Company (East India Company) would eliminate in-
tervening wholesalers and be able to undersell competitors 
in America. The critics charged that the company, having 
ruined its rivals, would raise its prices above existing levels 
to the detriment of the consumers. Even the smugglers had 
cause for concern because the East India Company was to 
have a refund of the English tea duties. As a consequence 
it might undercut also the illegal trader since its tea would 
be cheaper than the undutied Dutch tea. Moreover, other 
observers foresaw disaster for everyone if the East India 
Company proved the practicability of the project. There 
would be nothing to prevent the ministry from authorizing 
similar ventures in other lines of trade. Since fair trader 
2 Harrington, The New York Merchant, p. 344; Schlesinger, The Colonial 
Merchants, pp. 249-51. 
3 The act of 1773 conferred upon the East India Company a monopoly of 
tea exportation to the American colonies. Schlesinger, The Colonial M erch-
ants, pp. 262-64. 
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and smuggler would suffer alike, or as a contemporary drily 
commented, "virtue and vice being thus united," both 
groups had common ground on which to unite in their 
opposition to the plan.4 
If this situation in 177 3 had involved only these economic 
considerations, a tea party might not have occurred in New 
York. It was precisely because the affair fused the economic 
and political variables that it produced volatile combustibles. 
Impending large-scale importations of the commodity which 
itself was the focus of an attenuated constitutional conflict 
revived the complex controversy over colonial taxation and 
regulation. Although Bostonians and others imported and 
paid the three-pence duty on tea from 1770 to 1773, they 
saw that the Tea Act fundamentally altered their com-
mercial relationships. If the colonies consumed annually an 
estimated one to one and a half million pounds of tea leaves, 
if they bought their beverage from the East India Company, 
they would pay from £12,500 to £18,750 in import duties 
on this product.5 Having paid these duties, the colonials 
would no longer be able to argue that they did not acquiesce 
in parliamentary taxation. Indeed, there were Yorkers who 
accused the North ministry of seduction in this matter, of 
4 Ibid., pp. 249-51, 272·73; William Smith's Memoirs, quoted in Werten· 
baker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 32; Abbott, New York in the Amer-
ican Revolution, p. 99. For a contrary view see Benjamin W. Labaree, The 
Boston Tea Party (New York, 1964), pp. 76-77. 
5 Since there are no reliable tea consumption statistics, this total derives 
from crude calculation. Contemporary reckoning placed legal and illegal 
importations at three million pounds. Import statistics for 1768-1774 show 
that peak consumption in these years was 873,744 pounds but naturally 
this does not include the smuggled tea. However, the gap might be filled 
by calculating the average annual per capita consumption Irom later import 
data. From 1790 to 1798 annual importations of tea averaged two million 
pounds, which indicates an average annual per capita consumption of 0.51 
pounds. If the population is computed at 2.1 to 2.5 million and per capita 
usage at 0.51 pounds, the result is a total consumption of one to one and 
one-half million pounds. Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation 
Laws: A Seventeenth Century Experimem in Social Engineering (New York, 
1939), p. 269, n. 125; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1957), ser. 
Z254-261. See Labaree, Boston Tea Party, pp. 7-8. 
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providing cheap tea in order to lure Americans into pay-
ment of the tax. 6 Thus opened the great drama which con-
vulsed New York for the next decade. 
Although there were signs of strain in the political struc-
ture of New York in the 1760's, it did not reveal any grave 
defects that threatened to disrupt it. Through most of the 
ten years from 1763 to 1773 the political game was a triangu-
lar affair involving two factions and the governor. Each 
faction, the De Lancey and the Livingston, was intent upon 
domination of assembly, council, and governor. When the 
factions could not control the governor, they sought to in-
fluence and use him to gain their ends. The governor, 
naturally, strove to maintain his independence, to play off 
one group against the other. All three acted out their roles 
with one eye on London; this was especially true for the 
governor since he was dependent on the ministry and 
needed to maintain good relations in Britain in order to pro-
tect his possession of the governorship. It was not enough 
for the governor to concern himself with the appearance of 
his record in Whitehall; he perforce took into his calcula-
tions the fact that members of both factions kept up a con-
stant correspondence with friends in Britain, that their 
hostile depiction of events in New York would find its way 
to the attention of the ministry. On the other hand, an astute 
governor employed the official minutes of his council meet-
ings as a club over the heads of the members since he 
transmitted these to England and since councilors were 
removable by the crown. 7 
The anatomy of a faction illuminates the fluid state of 
politics. Family kinship, symbolized by the factional titles, 
was a material element in the nucleus of the political gro1,1p. 
6 Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, pp. 246-49; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, pp. 99, 104. 
7 Ibid., pp. 7-8, ll-12; Harrington, The New York Merchant, p. 43; Wil-
liam H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs from 16 March 1763 to 9 july 
1776 of William Smith (New York, 1956), passim. 
6 The Road to Independence 
Nonetheless, large families and intermarriage among the 
wealthy weakened the kinship factor except in primary .re-
lationships. Other adherents flocked to the family standard 
from varied motivations. Some were simply place-seekers; 
patronage was a magnet which strongly attracted all ranks 
of society. The desire for personal gain, particularly in the 
form of land, drew many to one faction or the other. Still 
others sought political and legal influence to further busi-
ness matters. There were some, also, who entered politics 
from a sense of noblesse oblige or to acquire prestige. Finally, 
there were those who sought power to gratify ambition. 
A faction, then, was a collection of interest groups having 
no organizational framework, no platform, and no pro-
claimed principles. Shifts from one faction to another, 
springing on occasion from personality clashes as well as 
quarrels over pelf and place, were neither unusual nor in-
frequent.8 
The composition of each faction cut across social lines. 
Both groups of leaders contained modest gentry as well as 
great landed proprietors. Although both factions numbered 
merchants among their ranks, the De Lanceys appear to have 
had the greater lure for the commercial class. There was 
one difference between the parties to which contemporaries 
attached special meaning. The De Lanceys apparently en-
joyed a greater affinity with the Anglicans than did the 
Livingstons, who seemed to hold a greater attraction for the 
dissenting denominations. Therefore, there were those who 
saw the factional antagonism in religious terms and labeled 
the Livingstons the Presbyterian party, the De Lanceys 
the Church party. The religious distribution between the 
8 Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, passim; Becker, The History of Polit-
ical Parties, p. 13; Harrington, The New York Merchant, pp. 11-13, 140-42. 
For the contention that organization and principles did count in politics see 
Milton M. Klein, "Democracy and Politics in Colonial New York," New 
York History, XL (July, 1959), 221-46. 
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factions partly mirrors the frictions which arose from the 
establishment of the Anglican church in some of the coun-
ties in the colony.9 
The mingling of the political and religious strife some-
times produced blunt exchanges at the topmost level of 
government. Such a clash took place at a meeting of the 
governor and the council in January, 1774. The dispute 
concerned a petition of the Schenectady Dutch Reformed 
Church to increase the amount of funds that its congregation 
might raise. William Smith, a Presbyterian and arch-foe 
of the De Lanceyites, pointedly compared this Schenectady 
request for a revenue of £1,000 with the £5,000 authoriza-
tion for the small Albany Anglican Church. Smith jotted 
down in his private notes that Oliver De Lancey, one of the 
faction leaders, "upon my mentioning the Albany Church 
Revenue said, that was because they were Christians. What 
said I are not the Dutch of Schenectady, Christians? Not 
such Christians says he. How do you mean not Episco-
palians? Do you mean that? Ay says he. That we all know 
said 1."10 
Although the De Lanceyites gained and held the upper 
hand in politics from 1769 to 1773, their superiority was 
neither overwhelming nor stable. On paper at least the 
De Lancey position was formidable. They had a long-
standing preponderance in the council where the subtle and 
9 Harrington, The New York Merchant, pp. 37-41; Becker, The History 
of Political Parties, pp. 12-13, 18-19; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
pp. 146, 169, 207, 235; Thomas Jones, History of New York during the 
Revolutionary War, and of the Leading Events in the Other Colonies of 
that Period, ed. Edward Floyd de Lancey (2 vols.; New York, 1879), I, 2, 
18n., II, 29ln.; Dorothy R. Dillon, The New York Triumvirate, pp. 44-53; 
Peter Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.: Washington, D.C., 1837-1853), 
4th ser., I, 300-301; Peter Van Schaack to Henry Van Schaack, January 27, 
1769, in Henry C. Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaack (New York, 
1842), pp. 10-11. 
10 Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 169. See also Peter Van Schaack's 
analysis of the 1769 election in terms of religious enmity. Van Schaack, 
Peter Van Schaack, pp. 10-11. 
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supple William Smith was their minor but frequently effec-
tive opponent.11 Since there were no colonywide political 
organizations and since there was no party discipline, the 
De Lancey sway in the assembly was less firm than in the 
council but they did put together majorities with which to 
pass legislation.12 The De Lancey political future was ap-
parently assured when that faction evolved a modus vivendi, 
first with Acting Governor Cadwallader Colden, 1769-1770, 
and then with the new governor, Lord Dunmore, 1770-
1771.13 This satisfactory state of affairs for the De Lanceys 
ended with the arrival in July, 1771, of a successor for Dun-
more, William Tryon. Tryon rejected the "leading strings" 
of the dominant faction and trod an independent path with 
the encouragement of the Livingstons.l4 Although their in-
11 Oliver De Lancey was the leader in the council, having most consistent 
support from John Watts, Joseph Reade, Henry Cruger, Roger Morris, and 
Charles W. Apthorpe. Other councilors who voted most frequently with 
De Lancey were Daniel Horsmanden, Hugh Wallace, William Axtell, and 
Henry White. Cadwallader Colden commonly had differences with De 
Lancey. Smith, though he had connections with the Livingstons, often pur-
sued an independent path. If Smith's notes are any guide to his motiva-
tion, he apparently aspired to be chief justice and perhaps to be lieutenant-
governor. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, passim. 
12 Although the question of who possessed the suffrage in New York is a 
moot one, recent research has tended to demonstrate that a broad electorate 
existed. Estimates range from 50 to 80 percent of the adult white male popu-
lation. See Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to De-
mocracy, 1760-1860 (Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 27-28; Klein, New York His-
tory, XL, 236-37; Nicholas Varga, "Election Procedures and Practices in 
Colonial New York," New York History, XLI (July, 1960), 252-53. 
13 Smith claimed that Colden and the De Lanceys framed a "bargain" 
under which the De Lanceys guaranteed approval of the Acting Governor's 
salary by the assembly and promised to seek the assembly's modification of 
its reproach of Colden for his conduct in the Stamp Act troubles. In return 
for these services Colden was not to dissolve the assembly until the end of 
its seven-year life nor to veto whatever legislation his allies enacted. Al-
though Smith initially made some impression on Dunmore, the councilor 
soon concluded from his conduct that the Governor had no political 
perspicacity, that he had fallen under De Lancey influence, and that he was 
a "fool." Sabine, Memoirs of William Srnzth, pp. 67, 83-103. 
14 Governor Tryon, surmising himself to be in a strong position in 1773, 
declared his independence of the factions. He is reported to have told his 
council: "I wish to promote the Interest of the Province, and find it very 
disagreeable to me to be crossed by your Parties. . . . I will take no sides 
myself, and desire that I may not be dealt with or crossed for Party Purposes. 
If you will maintain Parties keep Party Spirit to yourselves." Ibid., p. 143. 
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ability to yoke the Governor did not break the De Lancey-
ites, their difficulties mounted and in early 1773 they met 
with a severe mauling at the hands of the Livingstons and 
the Governor. Not only did the De Lanceys lose bills in the 
assembly and council but they also incurred the enmity of 
some of their erstwhile supporters at the polls. Smith 
exulted at "the Abatement if not the Ruin of the Power of 
the De Lancey Family" and happily proclaimed that "the 
old Despotism was broke .... " The obituary was, however, 
premature.15 
Local politics in the fall of 1773 gave promise of generat-
ing high temperatures, but the quarrels over patronage were 
only the brief prelude to a cataclysm. The Livingstons and 
De Lanceys were hard at it, scrambling for leverage with 
which to convince Governor Tryon that he should appoint 
their aspirants to a number of posts. Although these mat-
ters greatly roiled political relations, they receded quickly 
into obscurity in late September when the ship Lord Dun-
more out of London docked in New York. Captain Lawrence 
brought information that the East India Company had 
chosen agents in New York for its tea, that it was shipping 
600 chests of tea to the city, that the New York, Boston, 
and Philadelphia shipmasters declined to load the tea, and 
that the consignees would pay the duty upon entry.16 
Reactions to the East India Company project differed and 
some weeks elapsed before opinion jelled sufficiently to 
permit leaders to reach a consensus. Among the steersmen 
of the inactive Sons of Liberty there were men who saw 
clearly what to do, but even these firebrands were tempor-
15 For the intricate details of these events see ibid., pp. 136-48. 
16Jbid., pp. 152-55, 156; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 
103-4. Smith prophetically recorded in his notes for October 13, 1773: "A 
New Flame is apparently kindling in America .... Our Domestic Parties will 
probably die, and be swallowed up in the general Opposition to the Parlia-
mentary Project of raising the Arm of Government by Revenue Laws." 
Quoted in Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels (copyright 1948 by 
Charles Scribner's Sons, reprinted by permission of the publishers), pp. 31-32. 
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arily impotentP Their greatest accomplishment, appar-
ently, was the initiation of correspondence with Boston and 
Philadelphia. Some of them also may have participated 
in the propaganda campaign assailing the East India Com-
pany, its agents, and Parliament, a campaign which acceler-
ated during October. A break in the passivity of the town 
occurred when unknown persons summoned a meeting of 
merchants on October 15 for the purpose of congratulating 
the New York captains who had refused to load their ships 
with cargoes of tea. Since there were not only many merch-
ants but also other citizens at this gathering, it was likely that 
Liberty Boys were present. The assemblage, however, did 
not engender momentum for further action. When action 
did erupt, as on November 5, it was peripheral and pre-
sumably under the direction of Isaac Sears and John Lamb.18 
Perhaps one source of the indecision in New York was 
the difference of opinion over the tax sections of the Tea 
Act. Some interpreted the statute to mean that the East India 
Company would not pay the three-pence import duty in 
America, while others contended that the company was 
liable for the tax. If the company was not subject to the 
duty, importation of the tea had no bearing on the consti-
tutional problem of taxation. It therefore would not be 
necessary to prevent the entry of the tea.19 Since the merch-
ants were at odds with each other, it was impracticable to 
17 Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, and John Lamb played prominent 
roles in the organization in the 1760's. 
18 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 104; Wertenbaker, Father 
Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 32. A street demonstration hanged William Kelley, 
New York merchant, in effigy because he had urged the East India Com-
pany to ship to Manhattan. Isaac N. P. Stokes, ed., The Iconography of 
Manhattan Island (6 vols.; New York, 1915-1928), IV, 841. 
19 Both Tryon and Abraham Lott, one of the tea agents, implied the 
existence of this division of opinion. Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Docu-
ments Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (15 vo1s.; 
Albany, N.Y., 1856), VIII, 400-1; Becker, The History of Political Parties, 
p. 105. 
Those merchants who did not purvey tea may have emphasized the 
possibility of untaxed tea and have opposed the taking of any steps to 
block the landing of the commodity. 
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obtain agreement on a course of action. Even though it was 
a matter of public record that Philadelphia in October 
had forced the resignation of its tea agents and had resolved 
against the entry and landing of the tea, these events seemed 
to have no appreciable impact upon affairs on the Hudson.20 
It was the Sons of Liberty who broke the log jam and set 
in motion the machinery of opposition. However, the Lib-
erty Boys, disagreeing among themselves over what policy 
to adopt, did not arrive at a decision until the third week 
in November. They sought to have the tea consignees ac-
knowledge the "general sense" of the inhabitants that the 
agents ought not receive or sell the tea. Secondly, the Sons 
demanded a pledge that the tea commissioners would not 
receive or sell the tea.21 The reply of the agents the next 
day was only partially satisfactory since it stipulated that 
they would not accept the cargo if it was "liable to the pay-
ment of the American duty." Unwilling to assume at this 
time the onus for illegal action, the Sons of Liberty did not 
respond to this note, but a pseudonymous broadside, No-
vember 27, threatened that "The Mohawks" would wreak 
their anger on anyone who dared to import India tea. 
Rather than mount a campaign to obtain an unqualified 
resignation of the tea commissioners, the Sons of Liberty 
prepared a statement of association with which to launch a 
boycott movement. The weakness of the association was 
the lack of sanctions with which to enforce its provisions; 
the associators covenanted to publish the names of violators 
as "enemies to their country." The most effective method 
of enforcement was to prevent the landing of the tea, since, 
once it was ashore, merchants might sell it as Dutch tea. 
Nevertheless, the association skirted the problem, limiting 
20 The pot in Boston, simmering much as it did in New York, came to a 
boil in early November. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, pp. 281·84; 
Labaree, Boston Tea Party, chap. vi. 
21 One of the Liberty Boys, "Brutus," published a statement of these 
events in May, 1774. See Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 253n. 
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itself to a resolution to employ "all lawful means to defeat 
the pernicious project."22 The activists hardly began to dis-
tribute copies of their association when they learned that 
the tea ship Nancy was on the high seas for New York and 
that the consignees were responsible for payment of the duty. 
Although this intelligence swept away some confusion, it 
thrust upon New Yorkers the pressing problem of what 
to do with the tea when it arrived. The Sons of Liberty 
lost no time in calling upon Messrs. White, Lott, and Booth, 
agents for the John Company, and bidding these gentle-
men to resign their commissions. The merchants promptly 
complied and apprised the Governor that they could not 
accept the shipment of tea. 23 Tryon and his council were 
already exploring the ramifications of the circumstances 
and on December 1 they concurred in a proposal to store 
the tea either in the fort or in the barracks.24 When the gov-
ernment unofficially disseminated its decision, the towns-
people displayed no antipathy to the policy. Unlikely 
though it was that Sears would acquiesce in this disposition 
of the matter, the Sons of Liberty did not protest until 
December 10. Having had a letter from Boston which as-
serted the determination of that town to prevent the landing 
of tea, a committee of the Liberty Boys visited William 
Smith to acquaint him with the opposition of the society 
22!bid.; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 105-7; Wertenbaker, 
Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 32. 
23 Their declination seems to be directly connected with Governor Try-
on's attitude. One of the consignees, Henry White, was a member of the 
council. In a council meeting with White in attendance, November 30, 
Tryon asserted that he would protect the cargo if the commissioners "cast 
it into his care." The next day the agents announced their resignations. 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 157. 
The Sons of Liberty included in their leadership Livingstons, De Lanceys, 
and the activist element as represented by Sears. Control of the society 
seems to have been in the hands of a coalition of the Livingstons and De 
Lanceys. Smith mentions a visit to him of some of the leaders: Philip 
Livingston, Isaac Low, Sears, McDougall, and Samuel and John Broome. 
Ibid. 
24 Smith did not differ on this matter with his opponents on the council. 
He noted that "the De Lanceys wait to see the Disposition of the People." 
Ibid. 
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to government intervention.25 Isaac Low, spokesman for the 
group, told Smith that the governors of Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania had declined to take possession of the tea, 
that if Tryon stood aside the unbroken cargo would retrace 
its path to Britain. Furthermore, if the Governor unloaded 
the tea, it would "not be safe." Therefore, the committee 
entreated Smith to advise Tryon to reverse his position. 
Low, vindicating this view, argued that admission of the 
tea would open the door to its sale and arouse the hostility 
of the other colonies.26 In conclusion the Liberty Boys of-
fered to guarantee the safety of the tea so long as it remained 
aboard ship. Smith assented only to pass on to Governor 
Tryon the sentiments of the group. 
The stand taken by the Governor may have inflamed 
discord within the Sons of Liberty and paralyzed the society. 
Sears and McDougall might well have viewed with alarm 
the sweep of events in Boston and Philadelphia, since New 
York lagged behind in public resolutions and spirited mass 
meetings.27 On the other hand, the Low-Livingston clique 
wished to avoid action that would stir up the inhabitants and 
wished to minimize the possibilities of a clash with the gov-
ernment. The disposition of the tea clearly was a vital ques-
tion. Therefore, the December 10 conversation with Smith 
25 The letter reached New York December 7. Since the Liberty Boys did 
nothing for three days, it is possible that they were quarreling among them-
selves over what to do. 
The committee consisted of Philip Livingston, Isaac Low, Sears, Mc-
Dougall, David Van Horne, and the Broomes. Ibid. 
26 Smith, privately, did not accept this explanation; he speculated that 
the change of front by the Liberty Boys arose from other causes: "their chief 
Motive was an Apprehension, that the Populace would change their present 
Sentiments and call for the Tea. They had Reason for these Suspicions 
(I) because the Subscription to an Association Paper printed and set on 
Foot the 30 Inst, proceeded slowly and second, because there was but little 
Tea in the Port, third, the two old Insurance Offices hung back in the 
Subscriptions, and have not yet signed the Association Paper .... " Ibid.; 
Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 107. 
27 Philadelphia through mass meetings had unequivocally refused to 
permit the landing of the tea. Word had come from Boston of the develop-
ing clash with the government over the disposition of the tea. Schlesinger, 
The Colonial Merchants, pp. 278-81, 285-87, 290-91; Sabine, Memoirs of 
William Smith, p. 157. 
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represented a retreat by the cautious element which shortly 
turned into a defeat. After speaking to Smith, Low broached 
the subject to other members of the council, but their re-
plies were unsatisfactory. One of the councilors, John 
Watts, went so far as to deny that there was any potential 
danger if the Governor stored the tea. This rebuff by the 
councilors apparently caused a reaction among other mem-
bers of the liberty club, because the organization sent its 
committee to Smith to retract the promise of protection for 
the tea ship. Smith seized the occasion to expostulate with 
his visitors against their attitude, but only Low and Livings-
ton displayed any sign of approval. McDougall threw a 
bombshell into the circle when he asked, "What if we pre-
vent the Landing, and kill [the] Gov[erno]r and all the 
Council?" Philip Livingston "started and said I won't think 
half so far." 28 The conversation terminated on this grim 
note. 
The subsequent conduct of the Sons of Liberty connoted 
a serious rift in the ranks of the society. Since the tea ship 
was due momentarily, the activists had to prod the club into 
motion; any delay would enable the Governor to carry 
through his plan without effective opposition. In the face 
of Tryon's insistence the use of force was the most likely 
alternative open to the activists; otherwise they would have 
to accept the landing and storage of the tea. It was one thing 
for Sears to advocate opposition but it was quite another 
matter for him to find the means of executi~g the policy. 
The outcome was a call for the citizens' rally at the City 
Hall on December 17. The meeting would fulfill a number 
of major prerequisites. The leaders would use this oppor-
tunity to nerve the populace to the task before them. It was 
essential to the Liberty Boys to procure some expression of 
mass approval before they undertook to prevent the unload-
28 Smith ended his notes at this point, so the reply, if any, is unknown. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
Introduction 
ing of the tea. Moreover, the rally would afford the leaders 
an opportunity to secure general approval of the boycott 
association. Lastly, the occasion would be right for con-
cordance in the creation of a city committee of correspond-
ence. The new organ would constitute an effective center 
for the direction of the opposition; a general committee 
rather than a Sons of Liberty committee would command 
greater Tespect and wield broader authority. Although the 
prudent members would not concur in the proposal for a 
rally, the activists plunged ahead without them.29 
The proceedings at the City Hall on December 17 were a 
resounding triumph for the activists but the Governor de-
served credit for inadvertent assistance. The large throng 
who gathered in spite of the inclement weather listened to 
the reading of several letters from Boston and Philadelphia 
and elected a standing committee of correspondence.30 Hav-
29 The extent of the disagreement in the Sons of Liberty is unknown but 
certain external events point to its existence. Although Sears and Mc-
Dougall received correspondence from Boston on December 7, the notice 
of the meeting did not appear until December 16; there were no ostensible 
reasons for the time lag. The conversation with Smith on December 13 re-
vealed the difference in outlook between Low and Livingston on one side 
and Sears and McDougall on the other. Furthermore, the advertisement 
of the meeting was in the name of "a committee of the association" rather 
than in the names of any officers of the Sons of Liberty or in the name of 
the organization itself. When the rally took place, John Lamb was chair-
man. This was unusual, since Lamb was a secondary leader and the im-
portance of the event warranted a chairman of reputation and prestige. 
Jn this connection of course, Philip Livingston or Isaac Low, both of them 
wealthy merchants, would have chaired the meeting precisely because they 
would have had a positive impact on the audience. The fact that they did 
not serve suggests that they rejected the proposal for a meeting. Smith tells 
us also that Low, Abraham Walton, and others refused to serve on the 
committee of correspondence which the assemblage elected. Finally, on 
December 20 Low and Walton circulated a petition which condemned 
efforts to prevent storage of the tea. Ibid., pp. 157-58, 159-60, 162; Becker, 
The History of Political Parties, pp. 106-8. 
30 Estimates of the size of the convocation ranged from 800 to 3,000. 
Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 254n.; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, pp. 161, 162. 
It is probable that Sears and McDougall had selected the fifteen nominees 
before the meeting. All the names are not known but among them were 
Isaac Low, Abraham Walton, Leonard Lispenard, Francis Lewis, David 
Van Horne, Sears, McDougall, John Broome, John Morin Scott, and per-
haps Philip Livingston and John Lamb. Ibid., p. 162; Dillon, The New York 
Triumvirate, p. 126. 
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ing disposed of this business, the chairman, John Lamb, 
read the November 29 association and asked the audience 
whether they assented to the resolutions contained in the 
declaration. There was no dissenting vote. It was at this 
juncture that the meeting took an unexpected turn that 
yielded large dividends to its sponsors. Responding to the 
potential danger that might arise from the assemblage, Gov-
ernor Tryon summoned his council into emergency ses-
sion to obtain its advice. The council unenthusiastically 
thrashed over several ideas, one of which was a proclamation 
to disperse, and at last settled on the dispatch of the mayor 
and recorder with a message from the Governor to the con-
course.31 Tryon promised to disburse no tea except with the 
consent of the council, or on the orders of the King or the 
East India Company; he exhorted the citizenry to behave 
with moderation; he expressed his intention to use no force; 
he concluded that he could "do no more nor less" and hoped 
the people would "neither disgrace their Gov[ erno ]r nor 
themselves by any imprudent violent & intemperate Be-
havior." The maneuver miscarried, however, because Mayor 
Hicks in the City Hall confined his relation to a bare-bones 
statement of the pledge not to dispense the stored tea, omit-
ting any mention of the earnest plea of duty and for moder-
ation. When the mayor compounded his blunder by asking, 
"Gentlemen, is this satisfactory?" there was a general cry 
of "No! No! No!" Lamb, snatching this golden opportunity, 
read aloud the text of the Tea Act, which he embroidered 
with a suitable commentary. When he completed his cri-
tique, Lamb posed a crucial question to the crowd. "Is it 
then your opinion, gentlemen, that the tea should be landed 
31 Smith urged the Governor to go before the meeting but De Lancey and 
Watts rejected the idea, proposing that either one of the council or the 
mayor be sent. Tryon was unreceptive to Smith's advice. Since the Governor 
was popular, it was possible that he might sway part of the multitude and 
thus divide the meeting. Although Smith counted on this result, his plan 
involved considerable risk of failure. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
pp. 159, 160. 
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under this circumstance?" So loud was the negative oral 
reply that no one demanded a division.32 Nailing down the 
last loose scantling, the chairman secured acceptance of a 
resolution in which the "spirited and patriotic conduct" of 
Philadelphia and Boston was "highly" commended.33 This 
concluded the rally. 
Subsequent events confirmed the victory of the Sears-
McDougall group. Although Isaac Low and Abraham Wal-
ton set out on December 20 to obtain pledges of nonviolence 
in the tea boycott, the absence of support caused them to 
abandon the project the next day.34 Simultaneously, intelli-
gence arrived from South Carolina that Charleston had 
resolved to block the admission of the tea and to return it 
to Britain.35 The most telling stroke, though, was the news 
of the Boston Tea Party; the information generated the 
currents of opinion that moved Tryon to reverse his posi-
tion.36 There followed a series of conferences between the 
32 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 254n.; Sabine, Memoirs of Wil-
liam Smith, pp. 160, 161; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 106-7. 
If Smith was a reliable reporter, the reader may accept his statement 
that a number of prominent people attended the affair because they an-
ticipated a vote in opposition to the storage of the tea. However, at the 
critical moment James Jauncey and John H. Cruger, major De Lancey 
leaders, did not request a division but complained that the form of the ques-
tion did not allow the people a true choice of alternatives. 
Smith also reported that he encountered Sears and McDougall at Sim-
mons Tavern the next evening and discussed the meeting with them. He 
inferred that they had not expected the decisive majority vote, that had 
they anticipated it, they would have demanded a division be made on the 
question. 
Perhaps there was an undercurrent of local politics present, since Smith 
speculated that "the De Lanceys rather fell in with the Multitude to save 
Interest and out of Pique to the Governor who is too Independently spirited 
for them." Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 162. 
33 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 254n. 
34 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 107-8. 
35 Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 163; Schlesinger, The Colonial 
Merchants, pp. 295-96. Smith on December 20 stated that the news "greatly 
influences" the town. 
36 It is difficult to decide whether Smith derived his narration of this 
episode from firsthand knowledge or hearsay. He wrote that "the Boston 
News astonished the Town ... those who were for storing it seem most 
disposed to intreat the Govr. to change his Resolutions for Fear of the 
Multitude." Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 163. 
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Governor and several prominent persons in which Tryon 
made it clear that he was quite willing to forgo storage of 
the tea but that he was anxious to keep his skirts clean and 
his reputation untarnished with the ministry in London. 
The upshot of this intricate maneuvering was a design by 
which the consignees would stop the tea ship at Sandy Hook, 
inform Captain Lockyer of the Nancy of the menacing situ-
ation in town, advise him to depart forthwith, and furnish 
him with provisions at the Hook. Although Governor Tryon 
did not wish to publicize his change of front, Captain 
Ayscough of the warship Swan1 a "Blab Tongue," let the 
word slip out and Rivington printed it in his newspaper. 
The Governor was "in great Wrath" but the townsfolk 
approved of the executive retreat. Henry White and the 
other agents sent the letter of advice to Sandy Hook for 
delivery to the Nancy when Captain Lockyer entered the 
Lower Bay. So the city, confident that it had escaped a 
clash, settled down to await the tea ship.37 
The next three months were relatively calm and politics 
subsided into their customary channels. The legislature sat 
in these months and devoted much time to quarreling over 
local problems. One of the features of this legislative ses-
sion was a tendency of the Livingstons to lend aid to the 
Governor in order to embarrass the De Lanceys.38 On the 
whole, the De Lancey faction lost ground; it suffered the 
defection of the Jauncey family interest when a squabble 
arose over the appointment of James Jauncey, Jr., as master 
37 Ibid., pp. 163-66; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 108. Smith 
explained Tryon's conduct in this manner: "He is afraid of losing Popu-
larity & yet must be hurt at being obliged to drop his high Tone. If he 
can make the Agents his Instruments, & get the Ship away privately, his 
Credit will be saved on both sides of the Water; unless he has revealed him-
self too far to Capt. Ayscough as I think he has-for White says-Some 
(he means the DeLanceys) sneer & taunt with a What! all this Hauteur 
come to Nothing!" 
Henry White persuaded Smith to draft the consignee's letter to Captain 
Lockyer. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 165-66. 
3Blbid., p. 176. 
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of the rolls.39 Neither faction exhibited any pronounced 
alterations as a consequence of the imperial dispute; this 
quarrel had not yet become the touchstone of politics. 
The first third of spring had almost elapsed before the 
suspense in New York ended. Captain Lockyer hove to at 
Sandy Hook on April 18, twelve days after Governor Tryon 
took ship for Britain.40 The shipmaster, having read the 
communication from the consignees, did not choose to 
challenge the authority of the committee of correspondence, 
but he traveled to Manhattan in the pilot boat to arrange 
for provisions and for an explicit declination by the tea 
agents to accept the cargo.H Lockyer completed his arrange-
ment under the watchful eye of the committee while an 
observational sloop maintained surveillance over the Nancy 
at the Hook. Determined to impress upon British officialdom 
the magnitude of the opposition to the Tea Act, the com-
mittee of correspondence published the departure date of 
the captain and bade the citizenry be on hand April 23 to 
give him a rousing send-off. Although New York was on 
the verge of conforming to the pattern set by Philadelphia, 
an unexpected variable disrupted the proceedings.42 
New York had its tea party not because the committee of 
correspondence planned it but because a brash shipmaster 
chose to gamble that he could outwit the committee. Since 
the tea did not appear on the master's bills of lading, the 
only evidence of its existence was in the cargo's customs 
certificates of which those for the tea the captain concealed. 
39/bid., pp. 174-79. 
Smith was extremely sanguine about the DeLancey losses: "The De 
Lancey Party are so broken to pieces out of Doors, that a new Election 
would bring an independt. Sett of People at least for the City." Ibid., p. 176. 
40 Storms delayed the ship's arrival and dealt the vessel some hard blows. 
Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 108; Wertenbaker, Father 
Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 33. 
41 Lockyer needed evidence with which to defend in Britain his failure to 
deliver his cargo. 
42 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 249-50; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, pp. 108-9; Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 33. 
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However, Captain James Chambers, who arrived with the. 
London on April 22, underestimated his opponents; more 
specifically, he did not know that the committee possessed 
advices which informed it of the tea aboard his ship.43 Al-
though a committee paid a visit to the London at the Hook 
and searched through the cockets of the captain, it did not 
find any for tea. When the observers apprised Chambers 
of the information that they had, he still insisted that he 
had no tea in his cargo. Chambers, upon docking, submitted 
to another examination and maintained that there was none 
of the vile stuff aboard. Only when his interrogators threat-
ened to open "every package" did he break down and pro-
duce the cockets for the tea. Taken with the ship's owners 
before the committee of correspondence, Captain Chambers 
explained that he had laded the tea on his private account. 
By his conduct in New York the master of the London 
thrust a bouquet of thorns into the hands of the commit-
tee. Under normal circumstances owners or consignees of 
goods paid the customs duties within twenty days of entry or 
officials might seize the vessel.44 Furthermore, in order to 
depart, a ship needed a permit from the governor which was 
usually contingent upon clearance from customs. The own-
ers of the London were in a fair way to lose their whole 
lading even though they had no part in the importation of 
the tea; either customs would take the ship or the com-
mittee would compel it to depart. Having determined not 
to allow the landing of the tea, the committee of correspond-
ence deliberated over two alternatives. One, the members 
could demand that Chambers procure from Acting Gov-
ernor Colden the necessary leave to sail, or two, they could 
destroy the tea.45 It was ironical that the destruction of the 
43 The Philadelphia committee forwarded detailed data which one of its 
captains obtained from customs records in London. Secondly, Captain 
Lawrence docked in New York April 20 and passed on to the committee 
details which confirmed the Philadelphia intelligence. Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., I, 249; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 109. 
44 Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, pp. 286-87. 
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tea would protect the investment of the owners in their 
freight. The committee, "after the most mature delibera-
tion," communicated "the whole state of the matter" to the 
crowd that had assembled on the wharf near the London.46 
Although the "Mohawks" bore the responsibility for remov-
ing the tea, the "thousands" on the dock chafed at the in-
action and about eight o'clock some of them went aboard 
the vessel to seize the tea.47 Diligent labor in two hours 
dispatched the contents of eighteen boxes of tea into the 
waters of the harbor; an untold number of spectators 
carted the empty wooden containers to the Merchants Coffee 
House where a bonfire consumed them.48 Presumably there 
was some hue and cry against Chambers at the completion 
of the party "and it was not without some risk of his life 
that he escaped."49 
The city participated in the last act of the drama on 
the next morning when all the church bells summoned the 
citizenry to witness the departure of Captain Lockyer. 
"Many Thousands" watched and cheered, a band played 
"God Save the King," and ships' cannon fired as the hapless 
45 Since Colden was the bete noire of the Stamp Act proceedings in 1766 
and had shown no sign of changed political sentiment since then, there 
was little to hope for in that quarter. 
Colden later repeated hearsay, May 4, that the people particularly re-
sented the "duplicity" of Chambers because he claimed credit previously 
for being the first New York captain to reject the East India Company's offer 
of tea. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 249; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, p. 109; Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, p. 294. 
46 The phraseology of this contemporary newspaper account suggests that 
the committee itself took no specific decision to destroy the cargo but acted 
according to a prearranged scheme. The communication of information to 
the crowd was the signal for the activists to take the initiative. Smith re-
corded in his notes of December 22, 1773, the discovery "by Hints" that 
Sears, McDougall, et al. were meeting with mechanics in the pubs "to con-
cert Measures for the Day of the Shipp's Arrival." The parallel with Boston 
is too close to be coincidental. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 250; 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 163. 
47 This is Smith's report of the numbers on the docks. Ibid., p. 185. 
48 Smith said the value of the tea was £2,000. The raiders did not dam-
age any other portion of the cargo. Ibid. 
49 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 250; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, pp. 109-10; Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, 
pp. 33-34. 
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captain took leave of the town aboard the pilot boat. Al-
though there was shouting for Captain Chambers, that 
worthy, abandoning his command, was preceding Lockyer 
to the Nancy. The trials of Lockyer, however, were not 
quite over. The crew of the Nancy had strong objections to 
departing without shore leave and set about constructing 
a raft with which to jump ship. The captain with the aid 
of the picket sloop put an end to the plot and the ship stood 
out to sea on April 24.50 
An aftermath of the tea party was the emergence of the 
imperial dispute as a salient ingredient of New York fac-
tional politics. The tea affair was a catalyst which jolted 
some party associates into a realization that quarrels with 
the British ministry might lead to the generation of partisan 
capital for an alert leadership. Symptoms of this reappraisal 
appeared in the press shortly after the departure of the 
Nancy.51 Although the story of the transactions of the past 
week which the Gazette printed was a factual, anonymous 
piece, by implication it placed credit for the successful out-
come of the tea incident on the shoulders of the committee 
of correspondence. Since the De Lanceyites had dissociated 
themselves from the committee whereas John Morin Scott 
and perhaps Philip Livingston had remained on it, the 
Livingstons would pluck the fruit of the committee action. 52 
The De Lancey reaction to the committee account was swift; 
an anonymous writer ridiculed the whole affair, closing his 
diatribe with a veiled assault on the Livingstons. He not 
only attributed the narrative to "party relations" but also 
50 The phrase "Many Thousands" is Smith's. Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 185; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. llO; Wertenbaker, 
Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 34. 
51 The committee of correspondence, apparently as a means of informing 
the urban residents and other citizens of the colony, sent an anonymous 
relation of the preceding events to the New-York Gazette and Weekly 
Mercury (hereinafter cited as N.Y.G.). It appeared in the April 25, 1773 
issue; it is also in Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, pp. 249-51. 
52 See above, p. 15, n. 30. 
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sought to identify the Livingstons with "Coblers and Tail-
ors" by professing that tradesmen held "the power of direct-
ing the loyal and 'sensible' inhabitants of the city and 
Province .... "53 The objective of the author was to arouse 
among the merchants apprehension of the mechanics by 
raising a bogey and so to reduce mercantile attachment to 
the committee of correspondence. 
Although the targets of these taunts did not suffer them to 
pass unchallenged, two weeks elapsed before the defenders 
mounted their counterattack. Writing under the pseudonym 
"Brutus," one of them retorted with a lengthy relation of 
the December and April occurrences.54 When he disposed of 
these matters, "Brutus" shifted his fire to partisan politics. 
He warned his readers against those "who are well known 
to excite sedition, or countenance a suppression of the 
laudable spirit of liberty alternately .... " There were those, 
he went on, "who ever wear two faces; one to recommend 
them to ministerial favour, another to beguile the sons of 
liberty into bondage. . . . " These accusations were not 
riddles; they were specific characterizations of the De Lancey-
53 The reference to party relations was to the Livingstons since the com-
mittee nominally was not linked to the factions. Rivington's New-York 
Gazetteer, April 28, 1773 (hereinafter cited as Riv. Gaz.) and Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., I, 25ln. 
This letter has special importance because historians have seen in it a 
reflection of the fears of the wealthy at the interference of the poorer classes 
in politics. However, this interpretation does violence to the context of 
the letter. After all, it was common knowledge to contemporaries that the 
committee of fifteen consisted of merchants and lawyers rather than me-
chanics, that the committee rather than the mechanics directed the events 
of April 19-23, that the mechanics had played a supporting role in politics 
at least since 1765. Cf. Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. llO-ll; 
Alexander, Revolutionary Conservative: james Duane of New York, p. 97; 
Flick, History of New York, Ill, 225. 
The anonymous writer's phrase, "Coblers and Tailors," perhaps was a 
reference to individuals of these trades who led in the dumping of the tea 
or who were close associates of Sears. For example, John Lasher, a cobbler, 
was a member of the Committee of Mechanics. Jones, History of New York 
During the Revolutionary War, I, 101. 
54Riv. Gaz., May 12, 1773, and Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 
25ln.·258n. 
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ites with which many townspeople were familiar.55 "Brutus" 
declined to name these insidious foes because, he said, 
"their persons and their threadbare system of politics are 
well known. . . ."56 The polemicist closed his peroration 
with a thinly disguised reference to the De Lanceys: "if they 
do not alter their measures, incapable as they now must ap-
pear to lead this Colony, they must lose all credit with Gov-
ernment .... "57 
After the news of the British coercive acts hit New York 
on May 11, factional bickering over the tea party gave way 
to "heats" of a more serious order. Parliament in effect 
sealed the port of Boston and deprived Massachusetts of 
some of its powers of self-government. Confusion and divi-
sion reigned in New York in reaction to the legislation, 
confusion and division which stemmed partly from the 
severity of the ministerial measures. The prior experience 
with Parliament in 1766 and 1769 encouraged expectation 
of British concessions to the colonials; the coercive acts were 
a fearful shock. Opinions among the De Lanceys seemed to 
run the spectrum from those who contended that Boston 
had only to pay for the tea to find relief to those like Oliver 
De Lancey who insisted upon opposition to the acts. Al-
though sentiment among the Livingstons was unclear, 
there was no uncertainty among the Liberty Boys. Sears and 
McDougall not only condemned the laws but also expounded 
the necessity for the institution of a nonimportation policy.58 
55 Smith wrote of the De Lanceys in similar vein. Sabine, Memoirs of 
William Smith, pp. 47, 48, 60, 69, 95, 96, 97, 103, 141, 162. 
56 Perhaps the writer, if it was not McDougall himself, recalled Mc-
Dougall's arrest and indictment in 1770 on charges of seditious libel. Since 
De Lancey leaders were officeholders, publication of their names in this 
form was open to a charge of seditious libel of the government. On Me· 
Dougall's affair see Leonard ,V. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of 
Speech and Press in Early American History (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 79-85. 
57 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 258n. 
58 Roger J. Champagne, "The Sons of Liberty and the Aristocracy in 
New York Politics, 1765-1790" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1960), p. 316; Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, pp. 
34-35. 
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Anxious conferences of faction leaders and their hench-
men were the order of the day but it was the Liberty Boys-
Livingston coalition which sparked the protest movement.59 
Since a major aim of the Sears leadership was the imposi-
tion of an embargo on purchases from Great Britain, it was 
essential to have the wholehearted cooperation of the merch-
ant community. Collaboration of the economic elite with 
the existing committee of correspondence was highly un-
likely because most of the merchants were De Lancey ad-
herents. Set against these relationships, the problem ap-
peared to be most susceptible of solution by the organiza-
tion of a committee of merchants. Furthermore, the forma-
tion of this committee tied in with another related aim of 
the activists, that of stimulating a call for an intercolonial 
congress to grapple with the current discord. 60 Sears on 
May 14 hammered out a compact with the drygoods merch-
ants whereby the latter summoned the merchants to a meet-
ing on May 16.61 
59 It took the Sears-Livingston committee of correspondence three days 
to iron out its differences and agree on a policy. It was not until May 14 
that the group opened transactions with the merchants. Champagne, "The 
Sons of Liberty," pp. 315-16. 
60 The collapse of the last commercial boycott in 1769-1770 underscored 
the need for intercolonial cooperation as the best means of achieving an 
effective embargo. The proposal for a colonial congress would best come 
from a committee of merchants rather than from a minority committee 
of correspondence. 
61 There were important implications in the strategy of Sears and Mc-
DougalL The decision to found a merchants' committee as the key agency 
of the protest movement implied relinquishment of any aspiration by the 
Sons of Liberty to sole control of the organization. The Sons were too weak 
to win dominance in a merchant group. The other implication was the 
continuation of the alliance with the Livingstons as the device by which the 
Sons might influence the committee. Ibid., pp. 317-18. 
The May 16 rally was for the purpose of choosing a committee of corres-
pondence, of adopting a policy of nonimportation vis-a-vis Britain, of em-
bargoing the shipment of lumber products to the British West Indies, and 
of calling a colonial congress. Since the third item was aimed at squeezing 
the powerful sugar interests, it was odd that the group singled out only 
lumber. The inclusion of provisions, flour, meat, and fish would have greatly 
increased the pressure on the islands but perhaps these commodities were 
shipped mainly in the fall after the harvests whereas timber cargoes were 
mostly made up in the spring and summer. Ibid., p. 317; Wertenbaker, 
Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 35; Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, 
pp. 327-28. 
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When the gathering terminated its deliberations on May 
16, the outcome of the debates was not what the Sears-
Livingston leadership had anticipated. Although the De 
Lanceys did not inaugurate any action, the advertisement of 
the May 16 meeting galvanized them into strenuous exertion 
to insure a large turnout of their supporters. Their perturb-
ation had its roots in their fear of the potential application of 
the Boston Port Act to New York as well as in narrower 
partisan objectives.62 Their numerical preponderance en-
abled the Church party to place Isaac Low, a wealthy merch-
ant, in the chair. Having carried a motion to establish a 
committee of correspondence, the assemblage wrangled over 
the size of their committee. Sears and McDougall contended 
for a unit of fifteen or twenty-one members but the opposi-
tion advocated and obtained a fifty-member committee.63 
Taking up the business of nominations, the factions bickered 
hotly over the composition of the committee. When the 
dust settled, the slate of fifty nominees reflected the numer-
ical superiority of the De Lanceys. That faction won a large 
majority on the ticket but the Sears-LivingSton alliance 
refused to accept the results as final. 64 Although this was 
62 Although the De Lanceys did not approve of the rigorous Lord North 
policies, neither did they wish to have the Sears-Livingston combine drive 
a new committee to "extremities" as it had driven the committee of corres-
pondence in April. Perhaps the Church party would have preferred to do 
nothing except through the legislature but the excitement was such that 
inactivity for the leadership was impracticable. Finally, as a political interest 
group the De Lanceyites could not afford to permit the Presbyterian party 
to reap future good will from their leadership of a new committee. Har-
rington, The New York Merchant, p. 347; Wertenbaker, Father Knicker-
bocker Rebels, p. 36; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. Ill; 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 186; Colden to Dartmouth, June I, 
1774, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 433. 
63 Perhaps the objective in the dispute was the relationship of attendance 
to control. The coalition wanted a small committee because its members 
were apt to attend faithfully and so win dominance by perseverance. The 
De Lanceys desired a large committee in which they would have an over-
whelming majority in order that their members might absent themselves 
without endangering a De Lancey majority. See Smith's comment on the 
merchants' fear of a small committee. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
p. 186. 
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primarily a committee of merchants, both factions desired 
a formal expression of approval of the nominations by the 
townfolk and agreed upon a general meeting for this pur-
pose on May 19.65 
An unwonted component obtruded itself into political 
affairs at this juncture. Isaac Sears and Alexander Mc-
Dougall either contrived the formation of a committee of 
mechanics or joined forces with a recently founded me-
chanics organ in order to have a counterpoise for use against 
the De Lancey majority on the Committee of Fifty.66 Mc-
Dougall and Sears persuaded the mechanics, if persuasion 
was necessary, to prepare a rival ticket of twenty-five which 
they drew mostly from the list of fifty. 67 Armed with this 
slate, the leaders prepared to enter the lists again the next 
day in spite of the fact that some of the Livingstons were 
64 A correlation of the subsequent voting record of the committee and 
Becker's analysis of members who became loyalists indicates that the De 
Lanceys numbered thirty-seven and the Livingstons fourteen. The De 
Lanceys included Isaac Low, John De Lancey, James Jauncey, John Jay, 
·william and Abraham Walton, James Duane, John Alsop, and Alexander 
Wallace. Some of the Livingstons were Philip and Peter Van Brugh Liv-
ingston, Sears, McDougall, and Leonard Lispenard. Force, American Archives, 
4th ser., I, 294-321; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. ll6, n.16. 
65 Champagne, "The Sons of Liberty," pp. 318-20; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, pp. ll3-15. There is no record of a decision on the em-
bargo question. 
66 The first notice of the new organ is in the records of the Committee 
of Fifty; the committee received a Jetter from the Committee of Mechanics 
on May 23, 1774. However, William Smith noted a meeting of "Mechanics" 
on May 18 to consider the nominees of May 16. If Sears and McDougall 
did not create the Committee of Mechanics, its formation was an important 
declaration of political independence by the craftsmen who heretofore 
were content either to align themselves with one of the factions or to accept 
the leadership of a Sears or McDougall. This committee, therefore, was 
not a continuation of the Sons of Liberty which was in the hands of the 
merchants. When Sears, McDougall, and John Lamb went their separate 
ways, mechanics led the Committee of Mechanics. Ibid., p. 120 and n.23; 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 186, 187. 
67 The list is in Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. Jl3, n. 4. The 
ticket contained eleven men who were Livingstonians, three whose politics 
are unknown, and eleven who were De Lanceyites. Two of the twenty-five, 
Francis Lewis and John Aspinwall, were not among the original fifty. 
The De Lanceys on May 19 added Lewis to the slate, bringing the com-
mittee total to fifty-one. A surprising facet of the ticket of the mechanics 
is the omission of Philip Livingston. 
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apparently unwilling to renew the battle of nominees.68 
A "great concourse" thronged the Royal Exchange on May 
19 in preparation for the decisive engagement. Low again 
chaired the meeting and spoke at length on the need for 
"unanimity" and an end to "party distinctions, feuds and 
animosities."69 The exact strength of each side is unknown 
but the De Lanceys carried the day on the vital question of 
nominations.70 However, the victors threw a crumb to the 
vanquished by adding merchant Francis Lewis, a Livings-
tonian, to the committee as member fifty-one. Sears, be-
fore the disruptions which the nominations engendered, 
endeavored to maneuver the De Lanceys into formal dis-
cussion of the question of nonimportation. Low and others 
managed to stifle the attempt, although some speakers did 
give vent to ideas which disturbed the elite before the chair 
cut them of£.71 These events consummated the defeat of the 
68 William Smith, for example, argued extensively with McDougall, urg-
ing him to drop the issue and not to dabble with the idea of employing 
force to prevent importations. Presumably Smith anticipated that the ac-
tivists would use the Committee of Mechanics to intimidate the importers. 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 186, 187. 
69 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 115; Wertenbaker, Father 
Knickerbocker Rebels, pp. 36-37. 
Although the appeal for unity meant unity on De Lancey terms, the 
dangers inherent in disunity at this stage of events were very real. Smith 
was also fearful of disunity. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 187. 
70 The De Lanceyites won over the cartmen and some of the craftsmen, 
thus depriving the Livingstons of considerable strength. Ibid. 
Precisely what was decided at the meeting is difficult to discern. There 
were rabid speeches, disorders on the floor, and the people did not vote 
on the two tickets. Low at the height of the confusion proposed a division 
of the audience so that an actual count of the votes might be taken. Sears, 
for reasons unknown, rejected this procedure; perhaps he was unsure of his 
votes. "There was such an Uproar, that it was agreed to take the Voices 
of the Citizens by Subscription," Smith noted in his memoirs. Actually the 
antagonists compromised on this suggested canvass of the city but they did 
not execute the compromise. The negotiations between the two parties 
broke down over the mechanics of the balloting. The consequence was 
that the De Lanceys announced in the press that the meeting "confirmed" 
the slate of fifty-one. Gouverneur Morris "confirmed" the confirmation when 
he wrote on May 20 an account of these events to a friend. "We have 
appointed a Committee," he said, "or rather we have nominated one." 
Nonetheless, whether nominated only or elected, thereafter the Fifty-One 
wielded unchallenged authority. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 
342; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 187; Champagne, "The Sons of 
Liberty," pp. 321-22. 
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activists and the Livingstons but they also set the stage for 
the further development of illegal opposition to the crown.72 
Both factions desired the formation of a committee and, 
as it turned out, both initially sought to use the committee 
for the same purpose, to promote an intercolonial congress. 
Although Sears and McDougall primarily stressed the non-
importation proposal, their defeat at the May 19 meeting 
caused them to shunt aside the embargo idea and accept 
the priority of an intercolonial conference.73 Having grasped 
the reins of the Committee of Fifty-One, the De Lanceyites 
pondered over the direction which the committee should 
take. These men did not approve of the measures of Lord 
North but neither could they stomach commercial retalia-
tion, or at least they could not abide it if the boycott were to 
be the result of the unilateral decision of each colony. Never-
71 A clue to the content of the remarks of the speakers is in the letter of 
Morris to Penn, May 20, 1774: "[the citizens] fairly contended about the 
future forms of our Government, whether it should be founded upon aristo-
cratic or democratic principles." The contention over "aristocratic or demo-
cratic principles" might have arisen out of criticism of the fact that a very 
large majority of the Fifty-One were very wealthy, were the "gentry_" 
Morris himself depicted the Fifty-One as a "committee of patricians." A 
possible remedy for this condition was the ticket which Sears proposed 
since it proportionately reduced the number of very wealthy and increased 
the weight of the less affluent merchants. If this were true, Morris was not 
describing a debate in which the central question was rule by an elite or 
rule by all the people; rather he was characterizing contention in which the 
central question was rule by an elite or rule by the small propertyholders. 
There was still another context into which the description of the gentle-
man from Westchester might have fitted. Argument over nonimportation 
might have touched upon the right of an illegal body, the Fifty-One, to 
dispose of the property of the merchants. "Brutus" expounded one approach 
to this problem in his defense of the tea party: "when individuals ... will 
risk their property in the cause of despotism, or for the sake of sordid and 
flagitious profit, no good member of society will hesitate to pronounce, 
that private interest falls a just sacrifice to public utility." Since "public 
utility" took precedence over the right of private property, in a sense 
"aristocratic" values gave way to "democratic" values. Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., I, 258, 342-
72 Sears and McDougall and the Committee of Mechanics resigned them-
selves to their defeat and acce~;>ted De Lancey control of the Fifty-One. 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Sm1th, p. 187; Champagne, "The Sons of Lib-
erty," pp. 322-24. 
73 In a letter to Samuel Adams, May 15, 1774, Sears and McDougall 
espoused a commercial embargo under the direction of a continental con-
gress_ Stokes, The Iconography of Manhattan Island, IV, 853. 
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theless, relentless pressures were accumulating which would 
not permit the De Lanceys to obstruct endlessly committee 
action. Since the ministry, unlike its legislative action in 
1766 and 1768, was employing physical suasion against the 
colonies, New York could not close its eyes to the plight of 
Boston. It was also highly unlikely that the Livingston-
Mechanics coalition would accede to the abandonment of 
Massachusetts without vociferous and vigorous opposition. 
Another consideration for the De Lancey leaders was the 
impact of their tactics on the electorate, since the life of the 
current general assembly would expire in early 1776 and 
the governor would issue writs for elections to the new 
legislature. There was in addition to the foregoing matters 
a sphere of action over which the New Yorkers had no 
control but about which they manifested great concern. 
Passivity in New York would not insure passivity among 
the other colonies; indeed, it was probable that the other 
provinces would hasten to the aid of Massachusetts and 
move in the direction of the formation of an association. 
Having mulled over these affairs, the De Lanceyites fastened 
on the convocation of an interprovincial parley as the least 
objectionable alternative. This decision, risky though it 
was, did not surrender the De Lancey faction's freedom to 
maneuver, since the York delegates to a continental as-
semblage might employ their parliamentary skill in efforts 
to block the adoption of a nonimportation resolution.74 
When the Committee of Fifty-One met in May and June, 
the worst fears of the Livingstons and activists that the De 
Lancey faction would dominate the new organ were not 
realized. Whatever differences arose between the factions, 
the Livingstons might have regarded the conduct of the 
committee as a vindication of their position on the quarrel 
with Britain. A consensus in the matter of a congress ma-
terialized quickly in the course of the first session of the 
74 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 117-19. 
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Fifty-One and on the same day the members easily trans-
formed this sentiment into a formal proposal to Boston.75 
Awaiting a commitment from the New England entrepot, 
the activists neither pressed for committee adoption of non-
importation nor presented resolutions in condemnation of 
the Coercive Acts. Meanwhile, Sears and McDougall were 
advising Samuel Adams: "Be firm & prudent & a little time 
will effect your Salvation .... "76 However, the harmony 
dissolved when the Massachusetts acceptance of the New 
York suggestion of a congress arrived in the last week of 
June. 
Although the members of the Committee of Fifty-One 
could not have foreseen it, their meeting of June 27 opened 
a month-long period of protracted debate and maneuvering 
over the selection of the delegates to the Continental Con-
gress in Philadelphia. There were two central issues about 
which all others tended to circumvolve. One of these two 
questions was the composition of the continental delega-
tion; the other was the problem of a committee statement 
on the Coercive Acts. The Livingston allies, conscious of 
their minority status in the committee, strove to secure a 
majority of the mission to Philadelphia by insisting on the 
right of the Committee of Mechanics to approve the nomi-
nations by the Fifty-One.77 Even though the De Lanceyites 
triumphed in the Fifty-One and nominated Low, John 
Alsop, James Duane, John Jay, and Philip Livingston,78 
75 The committee proposition was stronger than that of Sears and Mc-
Dougall because it suggested a conference of deputies from the provinces 
whereas the activists recommended a meeting of deputies from the port 
committees of correspondence. Adherence to the former plan would auto-
matically commit the rural population to the support of the congressional 
program and would make possible effective enforcement of that body's 
policies. 
76 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 295-307; Stokes, The Iconography 
of Manhattan Island, IV, 857. 
77 The Mechanics, under the influence of Sears and McDougall, would 
have demanded candidates for whom these two activists had striven in the 
meetings of the Fifty-One. 
78 Alsop and Livingston were merchants; Jay and Duane were lawyers. 
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the activists carried the battle to the public. All their efforts, 
including the promulgation of a rival slate by the Com-
mittee of Mechanics, were unavailing.79 After McDougall 
gave up the struggle, the opposition, except for a splinter 
group, collapsed on July 25.80 An election on July 28 con-
firmed the victory of the De Lanceys. 81 
The second core question, one which split the committee, 
was the matter of a public statement on the British min-
istry's treatment of Massachusetts. Defeat within the Com-
mittee of Fifty-One on the matter of the candidates for the 
Continental Congress may have provoked the Livingstonians 
to a reconsideration of their role in the committee and of 
their objectives. Two days later, on July 6, the activists 
held a mass meeting at which McDougall presided and at 
which the organizers obtained approval of a series of reso-
lutions on the Boston Port Act. 82 Although the last of these 
79 The Mechanics retained Low, Livingston, and Jay on their ticket but 
substituted McDougall and Leonard Lispenard for Alsop and Duane. 
Although the encounter of the De Lanceys with the Mechanics began over 
candidates, it spread quickly into areas of voting procedures and qualifica-
tions. The merchants reluctantly agreed to a canvass of each ward by a 
team of merchants and mechanics as well as to an extension of the ballot 
to taxpayers. Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 133. 
80 The diehards seem to have been a fraction of the Committee of 
Mechanics and included Abraham Brasher, Theophilus Anthony, Francis 
Van Dyck, Jeremiah Platt, and Christopher Duyckinck. Whether Sears 
was one of them is problematical. This group hauled down its flag too, but 
only after it won a significant concession from the De Lancey candidates. 
It threatened to support a rival ticket unless the candidates promised to 
work in Congress for a nonimportation agreement. Although the com-
mittee slate would not bind itself in this fashion, it published a statement 
in which the signatories declared that they believed in the efficacy of an 
embargo as a means of exerting pressure on Britain. Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., I, 319; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 
134-35. 
81 The intricate details and a dissimilar interpretation of this fray over the 
candidates are in ibid., chap. v. 
82 There were nine resolves: (1) that the Port Act is "oppressive" and 
"unconstitutional"; (2) that "any attack" on the liberties of "any of our 
sister Colonies" is an attack on all; (3) that "shutting up" any port to 
"exact" taxation is "highly unconstitutional"; (4) that if "principal" col-
onies enter into nonimportation from and nonexportation to Britain, they 
will preserve the liberties of all; (5) that New York deputies to the Con-
tinental Congress are instructed to enter nonimportation agreements with 
other colonies; (6) that this meeting will obey all of Congress's resolu-
tions; (7) that each county send deputies to a provincial convention in order 
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statements directed the Committee of Fifty-One to carry 
the propositions into execution, that organ at its session of 
July 7 emphatically denounced the rally as "calculated to 
throw an odium upon this Committee .... "83 The De 
Lanceys, notwithstanding their disavowal of the public 
proceedings, yielded to this pressure and adopted a motion 
to constitute a committee to draft resolves on the Port 
Act. 84 A surprise motion by the De Lanceys at the close of 
the meeting to publish the previously adopted censure reso-
lution carried and the Livingstonians departed from the hall 
in a rage.85 Promptly resigning from the Committee of 
Fifty-One, the Livingstons publicly vindicated their be-
havior on the ground that the committee's disclaimer of the 
July 6 meeting proclaimed both at home and abroad the 
to choose delegates to the Continental Congress or that the counties approve 
the city's choices; (8) that money be raised for the relief of Boston's poor; 
(9) that the city Committee of Fifty-One be instructed to carry out these 
resolves. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 312-13. 
83Ibid., p. 311. 
84 The De Lanceys even permitted Sears and McDougall to be on the 
drafting committee. Ibid., p. 312. 
85 The precise nature of the incident is not clear. Apparently the timing 
of the motion was deliberate, since a move to publish ordinarily would be 
raised immediately after the adoption of the relevant resolve. The Liv-
ingstonians alleged that McEvers presented his motion after the session 
ostensibly ended and eight members had left the chamber. Whereas 30 
votes were cast on prior motions that evening, only 22 were recorded for 
this ballot. The tally was 13 to 9. Later the De Lanceys did not deny that 
eight men left before McEvers took the floor. Ibid., pp. 311-12, 313-14; 
Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 126-27 and n.42. 
When both parties aired their explanations of the affair in print, they 
adverted to their motivation and illumined an important aspect of fac-
tional politics. The statements of both sides indicate that the leaders were 
acting with one eye on Britain. Charles McEvers, in the course of the dis-
cussion on his motion to print the censure, justifying his maneuver, said 
that the activists published the July 6 rally's resolutions because they knew 
someone would transmit them to London. The speaker was implying that 
the ministry would interpret the news as a demonstration of the unity of the 
people and the Committee of Fifty-One in opposition to the Boston Port 
Act. Therefore, McEvers declared, the committee must make public its 
disavowal of the July 6 proceedings in order that it "might be sent home 
by the packet."' Consequently, the British government would not only see 
that the fractious opposition did not control New York but also would 
understand that the De Lanceys did not engage in sedition or treason. 
The Livingstons by implication admitted their desire to flaunt the united 
opposition of the colony to the Port Act in the face of Lord North. Force, 
American Archives, 4th ser., I, 313-14. 
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existence of grave dissension in New York.86 Perhaps the 
unspoken rationale in this situation was more important 
than the spoken. The practical significance of the motion 
to print the repudiation was that the Livingstons could not 
remain on the committee and mobilize the citizenry to re-
verse their defeats by the De Lancey majority. The tug 
of war between the De Lanceys and Livingstons over the 
resolves went on, even though the Livingstons were no 
longer on the Committee of Fifty-One.87 After both sides 
86 The Livingstons may have regarded the McEvers motion as treachery. 
When the committee proposed to draft its propositions on the Port Act, it 
tacitly conceded to the Livingstons the necessity of such procedure, but 
when it voted to publish a disavowal of the rally and those resolutions, 
it created a public impression of its opposition to the adoption of any 
proposals. This was partisanship with a vengeance. Since the De Lanceys 
acted deceitfully, the Livingstons could not hope for any future advantage 
from their labors in the committee. 
Three of the Livingstons did not resign, nor has anyone explained their 
action. They were Philip Livingston, Peter T. Curtenius, and Abraham 
Duryee. Those who withdrew were Peter Van Brugh Livingston, Sears, 
McDougall, Francis Lewis, Joseph Hallett, Thomas Randall, Abraham P. 
Lott, Leonard Lispenard, John Broome, Abraham Brasher, and Jacobus 
Van Zandt. Ibid., 310-14; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 127. 
87 On July 13 the Committee of Fifty-One drew up and printed its first 
set of propositions, which differed materially from the statement of the 
July 6 rally (see ibid., p. 129, n.47, for July 13 resolves). The most sig-
nificant difference between the two declarations was the July 6 call for 
immediate nonimportation and an explicit pledge of obedience to any con-
gressional policies. Desiring an expression of popular approval of their 
resolutions, the De Lanceys summoned a meeting for July 19 but the rally 
was a fiasco for the Church party. Under the leadership of .John Morin 
Scott the Livingstons won control of the gathering, Scott slashed the De 
Lanceys' "pusillanimous" affirmation to ribbons, and the assemblage re-
jected the document and chose a committee to draft a new bill of par-
ticulars. The Livingstons, probably according to preconceived plans, placed 
ten of their coalition on the drafting committee of fifteen. These were 
P.V.B. Livingston, McDougall, Sears, Lispenard, Randall, J. M. Scott, James 
Van Varck, William Goforth, John Lamb, and Theophilus Anthony. There 
were five De Lanceys: Low, Duane, Jay, John Moore, and Henry Remsen. 
Although the De Lanceyites did not serve on the new committee, the ten 
Livingstonians on July 20 and 21 put together a statement which they 
modeled on the Fifty-One's handiwork. Meanwhile, jolted by the events of 
July 19, the Fifty-One stiffened the verbiage in their resolves but there 
was still a gap between the ideas of the two groups. Principally, the con-
flict centered on the question of obedience to the decisions of the Continental 
Congress. The Livingstonians were unequivocal in their asseveration of 
compliance but the De Lanceys were evasive. The two factions seem to have 
attempted between July 21 and 24 to end their disagreement but the effort 
was fruitless. A stalemate prevailed. Ibid., pp. 130-33; Sabine, Memoirs of 
William Smith, pp. 188, 189; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 315-18. 
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modified their positions, they remained deadlocked until 
July 25.88 Possibly, the question of the Port Act and that 
of the candidates for the Philadelphia delegation merged 
here and as part of a compromise the Livingstonians dropped 
their insistence upon the adoption of their resolutions. 89 
No further mention of the matter occurred; the city ac-
cepted the Committee of Fifty-One's declaration of griev-
ances against the North ministry. 
The clamor of political strife hardly stilled in the streets 
of New York in August, 1774, when echoes of a more dis-
tant din disturbed the city. Through September and into 
October the colonials who met in Philadelphia to concert a 
common defense of American rights poured oratory into 
each others' ears in Carpenters Hall, argued earnestly over 
thorny questions in committee, and tactfully probed for 
weaknesses over food and drink in the city's taverns.90 Out 
88 When the committee of ten Livingstonians completed their work, they 
bade the people to attend at the City Hall, July 25, to approve the drafters' 
labors. The transactions at this meeting have not come to light except for 
the brief newspaper account which noted that "nothing decisive was resolved 
upon." Perhaps a vigorous opposition by the De Lanceys and the presence 
of a large number of their adherents deterred the Livingstons from driving 
matters to a conclusion. Under these circumstances any vote would have 
revealed serious differences and since both factions saw the need for unity, 
both were reluctant to shoulder the responsibility for initiating an open 
break. Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 133 and n.60. 
89 Perhaps the key to the secret lies in the relationship between the 
City Hall rally and Committee of Fifty-One meeting on the same day, 
July 25. Although nothing materialized from the public assemblage, the 
Fifty-One opened their meeting at 6 P.M. with the unanimous adoption 
of a plan for the election of the congressional delegates in cooperation with 
the Committee of Mechanics on July 28. Whereas such motions in the 
past paired the balloting with the Port Act resolves, this prescription was 
silent on the latter subject. Negotiations in the intervening hours between 
the sessions may have broken the deadlock. Some opinion certainly pressed 
for the kind of settlement which the parties made. A broadside, signed 
"An Honest American," on July 25 stressed that the "Resolves are not ma-
terial; whether we approve of a one Set or the other, is of no Consequence 
. . . a Reconciliation of Parties . . . is really essential, in order to procure 
a proper Delegation .... " Stokes, The Iconography of Manhattan Island, 
IV, 861; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 133-34. 
90 See the accounts in Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, chap. iii; 
Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), chap. 
iii; Becker, The History of Political Parties, chap. vi; Schlesinger, The 
Colonial Merchants, chap. x. 
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of the welter of words came a design which was to have a 
major impact on New York politics. Despite its tinkering, 
the Continental Congress bolted together an effective boy-
cott machine, the Continental Association, and sanctioned 
the use of compulsion to obtain compliance with the pro-
visions of the embargo. Since the provincials did not wish 
to trigger immediate economic chaos, they elaborated a time-
table for the cessation of trade with Britain. They set De-
cember 1, 1774, as the opening of the nonimportation phase 
of the association; March 1, 1775, as the commencement of 
nonconsumption of tea; September 10, 1775, as the in-
auguration of nonexportation to Great Britain, Ireland, 
and the West Indies. 91 The association recommended the 
formation of county, city, and town enforcement committees 
and empowered these committees to seize goods which 
merchants imported in violation of the terms of the boy-
cott. The committees were to publicize the names of those 
who flouted any of the association's stipulations and the 
people were not to purchase from those merchants. There 
was little consolation in all this for the De Lanceys but the 
association was not an unqualified disaster for them. All 
merchants were under the same restrictions; merchants in 
other towns would not be able to capture the New Yorkers' 
markets. Secondly, there was a period of grace before the 
nonexportation stage became operative, whereas in New 
York in the preceding May and June, 1774, the Livingston-
ians had sought an instant suspension of commerce.92 
When the De Lancey representatives returned home from 
the Continental Congress, they brought with them a prob-
lem that caused considerable anguish among that faction. 
91 The association banned the importation of all goods from Great 
Britain and Ireland, of smuggled tea, of molasses, coffee, pimento, syrups, 
and paneles from the British West Indies, of wines from Madeira and the 
Western Islands, of foreign indigo, and of slaves. The nonexportation article 
placed an absolute ban on both direct and indirect shipments to Great 
Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, except rice for Europe. Ibid., pp. 
421·27. 
92 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 152·55. 
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By signing the Continental Association, they bound their 
colony to observe the conditions of the boycott. However, 
many of the leading merchants thought that it was a "wrong 
measure."93 A conflict over what policy to pursue seems to 
have supervened among the De Lanceys but the differences 
did not lead to the dissolution of the Committee of Fifty-
One.94 Since the Low-Duane-Jay group among the Church 
party accepted the association, its knotty problem was how 
to apply the boycott without losing control of the machinery 
to the Livingstons. As a factor in the relative strength of 
the two factions, the association was a vindication of the 
views of the Livingstons and a consequent blow to the pres-
tige of the De Lanceyites. 
Any potential political advantage for the Livingstons in 
this situation remained hypothetical until the party hit upon 
the means by which to transmute their vindication into 
power. Since the Presbyterian party had read itself out of 
the Committee of Fifty-One, its record militated against its 
reentry into the committee. A practical alternative was the 
formation of a new committee to enforce the boycott, but the 
initiative lay in the hands of the Fifty-One because that 
body was still the titular leader of the city. The Livingstons 
did not act until the Fifty-One announced its plans and then 
the Presbyterians chose to challenge the De Lanceys through 
the medium of the Committee of Mechanics.95 
93 Colden to Dartmouth, October 5, 1774, Letterbooks of Cadwallader 
Colden, (New-York Historical Society Collections, Vol. X), (New York, 1877), 
II, 368; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 203; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, p. 163. 
94 The Fifty-One met three times in November after the publication of 
the decisions of the Continental Congress. De Lancey attendance at these 
meetings did not decline, since it was fifteen, seventeen, and nineteen, 
respectively, approximating that group's range of nineteen to twenty-seven 
in June and July, thirteen to twenty in August, September, and October. 
Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 300-12, 328, 329, 330. 
Becker interprets this internal conflict of the De Lanceys as centering 
on the fear that the Livingstons might assume direction of the opposition 
to Britain if the Church party withdrew. The History of Political Parties, 
pp. 163-64. 
95 Ibid., p. 165; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 203. 
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Although the Committee of Fifty-One proposed a modus 
operandi for the enforcement of the association, the Liv-
ingstons' opposition compelled that junto to abandon its 
project. When the Fifty-One published a plan on November 
7 for the election of ward committees of inspection to super-
vise the terms of the association, the Committee of Mechan-
ics objected and on November 14 organized a protest meet-
ing which condemned the Fifty-One's proposition. If the 
De Lanceyites were as confident of their political strength 
in November as they were in July, they would have spurned 
the Mechanics' objections and permitted a stalemate to 
evolve. Their action was indicative of their apprehension; 
they heeded the Mechanics. On the evening of November 
14 the De Lanceys invited the Mechanics to hold a joint 
session on the morrow with the Fifty-One in order to smooth 
over the differences between them. Apparently there were 
two bargaining conclaves, November 15 and 16, from which 
the Livingstons came away with a major victory.96 
The dimensions of the Livingstonian triumph clearly 
illumined the shift in power relationships. Not only did 
the De Lanceys agree to the formation of another committee 
but they consented also to the dissolution of the Commit-
tee of Fifty-One. Another revealing facet of the situation was 
the composition of the new Committee of Sixty. The De 
Lanceys accorded 43 percent of the seats to their opponents, 
which sharply contrasted with the Livingstons' 27 percent 
of the membership of the Fifty-One. 97 Moreover, the joint 
96 For a different interpretation of the De Lanceys' motivation, see Becker, 
The History of Political Parties, p. 165; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 
I, 330. 
97 The division of the membership is conservative but conjectural. \Vhat 
it amounts to is this. In addition to the sixteen De Lancey holdovers, there 
were six who became loyalists and twelve whose affiliations are unknown. 
This combination gives the De Lanceys thirty-four members. One might 
argue that perhaps four of the unknowns (John White, Francis Bassett, 
John Anthony, and Jacob Van Voorhees) belong in the Livingston camp. 
If the De Lancey share is reduced by four, one has evenly divided the Sixty. 
Such an arrangement would accentuate, of course, the scope of the Liv-
ingston victory. Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. l68nn. 
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nominations for the succession organ contained ten of the 
eleven Livingstons who had resigned from the Fifty-One 
as well as six members of the Committee of Mechanics.98 
In addition, the De Lancey share of the slate denoted that 
the faction retained sixteen and dropped twenty-one of its 
adherents on the Fifty-One, substituting eighteen other men 
for the latter.99 Circumstantial evidence suggests that pres-
sure by the Livingstons forced the Low-Duane-Jay group to 
jettison twelve of those twenty-one whom it discarded.100 
98 Jacobus Van Zandt was not among the ten Livingstons. 
The six men from the Committee of Mechanics were Abraham Brasher, 
Hercules Mulligan, Victor Bicker, Theophilus Anthony, William Goforth, 
and Jeremiah Platt. Ibid., p. 198, n.23; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 
I, 319. 
99 The sixteen carryovers were Alsop, Bull, De Lancey, Duane, Hoffman, 
Jay, Johnston, Laight, Low, Ludlow, Nicholl, Remsen, Shaw, Van Schaack, 
and A. and W. Walton. 
The eliminated were Bache, Bayard, Beekman, Booth, Browne, Desbrosses, 
Duyckinck, Goelet, Jauncey, McAdam, McEvers, Marston, Moore, Pearsall, 
Sharpe, Sherbrook, Thurman, Van Horne, Wallace, Yates, and Young. 
The eighteen new men were J. Anthony, F. Bassett, J. Berrien, L. Burling, 
L. Embree, W. W. Gilbert, T. Ivers, G. Janeway, F. Jay, S. Jones, W. W. 
Ludlow, J. B. Moore, L. Murray, J. Roome, J. Totten, W. Ustick, J. Van 
Voorhees, and J. White. Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 168, 
197 and nn. 
100 Perhaps there were two factors which motivated the De Lancey lead-
ership: Livingston pressure and De Lancey attendance at meetings. Pos-
sibly it was coincidence but these twelve members voted for the censure of 
the Livingstons on July 7. This was the meeting which induced eleven 
Livingstons to resign from the Fifty-One. There is the possibility that 
some De Lanceys withdrew because they could not accept the association. 
This is unlikely, however, since the attendance pattern of these dozen men 
was quite consistent. Their best record at meetings of the Fifty-One was 
from May through July 7 when their average was 66 percent. From July 
19 through October 4 their attendance was an average 33 percent. There 
were no other meetings until November, at which time there were three. 
The group's attendance then averaged 28 percent. Even at the climax of the 
struggle with the Livingstons on July 7, only 57 percent of this De Lancey 
dozen were present. The attendance record of the sixteen De Lanceys who 
remained on the committee was much better than that of their factional 
colleagues. The comparable averages were 81, 62, and 62 and for July 7 it 
was 62 percent. Finally, four of the twelve who were purged appeared on 
the newly formed Committee of One Hundred in April, 1775. Pressure 
rather than dislike of the association seems a more plausible explanation 
of the change in De Lancey personnel. 
The attendance factor rather than Livingston antagonism may explain 
the case of eight of the remaining nine De Lanceys. There are records for 
twenty-seven committee meetings between May and November. Four of this 
group of eight members were not present at any of these sessions and the 
other four went to fewer than 40 percent of the meetings. A possible ex-
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Therefore, acceptance by the De Lanceys of the Committee 
of Sixty with which to enforce the association was a signal 
stride forward for the Livingstons. 
The people consummated this compromise between the 
factions on November 22, 1774. Since there was no opposi-
tion ticket, there was little interest among the electorate. 
Contemporaries estimated that from 30 to 200 voters par-
ticipated.101 The city thus preserved its facade of unity in 
opposition to imperial policies but the facade concealed 
serious antagonisms that were becoming less and less 
amenable to conciliation. 
Subtly but surely the grounds of factional hostility were 
shifting from the traditional arena of legal power and place 
to that of illegal power and place. The catalytic agent in 
this trend was imperial relations. As the colonial cns1s 
-----·----------------------
planation of their elimination is that the faction leaders hoped to replace 
eight shirkers with more active partisans. 
One other facet of this intrafactional strife demands clarification. Since 
there were thirty-seven De Lanceyites on the Committee of Fifty-One, one 
might well wonder how a minority of sixteen managed to purge a ma-
jority of twenty-one. The answer lies in the attendance at the committee 
meeting of November 15 at which the Fifty-One arranged their compromise 
with the Mechanics. There were nineteen De Lanceys and three Livmgstons 
at this session; twelve of these were among the survivors, seven were among 
the purged. The combination of twelve De Lanceys and three Livingstons 
supplied a majority vote of 15 for motions on whom to eliminate. William 
Smith who probably had the information from a Livingston leader suc-
cinctly summarized these maneuvers in this fashion: "You'll not wonder 
therefore to learn that by the interest of the [Continental Congress] dele-
gates the committee of Fifty-One is to be dissolved and a new committee 
to be appointed to execute the decrees of Congress, which is to consist of 
the [Continental Congress] Delegates and such a set as the most active of 
the Liberty Boys approve, and had (through the mechanics, who were con-
sulted) chosen in conjunction with the Fifty-One, from which a set [i.e., 
the twenty-one] wh_o formerly dictated all their movements, have retired, 
outwitted and disgusted, and, as they think, betrayed." For the attendance 
record of the Fifty-One see Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 293-330; 
Smith to Philip Schuyler, November 22, 1774, quoted in Becker, The History 
of Political Parties, p. 164, n. 24, and in Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
p. 203; Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War, I, 488-89. 
101 William Smith implied that the De Lancey-Livingston agreement on 
the membership of the Sixty removed the stimulus to vote: "Not above 200 
Electors attended, the Committee of Merchants & Mechanics having con-
certed the Nomination some Days before." Becker, The History of Political 
Parties, p. 167, n. 33; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 202-3. 
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sharpened in 1775, more and more De Lanceyites drifted out 
of illegal committees into the ranks of the Friends of Gov-
ernment, or, as the revolutionaries called them, Tories. 
The formation of rural committees of safety accentuated 
this direction of events since the De Lanceyites frequently 
refrained from joining these committees. Furthermore, the 
legislature which was a major center of De Lancey puissance 
atrophied in response to the deepening hostility to royal 
government. De Lancey influence waned gradually, while 
that of the Livingstons waxed. The Livingstons were build-
ing a broader party base than they had ever had.102 
There were other factional permutations which also had 
their origins in the quarrel with Britain. Those who be-
labored the British ministry and their supporters increas-
ingly denominated themselves Whigs and their opponents 
Tories. These appellations were naturally broader in their 
connotations than the party entities, but the Livingstons 
tended to assume that Whig was synonymous with Liv-
ingston. However, the application of these labels did not 
and does not imply the materialization of two political 
parties, each of which possessed a specifically defined pro-
gram. There were no party programs but the factions 
espoused a line of conduct on sundry issues, issues which 
centered on colonial ties with Great Britain. Moreover, it 
does not clarify the relationship of the two factions to tag 
them as conservative or radical courses of action. N everthe-
less, the Whig faction's conduct was more ambivalent than 
that of the Tories because the Whigs included an articulate 
group of mechanics who did not always concur in the 
policies of the leadership and who sometimes demanded 
substantial political reform.103 
102 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 155-57, 160-61. 
Some of the De Lanceyites moved into the Livingston or Whig camp. 
Duane and Jay were prominent examples of this minority trend. 
103 For another interpretation of the events of 1773-1774 see Roger J. 
Champagne, "New York and the Intolerable Acts, 1774," New-York His-
torical Society Quarterly, XLV (April, 1961), 195-207. 
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'Rf!..yal Influence in 
~w rork 
,..-... ~ALTHOUGH the Continental Congress ad-
~ J) journed October 26, 1774, and published 
the Continental Association, the people of New York, except 
in the metropolis, reacted uncertainly and slowly to the 
general policies which that document set forth. Hesitation, 
indifference, and opposition became manifest in the rural 
counties when the Fifty-One circularized them in November 
to organize county committees of inspection. Only three 
counties-Albany, Ulster, and Suffolk-complied with the 
recommendation from their brethren in Manhattan. The 
Whigs in five counties, if they bestirred themselves at all, 
made no impression on the countryside; neither county 
committees nor district committees were forthcoming. The 
Tories in the other five counties checkmated the Whigs, 
although the Whigs did mobilize some district committees in 
Tryon and Queens.1 
Disturbed by these setbacks, the Whigs cast about for a 
means of invigorating the association movement. The Whig 
leaders transferred the weight of their efforts from the rural 
districts to the legislative halls, but their parliamentary 
tactics in the provincial assembly were no more successful 
than their county campaigns. Laboring assiduously, the 
De Lancey faction mustered the requisite majorities with 
which to beat down the three key Whig motions.2 These 
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three resolutions were a proposal to approve the policies 
of the Continental Congress, a statement of gratitude to 
the merchants for their cooperation in the execution of the 
association, and a recommendation that the assembly ap-
point delegates to the Second Continental Congress. When 
the session closed, the Whigs took some comfort in the fact 
that the assembly adopted a petition to the King, a remons-
trance to the House of Commons, and a memorial to the 
House of Lords. However, the Tories hailed the conduct 
of the legislature as a great victory for constitutional gov-
ernment.3 
Although the Whigs had no other alternative but to call 
for the election of a provincial convention, they had to 
reach a difficult decision on what measures to propose to 
that body. Their inability to form strong county commit-
tees and their defeat in the assembly were factors in their 
decision not to strive in convention for an expression of 
approval of the Continental Association. If the motion of 
approval had carried in the assembly, it would have com-
mitted the colony to the policies of the Continental Con-
gress and would have commended the city Committee of 
Fifty-One for their enforcement of nonimportation. This 
latter commitment by implication would have placed the 
imprimatur of the assembly on the extension of committees 
throughout the colony. Since none of these possibilities 
1 Becker mistakenly notes that there was no record of any action in 
Cumberland. Cumberland elected a county committee but the Tories pre-
vented it from functioning. Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties 
in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (Madison, 1909), pp. 169-73: Peter 
Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1837-1853), 4th 
ser., II, 218·22. 
2 See below, p. 52. 
3 The British government interpreted these events as a serious setback 
for the Whigs. General Gage congratulated Colden on the conduct of the 
assembly. Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 177-78; Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Sr., The Colonial Aferchants and the American Revolution, 
1763-1776 (New York, 1939), p. 452; Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Father Knicker-
bocker Rebels: New York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948), 
p. 45. 
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had materialized and since these county elections were of 
purely local relevance and could not be affected by external 
concerns, the Whigs would find it very difficult at this 
juncture to circumvent the veto of the assembly. There-
fore, the only feasible course for the Whigs was to summon 
a convention in order to choose delegates to the Continental 
Congress. This was not likely to be opposed by other than 
Tories, because the New Yorkers understood that Congress 
would meet with or without delegates from the Hudson. 
Since the Continental Congress might function without a 
New York representation, the province might lose out or 
suffer embarrassment through the lack of a voice in the 
continental proceedings.4 
The climax of these months of maneuvering was the 
convocation of a provincial convention in April, 1775. The 
recently chosen city General Committee of Sixty, initiating 
the convention movement in March, circularized the coun-
ties, asking them to send deputies to New York City on 
April 20 for the purpose of selecting delegates to the Con-
tinental Congress. Although nine counties responded favor-
ably to the appeal from the city, five did not comply. Forty-
one men met April 20-22 and chose a delegation of twelve 
to represent the province in Continental Congress.5 Thus 
the Whigs managed to maintain intact the ranks of the 
intercolonial opposition to the North ministry but their 
4 For a contrary analysis of these events see Schlesinger, The Colonial 
Merchants, pp. 453-54. 
If Whig Alexander McDougall may be believed, the Friends of Liberty 
reached a consensus in early February on the question of holding a pro-
vincial convention. "We have not yet chosen Delegates to meet the next 
Congress, waiting till we know whether the Assembly will do it or not. 
If they don't we shall be able with more Ease to bring about a Provincial 
Congress." McDougall to William Cooper, February 9, 1775, Alexander 
McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
5 Richmond, Charlotte, Cumberland, Tryon, and Gloucester did not re-
spond. Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 186-92; journals of the 
Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Coun-
cil of Safety of the State of New York, 1775-1777 (2 vols.; Albany, 1842), I, 5 
(hereinafter cited as jour. Prov. Cong.). 
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activity faltered because they did not have a viable county 
committee network. 
The halting progress of revolutionary organization in the 
colony of New York in 1774 and 1775 was partly the con-
sequence of royal authority. Although critics in neighbor-
ing colonies often harshly criticized the Yorkers for their 
dilatoriness, some critics permitted their ardor to override 
their knowledge of that colony's complex state of affairs, 
a state of affairs that compelled the revolutionaries to tread 
warily. The British government sought to block every move 
of the Whigs and its influence in the colony was widespread. 
The province had special significance for the British for 
both political and military reasons. The continued attach-
ment of New York to the crown would split the continental 
union and multiply the pitfalls in the path of those who 
persisted in opposition. Since 1763 the city had been the 
headquarters of His Majesty's Forces in North America, 
a strategic center from which to direct the assembling and 
transposition of troops. Moreover, in critical days to come, 
it would afford a secure base from which to launch an offen-
sive to split the rebels, or from which large-scale operations 
could be directed against the whole continental seacoast.6 
One source of royal authority was the considerable ad-
ministrative machine that permeated the province. 7 Some 
6 Edmund Burke to James De Lancey, March 14, 1775, in Ross J. S. Hoff· 
man, Edmund Burke, New York Agent with His Letters to the New York 
Assembly and Intimate Correspondence with Charles O'Hara 1761·1776 (Phila-
delphia, 1956), pp. 262-63; General Gage to Lord Dartmouth, August 20, 
1775, Dartmouth to Gage, April 15, August 2, 1775, Clarence E. Carter, ed., 
The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State 
and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763-1775 (2 vols.; New Haven, 
1931, 1933), I, 413-14, II, 194, 205. See also the discussion of the importance 
of the commander-in-chief by C. E. Carter, "The Office of the Commander 
in Chief," in Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the American Revolution 
(New York, 1939), pp. 170-213. 
7 See the civil list reported by Governor Tryon in Edmund B. O'Callaghan, 
ed., Documentary History of the State of New York (4 vols.; Albany, 1850-
1857), I, 521-22. Extensive as the list is, it omits such county and town 
officials as county judges, coroners, sheriffs, county clerks, justices of the 
peace, and mayors. 
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of these officials had imperial responsibilities; some had 
primarily local duties; others combined both. At the head 
of the administration stood the governor whose power in 
varying degrees reached down through the council, assembly, 
courts, sheriffs, mayors, and county and town officials. In 
another area functioned the customs, Indian, and post office 
departments. Standing behind civil officialdom, more and 
more obtrusively by 1775, loomed the armed forces under 
the control of the commander-in-chief. The South Carolina 
General Committee illustrated the contemporary compre-
hension of these relationships when that organ wrote to the 
New York Committee of Sixty: "We are not ignorant of 
that crowd of placemen, of contractors, of officers, and needy 
dependents upon the Crown, who are constantly employed 
to frustrate your measures. We know the dangerous tend-
ency of being made the Headquarters of America for many 
years."8 Despite the imposing outlines of the provincial 
machine, no one would contend that a strong and vocal 
opposition did not exist. Within the provincial government, 
however, only a minority would join the revolutionaries. 
More particularly, a point of complaint arose over the 
administration's influence in the assembly, which repre-
sented the freeholders and freemen. An anonymous New 
York correspondent of the Pennsylvania journal) after list-
ing the elected members of the legislature, their occupations, 
their social connections, and in many cases their crown 
offices held during pleasure, asked: 
First, Whether the great number of crown officers, or their near 
relatives in the Assembly, is not a proof either of our extreme 
negligence of our Liberties, or of the vigilance of government for 
biassing our Members? 
8Letter dated March I, 1775, New York journal, April 6, 1775 (herein· 
after cited as N.Y.].); Force, American Archives, 4th ser., II, 1·2. In the 
pamphlet The Farmer Refuted Alexander Hamilton says: "How great an 
influence, places, pensions and honours have upon the minds of men, we 
may easily discover by contrasting the former, with present conduct of some 
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Second, Whether though the highest honour is due to the 
integrity of so many gentlemen, who have nobly risked their 
offices by their fidelity to the country, it is not nevertheless a 
scandal to the province, that we have as yet no place bill to ex-
clude such from the House of Assembly as after an election 
render themselves dependent upon the Crown for offices held 
during pleasure, and Third, Whether from the arbitrary project 
of the late Parliament for introducing a council into the Massa-
chusetts Bay, at the pleasure of the Crown, it does not appear 
to be an indispensible duty firmly to insist upon a law utterly 
to exclude the dangerous influence of his Majesty's Council, at 
all elections for representatives of the People.9 
The unappropriated lands of the colony gave to the 
British a potentially persuasive instrument, especially in a 
tense period, since the possession of land seems to have 
been an almost universal aspiration among both the lesser 
and greater propertied classes.10 Issuance of the letters 
patent for land grants depended upon approval of the gov-
ernor and council, who tended to favor the supporters of 
administration. Those who lacked the requisite political or 
social connections had to resort to other methods which 
might entail partial loss of the grant. "Rough Hewer" 
referred to this practice when he wrote that one "could 
not obtain a patent, except through the interest of ... [gov-
ernment] favorites, and that often at the expense of part, 
if not the half of his right."11 In the case of the Vermont 
lands some men even managed to secure patents from the 
New Hampshire government. Henry Franklin and Fred-
erick and William Rhinelander inserted an advertisement 
in the newspapers, warning that they had obtained recently 
among ourselves." Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton (8 vols.; New York, 1961- ), I, 141. 
9Pennsylvania journal, February 22, 1775 (hereinafter cited as Pa. ]our.). 
Perhaps some of the radical members of the New York City Committee of 
Sixty sent the letter to the Philadelphia committee. 
10 For British use of this device see below, pp. 49-50. 
11 This was the pseudonym of Abraham Yates, Jr. "Rough Hewer," 
N.Y.]., January 24, 1784; Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Merchant 
on the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1935), pp. 140-41, 142. 
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a New York grant of 63,000 acres in Charlotte County on 
the east side of Lake Champlain but that they would share 
it with those who held these lands under a prior New Hamp-
shire patent. The new patentees demanded the sharing of 
all costs and the procurement of a New York title. Among 
those named as holding from New Hampshire were Isaac 
Sears, Isaac Sears, Jr., William Smith, William Smith, Jr., 
Philip French, Philip French, Jr., David Matthews, Corne-
lius Low, Jr., Benjamin Blagge, John Blagge, Peter Ten 
Eyck, and Andrew Ten Eyck.12 
Although the home government sought to revise the 
system, the governor and council perpetuated it by granting 
land to those who would uphold the royal prerogative. From 
April, 1775, to July, 1776, Colden and Tryon approved 
grants totaling 423,064 acres, of which 328,216 acres lay in 
Vermont. More than 64 percent of the total, 273,121 acres, 
went to prominent Tories: the Rhinelanders, Franklins, 
Apthorpes, Edmund Fanning, the Rapaljes, Robert Rogers, 
and William Smith, agent for Governor Martin of North 
Carolina.13 
The merchants presented another possible channel for the 
diffusion of royal influence. Many Yorkers had strong com-
mercial ties with the mother country; either they relied on 
British credit for their operations or they traded wholly 
within the empire. Still others functioned as factors for 
English houses or sold goods on a commission basis for 
British correspondents. A small group profited as contrac-
tors for the British military and naval establishment.14 In 
12 New York Packet, March 7, 1776 (hereinafter cited as N.Y.P.). 
13 New York, Calendar of New York Colonial Manuscripts Indorsed Land 
Papers in the Office of the Secretary of State of New York (Albany, 1864), 
pp. 6251f.; Harrington, The New York Merchant, pp. 142-43; Irving Mark, 
Agrarian Conflicts in New York, 1711·1775 (New York, 1940), p. 48, nn. 
137 and 138. 
14 Barrack Master General Brigadier General James Robertson told some 
merchants he had spent £260,000 in New York. Presumably this covered 
the period as B.M.G., 1765-1775. William H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical 
Memoirs from 16 March 1763 to 9 July 1776 of William Smith (New York, 
1956), pp. 219·20; Carter, Correspondence of General Gage, II, 310. 
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addition to these, the Indian traders under the supervision 
of the government had long conducted a profitable business. 
Economic considerations, however, by no means predom-
inated in the web of bonds with Britain. A number of 
merchants had emigrated only recently to America or had 
maintained close ties back home. Another group of merch-
ants served on the council or held office on the local level 
in Albany and the capital. Finally, intermarriage between 
merchants and officials drew a number of leading families 
into the circle of government supporters.15 
When colonial affairs deteriorated critically in 1773 and 
1774, the British ministry turned to good account its posi· 
tion in New York. Employing a combination of persua-
sion and pressure, the ministry sought to mobilize enough 
strength to split New York from the Continental Associa-
tion. Certainly the landholding aristocracy and speculators, 
involved in major boundary disputes with New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey, would have welcomed a 
Privy Council decision in their favor. The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Lord Dartmouth, intimated the re-
wards that awaited the faithful when he discussed the state 
of the Vermont controversy with Lieutenant-Governor 
Colden at the close of 1774: "Their [i.e., the Yorkers'] 
Pretensions will meet with every Countenance and Support 
that can be shewn consistent with Justice; for I can with 
Truth say that the Conduct of that Province in general 
... has been such as justly intitles its well disposed and 
peaceable Inhabitants to His Majesty's particular Favor and 
Indulgence."16 Colden himself pressed the Secretary to con-
duct policy along these lines, expressing the hope that he 
"will encourage this good and singular disposition by such 
15 Harrington, The New York Merchant, pp. 350-51. See also the mar-
riage relations of the council listed in Pa. ]our., February 22, 1775. 
16 Dartmouth to Colden, December 10, 1774, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (15 
vols.; Albany, 1856), VIII, 514. 
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instances of indulgence and favor, as shall be wisely calcu-
lated to render most evident the good effects of the conduct 
of this Province."17 
Governor William Tryon's instructions of May, 1775, 
containing several important proffers, bore out the con-
tinuance of these tactics. Dartmouth offered a blanket 
assurance to give "every reasonable satisfaction" to His 
Majesty's faithful subjects in New York. A second example 
of the royal indulgence and favor manifested itself in con-
ditional approval of the Totten and Crossfield Indian pur-
chase. This tract comprised an extremely large area in the 
Adirondacks and involved many of the colony's leading 
personages. Royal confirmation of the transaction hinged 
upon New York's repudiation of the Continental Associa-
tion. Even education had its political application. The 
Colonial Secretary had no objections to the draft of the 
new charter for Kings College and did not anticipate dif-
ficulties for it in the Privy Council. In addition, the instruc-
tions held out the prospect of the council's assent to charters 
of incorporation for the Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian 
churches.18 
The British did not neglect the power of the purse, al-
though no evidence of open bribery has come to light. 
Nonetheless, the Whigs circulated charges that Dartmouth 
17 Colden to Dartmouth, February I, 1775, ibid., VIII, 532. Those in high 
places in London assured the Friends of Government in New York of the 
royal esteem for that colony: "'Pursue the same path, and your province 
will be honoured with every mark of distihction from this country. His 
Majesty is already disposed to grant you every honourable favour that can 
be proposed.'" Dr. Samuel Auchmuty to Captain Montresor, April 19, 
1775, quoting from a letter to himself from London, Pa. jour., May 31, 1775. 
18 Major Philip Skene and Rev. John Vardill urged Dartmouth to grant 
the charters since it would lead the Presbyterians "to cooperate more zeal-
ously in support of government." Skene and Vardill to Dartmouth, March, 
1775, Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fourteenth Report, 
Appendix Part X (Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth) (London, 1895), 
p. 284 (hereinafter cited as Hist. Mss. Com.). Dartmouth to Tryon, May 4, 
1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 573. See William 
Smith's comment, Historical Memoirs of the Province of New York, V, June 
28, 1775, William Smith Papers, NYPL (hereinafter cited as Memoirs). 
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had large sums to expend in America. Some "Citizens of 
New York" published a broadside in November, 1774, 
warning the people that the ministry intended to buy up 
the newspaper printers.l9 Early in 1775 the press carried an 
extract of a letter from London which asserted that "it is 
currently said here and with much confidence, that a good 
deal of public Money, has been put in the Hands of a 
Mr. --- one of the -- and some of your other great 
Men, in order to buy their Influence in Favour of the 
Ministerial Measures .... "20 
By far the most sensational allegation of bribery came to 
hand in May, so sensational that the New York Committee 
of One Hundred21 tried to suppress it, but the Pennsylvania 
Journal frustrated the committee's design. The Journal of 
May 17 reproduced an extract of a London letter which 
asserted that several members of the New York assembly 
had pocketed bribes of more than £ l ,000 each for their 
votes in January, 1775. The writer went on to allege that 
a group of De Lancey party leaders would be rewarded with 
places of "honor, profit and pensions." 
The source of this information seems to have been a letter 
from London alderman William Lee to Samuel Adams, who, 
in turn, edited the letter for publication. Lee charged that 
"the Ministry now openly boast of their having last year 
sent large sums to New York to bribe the Members of that 
Assembly and the names of De Lancey, Phillips and Rappalje 
are frequently mentioned as having each of them received 
one thousand guineas for their conduct in the Assembly 
respecting the late Continental Congress and for refusing 
19 To the Public by "Citizens of New York," November 16, 1774, Broad· 
sides, NYPL. 
20 N.Y.]., February 9, 1775. A similar warning appeared in ibid., March 
16, 1775. This letter seems to have been from Thomas Lane, Chairman of the 
London Merchants to Francis Lewis. See the comment of William Smith, 
Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 213. 
21 For the creation of the Committee of One Hundred, see below, pp. 
69-75. 
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to send Delegates to the May Congress." Lee set forth a 
number of other grave imputations. For example, he al-
leged that Lieutenant-Governor Colden would resign with 
a pension, that Councilor John Watts would succeed Colden, 
that Watts's son would take his father's place on the gov-
ernor's council. Lastly, Lee declared that Philip Skene 
would receive a land grant of 120,000 acres and a commis-
sion as governor of Crown Point and Ticonderoga. 
Later events substantiated some of the allegations. Skene 
did secure both the office and the land. Moreover, the De 
Lancey party did move as a subterfuge to petition the King 
and Parliament in order to forestall approval of the Con-
tinental Congress by the New York assembly.22 
A passage in Smith's memoirs tends to give a shadow, but 
no more, of credibility to the bribery charges. Smith records 
a meeting of the key De Lancey faction leaders on January 
9 at which they discussed the probable division of the as-
sembly on the question of approving the acts of the First 
Continental Congress. The leaders agreed that the admin-
istration could count on eleven vqtes against approval, but 
they calculated Whig strength at fourteen votes, which 
meant there were six uncommitted members. When the 
January vote came, it went 11 to 10 in favor of the De 
Lancey faction. Later votes on the colonial dispute ran 
15 to 9, 15 to 10, and 17 to 9 for the government's position.23 
'22 There were two letters, April 4 and 10, 1775, Bancroft Transcripts: 
Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL. Lee apparently prepared the first one for 
publication, signing it "L.L." The New York copy of the extract, which 
Adams probably sent to a number of committees, is printed in New York, 
Calendar of Historical Manuscripts Relating to the War of the Revolution, 
in the Office of the Secretary of State (2 vols.; Albany, 1868), I, 1-2 (herein-
after cited as Cal. Hist. Mss.). 
Adams, prior to receipt of the Lee letter, believed the assembly to be 
corrupt. Adams to Arthur Lee, March 4, 1775. Arthur Lee had warned 
Adams also that the North ministry was spending lavishly and offering con-
cessions in order to maintain New York's allegiance to the crown. Arthur 
Lee to Adams, March 2 and 4, 1775, Bancroft Transcripts: Samuel Adams 
Papers, NYPL. 
On Skene see Carter, Correspondence of General Gage, I, 354, II, 158; 
Hist. Mss. Com., p. 269. 
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The De Lancey leaders' gross underestimation of Tory 
strength suggests that the administration applied powerful 
pressure to change some votes.24 
Although nothing in the preceding material proves the 
Whig charges of bribery, it is true that some men did re-
ceive special inducements. The Colonial Department noti-
fied Drs. Myles Cooper and Thomas B. Chandler, able Tory 
penmen, that the Treasury would pay them £200 per an-
num "from a consideration of your merit and services."25 
James Rivington, printer of Rivington's New-York Gazet-
teer, having won favor in the ministry's eyes, became the 
recipient of £100 per year and the title of His Majesty's 
Printer within the Province of New York.26 
Rivington had earned his £100 salary. Although he had 
not begun publication of his newspaper until 1773, he had 
surpassed his competitors, Hugh Gaine and John Holt, and 
circulated his Gazetteer through many of the colonies.27 As 
political differences multiplied, Rivington's paper emerged 
as the bulwark of established government. Equally im-
portant, the printer functioned as a publisher of Tory 
tracts.28 It is not surprising that the Whigs detested him. 
Bitter denunciation of his press spread through the colonies 
23 The difference among the totals of votes cast reflects the absences of 
members. There were thirty-one members of the assembly. 
24 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 176; Sabine, Memoirs of 
William Smith, p. 208. See below, pp. 79-80, for discussion of these affairs 
in the assembly. 
25 Secretary Pownall to Drs. Cooper and Chandler, April 5, 1775, O'Callag-
han, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 569. 
26 Sidney I. Pomerantz, "The Patriot Newspaper and the American Revo-
lution," in Morris, Era of the American Revolution, p. 316. That this was 
an unusual appointment may be seen from the source of the money. The 
Lords Commissioners of the Treasury were to pay him "out of such fund 
as their Lordships shall think proper." O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, 
New York, VIII, 568. 
27 Pomerantz, "The Patriot Newspaper," in Morris, Era of the American 
Revolution, p. 315. Gaine published the New-York Gazette and Weekly 
Mercury; Holt printed the New-York journal. 
28 In 1775 Rivington printed approximately twenty-eight political tracts, 
most of which were Tory. Charles R. Hildeburn, Sketches of Printers and 
Printing in Colonial New York (New York, 1895), p. ll7. 
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from South Carolina to Rhode Island, taxing him with the 
publication of "glaring falsehoods." 29 
One of his stories brought him a reprimand from the 
New York City Committee of Observation30 in March, 
1775. Sponsoring the most debatable recommendation of 
the day, participation by the province of New York in the 
Second Continental Congress, the Whigs maneuvered to 
win popular approval of their proposal.31 On March 2, 
Rivington's Gazetteer carried this item without any quali-
fication: "Last Monday the committee of observation met; 
it was proposed that they should nominate delegates, to the 
continental congress, for the approbation of the city and 
county, but being opposed, the final resolution of the com-
mittee was deferred until the next meeting." To the reader 
the story bore the implication that those who advocated 
sending delegates to Congress comprised only a minority 
of the committee and so avoided a vote on their proposal. 
Fearing an adverse reaction to the report, the committee 
formally repudiated it as false and voted to have two mem-
bers pay Rivington a call in order to learn its origin. The 
delegation apprised their colleagues that Rivington had 
stated the source of his news as "common report" and, 
under pressure, had agreed to print a retraction. Having 
heard the presentment, the committee resolved then that 
Rivington should not present "common report" to the 
public as news.32 
After the startling news of Lexington and Concord had 
aroused the city on April 23, the Tory printer abruptly 
29 Quoted in Pomerantz, "The Patriot Newspaper," in Morris, Era of the 
American Revolution, p. 316: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Prelude to lnde· 
pendence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764·1776 (New York, 1958), pp. 
223-27. 
30 The Committee of Sixty. 
31 See below, p. 81. 
32 Riv. Gaz., March 2, 1775; N.Y.G., March 20, 1775. Rivington challenged 
the accuracy of the delegation's summary of their interview: he asserted he 
told the committeemen the news was "credited" not "common report." 
Riv. Gaz., March 16, 1775. 
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revised the tone of his paper. The numerous letters from 
Tories vanished; the partisan news reporting diminished; 
however, the reformation did not result in the publishing 
of the pseudonymous political letters of the printer's an-
tagonists.33 Although Rivington in the issue of May 4 denied 
any intent to injure American liberty, six days later he 
fled from a group of angry Whigs to a British vessel in the 
harbor. By promising to reform and promising not to vio-
late the association, Rivington won the permission of the 
Provincial Congress to continue publishing.34 
Shortly thereafter the Gazetteer showed signs of trim-
ming even more closely to the prevailing wind but once 
more changed course with the arrival of Governor Tryon. 
Before Governor Tryon, returning from Britain, reached the 
city June 25, this newspaper carried two installments of 
Alexander Hamilton's pamphlet which attacked the Quebec 
Act.35 The reappearance of the Governor seems to have 
emboldened Rivington, and the Gazetteer took on a more 
pronounced Tory flavor. Even though the Rivington press 
had begun printing Hamilton's Remarks on the Quebec 
Bill, the newspaper not only discontinued further install-
ments but also ceased to advertise it. The June 29 number, 
furthermore, while containing a description of Tryon's re-
ception by the town, had nothing to say about the simul-
taneous arrival of Washington in New York and only a few 
words that noted his departure for Boston. Having changed 
33/bid., April 27, May 4, 11, 18, 25, 1775. 
34 Pomerantz, "The Patriot Newspaper," in Morris, Era of the American 
Revolution, pp. 317-18; Hugh Finlay to his brother, New York, May 29, 
1775, Great Britain, Calendar of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George 
Ill, 1773·1775 (London, 1899), pp. 365-66 (hereinafter cited as Cal. H. 0. 
Papers); "Case of Mr. James Rivington, Printer at New York" by Coriolanus, 
Gentleman's Magazine, November, 1776, quoted in J. Shannon, comp., 
Manual of the Corporation of the City of New York, 1868 (;"\lew York, 
1868), p. 825; Robert C. Livingston to Colonel Robert Livingston, May 13, 
1775, Livingston Redmond Papers, FDRL. Despite Rivington's absence 
from his shop, the paper continued to appear. 
35 Riv. Gaz., June 15, 22, 1775. Rivington had published previously two 
other Hamilton pamphlets, although not serializing them in the Gazetteer. 
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his publishing policy, Rivington persistently filled his 
columns with pro-Tory news stories until the demise of the 
paper in November, 1775.36 
Rivington was so successful in presenting the Tory view 
of events in America that the Whigs destroyed his news-
paper in November, 1775. The most widely accepted in-
terpretation of the wreckage of Rivington's shop is that 
Isaac Sears conducted the foray to satisfy his personal animus 
against the printer. The basis for this viewpoint is an 
acrimonious exchange of letters in 1774 between the two 
men. An examination of the letters, however, does not 
reveal any threat, overt or implied, by Sears.37 
Early in January, 1775, Rivington and the Tories utilized 
a minor incident to seek to discredit Sears. The Gazetteer 
carried a statement by John Case which charged that Sears 
had threatened and roughly handled him in a political 
dispute. "A Friend to Constitutional Liberty" rebutted the 
accusation in detail with supporting statements from wit-
nesses and stated that Case was a dupe of the "anti-American 
club" that met at Rivington's. Although he might have 
done so, Sears did not turn his anger on Rivington.38 
If the accusation of a personal feud were true, the radical 
leader certainly did not have a consuming desire to wreak 
vengeance on his adversary. He waited eight months to 
strike a blow. With the city in turmoil the week after the 
36 Ibid., June 29-November 23, 1775. On Washington and Tryon see 
below, p. 78. 
37 Pomerantz, "The Patriot Newspaper," in Morris, Era of the American 
Revolution, p. 318; Henry B. Dawson, Westchester County, New York, 
During the American Revolution (Morrisania, 1886), pp. 127-40; Thomas 
Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War, and of the 
Leading Events in the Other Colonies at that Period, ed. Edward F. de 
Lancey (2 vols.; New York, 1879), I, 66; Becker, The History of Political 
Parties, pp. 245-46; Hildeburn, Sketches of Printers, p. 120; Victor H. 
Paltsits, "James Rivington," and Charles H. Vance, "Isaac Sears," Diction-
ary of American Biography, XV, 638, XVI, 539; George H. Sargent, "James 
Rivington, the Tory Printer," Americana Collector, II (Metuchen, 1926), 336-
41; Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence, p. 240. The letters are in Jones, 
History of New York During the Revolutionary War, I, 561-66. 
38Riv. Gaz., January 12, 1775; N.Y.]., February 2, 1775. 
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news of Lexington arrived, Sears could have very easily 
organized a mob to destroy the Rivington press. Moreover, 
when a band did visit the Rivington shop in May, 1775, 
apparently seizing the sheets of a Tory pamphlet in press, 
it did not molest the newspaper, which was published reg-
ularly during the temporary exile of the printer.39 
Why then did Sears hold his grudge in abeyance another 
six months before putting an end to the printing activities 
of Rivington? Governor Tryon did not mention personal 
feelings when he apprised Dartmouth of the November 
incident. Tryon attributed the catastrophe to "the free-
dom of Mr. Rivington's publications, & especially in his 
last paper."40 Since the last number of the Gazetteer bore 
the date November 23, Sears could not have seen it before 
setting out on his expedition from New Haven on the 
twentieth.41 The Governor, however, may have been partly 
correct. 
A comparison of the Gazetteer for November 2, 9, and 16 
points to the issue of the ninth as likely to have offended the 
Whigs most. The volume of pro-Tory news in that day's 
paper far overshadowed the other numbers; indeed, the 
final issue of the twenty-third was quite mild in contrast. 
Rivington devoted three and a half columns of the front 
page of the November 9 issue of the Gazetteer to the Au-
gust 8 proclamation of Governor Martin of North Carolina 
39 Hildeburn, Sketches of Printers, p. 120. See above, p. 55. The pam· 
phlet, The Republican Dissected, was "A. W. Farmer's" reply to Hamilton's 
The Farmer Refuted. Advertisement, Riv. Gaz., April 13, 1775. 
40 Tryon to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, 
Colonial, New York, VIII, 646. 
41 Sears apparently quitted New York in a huff after he quarreled with 
the Provincial Congress in early November, 1775. He urged the seizure of 
some British army blankets and hospital stores but the Provincial Congress 
would have nothing to do with it. "Sears I'm told is so highly offended with 
this Congress for acting so that he is set out for Connecticut and swears he 
wont return-meaning to punish the City by absenting himself from it. 
All people seem to wish he may persevere in such a punishment." John 
Patterson to Colonel Robert Livingston, November 6, 1775, Livingston Red-
mond Papers, FDRL. 
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which labeled the provincial convention of that colony as 
treasonable and its members traitors, ordered the arrest of 
its leaders, placed prices on the heads of the leaders, and 
held out pardon to those who would ask for it.42 Page 
two presented the address of the Boston Tories to Gage on 
his departure and the reply of the latter. Page three con-
tained more Boston items, three proclamations of General 
Howe, and a proposal to form an association of Boston 
Tories. Page four reproduced the Quaker address to the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly, an address which was 
strongly Tory in tone.43 
Radical Whigs seem to have maintained a sharp eye on the 
press and reacted strongly. "An Occasional Remarker" at-
tacked the Gazetteer in the New-York journal on the six-
teenth, exhorting the Committee of Safety44 and other 
"friends of liberty" to make Rivington reveal the names of 
the persons who contributed the offensive pieces. Alarmed 
by the quantity of Tory news, "Remarker" also pressed 
for the creation of a special committee that would write re-
plies to these stories. It may be that "Remarker" reflected 
the growing alarm among the more radical rebels at the 
increasing boldness of Rivington. 
There is still another aspect of this picture that deserves 
notice. Governor Dunmore of Virginia may have unwit-
tingly played a part in the ruin of Rivington. On October 
7 he directed the seizure of the Norfolk press of John H. 
Holt and two of his workmen, provoking even the Tory 
mayor and town council to protest unavailingly.45 It is highly 
42 Rivington copied the text from the Pennsylvania Journal, November 1, 
1775, but the latter also printed the North Carolina Convention's indignant 
reply to Martin which the New Yorker omitted. 
43 Of the other New York newspapers, the ardent Whig Journal did not 
carry any of the North Carolina, Boston, and Philadelphia items, but the 
Gazette did publish the Boston stories November 6 and 13. 
44 See Becker, The History of Political Parties, chap. ix, for the chronolog-
ical narrative of these months. 
45 John H. Holt was the nephew of printer John Holt of New York. 
Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence, p. 57. 
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probable that Sears read of this event since the story ap-
peared in both the New Haven and New York papers.46 
There is, furthermore, a more direct link between the 
Virginia and New York proceedings. According to the 
contemporary account of the Rivington incident, as Sears 
and his men carried out the printing types, "they offered 
to give an order on Lord Dunmore [for them]. "47 It may 
be that the combination of the content of the Gazetteer and 
confiscation by Dunmore of the printing equipment of 
Holt led to the drastic action against Rivington. 
The foray of Sears from New Haven reflected careful 
planning which involved two other Yorkers, Samuel Broome 
and John Woodward. The leaders had two major objec-
tives: the seizure of three Westchester Tories and the de-
struction of the Rivington press. Sears suspected the in-
tended Westchester victims of planning to waylay him and 
put him aboard the British warship Asia. Assembling ap-
proximately ninety-seven mounted men, Sears departed for 
New York on November 20. In Westchester the troop 
secured Samuel Seabury, Judge Jonathan Fowler, and May-
or Nathaniel Underhill of Westchester Borough without 
incident and dispatched them to New Haven under strong 
guard. At Mamaroneck they burned a small sloop which 
the British had purchased to supply the Asia. They paraded 
down the "main street" of Manhattan at noon, November 
23, and drew up in front of the Rivington shop. It took a 
small detachment about three-quarters of an hour to smash 
the printing press and package the type. As they rode off 
with the type the "vast concourse" of spectators, estimated 
at 1,500, "gave them three very hearty cheers." On their 
eastward journey the raiders disarmed all the Tories whom 
46 Connecticut Journal, October 25, 1775; Riv. Gaz., October 26, Novem-
ber 2, 1775. 
47 Connecticut Journal, December 6, 1775; Schlesinger, Prelude to Inde-
pendence, p. 240. 
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they encountered. The last leg of the trip through Con-
necticut assumed the proportions of a triumphal procession 
and New Haven welcomed them with a salute from two 
cannon. The loss of Rivington's Gazetteer deprived the 
British of a major channel of communication with the 
people of the province in this critical period and contributed 
to the diminution of the influence of the government.48 
British patronage and the hesitant policy of the New York 
Provincial Congress in 1775 inspired ugly suspicions in the 
other colonies.49 Holt's journal published a warning to its 
readers on how New York looked to the outside world, 
when it printed part of a letter from the familiar "gentle-
man in London to his friends": "The duplicity of New York 
will ever render them suspected. The many, repeated as-
surances given to the Ministry by their quondam leaders, 
will justify a suspicion, which the conduct of some of the 
merchants and traders confirms, that they would adopt any 
means to break through or elude the association."5° Closer 
to home, General Wooster of Connecticut was protesting to 
Governor Trumbull his subordination to the control of the 
New York Provincial Congress as a "disgrace" to himself 
and a "dishonour" to his own colony. "Your Honour well 
48 The Connecticut journal, November 29, 1775, has a narrative of the 
raid. The same version also appears in the Connecticut Courant, November 
29, 1775 and Pa. ]our., December 6, 1775. Briefer stories were published in 
the Constitutional Gazette, November 25, 1775 (hereinafter cited as Const. 
Gaz.), Connecticut Gazette, December 1, 1775 and Pennsylvania Gazette, 
December 29, 1775. Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary 
War, I, 66; Proceedings of the General Committee of New York, November 
23, 1775, Shannon, Manual of Corporation of New York, 1868, p. 815. 
49 See below, chap. iv. 
50 N.Y.]., August 31, 1775, letter from London to his friend in Phila-
delphia, June 4, 1775. Pa. ]our., April 19, 1775, had printed an extract 
which stated that the ministry expected New York to desert the continental 
union. For similar sentiments see the broadside, To the Inhabitants of 
New York and ... America, New York, April 20, 1775, NYPL which con-
tains extracts of several letters from London. Franklin said the ministry 
expected the 4,000 troops being dispatched to New York would be re-
ceived with cordiality. Extract of a Letter from Philadelphia to a Gentle-
man in this City, Dated the 6th lnst., New York, May 8, 1775, Broadsides, 
~YPL. 
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knows," he wrote, "the suspicious light in which the New-
York Congress are viewed by the rest of the Continent .... 
I have no faith in their honesty in the cause."51 After having 
encountered New York reluctance at first hand, General 
Charles Lee had much the same opinion of the rebel lead-
ership.52 Although John Jay confessed anxiety for the 
"Honour of our caluminated Colony," he hastened to add, 
"I can assure you the Province stands well with the [Con-
tinental] Congress .... "53 Jay to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, a committee of Congress that had visited New York 
in February, 1776, privately voiced skepticism of New York 
loyalty to the cause.54 These misgivings persisted until the 
colony accepted the Declaration of Independence.55 
In spite of the far-reaching authority of the government, 
a rising opposition to royal policies gradually broke down 
the government's supremacy. The province divided into 
two major groups, Tory and Whig, that cut across social 
and class lines. 
51 Wooster to Trumbull, August 24, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th 
ser., Ill, 263. 
52 Curtis P. Nettels, George Washington and American Independence 
(Boston, 1951), pp. 207, 211-12. 
53 Jay to McDougall, March 27, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. Jay said, 
"it would give me Pleasure to see them [New York] distinguished by vigorous 
Exertion." 
54 Nettels, George Washington, p. 212. 
55 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 272. 
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'Division into Tory 
and Whig 
,-... ~ WHEN General Thomas Gage set his troops 
~ ..__) ) in motion for Lexington and Concord in 
April of 1775, he had no notion, of course, that he was 
constructing a species of deus ex machina for the New York 
Friends of Liberty. The spur of the military confrontation 
enabled the Whigs to solve the internal problem of revolu-
tionary committee organization and to elaborate a provincial 
system of district and county committees. This linkage of 
external and internal affairs was to recur in New York at 
critical moments in 177 5 and 1776 and was to give a fillip 
to the revolutionary movement. 
Events in New York moved swiftly in April in direct 
response to word of the encounter in Massachusetts. Amid 
the excitement which this information generated, the city 
General Committee on April 26, seizing the initiative, en-
treated the counties to elect a provincial congress, which 
would convene May 22. The General Committee, reorganiz-
ing itself to meet the new conditions, expanded its member-
ship to one hundred.1 Well might the Tories have gnashed 
their teeth in frustration over the trend of affairs, especially 
since Lieutenant-Governor Colden had received a copy of 
Lord North's conciliatory resolution. However, so intense 
was the agitation in the city that Colden and the council 
reluctantly declined to permit the colonial assembly to 
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resume its adjourned session and consider this gesture of the 
British ministry.2 
The focus of revolutionary power in the next few months 
swung to the First Provincial Congress, which assembled 
May 23. The passage of a recommendation to the laggard 
counties to create county and district committees was one 
of the first measures which the Provincial Congress under-
took. Concomitantly, the deputies agreed unanimously to 
have the local committees canvass their districts for signatures 
to the Defense or General Association. This General Associa-
tion, not to be confused with the Continental Association, 
was in effect a pledge of allegiance to the Provincial Congress, 
since the signer resolved "in all things [to] follow the advice 
of our [Provincial Congress] respecting the purposes afore-
said, the preservation of peace, and good order, and the 
safety of individual and private property."3 All problems, 
however, paled into insignificance beside the crucial one of 
defense, and the congressmen devoted most time and energy 
to placing the colony in a military posture. Two transactions 
in Philadelphia confirmed the Yorkers in the wisdom of 
their military preparations: the Continental Congress as-
sumed jurisdiction over the colonial units that were besieging 
Boston, appointing George Washington in June as com-
mand-in-chief of all continental forces, and then, in July, 
administered the coup de grace to the conciliation proposal 
of Lord North.4 Although the Whigs wielded authority in 
these weeks, they acted so hesitantly on numerous occasions 
that they gave contemporaries an impression of weakness 
rather than of strength. 
1 See below, pp. 69-75. 
2 Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New 
York, 1760·1776 (Madison, 1909), pp. 194-99. 
3.Jour. Prov. Gong., I, 15. 
4 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 201, 212, 216; Edmund C. 
Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), pp. 76, 95-96; John 
R. Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New York, 1954), pp. 29-31. 
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The slow maturation of the New York revolutionary party 
and the tortuous course of the Whigs generated a deceptive 
image of political relationships in the colony. The unwary 
observer might have inferred from an uncritical examination 
of these factors that the Whigs were a minority, but a 
searching probe of these elements exposes the falsity of this 
conclusion. It is the contention of the subsequent pages that 
the Friends of Liberty constituted a majority of the popu-
lation. 
It is impossible to determine with exactitude the division 
of the people into Tory and Whig. British rule in the 
province enjoyed its most loyal support among the De 
Lancey faction, who composed the core of Toryism. The 
faction drew its leaders from the landed aristocracy and the 
principal merchants of the province, a group largely in 
support of the administration.5 Moreover, the Tories pos-
sessed a numerous following among the middle landholders 
and tenantry, the professional classes, the smaller merchants, 
mechanics and tradesmen, and among the urban laborers.6 
5 Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York During the American Revolu· 
tion (New York, 1901), p. 33; Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Mer· 
chant on the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1935), pp. 74, 349; E. Wilder 
Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 1783·1789 (New York, 1932), p. 
121; Harry B. Yoshpe, The Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern 
District of the State of New York (New York, 1939), pp. 121-53; Samuel 
Adams to Arthur Lee, March 4, 1775, Bancroft Transcripts: Samuel Adams 
Papers, NYPL. 
6 William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), p. 86; Flick, 
Loyalism, pp. 32-33; Alexander C. Flick, ed., A History of the State of New 
York (10 vols.; New York, 1933-1937), IV, 151; Irving Mark, Agrarian Conflicts 
in New York, 1711·1775 (New York, 1940), pp. 91, 201; Paul M. Hamlin, 
Legal Education in Colonial New York (New York, 1939), pp. 135-55; Spauld-
ing, New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789, p. 127; Henry B. Dawson, 
Westchester County, New York, During the American Revolution (Morris· 
ania, 1886), p. 83; Yoshpe, The Disposition of Loyalist Estates, pp. 187-209. In 
June, 1775, ca. one-third of the Livingston manor tenants were Tory. Judge 
Robert R. Livingston to Robert R. Livingston, Jr., June 17, 1775, Robert R. 
Livingston, American Art Association Catalogue, Revolutionary Letters of 
Importance: The Unpublished Correspondence of Robert R. Livmgston (New 
York, 1918), No. 46; Staughton Lynd, "The Tenant Rising at Livingston 
Manor, May, 1777," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XLVIII (April, 
1964), 163-77. 
Among the Tory middle landholders and tenantry were Alpheus Avery, 
Division into Tory and Whig 
The colony was indeed a house divided. As for the revolu-
tionary opposition, it attracted a minority of the great landed 
families and rich merchants but enlisted strong popular 
support among the middle-class farmers and tenantry and 
the lesser merchants, mechanics, and laborers. Furthermore, 
it is possible to obtain an approximate idea of the relative 
strength of the contending parties through an examination 
of some of the events of these days and of the opinions of 
contemporaries. 
New York City faithfully performed its role in 177 5 as the 
storm center of the province. The Friends of Government 
challenged the Liberty Boys to a test of their popularity in 
February when they sought to break the Continental Associa-
tion against imports from Britain. The arrival of the ]ames) 
Captain Watson commanding, from Glasgow the morning of 
February 2 became the occasion for a contest between the 
defenders of the established order and the government's 
critics. A few members of the Committee of Sixty leaned 
toward granting Watson permission to unload, but at a 
meeting that same night only three or four members of the 
approximately forty present voted for it. The committee, 
therefore, ordered the ]ames to depart without registering at 
customs or breaking cargo, although it granted the captain 
time to obtain supplies and necessary papers. At the special 
request of Buchanan, consignee of the cargo, the committee 
conferred again the evening of the third to reconsider but 
adhered to its original decision. Although the consignee 
declined to invoke governmental aid, the Friends of Govern-
ment, with Watson's approval, planned to organize a posse 
to protect the unloading of the goods, a species of tea party 
John Bates, and James Beyea, farmers of Westchester; John Brown, William 
Brown, Abraham, Henry and John Bulyea, and James Crawford, tenants of 
Westchester. Among the professional classes and merchants, for example, 
were Samuel Clossy of Kings College and Isaac Bennet, merchant of New 
Rochelle. Among mechanics, tradesmen, and laborers were Thomas Austin, 
blacksmith, John Bennett, ship's carpenter, and Frederick Brantigan, baker. 
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in reverse. Learning of these intentions, the radicals spread 
the alarm and mobilized so many people to oppose the 
landing that it could not be carried through; the crowd dis-
persed the posse.7 
Checkmated, but not willing to concede defeat, the Tories 
now turned to official measures. Lieutenant-Governor Colden 
convened his council to determine a course of action and, 
after a three-hour debate without Colden's presence, the 
councilors ordered the man-of-war King's Fisher to provide 
an armed escort for the ]ames. When the ]ames reappeared 
at the wharves with a naval complement aboard, a large 
Whig crowd stood ready to prevent the ship's unloading. 
Deterred by this show of popular sentiment, the Tories 
yielded. So great was the hostility of the people that even 
Tory leaders denounced Captain Watson. Oliver De Lancey 
exclaimed to Philip Livingston and Francis Lewis, "What 
does that dam'd Rascal come up here again for? Why don't 
he quit the Port?"8 And quit the port Captain Watson did, 
with cargo unbroken. 
The very day, February 10, the De Lanceys strove to 
mollify public opinion, a grand jury drew up an address to 
the city Court of Quarter Sessions. The message expressed 
opposition to parliamentary taxation and termed "oppres-
sive" those acts of Parliament which extended the powers of 
the Admiralty and Vice Admiralty courts. The ideas and 
7 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The Colonial Merchants and the American 
Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 1939), p. 490; N.Y.]., February 9, 16, 1775; 
To the Freeholders, Freemen, and Inhabitants of the City and County of New 
York, February 6, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
8 Quoted by William Smith. John De Lancey went about declaring to all 
and sundry that Colden had not solicited the captain to remain. William 
H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs from 16 March 1763 to 9 july 1776 of 
William Smith (New York, 1956), pp. 209, 210. 
Colden defended his conduct to Lord Dartmouth by distorting the actions 
of the participants. Smith saw Colden's role in the affair as an effort to cast 
the blame for governmental failure on the council. Letterbooks of Cadwallader 
Colden, New-York Historical Society Collections, Vol. X (New York, 1877), II, 
389; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 210. 
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terminology followed the fourteenth section of the Con-
tinental Association.9 
The government's position continued to deteriorate and 
suffered a further shock in the middle of April. Whereas in 
October, 1774, the Fifty-One had disapproved interference 
with shipping supplies to Gage in Boston, in April, 1775, 
the Committee of Sixty resolved to forbid such shipments. 
Although two merchants fell victim immediately to the ban, 
two others, Ralph Thurman and Robert Harding, deter-
mined to defy the committee. Sears, John Lamb, and Marinus 
Willett rallied the people to compel the two merchants to 
abide by the committee's resolution. Alarmed by the threats 
of the British Barrack Master General to take himself and 
his contracts elsewhere, the mayor and petty merchants 
importuned the government to intervene.10 Although the 
council voted to have Colden issue a proclamation against 
interference with commerce, William Smith prevailed upon 
his colleagues to launch an inquiry into the matter in order 
to "know the Truth, & have solid Grounds to act upon." 
The council lost its opportunity to investigate the matter 
because some councilors underestimated the hostility of the 
people. After hearing the testimony of Barrack Master 
General Brigadier General James Robertson, some members 
of the council implied to Mayor Hicks that the governor 
and council wished him to arrest Sears and Willett. The 
Mayor obligingly had the two men brought before him. 
Willett gave bail, but Sears refused to do so on the ground 
that the arrest was "a violation of liberty." When the officers 
of justice arrived at the jail with their prisoner, they had to 
9 N.Y.]., February 16, 1775 and Pa. jour., February 20, 1775. A squib in 
the N.Y.G., February 20, 1775 stated that the jury foreman did not present 
the address to the court nor read it to the court. The association text is in 
Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants, p. 612. 
10 Ibid., p. 388; Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 162-63. Gen-
eral Robertson said he had spent £260,000 in his department, presumably 
since 1765. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 219-20. 
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surrender him to a party of his friends who had gathered 
hurriedly to rescue him. The release became a triumphal 
procession, with colors flying, through the town to the 
Liberty Pole. According to prior notice, a multitude of 
people had assembled at the Pole to adopt a decision on the 
violation of the exportation interdict. Although Mayor 
Hicks and all the bailiffs had come to this meeting, Sears 
underscored their helplessness when he asked the audience 
"whether a Son of Liberty ought to give bail or not?" Upon 
hearing the question carried in the negative, the assemblage 
gave three huzzas. The intended show of authority ended 
in defeat for the government and exposed it to the contempt 
of the people.11 Although Anglican churchman Dr. Samuel 
Auchmuty could declare disgustedly that "our magistrates 
have not the spirit of a louse," there was little else they could 
do.12 The British had reduced the garrison to slightly more 
than l 00 men in order to reinforce Gage in Boston and could 
not rely upon the city militia, as coming events would soon 
prove. In Tryon County the Tory Johnson family depended 
upon their Highlander tenantry to intimidate and overawe 
the Whig farmers, but in the city to whom could the 
administration look for aid?13 The Sears incident dramati-
cally revealed how public opinion had shifted since the 
preceding December. 
At the close of December, 1774, however, an incident 
occurred which exposed the Whigs' weakness. Andrew Elliot, 
Collector of the port, seized a shipment of British manu-
factured arms imported in the Lady Gage.14 As the customs 
11 Ibid.; "Anti-Licentiousness" to the Printer, Riv. Gaz., April 20, 1775; To 
the Inhabitants of the City and County of New York, April 13, 1775, Broad-
sides, NYPL; Berthold Fernow, ed., "Calendar of Council Minutes, 1668-1783," 
New York State Library Bulletin 58 (March, 1902), p. 505. 
12 Auchmuty to Captain Montresor, April 19, 1775 in Pa. ]our., May 31, 
1775. Auchmuty hopefully predicted "That it will not be long before he 
[Sears] is handled by authority." 
13 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 202; Flick, History of New 
York, Ill, 335; Samuel L. Frey, ed., The Minute Book of the Committee of 
Safety of Tryon County (New York, 1905), pp. 7, 11. 
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officers carted the arms to the custom house, a small party 
of Whigs fell on the officials and carried off the wagons. 
Before they could secrete the weapons, however, a larger body 
of royal officials recovered them and eventually put the cargo 
aboard a man-of-war. A broadside, appearing over the pseu-
donym "Plain English," arraigned Elliot for acting arbitrarily 
and exhorted the people to assemble and demand the arms. 
The Collector denied the charge and challenged "Plain 
English" to come to the Coffee House to present a bill of 
particulars. The Tories rallied a considerable number of 
people, including merchants, shipmasters, seamen, and citi-
zenry, to Elliot's defense. When the Collector demanded 
that the broadside's author step forward, there was no re-
sponse and the crowd gave three cheers for Elliot The 
Whigs could not win enough support to regain the arms.15 
But between December and April the change in public senti-
ment might have stimulated forebodings about the future. 
Further inflammatory acts or news might lead to a crisis. 
The crisis immediately followed the Sears affair. The grim 
tidings of Lexington reached New York about 2 P.M. Sunday, 
April 23, 1775, by an express rider from Connecticut and 
two ships from Newport. Hastily convening in response to 
the emergency, the Committee of Sixty met at 4 P.M. amid 
the general confusion and took important preliminary steps. 
14 The destination of the arms was Rhode Island. Elliot confiscated the 
weapons when they were being loaded aboard a coasting vessel because the 
Lady Gage's captain had no cockets for the shipment. Furthermore, a 
British order-in-council forbade the colonial importation of arms and am-
munition without a license from the Privy Council. Just prior to this incident 
Colden transmitted to Elliot Dartmouth's instructions on such matters. 
Colden to Elliot, December 15, 1774, Colden to Dartmouth, January 4, 1775, 
Letterbooks of Cadwallader Colden, New-York Historical Society Collections, 
X (New York, 1877), II, 376, 377-78; A Short Detail of the Conduct of the 
Collector of New York from December 1774 to March 1776 ... , Andrew 
Elliot Papers, NYSL. 
15 Isaac Q. Leake, Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb 
(Albany, 1857), pp. 95-96; Riv. Gaz., January 5, I 775. 
An unknown person or persons filed suit against the Collector in I 775 but 
the closing of the courts blocked the action. A Short Detail . . . of the 
Collector . . . , Andrew Elliot Papers, NYSL. 
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They dispatched the express to Philadelphia with the news, 
ordered the unloading of two sloops with provisions for the 
British troops in Boston, sent after a ship that was in motion 
down the harbor for the same destination, prepared a broad-
side containing the advices from Boston, and notified the 
citizenry of a public meeting in the fields at 2 P.M., Monday, 
the following day.16 The Committee of Sixty gained control 
of the situation, but the tremendous upsurge of hostility to 
the British ministry caused many of the committee to 
reassess their position. 
The outpouring of the people on April 24 played a part 
in the shift of the committee from the enforcement of a 
boycott to the usurpation of authority. An estimated 8,000 
of the city's population responded to the call for a meeting. 
The rally approved proposals to organize a militia, to draw 
up a new defense association (a draft of which the committee 
read), and to authorize the committee "with full & unlimited 
Power to consult upon and determine & direct the means" 
for the city's preservation. By voting unanimously for the 
last of these proposals the people had in fact created a revolu-
tionary government for the cityP The size and enthusiasm 
of the crowd and the policies approved may have aroused the 
committee to a realization of the need for a new approach. 
16 Activist leaders had broken into the city's arsenal to secure arms but 
McDougall persuaded them to cease their distribution for a day. McDougall's 
notations, n.d., The Following interesting Advices were this Day received 
here, by two Vessels from Newport, and by an Express by !-and, New York, 
April 23, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL; New York, New York City During the 
American Revolution. Being a Collection of Original Papers (Now First 
Published) from the Manuscripts in the Possession of the Mercantile Library 
Association of New York City (New York, 1861), pp. 54-55; Roger J. Cham-
pagne, "New York's Radicals and the Coming of Independence," journal of 
American History, LI (June, 1964), 21-40; Roger J. Champagne, "New York 
Politics and Independence, 1776," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, 
XLVI (July, 1962), 281-303. For a contrary view of these and the subsequent 
events, see Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 193-99. 
The "fields" are now City Hall Park. New York, New York City During 
the American Revolution, pp. 25-26. 
17 Pa. jour., April 26, 1775: McDougall's notations, Following interesting 
Advices ... by Land, April 23, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. McDougall opposed 
the appointment of officers for the militia. 
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The British conduct in Massachusetts was not only a shat-
tering blow to many of the De Lanceys but also it was another 
one of those actions which diminished old party differences 
and tended to convert people into Whigs and Tories. Per-
haps in response to the electric atmosphere as well as to 
personal indignation against the British many De Lanceys 
openly espoused defensive preparation and supported the 
tacit assumption of power in the city by the Committee of 
Sixty.18 Within the Committee of Sixty these trends forced 
a realignment in which some Livingstons and the De Lanceys 
allied against other Livingstons. The coalition consisted of 
erstwhile opponents who wished to pursue a cautious opposi-
tion to the British ministry but who disagreed among them-
selves over the nature of their circumspect resistance. Basi-
cally there were among them many who would carry their 
hostility up to that point which in their minds led to rebel-
lion and independence. When they thought this stage had 
arrived, they would submit to Great Britain. These men 
were conservatives. There were others who as a last resort 
reluctantly took up arms as the least objectionable of twin 
evils, submission or rebellion. These were the moderates. 
The minority who fought the conservative-moderate com-
bine were the activists, men who would settle for nothing 
less than complete retreat by Britain, who would willingly 
embrace rebellion and independence.19 These were the radi-
cals.20 Although this process of division was far from com-
plete, it shaped the occurrences of April and May. 
18 Judge Robert R. Livingston informed his wife on April 27, "the Tories 
turn Whigs so fast that they will soon be as much united as they are in the 
Massachusetts colony." William Smith observed on the same day that "all 
Parties here ... cry out for committees and Congresses .... " Isaac N. P. 
Stokes, The Iconography of Manhattan Island (6 vols.; New York, 1915-1928), 
IV, 883; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 222. 
19 For different usage of the same terminology see Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, passim. 
20 The touchstone which underlies the usage of these terms (conservative, 
moderate, radical) is the question of rebellion-independence. These words 
are not intended to denote general values, nor do they imply that each 
category is monolithic. For example, there are perhaps as many variants of 
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When the Committee of Sixty on April 26 recommended 
to the city its enlargement in function and numbers and the 
summoning of a provincial congress, the new political affini-
ties quickly made themselves felt. Although the committee 
declared that it unanimously adopted these proposals, the 
unanimity rapidly dissolved in a conflict over the personnel 
of the projected city Committee of One Hundred and the 
city delegation to the Provincial Congress. Since the con-
servatives and moderates dominated the Sixty, they filled the 
nomination lists with men ~f similar stripe.21 There were 
conservatism as there are conservatives and this qualification applies also to 
the other two categories. Obviously, some in one group are closer to persons 
in the adjacent classification than they are to others who bear their label. 
Moderate John Jay illustrates this point. His views of the imperial conflict 
in 1774-1775 were more nearly similar to those of conservative Isaac Low 
than they were to those of moderate Philip Livingston. Furthermore, there 
were many men whose opinions gradually changed, who were conservatives 
in 1774 but who were moderates in 1776. James Duane exemplifies this 
process of almost invisible transition, moving from condemnation of vigorous 
resistance in 1774-1775 to acceptance of independence. Since contemporaries 
did not consider themselves as being conservatives, radicals, and moderates, 
the preceding categorization is an artificial imposition of present ideology 
on the past. However, it serves the purpose of facilitating the grouping of 
people in relation to one issue in order to clarify their political differences. 
21 A tentative analysis of the two slates suggests the existence of a quid 
pro quo by means of which the conservatives and moderates cemented their 
union. The ticket for the Committee of One Hundred contained forty-five 
known to be De Lanceys and thirteen others who perhaps were of that fac-
tion; of the remaining forty-two men, there were thirty-six Livingstons (in-
cluding activists) and six possible Livingstons. The list of twenty candidates 
for the Provincial Congress is made up of nine known De Lanceys and one 
who perhaps was of the same persuasion; of the remaining ten men, nine 
were known Livingstons and one was possibly a Livingston. It seems that the 
De Lanceys traded an even division or a numerical majority of the congres-
sional delegation for a majority of the city committee. 
On the Provincial Congress ticket the following were Livingstons: L. 
Lispenard, I. Roosevelt, A. Brasher, A. McDougall, P.V.B. Livingston, J. M. 
Scott, T. Smith, J. Hallett, J. Van Cortlandt, and possibly David Clarkson. 
On the city committee slate the following were Livingstons: Philip 
Livingston, P.V.B. Livingston, Sears, McDougall, T. Randall, L. Lispenard, 
J. Broome, J. Hallett, P. T. Curtenius, A. Brasher, A. P. Lott, A. Duryee, 
F. Lewis, H. Mulligan, V. Bicker, T. Anthony, W. Goforth, W. Denning, I. 
Roosevelt, J. Platt, C. Sands, R. Benson, N. Roosevelt, R. Ritzema, J. Lasher, 
J. Van Zandt, D. Beekman, E. Bancker, R. Ray, J. Lamb, D. Phoenix, and 
D. Dunscomb. Additional possible Livingstons were: D. Clarkson, G. Keteltas, 
C. Clopper, J. Lefferts, A. Brinckerhoff, and P. Byvanck. Ibid., pp. 197-98 nn.; 
Thomas Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War, and of 
the Leading Events in the Other Colonies at that Period, ed. Edward F. de 
Lancey (2 vols.; New York, 1879), I, 488-89; John A. Stevens, Jr., ed., Colonial 
Division into Tory and Whig 73 
perhaps twenty radicals on the ticket for the One Hundred 
and three to six out of the twenty for the congressional 
deputation.22 Responding to criticisms of its nominations, 
the moderate-conservative group frankly explained that it 
sought to add "many of weight and consequence" in order 
to reduce opposition to committee measures. Some of the 
nominees, the coalition admitted, were "objects of distrust 
and suspicion" but Whigs ought not to exclude them unless 
they rejected the Whigs. Lastly, this broadside warned of 
"tumult, anarchy and confusion" if the populace did not 
elect an enlarged committee.23 
The moderate-conservatives' maneuvers put the radicals 
in a difficult position. On the one hand the radicals objected 
to many of the candidates but on the other hand the slates 
bore the official imprimatur of the Sixty, who had popular 
backing. If the radicals offered opposition nominations, in 
whose name could they be put up? The radicals resolved 
their dilemma by sponsoring a meeting Thursday afternoon, 
April 27, in the name of the Sons of Liberty; at that meeting 
they obtained approval of their own nominees for the Com-
mittee of One Hundred and the Provincial Congress.24 On 
Records of the New York Chamber of Commerce, 1768·1784 (New York, 
1867), passim; Harrington, The New York Merchant, pp. 338, 348-51. 
22 The twenty radicals on the city committee slate were: P .V.B. Livingston, 
Sears, Randall, Lispenard, Broome, Hallett, Brasher, Lott, Duryee, Lewis, 
Mulligan, Bicker, Anthony, Goforth, Platt, Lasher, Scott, Van Zandt, Lamb, 
and Dunscomb. Of these men, there were a number whose views were not 
clear. McDougall, for example, began to move toward a center position. 
The radicals on the congressional ticket were Lispenard, Brasher, Mc-
Dougall, P.V.B. Livingston, Scott, and Hallett. This classification is uncertain, 
since the radicals struck Brasher and Hallett from their congressional list 
of candidates. See below, note 25, the slate of the Sons of Liberty. Becker, 
The History of Political Parties, pp. 197-98nn. 
23 Peter Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1837-
1853), 4th ser., II, 400, 427-28. 
24Sons of Liberty, New York, April 28, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. An earlier 
broadside implied the continued existence of the Sons: The Following 
Anonymous Letter was some Nights Ago thrown in among the Sons of 
Liberty, 1775, ibid.; Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the American Revolu-
tion (New York, 1939), pp. 287-88; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the 
American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill, 1941), p. 79, n. 41. 
Revival of the name of the Sons of Liberty seems to have had the objective 
of broadening the appeal of the radical ticket since merchants were prominent 
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the list of one hundred that the Sons of Liberty offered, only 
twenty-one differed from the moderate-conservative ticket, 
but these were substitutes for men who had not served on 
previous committees.25 On the Provincial Congress list, the 
radicals backed only eight of the Sixty's choice, substituting 
twelve of their own choosing.26 
Confronted with an opposing slate, the moderates and 
conservatives took to the press to justify their selection. Thus 
on Friday, the twenty-eighth, New Yorkers were reading the 
handbills both of the Sons of Liberty and of the Committee 
of Sixty which drew the lines of political strife. The Sixty 
had set Friday for the election, but apparently as a conse-
quence of the opposition, their Friday broadside postponed 
the voting to Monday, May 1. 
These political debates became even more complicated 
after the arrival of the Pennsylvania journal on Friday. The 
newspaper contained an extract of a letter from London 
which stated that Oliver De Lancey, John Watts, Myles 
Cooper, Henry White, and Colden had requested the North 
government to dispatch troops to New York to regain control 
participants in the old organization. If the radicals offered their slate in the 
name of the Committee of Mechanics, they could hardly hope to attract many 
votes from the merchants. 
25 The twenty-one substitutes were: T. Van Wyck, J. Woodward, John W. 
Smith, W. Keteltas, J. Pell, L. Van Ranst, P. Vandervoort, P. Clopper, J. 
Imlay, G. Abeel, P. P. Van Zandt, Capt. W. Heyer, T. Tucker, J. Le Roy, 
R. Deane, Capt. Nicholas Bogart, W. Bedlow, W. Post, I. Stoutenburgh, A. 
Marschalk, and P. Messier. Since it is likely that most of these men were 
radicals, the number of radicals on the Sons of Liberty ticket was between 
thirty and forty. If all of the twenty-one substitutes were Livingstons, the 
factional division of the radical slate was fifty-one Livingstons, forty-nine 
De Lanceys. Sons of Liberty, New York, April 28, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
26The twelve substitutes were: G. W. Ludlow, P.V.B. Livingston, J. 
Broome, W. Bedlow, Sears, J. Woodward, Hugh Hughes, J. W. Smith, P. T. 
Curtenius, P. Vandervoort, S. Broome, and P. Clopper. Perhaps eight to 
thirteen of the twenty-man list were radicals. Thirteen of the slate are clearly 
Livingstons (Lispenard, Roosevelt, P.V.B. Livingston, J. and S. Broome, 
McDougall, Sears, T. Smith, Scott, H. Hughes, J. Van Cortlandt, Curtenius, 
and Van Zandt) and one (G. W. Ludlow) is clearly a De Lancey. The other 
six (D. Clarkson, W. Bedlow, J. Woodward, J. W. Smith, P. Vandervoort, 
and P. Clopper) are probably not De Lanceys but are assignable to both 
factions. Sons of Liberty, New York, April 28, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
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of the colony. A furious crowd gathered which threatened 
"to proceed to execute them immediately." White and De 
Lancey did their utmost to assure the people of the falsity 
of the letter, but without notable success. So high did tem-
pers rise that the Committee of Sixty summoned a meeting 
on that day in the fields with two of the accused in attend-
ance. Denials from White and De Lancey and their pledge 
to swear out affidavits attesting their innocence satisfied the 
crowd and averted the threat of violence. The next day the 
Sixty promulgated the new form of association and De 
Lancey, White, and Watts produced the promised affidavits. 
The excitement over the association eased the tension and 
the Tories heard no more threats.27 
Publication of the new association by the Committee of 
Sixty dealt the radicals a shrewd political blow. The firm 
tone of the oath not only reassured the Whigs of the com-
mittee's steadfastness but also demonstrated the adroitness 
of the conservatives and moderates. The moderates carried 
the election. The caution with which the new committee 
moved can be attributed to the natural prudence of the coali-
tion. Although the committee contained a diversity of poli-
tical views, to assert that it was an instrument of party rather 
than of a large proportion of the people is to ignore the fore-
going events.28 
Impressive testimony of the minority position of the Tories 
in the city comes from the Tories themselves.29 The gov-
27 Pa. ]our., April 26, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 222. 
White went to the trouble of having his statement and affidavit printed as a 
broadside and distributed. To the Public by Henry White, New York, April 
29, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
28 Becker sees this as a party measure; The History of Political Parties, p. 
196. 
29 However, McDougall had quite accurately predicted how the people 
would react in a crisis: "from the Knowledge I have of the State of this 
Colony, I am morally certain, they will not fly to Arms as a Colony; but by 
the Influence of one of these Contingencies Vizt: The Attack of the Troops 
on your People [i.e., Massachusetts] .... " McDougall toW. Cooper, February 
9, 1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
The Road to Independence 
ernor's council, meeting Monday, April 24, to assess the 
situation, called in various officials to inform them on specific 
points. The councilors first considered turning to the militia, 
but Leonard Lispenard, commander of the city's regiment, 
said no aid would come from that quarter since the men 
counted themselves as Liberty Boys. The Major then re-
marked that the authority of the magistrates had vanished. 
Councilor Thomas Jones, nevertheless, advocated calling 
out the militia, reading the riot act, and imprisoning the 
ringleaders. William Smith, opposing Jones, argued that the 
government would have to deal with the general population 
and not just a few rioters. To this, Jones had no rebuttal. 
"We were thus unanimously of Opinion," Smith recorded 
in his memoirs, "that we had no power to do anything & the 
best mode of proceeding for private Safety and general Peace 
was to use Diswasion from Violence."30 
Colden also confessed to the complete collapse of the 
government's authority. In his report to the Colonial Secre-
tary, Colden attributed the lack of popular support for the 
government to the magistrates' till1idity and the depletion 
of the garrison. A month later, however, he declared that 
government authority would have withstood the storm if the 
garrison had been at its normal strength.31 Captain Monta-
gue of the King's Fisher wrote with something akin to aston-
ishment that "the major part of the people here are almost 
in a state of rebellion .... "32 One of the numerous letters 
from New York printed in a London newspaper commented 
that "in this city it is astonishing to find the most violent 
30 Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 221; Jones, History of New York 
During the Revolutionary War, I, 41; Fernow, "Calendar of Council Minutes," 
p. 505. 
31 Colden to Dartmouth, May 3, June 7, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, 
Colonial, New York, VIII, 571, 582; Colden to Captain Vandeput, May 27, 
1775, Letterbooks of Cadwallader Colden, II, 413. 
32 Montague to Admiral Graves, April 26, 1775, Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 358. 
See also the comment of a post office official, Hugh Finlay to his brother, 
:\fay 29, 1775, ibid., p. 366. 
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proposals meeting with universal approbation."33 Merchant 
James Richardson explained the latest developments to his 
business correspondent in London with these words: "Friends 
of government in this city in danger and business suspended; 
port now re-opened and the whole city entered into an 
association to abide the measures recommended by the next 
Congress. All unanimous for the American cause."34 
Even a fully manned garrison might have had difficulty in 
maintaining the government, particularly in view of the 
revolutionaries' relations with the soldiers. The Whigs 
effectively utilized the press to appeal to the soldiery to desert 
and join the cause of liberty. Although only four men 
deserted from May l to May 23, in the next three days four 
more went over to the rebels. Major Isaac Hamilton ex-
pressed to Colden his fear of losing the whole garrison. Ten 
days later Hamilton confessed to Colden that his position 
was untenable: "The Loss of our Men by Desertion is so 
great, and [due to] the Apprehension of losing more, I there-
fore think it necessary for the good of the Service to retreat 
on Board his Majesty's Ship the Asia .... " The British with-
drew the troops, about I 00 in all, to the Asia on June 6. The 
retreat, therefore, did not constitute a peaceful gesture to 
avoid an armed clash between the soldiers and citizenry.35 
The same month, June, which saw the garrison's evacua-
tion, also witnessed another incident of some significance. 
33 Letter from New York, May 4, 1775, Margaret W. Willard, ed., Letters 
on the American Revolution, 1774·1776 (Boston, 1925), p. 101. See also simi· 
lar letters, May 1, 4, 1775, ibid., pp. 97, 99-100. 
34 Richardson to Alexander Gordon, May 4, 1775, Hist. Mss. Com., p. 299. 
For a similar comment see Smith Ramadge to Johnston and Canning, May 3, 
1775, ibid., p. 298. 
35 As stated in Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 218-19; Gage 
to Barrington, May 13, 1775, Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Correspondence of 
General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, and with the War Office 
and the Treasury, 1763-1775 (2 vols.; New Haven, 1931, 1933), II, 678-79; Ma-
jor Isaac Hamilton to Colden, May 26, June 5, 1775, Letters and Papers of 
Cadwallader Colden, New-York Historical Society Collections, LVI (New 
York, 1922), VII, 297, 299-300; Colden to Dartmouth, June 7, 1775, O'Callag-
han, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 582; To the Regular Soldiery 
of Great Britain, New York, May 1, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
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As noted above, Tryon returned from England on the same 
day Washington reached the city on his way to Massachusetts. 
Not wishing to offend either party, the Provincial Congress 
detailed militia escorts for both. Ostensibly, the same people 
who greeted the General enthusiastically in the afternoon 
"huzzaed for Tryon in the evening." Smith clarified this 
apparently contradictory action when he put it down as a 
personal tribute to the Governor rather than a manifestation 
of attachment to the crown. The citizens "hate his com-
mission," Smith recorded in his notes, "& would certainly 
have insulted any other in that station."36 
Demographic statistics contribute a final bit of evidence to 
this examination of the city's political sympathies. Although 
population statistics for 1776 are only estimates, they do give 
some clue to the political temper of the people. Driven by 
fear of the cannon's thunder, thousands of the inhabitants 
streamed out of the city. Some of them returned after the 
danger had seemed to abate, but by February, 1776, perhaps 
11,000 had settled elsewhere.37 When news of the impending 
descent of the British spread through the streets, a wholesale 
evacuation of the populace got under way, leaving approxi-
mately 5,000 behind. After the fighting had halted in the 
environs, the tide of migration reversed itself. Of the esti-
36 Smith says that an "immense crowd" gave Tryon a warm sendoff when 
he sailed in April, 1774. Smith, Memoirs, V, April 7, 1774. Becker, The 
History of Political Parties, p. 218; Smith, Memoirs, V, June 25, 1775. 
37 William Axtel, council member, placed the remaining population at 
16,000. Smith, Memoirs, V, February II, 1776. 
Calculations of the city's population in 1776 have used the rate of 
increase between the censuses of 1756 and 1771 as their basis. Their estimates 
ranged from 22,000 to 25,000 people, white and Negro. However, this study 
has employed a figure of 25,000 whites and 2,000 Negroes which in turn 
derived from an estimated state total of 208,000 whites. Since the port 
maintained a fairly constant ratio of ca. 12 percent of the total population 
of li56 and 1771, this ratio has been applied to the calculation of total white 
population. For the computation of the total white population, see below, 
pp. 92-93. Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, American Popula-
tion Before the Federal Census of 1790 (New York, 1932), p. 91; Carl Briden-
baugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 (New York, 1955), 
p. 216. 
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mated 22,000 who had fled, some 4,000 made their way back 
through the British lines into the city.38 General Robertson 
calculated the city's inhabitants in February, 1777, at 11,000, 
but this figure probably included loyalists from upstate and 
other states as well as a number of slaves who thought to find 
freedom with the British.39 Far from remaining overwhelm-
ingly loyal, considerably more than half of New York City's 
residents opposed the crown.40 
To argue that the capital was a center of revolutionary 
activity is not to conclude that a majority of the province 
chose independence rather than British dominion. As in the 
case of the city there are no election returns to demonstrate 
how many supported the revolutionary cause and how many 
opposed it throughout the colony. Expressions of Tory 
opinion and indirect evidence, however, corroborate the 
existence of a Whig majority. 
As the year 1774 drew to a close the government faced the 
unpleasant fact that the Whigs would move to have the 
colony nominate representatives to attend the Second Con-
tinental Congress. If the provincial assembly met, it would 
take into consideration the resolutions of the First Congress 
and the choice of a delegation to the Second. If the governor 
prorogued the assembly, the Whigs would win by default. 
The government, therefore, had no alternative but to permit 
38 Oscar T. Barck, Jr., New York City During the War for Independence 
(New York, 1931), p. 76. On the basis of the number who signed the loyalist 
welcome to Howe, Barck estimated the loyalist following in the city at 9,000. 
Ibid., p. 77, n. 10. See also Flick, History of New York, IV, 261; Edward P. 
Alexander, A Revolutionary Conservative: ]ames Duane of New York (New 
York, 1938), p. 156; Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels: 
New York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948), p. 99. 
39 An undated, unidentified sheet in the Andrew Elliot Papers contains 
what seems to be a census return for perhaps 1779 or I 780 which approxi-
mates Robertson's statement. The city contained 4,686 white males and 5,771 
white females, none of whom were under fourteen years of age, and 1,951 
Negroes; the total was 12,408. Elliot Papers, NYSL; Barck, New York City, 
p. 77; Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 103; Flick, History of 
New York, III, 346; Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary 
War, I, 322-23. 
40 See Flick, Loyalism, p. 181. 
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the assembly to meet and to seek to win through parlia-
mentary maneuver. Although the issue hung in the balance, 
the De Lancey party leaders regarded the prospect with fore-
boding, while the Whigs maintained an optimistic outlook.41 
At a private conference summoned to devise strategy, leading 
Tories first discussed whether they should block assembly 
approval of the acts of Congress. Tactics of this sort, how-
ever, would lay the government open to a charge of arbitrary 
conduct. Convinced that they could muster only 11 votes 
to the Whigs' 14 on the questi!Jn of congressional endorse-
ment, the Tories prepared to concede to the Whigs on an-
other question in order to detach votes from the opposition. 
They would move for a petition to the King for a redress of 
grievances. "The Generality [was] for this Measure as the 
only Scheme to prevent voting in Favor of the Congress."42 
If the government could win this test, they could go on to 
defeat a motion to choose delegates to the Second Congress.43 
It is an instructive comment on the state of opinion in the 
colony that a De Lancey assembly elected by a limited suf-
frage should be expected to take a stand in opposition to the 
crown. 
At this critical juncture of affairs Colden decided to take 
41 For a differing interpretation, see Becker, The History of Political 
Parties, pp. 174-75. The radicals did have a keen interest in the assembly's 
action. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 208; McDougall to Samuel 
Adams, January 29, 1775, same to W. Cooper, February 9, 1775, McDougall 
Papers, NYHS. 
42 It is curious that party leader James De Lancey opposed the proposal 
to make the petition to the King the first order of business, although he 
approved the petition. Moving the petition immediately would prepare the 
ground for defeating the Whigs. Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, p. 208. 
Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison, 1940), p. 76, cites 
the assembly"s disapproval of the Congress as evidence of strong opposition to 
the Congress. 
43 Even though the Tories moved the petitions to King and Parliament, 
the drafts produced in committee proved to lJe too forceful for their taste. 
The Whigs charged the Tories with withholding emasculating amendments 
until some Whig members had left the session to return home. The sub-
sequent addresses, they asserted, differed materially from the drafts approved 
in committee. McDougall to Josiah Quincy, April 16, 1775, McDougall 
Papers, NYHS; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 177. 
For the assembly votes, see above, p. 52. 
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an aggressive tone in his message to the legislature and drew 
up a strong, provocative address in which he condemned the 
Continental Congress and insisted upon the supremacy of the 
royal prerogative. After receiving persistent criticism from 
the council, Colden modified the draft, but Smith said it 
shocked the assembly nevertheless. This incident points up 
Colden's willingness to act boldly, but Smith's memoirs make 
clear the complexity of the interplay between council and 
governor. A governor could not cavalierly disregard the 
council's advice. Colden's and the council's failure to act 
decisively on various occasions reflected more an acknowledg-
ment of their lack of power with which to execute firm 
policies than personal timidity.44 
In the middle of March, 1775, instructions from Dart-
mouth came to hand directing Colden to prohibit the prov-
ince from sending delegates to the Second Continental Con-
gress. Since the assembly had voted against doing so, the 
Whigs set out to call a provincial convention to choose the 
continental deputies. In fact, the Whigs had scheduled an 
election for March 15 to approve the convening of the con-
vention. Two days prior to this election, Colden met with 
the council to consider the Colonial Secretary's orders. Al-
though normal procedure entailed the issuance of a procla-
mation conveying the Secretary's instructions, neither Colden 
nor the council relished the idea. "All agreed that it would 
excite the People to be more zealous for Delegates." At 
Smith's suggestion they determined to have Colden show the 
letter to the assembly and to inform others that a congress 
displeased the King and that Dartmouth had forbidden it.45 
Although the Friends of Government had exulted only re-
cently over their victory on this question in the assembly, 
they watched it turn into a paper triumph. So little effect 
44 See Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 193 and n. 3; Sabine, 
Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 205-6; Fernow, "Calendar of Council Minutes," 
p. 503. 
45 Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 212-13. 
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did Dartmouth's letter have on colonial opinion that the 
government did not dare to take the next logical step and 
forbid the assumed minority to select representatives for the 
Continental Congress. 
When Tryon resumed the reins of government in June, 
1775, he perceived he could do little directly to reestablish 
British authority. As he disclosed to the Colonial Secretary, 
"to attempt coercive measures by the civil aid would hold 
up government to additional contempt by the exposure of 
the weakness of the executive and civil branches .... " More-
over, he added, even the provincial legislature would not 
accept the parliamentary measure for conciliation.45 By Octo-
ber the Governor seemed to have relinquished hope that 
Tory sentiment could ever again command a majority in 
New York; he read and approved a letter from William 
Smith to General Frederick Haldimand which quite frankly 
outlined the political atmosphere: "There is no more Hope 
from Intrigue & Diversity of Sentiment, no further De-
pendance upon antient Prejudice and Habits. The Ameri-
cans are voluntary Subjects to Congresses and Armies of their 
own forming, who are systematically supporting a Principle, 
which no man dare any longer to controvert on this Side of 
the Water."47 
46 Tryon to Dartmouth, July 4, 7, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, 
New York, VIII, 589, 593; same to same, December 7, 1775, Hist. Mss. Com., 
p. 402. 
The fact that the Governor with council concurrence refused to let the 
assembly meet during 1775 implies admission of the government's minority 
position. 
47 Smith, Memoirs, V, October 6, 1775. Smith declined a seat on the bench 
in December, 1775, because he considered the administration "a falling 
house." Ibid., December 19, 1775. 
A correspondent of emigre Isaac Wilkins made the following interesting 
observation on political polarization: "The people of desperate fortunes, and 
those who are sure to swing for what they have done, are as violent as ever, 
as are most of the ignorant, who are led by the others, but those of prosperity 
are afraid of their estates, and are coming about fast." V. Pearse Ashfield to 
Wilkins, November 4, 1775, Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 482. For other comments 
on Tory weakness see Hugh Finlay to his brother, May 29, 1775, John De 
Lancey to Oliver De Lancey, Jr., October 3, 1775, same to Ralph Izard, 
October 5, 1775, ibid., pp. 366, 439, 443. 
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The employment of troops to suppress the Whigs in the 
province received extensive consideration by local officials, 
but Colden warned the ministry to dispatch a large enough 
number "as might deter any Opposition to them." When 
the military proposed to march troops through New York to 
recapture Ticonderoga from the Aliens, the Lieutenant-
Governor advised Gage that "the Spirit and Phrensey of the 
People is such that it may be questioned whether one Regt 
could now prudently venture thro' the Country.''48 Tryon's 
estimate of the number of soldiers necessary to pacify the 
colony furnished a further clue to the state of political sym-
pathies. He thought that more than 6,000 regulars aided by 
three or four regiments of loyalists would have to be uti-
lized.49 
Although the Whigs had taken the initiative in evolving 
suitable forms to oppose the policies of the home govern-
ment, the Tories had not countered effectively. In the con-
test for men's loyalties the Tories did not manage to set up 
an active organization that could command a numerous fol-
lowing.50 When the occasion demanded it, they engaged the 
48 Colden to Gage, May 31, 1775, Letterbooks of Cadwallader Colden, II, 
415. 
By August, 1775, both Gage and Dartmouth thought New York lost to the 
government as a consequence of the Tories' minority position. Gage to 
Dartmouth, August 20, 1775, Dartmouth to Gage, August 2, 1775, Carter, 
Correspondence of General Gage, I, 413-14, II, 205. 
49 Tryon to Dartmouth, August 7, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, 
New York, VIII, 598. See also John Weatherhead to Charles Williamos, July 
5, 1775, Hist. Mss. Com., p. 327. 
The North government ordered four regiments, ca. 2,800 men, to New York, 
but Gage intercepted the ships and diverted them to Boston. Vandeput to 
Colden, June l, 1775, Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, VII, 299; 
Gage to Lord Barrington, June 6, 1775, Carter, Correspondence of General 
Gage, II, 682; Smith, Memoirs, V, June 28, 1775. 
50 Becker argues; "In defining their position the loyalists were strong; it 
was in giving practical effect to their views that they were weak. They never 
had any party organization worthy of the name, and in the nature of the case 
it was difficult for them to have one. Their position was essentially one of 
negation: they denied the authority of Congress; they denied the expedience 
of non-intercourse; their organization was the English government itself, and 
upon it they relied to do whatever was necessary. To attempt to suppress 
the extra-legal committees by force would involve the very illegal methods 
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dissidents vigorously in several spheres of battle. They raked 
the Whigs heavily in the newspapers and in pamphlets; they 
battered them in the assembly. They obstructed the forma-
tion of local and county committees; they voted against hold-
ing a provincial convention.51 They fought against the selec-
tion of delegates to the Continental Congress and opposed 
the enforcement of the Continental Association and the De-
fense· Association. They stood for the established order of 
things and obedience to the law.52 When words and ballots 
seemed inadequate, the Tories did not hesitate to try 
suppression. 53 
Reverend Samuel Seabury participated in this phase of the 
contest. In a pamphlet directed to the colonial assembly, he 
called upon the legislature to denounce the Continental 
Congress and the Continental Association and to refuse to 
cooperate further with the other colonies. Majority approval 
of this policy, he declared, would be forthcoming from the 
people when the assembly delivered them from the tyranny 
of committees, from the fear of violence and the dread of 
mobs. However, he gave no hint h<?w the assembly could 
against which they protested." Reprinted with permission of the copyright 
owners, the Regents of the University of Wisconsin, from Carl L. Becker, 
The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 
(Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1909), pp. 160-61. 
51 Ibid., pp. 201-3. 
52 A protest in Orange County against signing the Defense Association 
presents an interesting commentary on the extent to which the debate over 
political rights had spread through the countryside. Thirty-two recalcitrants 
drew up a substitute statement in which they reaffirmed their loyalty to the 
King but protested their love of liberty, "disallowing texation in any wise 
contrary to the Charter, and shall neaver consent to texsation without being 
fully represented with out consent." See also a similar espousal of no taxation 
without representation by a district committee in Tryon County in 1774. 
Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 9; Frey, The Minute Book, p. l. 
53 See above, pp. 65-69, 81-82, the ship ]ames incident in February, Dart-
mouth's order of March re delegates to the Congress, the arrest of Sears in 
April, and the actions of the Johnsons in May. Set on foot by Dr. Myles 
Cooper, a move began in March to ban a Whig meeting in the city, but gov-
ernment leaders seem to have divided on the proposal and did nothing. To 
the Freemen and Freeholders of ... New York, September 23, 1775, by 
"The Remembrancer," Broadsides, NYPL; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 211. 
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accomplish these objectives. A statute forbidding commit-
tees would have entailed the use of force to suppress them. 
Perhaps Seabury intended this, since he pleaded with the 
legislature to "break up this horrid combination of seditious 
men." 54 
These events do not disprove, however, the contention 
that the Tories by the very nature of their position did not 
need nor could not have had an extensive party structure. 
The conduct of the Friends of Government in other circum-
stances will demonstrate whether they did try to rally the 
people to their side. 
When the Whigs plunged into the task of obtaining local 
approval of the Continental Association in the first months of 
1775, they stirred the Tories into brisk opposition. In some 
districts the adversaries drew up loyalist declarations, in 
others they signed counterassociations. The latter usually 
contained a pledge to assist the magistrates in the execution 
of the law.55 Under the leadership of the Johnsons and 
Butlers, the grand jury and magistrates of the Tryon County 
Court of Quarter Sessions published a loyalist declaration. 
Shortly thereafter, in early May, the Palatine District com-
mittee denounced the declaration as unrepresentative of the 
county.56 The loyalist associations marked a new phase in 
Tory tactics, the attempted formation of a popular bulwark. 
The Tories seem to have concentrated their efforts in 
Westchester and Dutchess counties, but after three months 
they claimed a maximum of only 600 signatures to their 
association in Dutchess County. The lack of spirited response 
and Whig countermeasures apparently stalled the drive and 
the Friends of Government never revived it. 57 A similar fate 
54 Samuel Seabury, An Alarm to the Legislature of the Province of New 
York (New York, 1775), pp. 83, 88, 89. 
55 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 170-72; Schlesinger, The 
Colonial Merchants, p. 493; Dawson, Westchester County, pp. 43-45; N.Y.G., 
February 13, 1775; Riv. Gaz., February 16, March 2, April 6, 1775. 
56 Frey, The Minute Book, pp. 4-5. 
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overtook the Westchester campaign. Their rebuff is all the 
more surprising, since the county's greatest manorholder, 
Frederick Philipse, played a leading part among the Tories. 
On the other hand, Pierre Van Cortlandt of Cortlandt Manor 
aligned himself with the Whigs. "An Inhabitant" of this 
manor happily informed the public that "some lovers of 
Loyalty and Liberty" had "disconcerted" the loyalist associa-
tion drive there.58 Thus the Tory association movement 
lost momentum and died. 
If the Tory measures to build a popular base did not 
succeed, neither did the Whigs, according to some writers, 
attain that objective.59 Two key tests supply the criteria 
for the latter judgment: the election in April, 1775, for the 
provincial convention and the election in May, 1775, for the 
First Provincial Congress. Unfortunately, the surviving frag-
mentary evidence of participation in the balloting renders 
any conclusions tentative ones. However, a reexamination 
of certain contests suggests that the Whig influence pre-
dominated, although previous studies have given the primacy 
to the Tories. 
The cases in point in the provincial convention elections 
are Dutchess and Westchester counties. After the election in 
Dutchess, the Tories attacked the victorious Whig delegates 
as representatives of a minority. An anonymous correspon-
dent set down the Tory estimate of the county's sentiment, 
but gave figures for only one of the eleven Dutchess precincts. 
He said that the Poughkeepsie precinct balloted 110 to 77 
against sending delegates, that a "great majority" in Char- , 
lotte precinct voted similarly, that in five other precincts the 
57 "One of the Associators of Dutchess County," Riv. Gaz., March 30, 1775. 
The Tories circulated their association among all male inhabitants, not 
simply the freeholders. According to the 1771 census the county had 21,000 
whites. 
58 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 189 and n. 51; Dawson, 
Westchester County, p. 47; "An Inhabitant," Cortlandt Manor, N.Y.G., June 
19, 1775. 
59 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 187-91; Dawson, Westchester 
County, passim. 
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people "almost unanimously opposed" the convention. These 
supporters of royal administration approved a "Protest" 
against holding a provincial convention and denied that the 
remaining four precincts, which had voted Whig, spoke for 
the county. The writer of this letter felt so confident of his 
case that he offered to produce proof: "If any of the Minority 
entertain the least Doubt that the Protest does not express 
the Sense of the Precincts therein mentioned, formal and 
ample Testimonies of its Authenticity shall be sent you." 
"A Freeholder of Dutchess County" retorted that the Tories 
never read the "Protest" publicly, nor did any one of the 
seven precincts approve it before it appeared in print. 
Furthermore, this Whig "Freeholder," maintaining that 
1,200 of the 1,800 county freeholders favored a provincial 
convention, challenged the Friends of Government to print 
their list of names with precincts appended in order to pre-
vent fraud. After a two-week pause a Tory rejoinder ap-
peared, declining further disputation on the grounds that 
"every Altercation that may tend to promote Divisions and 
Animosities ought carefully to be avoided; and ... a Coali-
tion of Parties in the County of Dutchess will probably very 
soon take place, and a proper Union between its Inhabitants 
established .... " It is possible that the Whigs did not have 
enough time to organize their support throughout the 
county but, even so, the Tories seemed to have strength 
with which to counter only in Charlotte and Poughkeepsie. 
However, the news of the fighting at Lexington may have 
dissipated the previous indifference and deprived the Tories 
of much of their popularity. Therefore, the Tories declined 
to produce proof of their strength.60 
As it did in Dutchess, a sharp skirmish developed in West-
chester over participation in the provincial convention. 
When the Whigs circulated an appeal to the freeholders to 
60N.Y.G., April 24, May I, 15, 1775. 
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meet at White Plains to select a county representation, the 
Tories rallied their adherents, freeholder and nonfreeholder 
alike, to oppose them. "A White Oak," writing in Riving-
ton's Gazetteer, pressed the Tories "to give your votes" 
against the convention. Led by Colonel Frederick Philipse, 
Assemblyman Isaac Wilkins, and Reverend Samuel Seabury, 
some 250 gathered at White Plains on the appointed day to 
cast their ballots. Although the two opposing factions com-
prised approximately an equal number, an important differ-
ence existed between them. The Whigs seemed to be free-
holders, a fact which the Tories never disputed, whereas 
almost 50 percent of the opposition fell into the nonfreehold-
ing class. Consequently, half the Tory votes would be 
challenged and the Whigs would carry the day. Possibly 
this is the explanation of the Tory withdrawal from the 
meeting without voting. 
The importance of the White Plains incident lies in the 
determination of the representative character of the two 
parties. The evidence, however, is inconclusive. Since the 
Whigs claimed freeholds, it is possible they represented a 
larger section of the county population than the Tories.61 
On the other hand, a comparison of the list of Philipsburg 
Manor occupants with the signers of the loyalist statement 
shows that Philipse tenants constituted about one-third of 
the group that accompanied the Colonel to White Plains. 
In an attempt to recoup the loss at the county courthouse, 
an anonymous writer, perhaps Wilkins or Seabury, alleged 
that two-thirds of the county disapproved the provincial 
convention and promised to prove it with the publication 
of certain resolves then signing. However, the Friends of 
Government did not fulfill this promise.62 
61 Since the Whigs expected the Tories to challenge nonfreehold voters, 
they had not sought to mobilize these lessees at will and, therefore, Whig 
strength was potentially much greater than the number present at White 
Plains. 
62 "A White Oak," Riv. Gaz., April 6, 1775; Lewis Morris to the Printer, 
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The chief point of interest in the First New York Provin-
cial Congress election is the contention that in at least five 
of the counties only a small minority participated in the 
voting.6.~ In two of these, however, Tryon and Dutchess, 
there are indications to the contrary. Tory influence in 
Tryon seems to have centered in Mohawk District, the John-
son bailiwick, but the Whigs dominated the other four 
districts. The key factor lay in the tardy organization of the 
county committee. The Palatine District Committee notified 
the Albany County Committee of Correspondence on May 
19, 1775, that it could not hold an election early enough to 
be in time for the congressional meeting. Nevertheless, the 
committee assured Albany, a majority of the county were 
Whigs. Five days later thirty delegates from all districts, 
except Mohawk, met to form a county committee. Despite 
threats by the Johnsons, the Mohawk people chose four 
persons to represent them on the county committee. When 
the Johnsons threatened to imprison some of the Whig 
leaders, the county committee resolved to use force to free 
them unless the Tories abided by legal procedures. Unde-
terred by the Johnsons' armed tenantry, the Whigs could 
report by June 2 that all districts had met to sign the con-
gressional association and had completed the choice of full 
delegations to serve on the county committee. In response 
to the urgent letters of May 31 and June 3 from the First New 
York Provincial Congress, the committee voted promptly to 
delegate two members to represent Tryon County in that 
body. With this action Judge Robert R. Livingston could 
April 11, Anonymous, Westchester County, April 13, Lewis Morris to the 
Printer, May 7, 1775, N.Y.G., April 17, May 15, 1775; Memorial of Samuel 
Seabury, Philipsburg Rent Roll, in American Loyalists, Transcripts of the 
Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission of Enquiry into the Losses 
and Services of the American Loyalists ... , XLI, 562, 581-92, NYPL; M. K. 
Couzens, Index of Grantees of Lands Sold by the Commissioners of Forfeitures 
of the Southern District of the State of New York Situate in the Manor of 
Philipsburg, Westchester County, New York (Yonkers, 1880), passim. 
63 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 201. 
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advise his son that "the Whigs are predominated at last in 
Tryon .... "64 
In Dutchess the postelection conflict over the provincial 
convention still roiled the waters when the New York city 
committee's circular, soliciting a provincial congress, reached 
the inhabitants in early May. The Whigs campaigned 
energetically to establish committees in every precinct and 
to have the citizenry sign the association. The Tories fought 
back vigorously, but the tide ran against them. In mid-June 
the Whigs said with assurance that "Committees either have 
or will be chosen in every part of Dutchess .... " Considered 
in the context of this activity, the election of delegates to 
the Provincial Congress would seem likely to have aroused 
more than a minority of the freeholders to participate.65 
The clash of arms in the spring of 1775 sharpened the 
tensions in the colony and the subsequent deepening of 
hostility to the administration turned the Tories from words 
to guns. Shortly before Lexington and Concord, Dartmouth 
approved a plan to raise an armed loyalist association from 
the Highlanders of New York to oppose all illegal combina-
tions and insurrections and to give the utmost aid in sup-
pressing all such practices as were contrary to the law and 
to the King's authority. The project seems to have contem-
plated the settlement of associators on a strategically located 
tract of land in the province, awarding to each family head 
who took the oath of association 100 acres free of quitrents 
for five years. Although Dartmouth had commended Colden 
to secrecy, Gage reemphasized the necessity of stealth, "for 
the Friends of Government appear every where to be so 
subdued, as not to admit of its being done openly." When 
the association's sponsor, Colonel Allen Maclean, reached 
64 Ibid., pp. 202-3; Frey, The Minute Book, pp. 9, 12-19; Judge Robert R. 
Livingston to Robert R. Livingston, Jr., June 17, 1775, Livingston, Revolu-
tionary Letters of Importance, No. 46. 
65 Ibid.; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 203. 
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New York, the omnipresent hostility to the government sent 
him rushing off to Boston to confer with Gage. Apparently 
fearful of arousing the Whigs' anger, he dropped the associa-
tion scheme, but made his way cautiously to Johnstown. 
There he arranged with Sir John Johnson to recruit High-
landers for him from among his tenantry and to dispatch 
them to Montreal where he intended to organize a regi-
ment.66 Toward the close of the year, Sir John Johnson 
also undertook the formation of a battalion of his own, but, 
he wrote to Tryon, "we must however not think of stirring 
till we have a support. . . ." That support never came, 
however, even though Johnson raised 500 to 600 men. 
Schuyler disarmed them in January, 1776.67 If the Tories 
had the numerous adherents claimed for them, Tryon and 
Maclean would have succeeded in founding the loyalist 
association. 
The last link in the chain of evidence relating to the 
division of political loyalties is military service in the respec-
tive armies. There can be no more severe test of political 
beliefs than to call upon the people to defend them with 
their lives. That the people did so is a gauge of the pro-
fundity of their attachment.68 Determination of the numbers 
66 Colden to Dartmouth, June 7, 1775, Letterbooks of Cadwallader Colden, 
II, 426; Dartmouth to Colden, April 5, 1775, Letters and Papers of Cad-
wallader Colden, VII, 281; Gage to Dartmouth, May 25, July 24, September 
20, 1775, Dartmouth to Gage, April 15, 1775, Carter, Correspondence of 
General Gage, I, 401, 409-10, 414-15, II, 193, 195; Warrant to Colonel Maclean 
to Raise a Regiment, April 3, 1775, Oath of Association, Colden to Dart-
mouth, July 3, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 
562-63, 564, 588; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., III, 552. 
67 Sir John Johnson to Tryon, n.d., Tryon to Dartmouth, January 5, 
February 7, 1776, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 651, 663. 
Tryon directed his energies toward the military organization of the Queens 
County Tories, an act which provoked the Provincial Congress to request 
troops from the Continental Congress. The Tories published a declaration, 
averring that they were arming for self-defense only. New Jersey troops dis-
armed about 600 in January. Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 
238, 244-45; Queens County, December 6, 1775, Broadsides, NYPL. 
68 A rebuttal to this argument is that many Tories, confronted with the 
alternatives of fleeing and surrendering lands or leases or serving in Whig 
militia, chose to endure militia service. Their duty with their units did not 
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who served, however, is a very difficult task. The investi-
gator is beset by obstacles of many kinds, some of which are 
insoluble for the present. For example, the American lists 
of soldiers do not distinguish men who enlisted as paid 
substitutes, deserted, and then reenlisted for someone else. 
Nor is it possible to tell how many fictitious names are in 
muster rolls, nor how many names there are of those who 
deserted at a propitious moment to join the British. 
Since available military statistics are incomplete and even 
conflicting, one method of evaluating them is a comparison 
with population figures. The Continental Army drew 19,793 
New Yorkers into the regiments of the line, the levies, and 
the privateers. Another 23,852 served in the militia and an 
additional 8,327 prepared for duty, but the termination of 
the war spared them. The total is 51,972. Furthermore, 
fragmentary documents suggest that this figure is incomplete, 
that units existed whose records have disappeared.69 Ap-
make these men Whigs. However, one might compare this hypothesis with 
the case of American prisoners on the British prison hulks. In the face of an 
extremely high mortality rate large numbers of prisoners refused to take 
advantage of a British offer of freedom in return for enlistment in His 
Majesty's forces. In the one case land was hypothetically more important 
than political principle, in the other life itself was less important than 
political belief. One might also ask why pseudo-Whig militia who fell into 
British hands did not promptly disavow the Revolution and enlist in the 
royal forces. See below, pp. 94-96. Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and 
the American Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIX (Jan-
uary, 1962) 15. 
Inspiration for the preceding viewpoint seems to come from contemporary 
Whig comments relative to Tory strength in Dutchess County. If the state-
ments of some \Vhigs on this matter were accepted at face value, posterity 
would have wondered whether there were any Whigs in the state. Although 
the tendency to see Tories behind every tree often stemmed from defeatism 
and fright, there were other reasons for the phenomenon. Whig leaders 
not only sometimes identified criticism and complaint with disloyalty but 
they also considered the grumblings of the tenantry as toryism. Staughton 
Lynd, Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County New York: A Study of Democracy 
and Class Conflict in the Revolutionary Era (Chicago, 1962), pp. 59-61; 
George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York, 1746-
1813 (New York, 1960), pp. 60, 81; Nelson, The American Tory, p. 101. For 
other examples of Whig fears of Tories, see ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 606, 687, 
700, 919, 1039; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., I, 355, III, 458, VI, 1415, 
1442; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 525. 
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proximately 23,500 fought for the British, of whom 15,000 
were in the army and navy and 8,500 in the loyalist militia.70 
Thus the total number of men under arms is 75,472. Herein 
lies a contradiction. The sixteen to sixty age group supplied 
the pool from which the armies drew their recruits.71 Accord-
ing to the censuses of 17 56, I 771, and 1786, this bracket 
comprised 23.8 percent, 25 percent, and 24 percent respec-
tively of the total white population.72 Therefore, if 75,472 
men bore arms, and if 25 percent was the age-bracket per-
centage, the total white population must have been at least 
301,888. Since the 1771 census counted only 148,124 whites, 
it is highly improbable that the population could have 
doubled by 1783. Even if it is assumed that the rate of 
growth was the same for 1771-1776 as for 1756-1771, the 
total white population would have been only 169,148 and 
the military age group only 42,287. It is possible that the 
estimates of men in arms are erroneous and that the census 
understated the size of the population. Application of the 
25 percent military age bracket to a suggested total white 
population of 208,000 would yield a pool of 52,000 fighting 
men.73 
69 James A. Roberts, comp., New York in the Revolution as Colony and 
State (2nd. ed.; Albany, 1898), p. 15. A year-by-year breakdown of regulars 
and levies furnished the Continental Army is in the Hamilton Papers, L.C., 
V (microfilm, 1st ser., reel 3, courtesy of The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 
CUL). 
70 Flick, Loyalism, p. 112; Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the Ameri-
can Revolution (New York, 1902), pp. 182-83. Van Tyne agrees with Flick's 
estimate, but an analysis of some of the sources employed by Flick raises a 
question as to their reliability and their interpretation. The detailed presen-
tation is in Flick, pp. 95-112. For the most part figures of troops are drawn 
from general statements and commissions to recruit specific numbers. Flick 
used very few unit records. The difficulties to which the use of this material 
can lead receive illustration in the Appendix, pp. 254-257. 
71 In August, 1776, the Provincial Congress ordered all white males aged 
sixteen to fifty to enroll in the militia. Since the state was under almost 
incessant attack from 1776 to 1782, it is unlikely the government released the 
able bodied from militia duty after they reached the age of fifty. ]our. Prov. 
Gong., I, 566. 
72 Greene and Harrington, American Population, pp. 101, 102, 104; Daily 
Advertiser, December 26, 1786. 
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Although the Continental Army compilations derive from 
an actual computation of names on payrolls and muster rolls, 
it is obvious that they are unreliable. On the other hand, 
the state of the evidence does not permit an accurate reevalua-
tion.74 
An analysis of loyalist statistics reveals much the same 
situation as that of the American. First, the total number 
of loyalists in arms from all colonies seems to be less than 
Flick thought. An early computation, which had the merit 
of drawing upon muster rolls, placed the overall figure at 
15,000, although the author warned that he could not find 
some unit records. 75 Troop returns by Howe and Clinton 
reveal that provincial forces from all colonies ranged from 
3,000 to 8,200 in any one year, while those in Canada fluctu-
ated around 2,400.76 A maximum of 25,000 would seem to 
73 There are signs that there was a substantial immigration to New York. 
One contemporary assessment was that twenty-two vessels discharged immi-
grants between August, 1773, and August, 1774. Stokes, The Iconography of 
Manhattan Island, IV, 862. Estimates of the New York population in 1776 
vary from 190,000 to 200,000, including slaves. Although the Continental 
Congress had accepted the latter figure, the former figure is an estimate 
based on the rate of increase between 1756 and 1771. Robert R. Livingston 
thought the total to be 190,000 in 1775. Greene and Harrington, American 
Population, pp. 7, 91; Livingston to de Ia Luzerne, April 24, 1787, Robert 
R. Livingston Collection, NYHS; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 
1957), ser. Z l-19. 
If the greater validity of the American figures is granted, it would be 
necessary to reduce them drastically to tailor them to fit into a white 
population of 169,000. On the other hand, if the total white population is 
increased much beyond 208,000, the growth between 1771 and 1776 tends to 
become less credible. 
74 Nevertheless, a very general approximation might be made on an 
arbitrary basis. Such an approximation might allow an error of 15,000 for 
all factors. Subtraction of this number from the American computation of 
51,972 would leave 36,000. The loyalists on this basis would have 16,000. 
75 W. 0. Raymond, "Loyalists in Arms," New Brunswick Historical Society 
Collections, II (St. John, 1904), 220-21; Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: 
-~ Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 60-61. 
76 After a year's occupation of southern :'1/ew York Howe could only list 
3,257 provincials from all colonies. Troyer S. Anderson, The Command of 
the Howe Brothers During the American Revolution (New York, 1936), p. 
314; Sir William Howe, A Schedule of Sir William Howe's Correspondence 
as Produced to the House of Co/Ill/Ions (Extracted from the Parliamentary 
Register, XI, 1779) (London, 1779), p. 390: Great Britain, Historical Manu-
scripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville of 
Drayton House, Northamptonshire (2 vols.; London, 1904-1910), II, 65, 212 
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be a reasonable appraisal of the total loyalist contribution. 
When assessed against this figure, it is highly improbable 
that New York's share is 23,000.77 Second, many New York 
units consisted of men from other colonies as well as from 
New York. For example, one battalion of De Lancey's 
brigade drew its recruits from Connecticut.78 Third, an 
unknown number joined the British army involuntarily. 
Howe himself admitted that his officers sought recruits among 
prisoners of war, offering such inducements as "pay, liberty 
(hereinafter cited as Stopford Mss.); General Sir Henry Clinton, The American 
Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven, 1954), p. 548; Ernest A. 
Cruikshank, ed., The Settlement of the United Empire Loyalists on the Upper 
St. Lawrence and Bay of Quinte in 1784: A Documentary Record (Toronto, 
1934), pp. 30-31; Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783, p. 88. 
77 Flick thought that the New York total was about half of all loyalists in 
British units. Loyalism, p. 113; Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, chap. v. 
78 On De Lancey see Arthur W. Eaton, "New York Loyalists in Nova 
Scotia," The Grafton Magazine, February, 1910, p. 174. Roger's King's 
Rangers included enlistees from Quebec, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Nova 
Scotia, and other colonies, although the British regarded it as a "New York" 
corps. Simcoe's Queen's Rangers began with ca. 100 from Westchester, but 
the majority of the unit were Europeans. Although Maclean raised one 
battalion of his Royal Highland Emigrants in New York, the other battalion 
comprised Nova Scotians. Indeed some of the men came out of Quebec's 
prison. The New York Volunteers first came from New England refugees 
and later from New York. Another Yorker regiment, the Royal Fencible 
Americans, had its origins in Boston in 1775. The King's Royal Regiment 
of New York numbered men from Canada, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 
Wilbur H. Siebert, "The American Loyalists in the Eastern Seigniories and 
Townships of the Province of Quebec," Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings 
and Transactions, Series 3, VII (Ottawa, 1913), Section II, 15, 16; ]our: Prov. 
Gong., II, 317; H. M. Jackson, "Queen's Rangers and Their Contribution in 
the Years 1776 to 1784," Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report, 
1950, p. 13; Harold M. Jackson, Roberts Rangers: A History (Ottawa, 1953), 
pp. 183-88; Jonas Howe, "The Royal Emigrants," Acadiensis, IV (St. John, 
1904), 50-51; C. T. Atkinson, "British Forces in North America, 1774-81," 
journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XVI (1941), 6, 9, 14, 
n. 26. 
Not all loyalists came from the revolting thirteen colonies. Some had 
just arrived from Europe, some lived in Canada and Nova Scotia. Howe 
stated that a large number of his 3,609 provincials in May, 1778, were not 
Americans. There are indications that Scottish emigrants reached America 
only to be inducted into loyalist regiments. Sir William Howe, Narrative of 
Lieutenant-General Sir William Howe in a Committee of the House of Com-
mons on 29 April, 1779 Relative to His Conduct During His Late Command 
of the King's Troops in North America: To Which are Added, Some Ob-
servations Upon a Pamphlet Entitled, Letters to a Nobleman (London, 1780), 
pp. 52-53; W. 0. Raymond, "Roll of Officers of the British American or 
Loyalist Corps," New Brunswick Historical Society Collections, II (St. John, 
1904), 225, 226; Canst. Gaz., December 30, 1775. 
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and pardon."79 The British employed another kind of in-
ducement of which the Continental Congress took note. The 
American Board of War reported that the British commonly 
held new prisoners for three to five days without food, then 
tempted them to enlist in order to avoid starvation.80 There 
is profuse testimony of British compulsion, particularly 
among the prisoners aboard the prison hulks in New York 
harbor where thousands died.81 Lastly, contemporary cor-
respondence indicates that some loyalists deserted from the 
British. Unfortunately no figures are available and the scope 
of the movement is indeterminate.82 For these reasons the 
calculations of New York loyalist soldiers are tentative until 
someone evaluates these factors accurately. 
79 Howe, Narrative, p. 52. Since the King had declared the Americans 
rebels, they might be threatened with execution. Howe's statement on 
"pardon" implies that the British did so threaten the prisoners. 
80 N.Y.P., February 26, 1778. John Adams threw this charge at the British 
during the peace negotiations in 1782. He said the British starved the 
American pnsoners taken at Fort Washington in order to force them to enlist 
in the British army. Extract from John Adams's Journal, November 17, 1782, 
American Daily Advertiser, Extra., February 12, 1794. See also the references 
to 1,821 privates in "dispute," presumably the Fort Washington prisoners, in 
David L. Sterling, ed., "American Prisoners of War in New York: A Report 
by Elias Boudinot," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIII (July, 1956), 
382, 384. 
81 Depositions of Robert Troup, January 17, 1777 and Adolph Myer, 
February 5, 1777, ]our. Prov. Gong., II, 411, 412; testimony of Peter Wood, 
February 19, 1777 and deposition of Garret Luyster, May 13, 1777, Minutes 
of the Committee and of the First Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiraicies in the State of New York, 1776-1778, New-York Historical 
Society Collections, LVII (New York, 1924), I, 135, 283. 
On the prison hulks, see David Ramsay, The History of the Revolution (2 
vols.; Trenton, 1811), II, 372; William Gordon, History of the Rise, Progress, 
and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America (3 
vols.; New York, 1801), II, 172; Henry Onderdonk, British Prisons and Prison 
Ships at New York, 1776-1783 (Jamaica, 1863), n. p., "recollections of General 
Jeremiah Johnson"; Minutes, Commission, Conspiracies, New York, I, 89; 
American Citizen, February 22, 1803; Albert G. Greene, Recollections of the 
jersey Prison-Ship (Morrisania, 1865), pp. 70-71 and n. I. 
Hobart relayed disturbing news about Tryon's recruiting tactics in Suffolk. 
The British governor threatened Huntington that "unless the young men do 
voluntarily take up arms against their country, an inveterate and disap-
pointed soldiery will be let loose upon them." four. Prov. Gong., I, 671. 
82 John Henry to President, Council of Safety, May 31, 1777, ]our. Prov. 
Gong., II, 444; Assistant Commissioners for Conspiracies to Council of Safety, 
December 4, 1777, Minutes of the Committee and of the First Commission for 
Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York, 1776-1778, 
New-York Historical Society Collections, LVII (New York, 1925), II, 445. 
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There is still another element in any consideration of Tory 
strength. If the loyalists counted such large numbers of 
supporters as they themselves so frequently maintained, why 
did they not rally to the British standard when Howe arrived? 
Howe, for example, described the energetic, but futile, efforts 
of De Lancey to bring his brigade to its authorized level of 
l ,500. Brigadier General De Lancey scoured not only the 
occupied counties, but also the American-held areas for 
volunteers. Despite these vigorous exertions, at the com-
mencement of the 1777 campaign De Lancey's brigade num-
bered only 597 men. 83 As a matter of fact, General Howe 
quickly perceived the fatal weakness of the Tories, for in 
September, 1776, he wrote to Lord George Germain from 
New York: "We must also have recruits from Europe, not 
finding the Americans disposed to serve with arms, notwith-
standing the hopes held out to me upon my arrival at this 
port."S4 
Burgoyne put the loyalists to the acid test in 1777 and 
found them wanting. Some historians think he acquired a 
few thousand reinforcements from the Tories, but reliable 
statements place the number at 682 to 830.85 Burgoyne 
extensively solicited loyalist aid before marching south from 
Canada. The General sent agents into New York to collect 
provincials. When the campaign began he issued proclama-
tions appealing to the loyalists to enlist and promising to 
support them if they rose against the Whigs.86 By August 
83 Howe, Narrative, p. 52. 
84 StoPford Mss., II, 41. For a contrary view see Smith, Loyalists and Red-
coats, chap. iv, v. 
85 Flick opines "several thousand," but Siebert reduced this to ca. 2,000. 
There is a difference in the official statement of the British lists, but Fortescue 
mentions the larger number, 830. The inconsistency of Siebert's estimate is 
his demonstration that the five loyalist units which had not surrendered 
with Burgoyne amounted to only 485 men in the winter of 1778-1779. Flick, 
Loyalism, p. IIO; Siebert, Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings and Trans-
actions, ser. 3, VII, II, 14; Sir John W. Fortescue, A History of the British 
Army (14 vols.; New York, 1899-1930), III, 234n.; Jones, History of New 
York During the Revolutionary War, I, 678 (ed. notes on Burgoyne). 
86 Siebert, Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings and Transactions, ser. 3, 
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Burgoyne became convinced of the minority status of the 
loyalists. In a communication to Germain, he complained: 
"The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the 
Congress, in principle and zeal; and their measures are 
executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be 
equalled."87 Subjected by Parliament to examination on his 
defeat, Burgoyne was called upon to explain why he did not 
attempt a rapid advance to reach Albany. He retorted: 
"Would the Tories have risen? Why did they not rise round 
Albany and below it, at the time they found Mr. Gate's army 
increasing ... ? Why did they not rise in that populous and 
as supposed well affected district, the German Flats at the 
time St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix? A critical insur-
rection from any one point of the compass within distance 
to create a diversion would probably have secured the success 
of the campaign."88 There can be no doubt that a rising of 
several thousand loyalists would have created a critical situa-
tion for the Americans. 
A comparison of the loyalist reaction with the American 
at this time reveals the validity of Burgoyne's strictures. 
Governor Clinton advised Washington of the alacrity with 
which the militia responded to the mobilization order.89 
VII, 7; A Broadside by john Burgoyne, Esq., July 2, 1777, Broadsides, NYHS; 
Proclamation, June 29, 1777; [N.Y.] Diary, January 17, 1794; Philip Skene to 
Dartmouth, August 30, 1777, Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manu-
scripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (25 vols.; Lon-
don, 1889-1898), XVIII, No. 1665; Morris to Council of Safety, July 16, 1777, 
]our. Prov. Cong., II, 511. 
87 Burgoyne to Germain, August 20, 1777, General John Burgoyne, A State 
of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before the House of Commons 
(London, 1'780), Appendix, xlvi. 
88Jbid., pp. 151-52. However, see Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, P.P· 50-59. 
Sir Henry Clinton also complained of loyalist indifference: "It Will not be 
out of place here to express my regret at seeing the incomplete state of the 
provincial corps. So many attempts to raise men have always totally failed 
of success, and some corps which at first promised to be of importance have 
remained notwithstanding in so very weak a state that there is little encour-
agement to undertake anything more in that line." Clinton to Germain, 
December, 1779, quoted in Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 227. 
89 August 9, 1777, George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clinton, First 
Governor of New York (10 vols.; Albany, 1899-1914), II, 195-97. 
90 Ibid., II, 323-25, 333, 334-35, 344, 347, also 402, 409, 411. Nickerson put 
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At the height of the campaign in September, Clinton related 
to Duane that New York had eleven militia regiments from 
the region south of Poughkeepsie and New Paltz on active 
duty and had dispatched to Gates every other regiment in 
the state except two in Tryon and one in Schoharie.90 
The testimony of two other men strongly sustained the 
preceding evidence. Joseph Galloway, when questioned in 
Parliament, conceded that the New York loyalists could not 
defend themselves without the British army, even though 
the British might fully arm and organize them. General 
James Robertson, who had served in New York from 1765 
to 1777, made a similar admission.91 
Although the Tories possessed the advantage of an exten-
sive governmental machinery, they lacked the capability of 
halting the burgeoning revolutionary sentiment and in 1775 
went down to a series of political defeats throughout the 
colony. Tryon, Gage, and Dartmouth admitted the loss of 
royal control in New York as the consequence of the unpopu-
larity of the government. Endeavors to form loyalist associa-
tions and to arm the friends of government proved fruitless 
in the long run. So long as the Tories constituted a minority 
of the populace, they had little chance of regaining a position 
of supremacy.92 
the total number of militia with Gates at 12,000; some were from New Eng-
land. Both Patterson and Ward understate the militia units. Hoffman 
Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution (Boston, 1928), pp. 326-37, 
graph opp. p. 384; Samuel W. Patterson, Horatio Gates (New York, 1941), p. 
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A recent computation which is based on fragmentary militia records indi-
cates the strength of the New York units at more than 2,000. Charles W. 
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19, October 7, and October 17, 1777, Including an Appendix with Regimental 
Data and Notes," pp. 18-19, 76-77, Files of the Saratoga National Historical 
Park. 
91 Anderson, The Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 311, 315. 
92 Hamilton, writing to John Jay about the impending assembly election 
early in 1776, commented, "for the Whigs, I doubt not, constitute a large 
majority of the people." Hamilton to Jay, December 31, 1775, John Jay 
Papers, Iselin Collection, CUL; Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence 
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Crystallization of the 
'Revolutionary Spirit 
r-' ~WHEN the fall and winter of 1775-1776 had 
~ ..__} ) run their course, the Whig leaders possessed 
a double reason for congratulating themselves. Elections in 
November registered approval of the First Provincial Con-
gress and eliminated some of its less vigorous men.1 And, 
military forces disarmed the menacing Tories in Queens, 
Richmond, and Tryon, who became more submissive to 
congressional authority.2 However, there were other circum-
stances that prevented the appearance of complacency among 
the Whigs. 
Lowering transatlantic skies during these months induced 
growing anxiety among the Friends of Liberty. It was the 
season for harsh pronunciamentos from Whitehall as the 
ministry reacted vigorously to the dispatches from America. 
The first of these chilling advices, reaching New York in 
early November, was the royal proclamation of August, 
1775, which pronounced the colonies to be in a state of 
rebellion and fulminated against the misleaders of His 
Majesty's subjects. Hardly had the shock of this information 
begun to subside when word came that George III had 
refused to receive the Olive Branch petition from the 
Continental Congress. January, 1776, brought copies of the 
royal speech to Parliament in October in which the King 
called for suppression of the rebellion by armed force. The 
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last of these ill tidings, arriving in February, was the Pro-
hibitory Act, which declared a blockade of the colonies and 
ordered the impressment of colonial seamen from captured 
merchant vessels. 3 
As the year 1776 opened, New York seemed about to 
become the scene of major military operations. Washington, 
worried over the slow progress of military preparations on 
the Hudson, commanded General Charles Lee to repair to 
New York City to fortify it. Lee marched into town just as 
General Henry Clinton sailed into port with three ships. 
A panic ensued; "away flew the women, children, goods and 
chattels."4 Although the inhabitants did not give credence 
to the statement, Clinton averred that he had no hostile 
intentions; his objective was the Carolinas. Meanwhile, 
there was widespread hardship and privation as thousands 
of people in the depth of winter sought shelter on Long 
Island and in Jersey.5 The departure of Clinton was simply 
a temporary reprieve because in March Washington, antici-
pating an assault by Sir William Howe, began the transfer 
of his army from Boston to New York.6 
Amid these alarms and the swelling martial turbulence 
the Second Provincial Congress, or its alternate, the Com-
mittee of Safety, ran out the remainder of its allotted life-
1 See below, p. 181. 
2 See below, pp. 99, 131, 141, 198. 
3 Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), pp. 
115, 116, 138; John R. Alden, The American Revolution, 1777-1783 (New 
York, 1954), pp. 65, 75; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The Colonial Merchants 
and the American Revolution (New York, 1939), p. 579. 
4 Shewkirk Diary, quoted in Thomas J. \Vertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker 
Rebels: New York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948), p. 70. 
5 "The Fears of the Multitude made them forget the Mayor's Message con-
cerning the expected Ship & conceiving that they were betrayed Mr. Clinton 
& the Governor were calumniated as false Villains, Liars and Decievers-The 
River was full of Ice and the Cold intemperate and yet the Inhabitants 
flew into the Country with their Effects." William H. W. Sabine, ed., Histori· 
cal iHernoirs from 16 March 1763 to 9 July 1776 of William Smith (New 
York, 1956), p. 263. 
6 Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New 
York, 1760·1776 (Madison, 1909), pp. 246, 248, 251; Wertenbaker, Father 
Knickerbocker Rebels, pp. 70-71, 77. See below, pp. 105-7. 
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span. Although the congressmen early in this session had 
designated April for elections to a third provincial assembly, 
they had not foreseen the circumstances in which the bal-
loting would occur. Tory manipulations in local contests 
largely disappeared; those Tories who had hoped for an 
accommodation with Britain despaired and withdrew into 
passivity or armed opposition. The Continental Congress 
caused a stir when on April 6 it flung open the colonial ports 
to the ships of nations other than Great Britain. Upon 
receiving this intelligence, the New York Committee of 
Safety urgently summoned a meeting of the Provincial Con-
gress for May I in order to execute the instructions of the 
Continental Congress in relation to trade.7 The conduct of 
the Second Provincial Congress from December, 1775, to 
May, 1776, rendered no satisfaction to men of a radical stamp 
like Isaac Sears. Indeed there were many far from the North 
River who looked askance at the Provincial Congress be-
cause they thought that body dragged its collective feet in 
the opposition to Britain. 
Although opposition to the measures of the North ministry 
had proceeded on the premise that the Whigs could compel 
Great Britain to yield the desired reforms, the events of the 
latter half of 1775 and early 1776 made that premise more 
and more untenable. The increasing resort to muskets and 
cannon had a dispiriting effect upon the moderate and con-
servative leaders in New York. Furthermore, the campaign 
against the imperial government posed a delicate internal 
problem for the revolutionary party. Slogans of no taxation 
without representation and demands for constitutional liber-
ties had a dangerous potential in a province where the great 
landholders frequently manipulated their tenants' votes. 
Notwithstanding the caution of the great landholders, some 
of the revolutionary ferment seeped down to the tenantry, 
7 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 253, 256; Burnett, The Con· 
tinental Congress, pp. 139-40; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 410. 
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expressing itself in pressure for more favorable land leases. 
Writing from Dutchess County, Henry B. Livingston con-
veyed the attitude of the aristocracy when he condemned the 
renters: "The Tenants here are Great Villains. Some of them 
are resolved to take advantage of the times and make their 
Landlords give them Leases forever .... " 8 
The sharpening lines of conflict and the consequent Whig 
loss of vigor have given rise to the view that a loyalist 
reaction had set in.9 This interpretation rests on several 
considerations: the delays in the election of deputies to the 
Second New York Provincial Congress and in the attendance 
of the members, and Tryon's maneuver to convene a new 
provincial assembly. However, there is another pertinent 
but overlooked fact: Whig timidity. 
Vacillation appeared among the Whigs in consequence of 
events in July and August, 1775. In July the Continental 
Congress published its justification for taking up arms and 
virtually rejected Lord North's conciliatory motion. Immedi-
ately thereafter word came from Britain that both the King 
and Parliament had rejected the New York provincial assem-
bly's conciliatory overture. After the engagement occurred 
in Massachusetts and units of the Continental Army gathered 
at Albany for an invasion of Canada, the prospect of peace 
receded visibly. The practical meaning of these occurrences 
came home literally with the crash of cannon when the 
warship Asia in New York Harbor clashed with a party 
removing cannon from the fort on the night of August 23. 
Fear of the cannonading set in motion a general exodus of 
the population that continued in sporadic fashion until the 
practical evacuation of the city in June, 1776. Haunted by 
their fear of loss of life and property, many Whig leaders 
became visibly less belligerent when Tryon and the Tories 
8 H.B. to R.R. Livingston, May, 1775, Robert R. Livingston, American Art 
Association Catalogue, Revolutionary Letters of Importance: The Unpub· 
fished Correspondence of Robert R. Livingston (New York, 1918), No. 30. 
9 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 221-52. 
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reminded them of the possibility of a general bombardment 
of the city. 
In fact, some radicals had anticipated such an eventuality 
back in July and had proposed the seizure of the Governor as 
hostage for the good behavior of the ships. The plan did 
have much to commend it. It would have spared the people. 
It would have mitigated the growing fear within the Provin-
cial Congress and reduced the spread of confusion among 
the general populace. It might very well have put a halt 
to the arming of the Tories on Long Island. However, 
seizing the King's personal representative would have put 
New York in the same position as Massachusetts and placed 
the members of its congress in the same category as the 
Adamses and Hancock.l0 The plan had its inception when 
Isaac Sears returned to the city from a visit to the Continental 
Congress and conferred with General Philip Schuyler. Schuy-
ler, characterizing the idea as "rash" and "unjustifiable," 
argued that the Continental Congress would disapprove. 
Sears replied that he had discussed the proposal with anum-
ber of the continental delegates, who had approved it. Only 
when Schuyler stated that he had written orders from Gen-
eral Washington against it did Sears reluctantly agree to 
drop the matter. Schuyler hastened to inform Councilor 
William Smith of the affair and to assure him that he sup-
ported the "Magistracy in all cases but where they opposed 
the Common Defence." The General, while refusing Smith 
permission to warn the Governor, did have the Councilor 
draw up a proclamation for the protection of Tryon. Schuy-
ler incorporated it in a letter of orders to General Wooster, 
commander of the Connecticut detachment in the city.U 
10 Tryon transmitted at this time lists of names of Whigs and Tories to 
Dartmouth. Tryon to Dartmouth, January 5, 1776, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, 
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York 
(15 vols.; Albany, 1856), VIII, 651. 
11 William Smith, Memoirs, IV, July 3, 1775; Schuyler to Wooster, July 3, 
1775, Benson J. Lossing, The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler (2 vols.; 
:\ew York, 1873), I, 346. 
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The Governor essayed a psychological maneuver in order 
to heighten the tension that the Asia incident aroused. It is 
likely that the Provincial Congress, temporarily handing 
over power to a Committee of Safety on September 2, was 
partly responding to the previous week's cannonade.l2 
Tryon discomfited the Whigs when he arranged to have 
Mayor Hicks inform the Committee of Safety that Tryon 
had word from Dartmouth pertaining to fresh orders for 
naval commanders. British captains would adjudge towns 
to be in a state of rebellion where they raised troops, erected 
fortifications, or removed His Majesty's storesP Actually, 
Admiral Graves sent Captain Vandeput of the Asia similar 
but more limited orders at the same time. If the city pro-
hibited intercourse with the ships or molested them, Graves 
ordered Vandeput to open fire. The Admiral directed the 
Captain to destroy Sears's house, the houses of other known 
rebels, and burn all shipping in the harbor.l4 Although 
the committee strove to obtain an extract of the letter from 
the Governor or its "exact purport," their journal did not 
refer to the matter again. Two days later, however, Riving-
ton's Gazetteer carried the substance of a part of the letter 
that conveyed the same information Hicks had given the 
Committee of Safety.15 If Tryon intended to immobilize the 
Provincial CongTess, he very nearly succeeded. 
Although the Whigs did not take the threat of bombard-
ment lightly, nevertheless, there is strong ground for believ-
ing it to have been a bluff. As long as the Governor remained 
in the city, he was, in effect, a hostage who guaranteed the 
peaceable behavior of the warships. Moreover, the Tories 
12 Congress's mood was not necessarily the people's mood. The indignant 
reaction of the populace to the August 23 incident caused the Provincial 
Congress to arrange an alternative method of supplying the ships which 
would keep the crews out of the city. jour. Prov. Gong., I, 126. 
13 Ibid., I, 152, 153; Dartmouth to the Lords of Admiralty, July 1, 1775, 
Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 362. 
14 Admiral Graves to Vandeput, September 10, 1775, Cal. H. 0. Papers, 
p. 464. 
15 Riv. Gaz., September 21, 1775. 
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and their property would suffer as much as the Whigs in a 
general cannonading. The British weighed other factors. A 
pitched battle in the port might very well raise the political 
temperature of the province to fever pitch, rendering the 
position of the Tories impossible. The Yorkers would appeal 
to the Continental Congress and neighboring colonies, and 
troops would pour into the city. The combination of these 
factors would drive the ships out of the harbor, and the 
destruction wrought by the cannon might end the city's 
usefulness to the British as their headquarters.16 
News of the impending arrival of continental troops com-
manded by General Charles Lee stirred new fears in the city. 
Tryon in mid-December, underscoring his September warn-
ing, distributed a handbill that reprinted a letter from the 
captain of the Phoenix to the Governor. Captain Parker 
stated that he had orders to treat the town as in open 
rebellion against the King if the people resorted to violent 
acts. When General Lee prepared to march into New York 
in January, 1776, to fortify the city against an expected 
British attack, the Committee of Safety reacted with alarm. 
Eliphalet Dyer, Connecticut delegate to the Continental 
Congress, described the atmosphere as he passed through 
the town homeward bound: "New York appears empty and 
desolate; you would scarce see any person or but few in the 
streets carts and waggons all employed in carrying out goods 
and furniture, the men-o-warr lying broadside against the 
town and near the wharfs sails bent and prepared at a 
moment's warning. Their present constirnation in New York 
arises from the near approach of Gen'l Lee .... " Nonethe-
less, a broadside signed "Sentinel" urged the people to isolate 
the British ships. The city, declared the author, "becomes 
more and more the scoff and wonder of America." He con-
cluded with an appeal to the people's patriotism: "Are you 
16 Curtis P. Nettels, George Washington and American Independence 
(Boston, 1951), chap. xi; Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels, p. 62. 
The Revolutionary Spirit 
so callous and dead to every sense of honour, as to disregard 
the taunts and scoffs of your brethren in the neighbouring 
Colonies?"17 
During his brief tenure in New York, Lee sought to 
checkmate the British and thereby alarmed the Whig leaders. 
He countered the menace of bombardment with a threat to 
retaliate against the Tories; it was a challenge the British 
did not choose to accept. The General charted a bold course 
when he ordered all communication with the ships halted 
and removed cannon and stores from the fortifications. Even 
though Tryon had advance information concerning Lee's 
plans, the ships did not intervene when the people hauled 
away the cannon in broad daylight. Complaints from the 
cautious Yorkers, however, forced Lee's transfer, but in April 
Washington rebuked the Provincial Congress for tolerating 
contact between the people and the ships. The Provincial 
Congress thereupon interdicted the traffic and the British 
made no move to retaliate. Tryon, informing the Colonial 
Secretary, George Germain, of the interdiction, wrote: "The 
destruction therefore of the city where there were so many 
friends to Government, with the loss of all their property, & 
the consideration of preserving the town for the King's army 
was thought to be too great sacrifices to make for only retard-
ing the removal of the artillery and stores which even after 
such sacrifices could have been carried off by the Jersey and 
Connecticutt troops." 18 
The Committee of Safety did little more than to further 
the measures already set in motion by the parent body. At 
17 Nettels, George Washington, chap. xi; Becker, The History of Political 
Parties, pp. 246-50; Parker to Tryon, December 18, 1775, N.Y.G., December 
25, 1775; Dyer to Samuel Adams, January 28, February 27, 1776, Samuel 
Adams Papers, NYPL; New York, New York City During the American 
Revolution. Being a Collection of Original Papers (Now First Published) from 
the Manuscripts in the Possession of the Mercantile Library Association of 
New York City (New York, 1861), pp. 85-87; To the Inhabitants of New York, 
January 27, 1776, Broadsides, NYPL. 
18 Smith, Memoirs, V, February II, 1776; Tryon to Germain, April 6, 1776, 
O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 674. 
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one point, indeed, when a combination of some moderates 
and radicals sought to move vigorously against the Tories, 
the committee lost its nerve. Driven by the critical shortage 
of arms, the committee had voted to impress all weapons and 
recompense their owners. Word from Queens soon reached 
the committee not only that the Tories had refused to hand 
in their arms but also that they had disarmed Whigs and that 
the Colden family had directed these proceedings. McDou-
gall presented a motion to dispatch to Queens a battalion 
from his regiment, which was then raising, to compel 
acquiescence in the impressment action. After considerable 
discussion the committee defeated the proposal.l9 Hesitancy 
of this kind was characteristic of the committee. 
The committee's timidity in dealing with the Tory prob-
lem provoked disgust within the army. Colonel Rudolph 
Ritzema demanded that the Provincial Congress "confiscate 
their estates and banish them from the country." Since the 
colonel wrote from Montreal two days after its capture, his 
subsequent vehemence may be understood. "Such miscreants 
ought not to breathe the same air with men resolved to be 
free. From their machinations in & out of Congress have 
arisen the hardships we have endured and are further to 
undergo."20 If the Committee of Safety heard these grum-
blings, it gave no sign. 
Additional difficult problems harassed the committee 
throughout September. September 28, three days after the 
rebuff to McDougall on the Queens affair, the committee had 
an urgent message from the commissioners who had been 
detailed to construct fortifications along the mid-Hudson. 
Information had reached them that Tryon and a party had 
19 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 156. Tryon praised the obstructionist activities of 
the Coldens. Tryon to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, O'Callaghan, Docu-
ments, Colonial, New York, VIII, 646. 
When the Provincial Congress reconvened, it disapproved the impressment 
resolution. McDougall dissented. ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 184. 
20 Ritzema to McDougall, November 19, 1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
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landed at Haverstraw where they questioned closely one of 
the commissioners about the fort and its strength. The com-
missioners expected the Governor to put in an appearance 
upriver and asked for a guard. When the committee an-
swered the letter, it ignored both the news of Tryon's move-
ments and the request for troops.21 The next day the officers 
of the city's militia petitioned the committee to revise the 
training regulations so that the companies would train once 
a week and the battalions once a month. The present routine 
of once a month, they complained, lacked efficacy. The 
committee did not reply; the journal tersely recorded, "Read 
and filed."22 Both moderate Alexander McDougall and radi-
cal Hugh Hughes complained of the militia situation. The 
former told Jay that "men of rank and consideration refused 
to accept of commissions as field officers of the militia; so 
that these commissions have gone a beging for six or seven 
weeks." Hughes ascribed the lack of drilling among the 
militia to the fact that the officers without their commissions 
could not compel them to turn out. "These circumstances," 
he added, "have a very bad effect, as they encourage the 
Tories, who exult at it, and discourage the timid Whigs." 
Just before its collapse the Provincial Congress finally issued 
the commissions.23 
When the New York Provincial Congress reassembled in 
early October, it sat hardly a week before ill tidings reached 
it. Washington warned that no prospect of conciliation 
existed and that all the evidence indicated the British would 
prosecute the war with the utmost vigor. The next day the 
Provincial Congress examined Captain Lawrence, a recently 
arrived shipmaster who had sailed from London August 2 
21 Peter Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1837-
1853), 4th ser., III, 914-15, 919-20. 
22 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 159-60. 
23 McDougall to Jay, October 30, 1775, John Jay Papers, Iselin Collection, 
CUL; Hughes to Samuel and John Adams, October 17, 1775, Samuel Adams 
Papers, NYPL; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 192. 
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and who brought news that more than sustained Washing-
ton's interpretation of the situation. Informed sources in 
London said that the ministry planned to hire 16,000 Hes-
sians and Hanoverians for the American campaign and that 
they intended to increase the army in America to 30,000 over 
the winter. Within twenty-four hours the delegates listened 
to the reading of three letters from London, dated July 31 
and August 7, which concurred in the fact that the govern-
ment had determined to recover New York, control the 
Hudson, and open direct communication with Canada.24 
Scarcely had the members comprehended this intelligence 
when Tryon demanded that the Provincial Congress guar-
antee his safety. Dissatisfied with the subsequent assurances, 
the Governor shifted his quarters October 19 to one of the 
vessels in the harbor.25 Tryon's flight seemed to denote the 
imminence of bombardment, and the seizure of three vessels 
in the lower harbor and their escort to Boston by the British 
sloop Viper tended to confirm it.26 Many congressmen now 
found it urgent to attend to their personal affairs and the 
Provincial Congress, lacking a quorum October 28 and 29, 
adjourned until November 2. 
When it reconvened on November 2, it heard more grim 
reports. Dispatches from the Continental Congress contained 
interrogations of captured British officers who had secretly 
recruited loyalists in New York. The bait offered to enlistees 
included a promise of 200 acres of forfeited lands in settled 
areas of the province, a promise authorized by Dartmouth.27 
That same afternoon the Provincial Congress listened to a 
letter from Washington which contained an eye-witness 
account of the burning of Falmouth by the British. Further-
more, the correspondent continued, the British commander 
24/bid., I, 170-71, 172-73. 
25 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 225. 
2G Riv. Gaz., October 26, 1775. 
~7 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 188-90; Captain M. Maclean to Major John Small, 
December 13, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 312-13. 
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reportedly told the inhabitants of Falmouth he had orders 
to burn all towns between Boston and Halifax and he 
expected that his compatriots had put New York to the 
torch.28 
Two actions of the New York Provincial Congress reflected 
the impact of this disconcerting news. On November 2 it 
rejected a request of the Continental Congress to appropriate 
the shirts, blankets, and sheets in the King's stores. Since 
some persons had carted them to the provincial commissary's 
house without the provincial organ's authority, the New 
Yorkers declared that they had ordered them returned be-
cause they feared retaliation by the warships. The next day 
the provincial body disposed of another delicate matter, 
which related to Westchester. Whigs of Rye and Mamaro-
neck, writing to New York in alarm, had charged the Tories 
with plotting to seize a number of leading committeemen 
and to put them aboard a British tender for transport to 
Boston. Although the Provincial Congress had provided by 
its resolutions of September l for the arrest, trial, and im-
prisonment of dangerous opponents by the district and 
county committees or by itself, it turned its back now on its 
former directive and voted to instruct the Westchester 
County committee to investigate the affair. If the plot were 
real, then the committee would furnish protection to those 
threatened. The Provincial Congress recommended that any 
culprits taken be handed over to the civil magistrates for 
prosecution. This last proposition proved too weak not only 
for Isaac Sears but also for John Thomas, Jr., Dr. Robert 
Graham of Westchester, and Melancton Smith of Dutchess, 
all of whom dissented.29 By November 4 so many representa-
tives had absented themselves that the Provincial Congress 
ceased functioning without formal adjournment. McDougall 
complained to Schuyler that this hasty dissolution endangered 
28 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 191. 
29 Ibid., I, 190, 192-4. 
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the colony since Provincial Congress had not established a 
committee of safety.3o 
Tory comment not only accurately reported this vacillation 
but also revealed one of its sources. V. P. Ashfield, a Tory 
merchant, noting the influence of property on the political 
situation, advised Isaac Wilkins that "those of prosperity are 
afraid of their estates, and are coming about fast. They say 
they have gone too far." 31 Jacob Walton, another Tory, 
spoke of the leaders' "growing very timid," and added sig-
nificantly, "but now they hav~ raised the devil amongst them 
they do not know how to lay him."32 
The Second Provincial Congress, which assembled in 
December, was in the eyes of contemporaries just as timid 
as its predecessors. Hughes wrote Sam Adams that "the 
people [are] constrained, disappointed and discouraged here 
by the timidity or treachery of their leaders."33 A writer in 
the New York journal berated the cowardly, the do-nothings, 
and called for "activity, vigilance and resolution." 34 The 
hesitancy of some Whigs led them to urge Holt not to 
reprint Thomas Paine's Common Sense. In describing this 
incident Hughes wrote: 
"Another anecdote I must trouble you with, is, that Col. McDou-
gall waited on Mr. Holt and desired that he would not reprint 
'Common Sense'; the people's minds not being prepared for such 
a chance &c. Somebody else, I forget who, waited on him for the 
same purpose. The contrary is so much the case, that the people 
are constantly treading on their leaders heels, and, in a hundred 
30 McDougall to Schuyler, November 14, 1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS 
and Schuyler Papers, NYPL. 
31 Ashfield to Wilkins, November 4, 1775, Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 482. See 
also the similar comments of John Cruger to Henry Cruger, November 1, 
1775 and Harris Cruger to Henry Cruger, November 3, 1775, ibid., pp. 479, 
481. 
32 Partially quoted in Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 226, 
n. 205; Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 478. 
33 Hughes to Adams, December 19, 1775, same to same, January 8, 1776, 
Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL. 
34 "The Monitor", No.7, N.Y.]., December 21, 1775. 
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cases, have taken the lead of them. But his patrons don't approve 
of it, and he must beat time with them. Phil [Livingston] says 
it was written by some Tory &c. However, let them say and do 
what they please, the people are determined to read and think 
for themselves. It is certain, that there never was any thing 
published here within these thirty years, or since I have been 
in this place, that has been more universally approved and 
admired."35 
None of the foregoing events came as a response to an up-
surge of Tory sentiment among the people; rather, they re-
veal the working of the powerful emotion of self-preservation. 
At first glance the polling for the Second Provincial 
Congress and the laggardness of the deputies in assembling 
for its opening seem to lend credence to the idea of a royalist 
reaction, but a closer scrutiny will disclose the fallacy of this 
view.36 One author pointed out that the people went to the 
polls in only nine of the fourteen counties, that, of the nine, 
in Orange only one precinct voted, and that in Tryon a 
newly chosen deputy resigned and his successor did not 
appear until February.37 Therefore, the people in only seven 
counties supported the Second Provincial Congress. 
However, in Orange County factionalism may have com-
plicated the situation. Although two precincts had voted on 
November 7, Goshen precinct complained that the county 
committee, "through some unhappy mistake," had failed to 
notify the people of the election. Goshen hastened to rectify 
the omission, leaving Orange Town as the only precinct in 
which no balloting had taken place. The two precincts of 
Orange Town and Haverstraw had a joint precinct com-
mittee, but Haverstraw chose delegates November 7, whereas 
Orange Town did not. The freeholders and tenants held 
35 Hughes to Samuel and John Adams, February 4, 1776 [?],Samuel Adams 
Papers, NYPL. John Anderson, publisher of a new gazette, the Constitutional 
Gazette, reprinted Common Sense in pamphlet form. 
36 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 229·38. 
37 Ibid. 
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several meetings in Orange Town prior to election day, but 
on the vital day, owing to "some misapprehension" as the 
precinct chairman said, no polling occurred. Two days later, 
November 9, Chairman Thomas Outwater of Orange Town 
entreated the Provincial Congress to set aside another day 
for the precinct to vote, but that body did not read the letter 
until December 1; the delay did not wholly lie with the 
township. When Orange Town cast its ballots December 7, 
completing the precinct voting, the whole county, therefore, 
had taken part in the electoral process.38 
The Whigs seem to have organized the election in Tryon 
as well as in New York and Albany. The county committee 
notified each district of the impending election but confined 
the vote to freeholders. 39 Although the electors chose two 
deputies, one, Isaac Paris, resigned shortly after to assume the 
chairmanship of the county committee. On November 25 
the county committee selected William Wills to replace Paris 
and dispatched him immediately to New York. Wills's 
failure to arrive in the city became the subject of cor-
respondence between the Provincial Congress and the county 
committee. The committee expressed its astonishment at 
Wills's dereliction, mentioning that it had information that 
Wills had departed as instructed. Furthermore, the com-
mittee did not know what had happened to him. The delin-
quent delegate appeared at the Provincial Congress two 
months later.40 Whatever reason caused the delay, the 
promptness with which the committee held the election 
and the alacrity with which it picked Paris's successor refute 
the idea of any cooling toward the revolutionary cause. It 
may be that this incident illustrates the difficulties inherent 
38 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 213, 214, 225, II, 95; Force, American Archives, 4th 
ser., Ill, 1762, IV, 385, 399, 402. 
39 The First Provincial Congress had extended the suffrage to tenants 
having realty assessed at £80. Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 227. 
40 Samuel L. Frey, ed., The Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of 
Tryon County (New York, 1905), pp. 89·90; jour. Prov. Gong., I, 212, 213, 
293, II, 142; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 400. 
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in operating a revolutionary organization m the isolated 
rural areas of the province. 
Of the five counties (Richmond, Queens, Cumberland, 
Charlotte, and Gloucester) in which the people supposedly 
did not elect deputies,41 the situation in the last three was a 
compound of communication difficulties, factionalism, and 
the Vermont controversy between New York and New 
Hampshire.42 Through some miscarriage of the correspon-
dence the Cumberland committee did not receive the Pro-
vincial Congress's notice of election nor did it hear of it from 
its delegate in New York. The first intimation of it came 
through the New-York journal of October 19, which printed 
the text of the congressional resolution. Some of the com-
mitteemen desired to hold the election on the newspaper's 
authority, but most wished to have official word. When they 
wrote the Provincial Congress for advice, they affirmed the 
steadfastness of the county: "the people in general among 
us, want to choose new members; and are always ready to 
adhere strictly to the resolves of ... Congress .... " Since 
the Provincial Congress had already adjourned, Cumberland 
waited in vain for a reply. Finally, the committee, acting on 
its own authority, appointed two delegates.43 
41 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 234, 236-37, treats this 
occurrence in confusing fashion. The delegates in New York dispatched the 
letter of December 1, which posed the drastic consequences of a congressional 
collapse, to three counties (Tryon, Cumberland, and Charlotte), not to six. 
Although the letter writers could not have known it, their warning was 
unnecessary. As the material on the preceding and subsequent pages shows, 
the people of these counties did not deliberately drag their feet. The letter 
did not produce the delegates from these three counties as Becker contends. 
Furthermore, the arrival of Dr. john Williams from Charlotte on February 
13, 1776, reduced the number o unrepresented counties to two, Gloucester 
and Queens, not three. ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 199, 297. 
42 For the complexities of the dispute between New York and New Haml;'· 
shire over the "Grants" (Vermont) see Chilton Williamson, Vermont m 
Quandary: 1763·1825 (Montpelier, 1949), chaps. ii-v. 
43 Writing to Provincial Congress at the beginning of February, 1776, the 
committee declared that the people were "heartily disposed" to American 
liberty. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 426n.; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 
331, II, 99. Factionalism reared its head in matters relating to the organiza· 
tion of the militia and the choice of militia officers. Force, American Archives, 
4th ser., IV, 309; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 195-98, 204. 
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Similar delays occurred in Charlotte and Gloucester. 
Despite the friction with Yankee settlers over land rights, 
Charlotte in an election on January 25, 1776, chose two rep-
resentatives for the Provincial Congress.44 Although Glouces-
ter had established district and county committees by July, 
1775, and had chosen a deputy to the First Provincial Con-
gress, the fear of an attack from Canada deterred Congress-
man Bayley from attending. Undeterred by the uncertainty 
of communication with New York, the county committee 
took the initiative in circulating the Continental Association, 
which everyone signed. Furthermore, Bayley complained in 
October that notwithstanding the silence from the Provincial 
Congress, the people had commenced the organization of 
their militia, using the form suggested by the Continental 
Congress. Under the illusion that the First Provincial Con-
gress was still sitting, Bayley promised to attend that winter, 
"if health permit." In view of this isolation, it is not sur-
prising that the county seems not to have held an election for 
the Second Provincial Congress; probably the people did not 
hear of it until late in the spring. The wonder is that the 
county created an effective Whig organiz'ation.45 
Kings County may, or may not, have held an election. 
Eight days after the opening of the Second Provincial Con-
gress, the members present, lacking a quorum, wrote a letter 
to the "members chosen to represent Kings County," pressing 
them to attend. The next day, November 23, a Kings deputy 
appeared, but when deliberations began on December 6, only 
one Kings member attended. Although the house read and 
formally recorded all election certificates, they did not men-
tion Kings County. Moreover, even though Orange could 
44 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 297. On the land dispute and factionalism see Duer 
to Peter V. B. Livingston, June 2, 1775, ibid., I, 71-72 and Judge R. R. 
Livingston to R. R. Livingston, Jr., May 18, 1775, Livingston, Revolutionary 
Letters of Importance, No. 44. 
45 John Taplin to P. V. B. Livingston, July 15, 1775, Jacob Bayley to 
Provincial Congress, October 20, 1775, jour. Prov. Gong., I, 95, II, 96. 
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claim only one delegate from Goshen precinct, the house 
seated him, but with the provision that he have no vote 
until his county had a quorum. The meticulous action in 
relation to Orange renders the silence on Kings even more 
puzzling. When a second Kings representative arrived in the 
city on December 8, the county cast its vote in the first 
formal division entered in the journal, but the official record 
does not refer to the seating of the delegation nor to receipt 
of its election certificate. The reference of the Provincial 
Congress's letter of November 22 does seem to indicate that 
the county did have an election, but there is no explanation 
for the omission in the journal. Possibly it was the result of 
clerical oversight. For example, although William Smith's 
memoirs contain a brief summary of Thomas Smith's at:count 
of the proceedings of the afternoon of December 13, 1775, the 
journal does not record Thomas Smith as present.46 
Of the fourteen counties, then, only two (Richmond and 
Queens) refused to choose deputies, and since they had 
always been strongholds of Tory sentiment, their refusal did 
not represent any shift in political loyalty. No doubt the 
equivocation of the Provincial Congress in regard to the 
Tories during the preceding months had fatally affected the 
weak Whig organization in both counties. Nevertheless, the 
action of two Tory counties cannot be construed as evidence 
of a general loyalist reaction. McDougall's explanation of the 
Provincial Congress's predicament largely confirms the fore-
going: "This [bare quorum] is owing to the tardiness of the 
Deputies of the New Counties [Tryon, Charlotte, Cumber-
land, and Gloucester], who are not come down. And to the 
machinations of the Tories, who have so wrought on the 
Fears and Jealousies of the Counties of Richmond and 
Queens, that the Former has not chosen any deputies: and 
the Latter has Voted against any being Sent. "47 
46Jbid., I, 198, 199, 205-6, 207-8. 
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Those who see evidence of a rising loyalist tide also point 
to the circumstances surrounding the complicated Tory 
stratagem of having the Provincial Congress approve a meet-
ing of the general assembly. The irresolution of the Whigs 
in the fall of 1775 cost them the political initiative and 
exposed them to the possibility of a major political defeat. 
Perspicacious William Smith evolved a two-pronged maneu-
ver which ostensibly aimed at conciliatory negotiations with 
Britain but which substantially sought to break the con-
tinental union and to reestablish the government's control 
over New York. The first step envisaged instructions by the 
Provincial Congress to the New York representatives at the 
Continental Congress to move new conciliatory proposals. 
In preparing these proposals for presentation to the Provin-
cial Congress, Smith sought to attract enough moderate and 
conservative votes to secure the adoption of the recommenda-
tions by the New Yorkers, but he also sought to insure either 
their rejection by the Continental Congress or New York's 
freedom of action. The result of approval or disapproval 
by the "grand Congress" would be a meeting of the New 
York provincial assembly to debate Lord North's motion of 
February 20. Smith cannily incorporated a provision which 
he had suggested in June to the First Provincial Congress, 
to have the Continental Congress initiate negotiations.48 
47 McDougall to Schuyler, December 7, 1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
McDougall's reference to machinations and fears may not have been 
imaginary. A letter to the New York journal early in the year had described 
the tactics used by the Tories to prevent the formation of a Whig committee 
in Jamaica. The Tories circulated a statement to which they solicited 
signatures, opposing the election of the committee. "A Lover of Liberty" 
charged that the Tories told people the proposed committee would be 
authorized to break open their houses in search of tea, that the committee 
would break their molasses jugs, that if they did not sign the statement, they 
would be adjudged enemies to the King and might be hanged. N.Y.]., 
February 9, 1775. 
Even after the crushing defeat of the Queens Whigs in the election of 
:-.iovember, 1775, printer John Holt still insisted that the Tories did not 
number one·third of the Queens population, that those who voted for them 
were "dependant upon, or under the influence" of their social superiors. 
Ibid., December 28, 1775. 
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Smith's suggestion of June had centered on the formation 
of a permanent continental congress to apportion the colo-
nies' shares of funds requisitioned by Great Britain. Elabo-
rating on this idea now, he proposed that Britain consider 
such monies as a gift, that Parliament account for their 
expenditure for national defense, and that Parliament also 
report on the expenditure of the funds which came from 
the regulation of commerce. While the colonies sustained 
the costs of civil government, no official of the province 
might receive "any other pension or provision." Smith 
recommended as immediate steps that the Continental Con-
gress urge that all the colonial assemblies convene to petition 
the crown and Parliament and avoid "as much as possible 
everything that tends to irritate or offend in asserting the 
essential Rights and Privileges of His Majesty's American 
Subjects" and that it declare what parts of the parliamentary 
resolution of February 20 it would accept.49 Once the dis-
putants resolved the question of taxation, Congress would 
rescind the Continental Association and Parliament would 
48 Dorothy R. Dillon, The New York Triumvirate: A Study of the Legal 
and Political Careers of William Livingston, john Morin Scott, William 
Smith, Jr. (New York, 1949), pp. 139-40. The June instructions to the New 
York delegates included: repeal of the obnoxious legislation; limitation of 
colonial assemblies to three years; Parliament's surrender of its right to inter-
fere in colonial religious affairs; complete internal colonial autonomy subject 
to the crown's veto; all duties raised by regulation of trade to be paid to the 
colonies; all funds to be raised for defense to be voted by a continental con-
gress. The deputies from New York never presented the plan. Becker, The 
History of Political Parties, pp. 214-15; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
pp. 224-25, 228b. 
Smith formally described his purpose to Tryon after these events had 
occurred: "I confess that I flattered myself with hopes that this Province 
might have been induced by Your advice to set an example to the rest, for a 
return from their wanderings in that wide field of discontent opened by the 
Continental Congress in 1774." O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, 
VIII, 653. 
49 Since the Continental Congress had rebuffed Lord North's proposition in 
July and had learned in November of the King's refusal to receive their Olive 
Branch petition, it was highly improbable that they would consider another 
petition. Inasmuch as Smith's ideas represented a retreat from Congress's 
statement of July 31, the likelihood of a cordial reception for them was 
extremely remote. Burnett, The Continental Congress, pp. 95-97; Worthing-
ton C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds., journals of the Continental Congress 
(34 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1904-1937), II, 224-27. 
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pass a general act of "oblivion and indemnity." The colonists 
would express their readiness "to place an intire confidence 
in parliament" for the redress of their other grievances. The 
last provision of the plan revealed Smith's major intent, for 
it reserved to each colony the liberty to pursue any "measure 
... that may facilitate the designed Reconciliation not incon-
sistent with the Plan of Contract to be concerted and recom-
mended to them by the Continental Congress." Since the 
sole power and authority of the Continental Congress would 
consist of matters of taxation, New York would have a free 
hand to make her own peace·with the ministry.50 
If the Continental Congress defeated a New York motion 
on conciliation, Smith might plausibly appeal to the Whigs 
to call for a meeting of the provincial legislature. The assem-
bly would consider Lord North's motion.51 An independent 
memorial from the colony on this matter after its rejection 
by the Continental Congress would stir up dissension among 
the colonies, discredit the Provincial Congress, and open the 
door to restoration of the governor's authority. Smith's plan 
owed its inspiration to a letter from delegate John Alsop, 
50 Smith, Memoirs, V, November 30, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, pp. 244·47. Smith admitted indirectly that this was the case when his 
plan failed. Upon learning that the Provincial Congress had repudiated 
any separate negotiation, Smith wrote: "for it was resolved that the latter 
[i.e., Continental Congress] only should declare upon all terms of Reconcilia-
tion & thus the former [i.e., Provincial Congress] became meer executive 
Instruments." Smith, Memoirs, V, December 14, 1775. 
51 Smith's sincerity in advocating another petition by the assembly is a 
moot point in view of the preceding events. It will be recalled that the 
administration's supporters had made a great deal of noise over their decent 
and constitutional appeal to the King and Parliament in the spring, prac-
tically acting upon the unofficial invitation of the ministry. The refusal of 
the British, therefore, even to receive the assembly's petitions came as a 
sharp slap in the face not only to the Tories but also to the conservative and 
moderate Whigs. On what basis did Smith expect a different reaction now? 
Lord North's resolution did not offer negotiation; it required submission on 
specific terms. Moreover, by December the whole atmosphere had altered. 
In August the King had proclaimed the Americans to be in rebellion. The 
succeeding months had witnessed the rejection of the Olive Branch petition 
and the acceleration of measures designed to crush the rebellion by arms. 
Since Smith possessed acute political perception, it is difficult not to conclude 
that the petition was secondary to the aim of reasserting the government's 
authority. On the moderate attitude, see Jay to McDougall, December 8, 
1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
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conservative and future loyalist, which suggested that the 
New York Provincial Congress instruct its representatives in 
Philadelphia to introduce pacificatory measures.52 
The arrival of Alsop's letter presented William Smith with 
his opportunity. Smith and his brother Thomas, a member 
of the Provincial Congress, had striven for some time without 
notable success to persuade John Morin Scott to moderate 
his views. When Scott informed Thomas Smith of the 
receipt of Alsop's letter, Deputy Smith exhorted him to move 
at the opening session of the Second Provincial Congress for 
new instructions for the Philadelphia delegation. Scott con-
sented conditionally, insisting that Smith prepare the draft. 
William Smith, however, composed the resolves which 
Thomas Smith gave to Scott. 53 Councilor William Smith ran 
into strong opposition when he broached his plan to Tryon 
and some of the executive council on December l. In his 
memoirs Smith discreetly avoided disclosing the substance 
of the talk but recorded that the opposition subsided when 
he placed his formulation on this basis: "Suppose says I it 
procures a constitutional application to Parliament upon the 
controverted subjects in a more moderate tone." The "con-
stitutional application," of course, was an assembly petition. 
Shortly thereafter Smith handed Tryon the draft of a letter 
to the people in which the Governor intimated his desire of 
having the assembly examine Lord North's resolution. Dated 
December 4, Tryon's letter appeared in the newspapers in 
modified form. 54 The Tories had launched their trial bal-
loon, and Wiliiam Smith busily guided it. 
52 Apparently Smith was already thinking along these lines. Under date 
of November 25 he recorded counseling Tryon to make public his permission 
to return to England. Smith, Memoirs, V, November 25, 28, 1775; Sabine, 
Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 242, 243. 
53 Smith, Memoirs, V, December I, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, 
p. 243. 
54 Smith, Memoirs, V, December I, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 243; Canst. Gaz., December 6, 1775. Tryon explained to Smith that 
he could not use the letter as drafted because he feared the other governors 
might accuse him of being in league with "the People." 
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On the one hand, William Smith consolidated opinion 
among the city magistrates for having another meeting of the 
colony's assembly, while on the other, his brother sounded 
out feeling in the Provincial Congress for new instructions 
to the colony's representatives at Philadelphia. Having ob-
tained a favorable response, Thomas Smith arranged a 
private meeting of ten members of the Provincial Congress 
and his brother at Simmons Tavern on December 7.55 Before 
attending the meeting, William Smith submitted the draft 
instructions to Colonel Edmund Fanning, Tryon's son-in-law, 
who read and approved them. Most of the discussion at the 
tavern revolved around the terms of the conciliatory pro-
posals. When some members suggested that Alexander 
McDougall would never consent to the presently constituted 
provincial assembly's taking up the North resolution, Wil-
liam Smith assured them that the Governor would not 
insist upon it, but he, nevertheless, argued against the elec-
tion of a new assembly. Encouraged by the expressions of 
support, Thomas Smith declared he would introduce the 
resolutions in the Provincial Congress the next day.56 
Instead of moving for new instructions to the delegates at 
the Continental Congress, Thomas Smith presented four 
resolves to the Provincial Congress: (1) that Gage had begun 
hostilities without waiting for colonial consideration of Lord 
North's motion and that New York had borne arms in self-
defense; (2) that New York boasts the "most unshaken 
loyalty," the "warmest attachment" to the crown, and "an 
ardent desire to maintain the ancient union of the two 
countries"; (3) that the Provincial Congress "conceive it 
highly necessary and expedient" for the King to have the 
55 Smith, Memoirs, V, December 5, 7, 1775. The ten deputies were 
Nathaniel Woodhull, John Sloss Hobart and Ezra L'Hommedieu of Suffolk, 
John J. Bleecker, Leonard Gansevoort, Jacob Cuyler, Francis Nicoll, and 
Robert Van Rensselaer of Albany, John Van Cortlandt of New York, and 
Gilbert Livingston of Dutchess. 
56 Ibid., December 6, 7, 1775. 
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colony's opinion on the North resolution "in such a way as 
his Excellency may conceive to be most constitutional" and 
that the Provincial Congress consider the Governor's letter 
as "proceeding from an anxious desire for a reestablishment 
of ... harmony"; (4) that the Provincial Congress desire 
Tryon to return to his residence in the city and guarantee 
his safety.57 Since these resolves were preliminaries to the 
instructions, they were presumably intended to create favor-
able sentiment among the members for conciliation, to lay 
the basis for convoking the legislature should the Continental 
Congress reject conciliation, and to reassure the Governor as 
to the attitude of the Provincial Congress. 
Thomas Smith erred seriously when he neglected to assure 
himself of Scott's support before introducing his resolves.58 
The introductory motion precipitated an acrimonious de-
bate, in the course of which Scott teamed with McDougall 
and Hobart to oppose Smith. Scott severely castigated Gover-
nor Tryon for accusing the people in his December 4 letter of 
withholding "their allegiance from their sovereign and their 
obedience" from Parliament. The trio also criticized the 
assembly and demanded its dissolution.59 It is likely that the 
house would have defeated Smith's motion, but the delegates 
from Albany, Dutchess, and Ulster took refuge in the rules 
of procedure which enabled them to postpone further debate 
for five days.60 
Thomas Smith sought to repair the damage the next day, 
57 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 239-40; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 
210-ll. 
58Although Scott was a key figure in the Provincial Congress and had 
possession of a copy of William Smith's draft, Thomas had not invited him 
to the consultation at Simmons Tavern. William noted noncommittally that 
Thomas had not consulted Scott on the introductory motion. Smith, Memoirs, 
V, December 8, 13, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William Smith, pp. 252, 253, 256. 
59 Smith, Memoirs, V, December 4, 8, 13, 31, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of 
William Smith, pp. 252, 253, 256. 
60 Rule 10 stated: "That no question shall be determined on the day that 
it is agitated if three counties shall request that it be deferred to the next 
day." ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 206, 211. 
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December 9, by presenting a motion to appoint a committee 
to draft a letter to the representatives at Philadelphia that 
would instruct them on measures to be taken "in this alarm-
ing state of our affairs." The general nature of the motion 
won unanimous approval and the deputies referred it to a 
committee of Scott, Hobart, Smith, Gansevoort, Gilbert 
Livingston, and Abraham Brasher. 
When the Provincial Congress reopened the debate on 
Smith's resolves on December 13, Hobart proposed an amend-
ment to Smith's motion which rebuked the Governor and 
placed the responsibility for the crisis on the ministry's 
shoulders. The amendment contained five resolves: (1) that 
none of the people have renounced their allegiance to the 
King or desire independence; (2) that the colonies have 
taken up arms to defend their rights and privileges against 
"the arbitrary and tyrannical encroachments of His Majesty's 
Ministers"; (3) that though "this colony" had recourse to 
committees and Provincial Congress to secure redress of their 
grievances, the people do not desire to oppose the colonial 
legislature but insist upon their right to continued repre-
sentation therein; (4) that the government's failure to con-
vene the assembly this season has caused uneasiness among 
the people; (5) that the Provincial Congress thinks there 
is no danger of "insult or interruption" to either of the 
branches of the legislature and that it would be extremely 
agreeable to the people to have the assembly meet to con-
sider the "present unhappy controversy."61 The debate on 
Hobart's amendment produced heated exchanges. Smith re-
marked that the first part of the fifth resolution was similar 
to his own motion for guaranteeing the Governor's safety, 
whereupon Hobart answered that the Provincial Congress 
might arrest Tryon without breach of faith. Since Colden 
61 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 240; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 212, 
217. The committee appointed December 9 to draft the letter to Philadelphia 
never reported. 
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could legally replace the Governor, the Suffolk delegate 
stated, the legislature could proceed without "interruption." 
The speaker declared "impudently" that he had drawn the 
clause in that form to trap the Governor.62 The vote on the 
amendment overwhelmed Smith, for only one county, Kings, 
voted against it and one, Orange, divided. The house then 
held the amendment for detailed consideration, voting on it 
paragraph by paragraph. When the voting ended, Smith 
had won his major point: it would be extremely agreeable to 
the people to have the assembly sit. On all the other resolves 
Smith suffered a sharp reverse, and the volleys of invective 
had so exacerbated tempers that the ultimate fate of the 
motion remained in doubt. 
Indeed the following day's session demonstrated how the 
struggle over the amendment had fused the radicals, moder-
ates, and most of the conservatives into a determined opposi-
tion. This temporarily united group deprived Smith of his 
partial victory in the previous day's debates. Reflecting this 
new vigor, Isaac Roosevelt, a conservative from New York 
City, offered further amendments to the first two resolutions 
that broadened in harsh tones their scope to include Parlia-
ment. His motion charged that the sole sources of the sup-
posed present turbulence were the "oppressive acts" of Parlia-
ment, "devised for enslaving His Majesty's leige subjects," 
and the "hostile attempts of the Ministry to carry those acts 
into execution." Roosevelt's amendment carried unani-
mously, for all counties voted for it. John M. Scott and 
Alexander McDougall opened the assault on the next resolve. 
When Scott and McDougall finished obliterating and trans-
posing words in the third resolution, they barely left the door 
ajar for another session of the assembly. They declared that 
the people do not wish "to disuse ... the ordinary course 
62 Smith, Memoirs, V, December 13, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 253. Scott dissociated himself from Hobart's "trap the governor" 
remarks. 
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of legislation, but ... highly esteem their right of being 
represented in General Assembly." This, too, carried unani-
mously. Hobart moved that the fourth resolve be expunged; 
his motion carried with no county dissenting. The fifth 
resolve met the same fate, although its demise spanned two 
motions. Haring of Orange, seconded by Sands of New York, 
proposed to delete the latter half of the fifth, which welcomed 
a meeting of the legislature. When put to a vote, only Kings 
opposed it, but Roosevelt recorded his dissent from the New 
York City ballot. Sands then spoke for the disposal of the 
rump and only Kings voted against it.63 Having administered 
a stinging admonition to the Governor and the Tories, the 
house proceeded to other business. 
The dinner intermission that day must have seen further 
conversation on the debates because when the Provincial 
Congress reconvened in the afternoon, the moderates re-
opened the subject. Scott took the floor to present an 
additional proposition: "that nothing of a salutary nature 
can be expected from the separate declaration of the sense 
of this Colony on the Resolution of the House of Commons 
on the 20th February last; and that as the motion whereon 
the scheme was grounded was confessedly framed to disunite 
the Colonies, it would be highly dangerous and totally incon-
sistent with the glorious plan of American Union, should this 
Colony express their separate sense on the above-mentioned 
supposed conciliatory proposal. ... " All the counties voted 
in the affirmative except Orange, which divi_ded. 64 McDou-
gall concluded the business by moving "that this Colony is 
fully and effectually represented in the Continental Congress 
for the purpose of expressing the sense of its inhabitants on 
any overtures for a reconciliation, and that the Continental 
63 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 240-41; jour. Prov. Gong., I, 
217-18. Although William Smith states that his brother quitted the Provincial 
Congress in disgust on the fourteenth, the journal does not record him 
present either the afternoon of December 13 or at any time on December 14. 
64 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 241; jour. Prov. Gong., I, 219. 
Roosevelt, Cuyler, and Hay entered their dissents to their counties' votes. 
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Congress has fully and dispassionately expressed the sense of 
the inhabitants of this Colony on the above-mentioned 
Resolution .... " All the counties approved this resolution, 
but Roosevelt and Cuyler registered their disapproval. When 
the resolutions passed their third reading on December 15, 
the conservatives cast their last negative votes. Van Zandt, 
Roosevelt, and Beekman of New York, Van Derbilt and 
Covenhoven of Kings, and Cuyler of Albany voted against 
the fourth and fifth resolutions and opposed the publication 
of any of them.65 
William Smith officially attributed the defeat of his pro-
posals to the machinations of Scott, McDougall, and Hobart 
who, seeing "a spirit of moderation would be inauspicious to 
their private aims, of gaining seats in the new Assembly, 
and" who, "by working upon the general jealousies of the 
main Body, and the ambitions of some members who had 
ends similar to their own," defeated the resolves.66 In his 
private notes Smith ascribed the defeat to the arrival of news 
from Philadelphia and Canada on the evening of December 
8. From Philadelphia had come the Continental Congress's 
acerbic response to the royal proclamation on rebellion, a 
response denying that the Americans were rebels and oppos-
ing the "exercise of unconstitutional powers, to which neither 
the Crown nor Parliament were ever entitled."67 The reports 
from Canada spoke of further military successes after the fall 
of Montreal.68 Although the news of these events may have 
stiffened the opposition, as Smith thought, the information 
arrived in New York after intemperate argument had already 
occurred in the Provincial Congress. 
There is, however, another relevant factor in this affair 
65 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 219 and 220. See the comments of McDougall to Jay, 
December 14, 18, 1775, Jay Papers, CUL and Jay to McDougall, December 8, 
1775, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
66 Smith to Tryon, December 17, 1775, O'Callaghan, Documents, Colonial, 
New York, VIII, 653. 
67 Quoted in Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 117. 
68 Smith, Memoirs, V, December 13, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 253. 
The Road to Independence 
which Smith glossed over in his letter to Tryon. He referred 
to his brother's resolutions as "incautiously framed," and a 
comparison of them with Tryon's letter to the people will 
demonstrate the truth of this understatement. Although the 
Governor had expressed the wish to have the people's opinion 
of the North resolution and to have peace, he had concluded 
his letter with the implication that the Whigs had indulged 
in treason. In this context Thomas Smith's propositions 
possibly evoked the image of the dangling halter in the minds 
of some Whigs. 
Thomas Smith phrased his motion in more than concilia-
tory language. His first resolution ignored the North policies 
of 1773-1775 as the cause of the American unrest and sought 
to create the impression that Gage's expedition was the 
origin of the troubles. If this view were correct, what would 
Smith say about those who advocated the formation of a 
committee and a provincial congress before April, 1775? 
Would the government treat them as restless and turbulent 
characters? The second resolution conceded that the conduct 
of some "would countenance a charge of withholding their 
allegiance from their Sovereign," although it added, "it must 
be attributed to an apprehension that all protection was 
withdrawn from them." Nevertheless, the resolve did lend 
color to Tryon's accusation of treason. The third resolution 
praised the Governor's initiative as indicating both his affec-
tion for the people and his "anxious desire for a reestablish-
ment of that harmony that has been so long interrupted by 
the misrepresentations and artifices of evil and designing 
men." 69 Did these last words refer to the De Lancey faction 
or to the moderates and radicals? As phrased, these proposals 
seemed to bear the aspect of an invitation to approve Tryon's 
judgment of the Whigs. Furthermore, since Scott and Hobart 
had either read or heard the gist of William Smith's draft 
69 Ibid., p. 252; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 210·11. 
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instructions, these unrelated and unexpected resolves must 
have aroused suspicions as to Thomas and William Smith's 
objectives. It was not surprising that "Congress was thrown 
into great heats" and that it rejected the plan.70 
Although the radical and moderate Whigs might well have 
congratulated themselves upon their resounding victory on 
the floor of the Provincial Congress, William Smith was not 
yet ready to concede the battle. Since the resolutions pro-
vided at least indirectly for a meeting of the assembly, Smith 
counseled Governor Tryon to act upon the hint. Taking 
into account the congressional diatribes against the prorogued 
legislature, William Smith advocated the election of a new 
assembly: "The dissolution will enable men of temper, to 
testify their disapprobation of the present violence, under a 
popular and safe cloke form a confederacy to correct and 
undermine the tyranny erected over the colony, turn the eyes 
of the multitude to a power that is constitutional, and favor 
future overtures for the restoration of harmony .... " 71 When 
Tryon put the issues to his council, a majority favored a 
dissolution.72 Although the Governor tried to conceal his 
termination of the legislature, not even informing his coun-
cil, he failed to deceive the Whigs.73 They took prompt steps 
to wage an energetic campaign to insure the election of a 
Whig assembly.74 
70 Smith, Memoirs, V, December 13, 1775; Sabine, Memoirs of William 
Smith, p. 253. 
71 Smith to Tryon, December 17, 1775, quoted in Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, p. 241; Smith, Memoirs, V, December 17, 1775. 
72/bid., V, December 23, 26, 1775. De Lancey, Cruger, and Horsmanden 
opposed dissolution, at least until the legal life of the assembly had expired. 
In the face of this opposition the Governor declared he would use his own 
discretion as to the precise date of dissolution. 
73 Smith records that Tryon had not informed the council of his action on 
December 30. The secrecy would have hampered the organization of an 
effective campaign by the Whigs in the rural districts and a small vote would 
have enhanced the odds of a Tory victory. Ibid., V, December 31, 1775. 
74 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 242, states the election 
aroused "little interest," but the Whig activity belies such an interpretation. 
Robert R. Livingston, expressing his surprise and mystification at the 
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By means of handbills and the newspapers the Whig 
propagandists warned the people of the consequences of the 
election of a corrupt legislature and against Tory guile to 
divide the colony. "A Citizen," urging vigilance by the 
people, maintained that the administration had prepared the 
election as a trap. Avoid the snares, elect independent men 
of integrity, he concluded. "A Poor Man" wrote that a 
corrupt assembly would make dangerous concessions to the 
North ministry and that the people therefore should unite to 
choose "Good, steady friends" to their liberties. "Philo-
Demos" asked the citizens to examine carefully the candi-
dates' principles and warned that secret enemies were worse 
than avowed opponents.75 
On another front the provincial Committee of Safety 
warned the county committees not to be "taken unaware 
& surprized into an Election without Time to Consult & 
prepare for it," to hold caucuses of "leading friends to 
liberty" to choose candidates of "zeal, spirit and integrity," 
and to spare no "care & pains" to elect them.76 Desiring to 
leave as little to chance as possible, the Committee of Safety 
in a second circular to the counties emphasized the necessity 
of prompt attendance at the meeting of the Provincial Con-
gress February I so that it could "awe a corrupt Assembly."77 
The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for the 
Whigs, who won twenty-four seats to four for the Tories.78 
Governor's action, pressed Philip Schuyler to stand for the assembly. Liv· 
ingston to Schuyler, January 11, 1776, Livingston Redmond Papers, FDRL. 
75 To the Freeholders and Freemen of New York l)y "A Citizen," December 
29, 1775, To the Citizens of New York by "A Poor Man," December 30, 1775, 
To the Electors of New York by "Publicola," January 6, 1776, Broadsides, 
NYPL; "Monitor," No. 10, N.Y.]., January 11, 1776; "Philo-Demos," Canst. 
Gaz., January 6, 1776; Schuyler to McDougall, January 11, 1776, McDougall 
to Schuyler, January 17, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS; Hamilton to Jay, 
December 31, 1775, Jay Papers, CUL. 
76 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 236; Committee of Safety to Chairman, Tryon 
County Committee, January 2, 1776, Schuyler Papers, NYPL; Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., IV, 1020-21. 
77 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 242. 
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In the capital, the Tories had not even put up a slate.79 
Whigs won the two seats in Queens, but the Jersey troops 
probably had cowed the Tories when they disarmed several 
hundred in late January. 80 The dampening of Tory ardor in 
Queens did not affect Richmond where the two leading 
Tories retained their assembly seats. Similarly, in the Bor-
ough of Westchester in the southern part of that county a 
De Lancey gained the victory, but Whigs captured the two 
other seats for the county. Although the Whigs won an 
impressive victory, moderates and conservatives would com-
pose the new assembly and the Tories might sway the Whigs 
if they pursued a policy of indirection.81 
Having committed themselves to the election of the new 
78 Thirteen of the Whigs were members of the current Provincial Con-
gress. The previous assembly had thirty-one seats, but the newspapers re-
ported the names of only twenty-eight victors. There was no report from 
Cumberland and only one name from Orange. There was no mention of 
Charlotte and Gloucester counties. 
The four Tories were Oliver De Lancey of Westchester, Seaman and Billop 
of Richmond, and John Alsop of New York. The Whigs nominated the 
latter as a conciliatory gesture. 
The Whigs were Philip Livingston, Jay, and McDougall of New York, John 
Leffertse and Covenhoven of Kings, Blackwell and Samuel Townsend of 
Queens, N. Woodhull and William Smith of Suffolk, John Thomas, Jr., and 
Lewis Morris of Westchester, Pierre Van Cortlandt of Manor of Cortlandt; 
P. R. Livingston of Manor of Livingston; R. R. Livingston, Jr. and Dirck 
Brinckerhoff of Dutchess; Abraham Yates, Jr. and Robert Van Rensselaer of 
Albany; Abraham Ten Broeck of Manor of Rensselaer; Christopher Yates of 
Borough of Schenectady; Paris and Moore of Tryon; George Clinton and 
Charles DeWitt of Ulster; and John Haring of Orange. N.Y.P., February 22, 
1776. 
The account of the Whigs' victory in New York City triumphantly con-
cluded: "What think ye of our New York Tories now?" Canst. Gaz., February 
3, 1776. 
79 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 242. The Whigs had called 
in the newspapers for a meeting of the freemen and freeholders on January 
17 to choose a ticket. It was this meeting that nominated the victors. Canst. 
Gaz., January 17, 1776; Smith, Memoirs, V, February 2 and 3, 1776. 
80 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 244-45. When the Tories 
surrendered their weapons, they took an oath to support the Provincial Con-
gress and not to aid the British. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 858; 
N.Y.G., January 29, 1776. 
81 The inability of the Tories to win a majority in the assembly under the 
conditions of restricted suffrage is striking testimony of their loss of influence 
among the electorate. This is all the more astonishing in the countryside 
where the great landholders could sway the votes of their lessees. 
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assembly, the Tories had to make the difficult decision 
whether they would permit the legislature to convene. 
Certainly the Tory defeat at the polls had not induced the 
Governor to prorogue the assembly. What gave Tryon and 
his council pause was not the election but the state of public 
opinion. Early in January New York papers carried the text 
of the King's October speech to Parliament in which he 
declared his intention of ending the rebellion quickly by the 
"most decisive exertions."82 William Smith remarked that 
the news "greatly inflamed the multitude, upon the certain 
prospect of a new [military] campaign."83 When the council 
met before the election on January 29 to lay plans for the 
coming legislative session, the members were gloomy con-
cerning the administration's prospects.84 They divided over 
the question of how long to postpone the opening of the 
assembly; one faction favored a month's delay, the other a 
fortnight. They resolved the difference by agreeing to 
permit the meeting on February 14 as stipulated in the writs 
of election, if good news came from Britain to soothe the 
"popular ferments." Otherwise, the Governor would pro-
rogue the legislature for a month.85 Not only did expecta-
tions of good news from Britain prove illusory, but the threat 
of war increased with the arrival of General Charles Lee to 
erect defenses against an expected British assault.86 Con-
sequently, the council approved the prorogation of the legis-
lature and the assembly never again sat in the colony. 
Although the Whig leaders had wavered and hesitated in 
the latter half of 1775, they had consolidated support among 
the people for the revolutionary cause and had consolidated 
the revolutionary organizations throughout the province. 
82/bid., January 8, 1776. 
83 Smith, Memoirs, V, January 6, 1776. 
84/bid., V, January 29, 1776. 
85/bid. 
86 Nette1s, George Washington, pp. 209-13. 
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The February prorogation of the assembly signaled the end 
of Tory efforts, without the employment of an army, to 
regain supremacy in the province. Their defeat within and 
without the Provincial Congress underlined the fact that 
they were a minority. 
FIVE 
The Tide Sets for 
Independence 
,--.. ~THE irresolution of the First and the Second 
~ ...__} ) Provincial Congresses often tends to obscure 
the hardening of the opposition to Britain and the growth 
of sentiment for independence. Even in the dismal days 
of November when the First Provincial Congress collapsed, 
the press carried letters which expressed determined re-
sistance to British measures. "Philo Patriae," lecturing his 
readers on patriotism, heaped scorn on those who sold their 
talents to the ministry and on those who drew back in 
fear. 1 Although "The Monitor" confidently asserted that 
Britain would weary of fruitless endeavors and ultimately 
would concede, he also warned his country men that they 
must prepare to die in defense of their liberties.2 "An 
Occasional Remarker" warned against the increasing bold-
ness of the Tories and said that he was prepared to make 
the final sacrifice in defense of American rights.3 "A Poor 
Man" remonstrated with those of the "industrious" poor 
who favored the government. Contrasting the condition 
of the American farmer and laborer with his European 
counterpart, he wrote: "Here, a poor man, can get his 
bread, and eat it in comfort and peace. There, the greatest 
part of his earnings are taken from him, to fatten and feed 
the pride of the rich and lazy; who instead of thanking 
him for it, only insult and despise him. He hardly dares 
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to say his soul is his own .... I would rather die ten thou-
sand deaths, than to see this country enslaved, and ruined 
by a venal wicked, blundering parliament."4 When news 
of Governor Dunmore's depredations in Virginia reached 
New York, "Minos" proposed that he be tried and hanged 
for his crimes. 5 
Among those who sought to counteract the effect on 
public opinion of the Whig leadership's timidity was "The 
Monitor." When the Tories attempted to beguile the Second 
Provincial Congress into calling for a meeting of the as-
sembly to act on Lord North's proposition, "The Monitor" 
wrote a detailed dissection of the offer which exposed its 
damaging consequences.6 This same writer drove home 
sharp attacks on the frightened congressmen and on those 
who had opposed Britain in 1774 but who now sided with 
the ministry. 7 In his seventh number "The Monitor" dif-
ferentiated nicely between timidity and prudence: 
When the former qualities prevailed in the conduct of affairs, 
we see none but weak and irresolute councils, productive of 
plans and measures, slow in their execution, and insignificant 
in their consequences. Every proposal, whether trivial or im-
portant, is preplexed with endless debates; however obvious 
its propriety, still it must be examined in every light, must 
undergo the nicest dissection, and each member of it be viewed 
with the most scrupulous precision. . . . In a word, nothing 
wise, provident, manly or decisive is to be expected; a scan-
dalous remissness, imbecility and inaction, characterise the 
general current of affairs .... When the latter ingredients 
1 N.Y.]., November 2, 1775. 
2/bid., November 9, 1775. 
3/bid., November 16, 1775. 
4 Canst. Gaz., November 25, 177.~. 
5 N.Y.]., December 7, 1775. 
6 "The Monitor," No. 6, ibid., December 14, 1775. He concluded on a note 
of open hostility: "The resolution in question is at such an infinite distance 
from anything we can embrace, and is clothed in such a menacing garb, 
that it clearly evinces the most unfriendly disposition, and claims nothing 
from us, but the most contemptuous inattention." 
7 "The Monitor," ;'1/os. 7 and 8, ibid., December 21, 28, 1775. 
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preponderate, we see bold designs concerted with becoming 
resolution, and executed with answerable firmness and suc-
cess. . . . Deliberation is indulged within proper bounds. . . . 
Activity and fortitude are the very life of great exploits, and 
can alone produce security in perilous and stormy times. 
As the January, 1776, assembly election campaign ap-
proached its climax, "The Monitor" called for the rejection 
of "those whose conduct has been ambiguous and waver-
ing" and urged the electors to extract a promise from every 
candidate to espouse legislative reform.8 He concluded with 
proposals for triennial assemblies and laws against "every 
species" of bribery and corruption. 
Correspondents defended vigorously the colonial position 
on the political and constitutional issues of the day. In a 
special plea "To the Inhabitants of Queen's County, Long 
Island," "A plain man" reviewed the major irritants in 
imperial relations. Emphasizing no taxation without repre-
sentation and quoting Locke on the right to possess proper-
ty, the writer observed "that representation should accom-
pany taxation is an eternal law of nature, and inseperable 
from the very idea of property, so that no property can 
exist without it: whatever is a man's own, no other person 
can have a right to take from him, without his consent, 
expressed by himself, or his representative."9 Although 
"The Monitor" essayed a comprehensive analysis of the dis-
putes, he devoted more argument to the tax question than 
to any other single subject.10 The changing tone of these 
Blbid., January 11, 1776. 
9 He specified the other grievances in this order: the prohibition on 
making steel· the importation of Spanish and Portuguese wines through 
England; restrictions on the marketing of hats; the prohibition on building 
plating and slitting mills and tilt hammers; limitations on the marketing 
of wool and woolen textiles; trial of causes in Admiralty courts. Canst. 
Gaz., November 29, December 2, 6. 1775. 
10 N.Y.]., November 23, 30, 1775, January 4, 18, 1776. There is some 
ground for suspecting "The Monitor"' to be Alexander Hamilton. Professor 
Broadus Mitchell subscribes to this viewpoint of Hamilton. The known 
Hamilton pamphlets of this period provide a basis for comparison. The 
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articles connoted the stiffening of public opmwn. Writing 
in November, the author discerned the intent of the min-
istry to be the "subjugation" of the colonies to parliamen-
tary supremacy. By January "The Monitor" saw in the 
government's policies a consistent effort "to impose and 
rivet the chains of America."11 Notwithstanding the fre-
quent recurrence of the taxation theme, this author also 
touched upon home rule and claimed the "exclusive right 
to regulate our internal police." 12 Moreover, "the power 
of legislation," he argued, "is so necessary to preserve that 
of taxation, that the one cannot long exist without the 
other." These ideas, appearing in November and Decem-
ber, preceded the publication of Paine's Common Sense and 
their appearance suggested that they had obtained consid-
erable currency. 
Until September, 1775, the Whigs focused their criticism 
on the North ministry and Parliament but in that month 
they broadened their attacks to include the King. The 
Whigs proclaimed themselves the champions of constitu-
tional monarchy as opposed to Parliament, whom they 
accused of enacting illegal statutes. Since George III 
reigned as a constitutional sovereign, he must reject uncon-
stitutional laws. When the King sought to enforce these 
unlawful statutes, he acted unconstitutionally and in "very 
iniquitous" fashion. By opposing the royal measures, with 
force if necessary, the Whigs defended the Hanoverian 
crown, while the Tories sought to alter the constitutional 
basis of monarchy and to restore absolutism. 13 "Amicus 
similarity of style, method of argument, and references to Hume are sug-
gestive. Perhaps most persuasive of all is the similarity of content in "The 
Monitor" No. 4 on the tea tax and the Hamilton pamphlet, The Farme1· 
Refuted. 
11 N.Y.]., November 30, 1775, January 18, 1776. 
12 Ibid., February 8, 1776. 
13 "Obadiah," ibid., September 21, 1775; "Lucius," Canst. Gaz., September 
27, 1775. 
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Constitutionis" went so far as to assert that the King had 
deposed himself constitutionally by his conduct and could 
not be deemed lawful ruler until he stopped the war and 
repealed the "cruel" acts against the colonies.H Although 
"The Monitor" wrote in similar vein about King and con-
stitution in his second number, his twelfth production 
presented powerful reasons for breaking the tie to George 
IIJ.l5 This last philippic set out to destroy "superstitious 
veneration for dignified names," but went on to attack the 
institution of monarchy. "The Monitor" wrote: "the black 
catalogue of royal malignities would rather stimulate their 
[i.e., the people's] disgust than feed their admiration. They 
would discover that the ambition and avarice, the pride, 
caprice and cruelty of monarchs have been the most fruit-
ful sources of havoc, devastation and ruin among men. 
They would be sensible, that those attributes of perfection 
they are wont to ascribe to the British sovereign, as they 
have no sufficient foundation in his own particular charac-
ter, are altogether fancies and visions." Appearing fifteen 
days after Paine's Common Sense} this piece by "The Mon-
itor" reflected perhaps growing public sentiment in its disil-
lusionment with monarchy. 
Letters opposing surrender to the British continued to 
appear in the press throughout the spring of 1776. Writers, 
warning against the "insidious wiles" of the North govern-
ment, denounced the peace commissioners' mission as an 
attempt to divide and conquer. One anonymous penman, 
refusing to accept a British offer to repeal the "detestable" 
acts, questioned the faith of the ministry. He recalled to 
his readers the fate of those Dutch provinces in the six-
teenth century that had submitted to the Spanish. Having 
disarmed the rebels, the Duke of Alva hanged "upwards 
of 15,000 of their principal gentlemen."16 
14 N.Y.]., October 19, 1775. 
15Jbid., November 23, 1775, January 25, 1776. 
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While the newspapers reflected one facet of revolutionary 
thought, they were not the only guides. Other observers 
testified more directly to the popular enthusiasm for the 
American cause. In spite of the backwardness of the Whig 
leaders in fortifying the port against the probable British 
attack, William Thompson could still write: "I am happy 
to find the Inhabitants of the place so far exceed the char-
acter I had of them. I never knew people so willing to as-
sist in every military manoevre, and every thing that can 
be set on foot for the defence of the City is carried on with 
the greatest attention and spirit."17 Eliphalet Dyer at-
tributed "pannick" to "Mr Duane &c &c," but praised 
Isaac Sears for his role in the defensive preparations.18 So 
confident was Jay of the popular strength of the revolution-
ary party throughout the colony that he exhorted Mc-
Dougall to have the Provincial Congress levy taxes.19 
During the first four months of 1776 the thinking of the 
moderate Whigs moved perceptibly closer to that of the 
radicals. Men like Jay and Robert R. Livingston, driven by 
the current of events, slowly shifted position.20 Jay ac-
16 "An Observer" and "The Monitor" No. 15, February 22, 1776, anon. 
on the British commissioners, ibid., April 25, 1776; anon. on arbitrary rule 
and laying down arms, Canst. Gaz., February 24, 28, 1776: "American 
Patriot" and anon. on British commissioners, N.Y.P., April 11, 25, 1776; 
"H.Y.," N.Y.G., April 29, 1776; "Americanus," March 30, 1776, Peter Force, 
ed., American Archives (9 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1837-1853), 4th ser., 
v, 548. 
17 Thompson to Schuyler, March 28, 1776, Miscellaneous Papers: Philip 
Schuyler, NYPL. For similar comments, see General Charles Lee to Wash-
ington, February 14, 1776, quoted in Curtis P. Nettels, George Washington 
and American Independence (Boston, 1951), pp. 211-12; R. H. Lee to 
General Charles Lee, April I, 1776, Papers of Charles Lee, New-York His-
torical Society Collections, IV (New York, 1871), 367-68; Hugh Hughes to 
Samuel and John Adams, February 4, 1776, Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL. 
18 "I trust that City is now pretty well secured & can assure you it is much 
owing to that crazy Capt Sears which Y--k Delegates would affect to call 
him." Dyer to Samuel Adams, February 27, 1776, ibid. 
19 Jay to McDougall, March 27, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
20 Jay placed himself among the moderate group which included Mc-
Dougall. He frowned on those who "observe no medium and are either all 
Flame or all Frost." Ibid. 
Tryon's March proclamation, offering forgiveness to the penitent and 
promising armed support for the Tories, did nothing to reverse the trend: 
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knowledged that "from the present Appearance of Things it 
is natural to suppose that the Sword must decide the Con-
troversy-and with a View to that object our Measures 
should in a great Degree be taken."21 Livingston predicted 
"that another year of war and devastation will confirm me a 
republican .... "22 While accepting the inevitability of war, 
the moderates were also disturbed by the lack of "good and 
well ordered Governments" to counteract "that Anarchy 
which already too much prevails."23 Hugh Hughes had 
prodded Jay and McDougall in January on the "absolute 
necessity . . . for adopting some rational system of govern-
ment" but it took three months for the latter to accept that 
necessity.24 The moderates' and conservatives' reaction to 
Lord North's plan to send commissioners to negotiate with 
the colonies delineated the growing divergence in their 
views. Jay doubted that they would have any effective power 
to treat and therefore acquiesced in the requirement of more 
vigorous armed resistance." Conservative James Duane, 
who disagreed with Jay, wrote Livingston: "I am unwilling 
that while Commissioners are daily looked for, we should 
"It is generally a matter of laughter and surprize, that he could do any-
thing so weak and ill-judged. The friends of government were provoked at 
being so distinguished, and the friends to liberty hung him in effigy and 
printed a dying speech for him." Quoted in Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism 
in New York During the American Revolution (~ew York, 1901), p. 51 
from "a Letter from New York," April 12, 1776, The Remembrancer, p. 86. 
21 Jay to McDougall, April II, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
22 Livingston to Duane, February 16, 1776, Bancroft Transcripts: Liv-
ingston Papers, NYPL. A month previously he had written Schuyler, "it is 
time we sh'd act decisively, heaven & our own vigor must support us." 
January 16, 1776, Philip Schuyler Papers, NYPL. 
23 Jay to McDougall, April II, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. See also 
l\fcDougall to Schuyler, March 7, 1776, Schuyler to McDougall, March 14, 
1776, ibid. 
24 Hughes to Samuel Adams, January 8, 1776, Samuel Adams Papers, 
:\'YPL. 
23 Jay to McDougall, April II, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. See also 
William Floyd to John McKesson, May 9, 1776, Force, American Archives, 
4th ser., V, 395; speech of Gouverneur Morris, May 24, 1776, Gouverneur 
Morris Papers, CUL and Jared Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris with 
Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers (3 vols.; 
Boston, 1832), I, 106-7. 
The Tide for Independence 
by any irrevocable measure tie up our hands, and put it out 
of our power to terminate this destructive war."26 
When the election of the Third Provincial Congress in 
April, 1776, is contrasted with the election of the Second 
Provincial Congress in November, 1775, the scope of the 
changing political mood becomes readily apparent. As com-
pared with 80 delegates chosen to the Second Provincial 
Congress, the people sent 101 to the Third. 27 Most of the 
counties had fully established a network of district com-
mittees in which each district had a proportionate share of 
the county congressional representation.28 The numerical 
increase, therefore, indicated in part widespread voting 
within the districts.29 In part also it signified the participa-
tion for the first time of all fourteen counties in the elec-
toral process; Queens and Gloucester counties had not been 
represented in the Second Provincial Congress. The sterner 
treatment of the Queens Tories in January and February 
enabled the Whigs there to put together a county committee 
and several district committees.3° Finally, even though all 
the congressmen did not attend the session, enough did so 
to satisfy the quorum needs; the lack of a quorum had op-
erated as a constant obstacle in the work of the Second 
Provincial Congress. 31 All of these factors pointed toward a 
Third Provincial Congress that would be amenable to the 
adoption of firmer policies when it convened in May. How-
ever, this lay in the future. 
Meanwhile, the Second Provincial Congress and its Com-
26 Duane to R. R. Livingston, March 20, 1776, Bancroft Transcripts: 
Livingston Papers, NYPL. 
27 Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New 
York, 1760-1776 (Madison, 1909), pp. 232, 238, places the deputies for ten 
counties at 76, but two other counties chose a total of 4 men. See above p. 
114. 
28 Queens and Richmond lacked committees for most districts. 
29 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 258. 
30 Ibid., p. 259, n. 33; Provincial Congress to Queens County Committee, 
March 7, 1776, jour. Prov. Gong., I, 345. 
31 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 260. 
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mittee of Safety pursued a general course of temporization, 
although they did adopt some aggressive measures. Alarmed 
by General Lee's endeavors to interdict communication 
with Governor Tryon and the men-of-war, the Provincial 
Congress did consent reluctantly to a stricter regulation of 
the traffic after March 8. Resumption of the intercourse 
depended upon British nonmolestation of the city's supplies 
coming from Jersey. 32 Furthermore, the Committee of Safety 
strove to check on the quantities of supplies delivered to 
the British vessels in order to prevent them from accumu-
lating reserve stores.33 Taking advantage of congressional 
hesitancy, Tryon and the naval officers planned a partial 
blockade of the port. They fitted out two armed ships to 
prey on merchantmen that plied the waters between the 
Delaware River and Sandy Hook and to stop shipping from 
sailing out of the harbor. The congressional reaction to 
this challenge mingled new resoluteness with past fear. 
The Provincial Congress ordered the arming of a vessel 
to protect the trade lanes to Philadelphia, but it did not 
protest the interference with departures.34 
'When Washington's army commenced its transfer to New 
York in April, the Committee of Safety acknowledged that 
intercourse with the enemy would have to cease. The com-
mittee told the New Jersey Provincial Congress: "As the 
ships of war in our harbour are daily committing acts of 
piracy and depredation on vessels and property of the in-
habitants of the United Colonies, we apprehend orders will 
soon issue for stopping all farther supplies to them." It 
would not assume, however, the responsibility of putting 
the ships under a ban even though it charged the British 
with bad faith. The committee preferred to await the com-
32 Ibid., p. 249. For the details see jour. Prov. Cong., I, 346. 
33Ibid., I, 372. 
34 The ::-iew Yorkers asked the Continental Congress to provide a ship 
to patrol the southern half of the threatened area while they guarded 
the northern sector. Ibid., I, 354, 380. 
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mander-in-chief's orders. When Washington in mid-April 
prohibited the communication between ships and shore, the 
committee complied willingly.35 
Although the Continental Congress had authorized the 
colony to raise four regiments for the Continental Army 
in anticipation of a British attack upon the city, the Second 
Provincial Congress had neglected the task. Since the Con-
tinental Congress had not assigned these troops to the in-
vasion of Canada, Schuyler had left them under the com-
mand of New York. When Washington arrived, a delicate 
question of jurisdiction arose. The General's application 
for information on the status of the units not only posed the 
problem of their command but also embarrassed the Com-
mittee of Safety, since it revealed its negligence in re-
cruiting and arming the units. The committee admitted 
Washington's prior authority and spurred the campaign to 
enlist and equip the troops.36 
The need for the formation of a general antiloyalist 
policy grew in urgency as hostilities spread. Neglect of the 
loyalists would permit the growth of a party that might 
wreck the revolutionary organization. The Provincial Con-
gress's request in December, 1775, for continental troops 
to disarm the Tories in Tryon, Queens, and Richmond 
constituted a tacit admission of the critical nature of "the 
problem. An armed confrontation with the Tories was a 
task from which the moderates and conservatives shrank. 
On the other hand, if the Whigs adopted a stern policy of 
35 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 249; Nettels, Geor[!;e Wash-
ington, pp. 284-85; Committee of Safety to New Jersey Provincial Congress, 
April 2, I 776, ]our. Prov. Con[!;., I, 397. 
36 .'Jettels, George Washington, pp. 285-87; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 420-21. 
Washington also prodded the committee on the organization of the militia 
for emergency mobilization. He asked the committee how long it would 
take to gather 2,500 men in a "sudden emergency" and pressed them to 
cooperate with him in planning for such an eventuality. The committee's 
state of mind may be seen in its comment that "we do not at present 
foresee that emergencv." Conceding the possibility of the contingency, how-
ever, the committee readily set to work to fabricate the needed machinery. 
Ibid., I, 419-20. 
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imprisoning those suspected of hostile intentions, they would 
take another long stride down the road to revolution. When 
in March the Continental Congress passed a resolution to 
disarm all nonassociators, it thrust upon the New York 
Whigs the necessity of a decision on the Tory problem. 
The Committee of Safety first learned of Congress's action 
when General Lord Stirling passed on to it a copy of the 
congressional resolve. Having read and filed the copy, the 
committee received its official transcript from the Congress 
two days later. For five days nothing happened; then on 
March 26 the Committee of Safety appointed a committee 
"to report a plan" to give effect to the Continental Con-
gress's decision. Having taken the first step, the committee 
the following day presented its proposal which the Com-
mittee of Safety unanimously approved. The resolution 
ordered the local committee "forthwith" to disarm all 
known "disaffected" persons and those who refused to sign 
an association which pledged them to defend the colonies 
by arms. If it is true that the committee advocated the 
use of "prudence and moderation," it is also true that it 
gave the district committees a blank check to call out the 
militia and minutemen to assist them in carrying out the 
resolution. The Committee of Safety required an inventory 
of the arms gathered, since it contemplated the equipping 
of four new regiments with them.s7 
Although a month later the Committee of Safety com-
plained to the county committees about their failure to 
forward the arms inventories, the local organizations did 
carry out their instructions.38 For example, Washington 
37 Ibid., I, 375, 379, 386, 389. 
38 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 262, interprets this letter 
as evidence that "the order had scarcely been attended to at all." However, 
comments in the journal and other evidence indicate that arms had been 
seized in New York City, Queens, Dutchess, Ulster, Westchester, Suffolk, 
and Albany. Moreover, the lack of inventories is no proof of committee 
inaction as the heretofore cited cases show. jour. Prov. Cong., I, 4ll, 415, 
417, 420; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., V, 1469, 1487; J. Sullivan, ed., 
Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1779 and Minutes 
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acquired some of the guns in Ulster. The uncertainties of 
the communications system probably affected the commit-
tee's plans. The committee had entrusted the Albany Coun-
ty Committee of Correspondence's copy of its March 27 
order to member Peter R. Livingston for delivery, but 
Albany never saw it. Instead the Albany committee, taking 
the initiative, wrote to New York that it had seen a reso-
lution of the Congress for disarming Tories and solicited 
instructions on executing it. Meanwhile, Albany had lost 
more than a month.39 However halting, this step repre-
sented the first consistent effort to lay down a general anti-
Tory policy.40 Beyond this, however, the Second Provincial 
Congress would not go. 
The Provincial Congress moved cautiously in two other 
Tory matters. The question of confiscation arose in con-
nection with the case of Henry Lloyd of Queens Village, 
Queens. Lloyd went to Boston to join General Howe, 
leaving his property in the hands of his nephew, John 
Lloyd. The Committee of Safety ordered an accurate in-
ventory of all his property. Although the committee en-
trusted the property's care to John Lloyd, it forbade the 
nephew to transfer or sell any part of it unless by order 
of the Provincial Congress. While acting gingerly, the com-
mittee had exercised sovereign power in placing limits on 
the use of the property.41 
The second matter came to the reconvened Provincial 
Congress's attention the day before its life expired. A com-
mittee recommended the levying of a fine on all male dis-
armed Tories between the ages of sixteen and fifty. Since 
of the Schenectady Committee, 1775-1779 (2 vols.; Albany, 1923, 1925), I, 403. 
39 Exhorting Albany to carry out the resolution without delay, the com-
mittee complained that it "expected" that Livingston had delivered their 
resolve "long since." ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 424, 425. 
40 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 262 concludes that the 
Second Provincial Congress did not make "any serious effort to deal with 
loyalist opposition in a systematic or effective fashion." 
41 four. Prov. Gong., I, 428·29. 
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these Tories could not serve now in the militia, the com-
mittee proposed to penalize them five shillings for every 
mustering of the militia. Instead of rejecting the plan out-
right, the congress voted to refer it to the Third Provincial 
Congress, which would meet in five days.42 
Factors outside the colony could precipitate distasteful 
dilemmas for the New York Provincial Congress notwith-
standing its caution. The Continental Congress posed a 
knotty problem for the New Yorkers when it recommended 
in May the suppression of the crown's authority and the 
formation of new governments. However much the pro-
vincial body might have preferred to defer consideration of 
the topic, it could not escape its own constituents. 
Since January widespread public debate had occurred 
over the cognate questions of independence and a new in-
ternal government. "Salus Populi" in February declared 
that in the face of the crisis the people practically had abol-
ished the old forms of government and substituted tempor-
ary ones. This fact was a potent argument for more per-
manent change: "Does not this shew evidently, that the 
forms we have hitherto lived under are by no means equal 
to the task of preserving our liberties, and that without such 
reforms as will enable them to withstand attacks we can 
never be safe?" Pointing in admiration to Connecticut and 
Rhode Island which had an elected executive, he wrote: 
"That form of government alone can give us security which 
puts all the servants of the public under the power of the 
people."43 A handbill in the form of a petition to the Com-
mittee of Safety signed by "A Free Citizen" first appeared 
on the city's streets and then reappeared in one of the news-
42 Ibid., I, 440. 
43 He warned, "He who has the giving of all places in a government will 
always be master, if the constitution were in other respects the most perfect 
in the world." Canst. Gaz., February 14, 1776. Another unnamed author 
urged Connecticut's form as a model. "To the Freeborn Sons of America, in 
General, and of Connecticut in Particular," N.Y.P., March 21, 1776. 
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papers. Motivated by fear of military government on the 
one hand and the "ungovernable fury of a mob" on the 
other, "A Free Citizen" pleaded with the Committee of 
Safety to apply to the Continental Congress "for liberty" 
to establish a suitable government.44 An unsigned piece in 
May dismissed reconciliation as a "painted dream" and 
made the question of government one of timing. Which 
would be more advantageous, to draw up a constitution 
amidst the confusion of war or to wait until peace is won? 
We must choose the former alternative because "there is 
nothing so conducive to vigor, expedition, foresight, secrecy, 
and everything advantageous in war, as a well regulated 
government." Moreover, after we have triumphed over 
Britain, if we have no sound government, we may have to 
face the twin evils of a Caesar (or Cromwell) or "mobile 
frenzy." Read diligently England's history after 1649, he 
admonished his readers, so we may not "run the risk of 
having our constitution finally determined by the sword."45 
Moderate opinion in the revolutionary party in April 
veered toward the idea, one which radicals had long es-
poused, of a more stable government. Jay confided to Mc-
Dougall that the colony must look to the establishment of a 
firm government and suggested that the Second Provincial 
Congress begin to think about the problem. Having com-
mitted himself thus far, Jay hastened to remark that the 
expectation of British peace commissioners would probably 
delay the matter of a constitution.46 Citing the drafting of 
governments in the Carolinas, William Floyd expected 
New York to take similar action soon.H Writing to Jay 
from Philadelphia in May, R. R. Livingston voiced the hope 
44 "A Free Citizen" still hoped for a reconciliation "upon constitutional 
principles." Canst. Gaz., April 24, 1776. 
45N.Y.L., May 9, 1776. See also "Spartanus," ibid., May 30, 1776. 
46 Jay to McDougall, April 1l. 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS. 
47 Floyd to McKesson, May 9, 1776, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 
V, 395. 
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that the New York Provincial Congress understood the 
necessity of erecting a new government.48 Congressman 
Ezra L'Hommedieu of Suffolk assured his colleague General 
Nathaniel Woodhull that "most people" approved the idea 
of a new governmental form. 49 On the other hand, conserv-
atives like Duane contended that the defeat of most of the 
New York City radicals in the April elections for the Third 
Provincial Congress and the city committee demonstrated 
the lack of popular support for experiments in government. 
Therefore, Duane declared, the provincial body should not 
be "too precipitate" in raising the constitutional issue; 
rather, it should delay and see what course the other middle 
colonies adopted before it moved.50 
Duane's interpretation of the April balloting, if correct, 
is of considerable importance. It meant that public opinion 
opposed any effort to supplant the revolutionary commit-
tee system. An examination of the city elections, therefore, 
is necessary to determine the validity of Duane's claim. 
Four tickets were submitted to the inhabitants. The four 
slates carried many of the candidates in common, but the 
exceptions gave the election its tone. The city committee 
headed its list of April 13 with the men who represented 
New York in the Continental Congress (Jay, Philip Liv-
ingston, Francis Lewis, and John Alsop), but it excluded 
the fifth delegate, Duane.51 That same day a broadside by 
48Livingston to Jay, May 17, 1776, John Jay Papers, Iselin Collection, 
CUL; Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of 
John Jay (4 vols.; New York, 1890-1893), I, 60. 
49 L'Hommedieu to Nathaniel Woodhull, June 2, 1776, Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., VI, 684. 
50 Duane to Jay, May 18, 1776, Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, I, 
61. Duane also miscalculated the situation in Virginia in this letter. He 
implied that Virginia would be against changing the government, but at 
that very moment word was on the way to Philadelphia instructing the 
Virginia representatives to move for independence. 
51 The ticket included five radicals (J. M. Scott, John Broome, Samuel 
Prince, Peter Pra Van Zandt, and James Alner), five conservatives (John 
Alsop, Comfort Sands, Isaac Stoutenburgh, William Denning, and Isaac 
Roosevelt), and eleven moderates (Jay, Livingston, Lewis, J. Van Zandt, 
J. Hallett, A. Brasher, J. Van Cortlandt, J. Beekman, Anthony Rutgers, E. 
Bancker, and T. Randall). Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 257. 
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"Sentinel" circulated about town which substituted seven 
new choices (Alexander McDougall, Thomas Marston, John 
Ray, Adrian Rutgers, Robert Ray, Abraham P. Lott, and 
Henry Remsen) for an equal number of the committee's 
ticket. "Sentinel" deleted the names of the four contin-
ental delegates and three radicals (John Broome, Peter Pra 
Van Zandt, and James Alner).52 Two other tickets ap-
peared in rapid succession. 
On April 16 the Committee of Mechanics produced a 
modified slate. It approved "Sentinel's" excision of the con-
tinental delegates' names but did not accept his substitutes 
for them. It would not permit the loss of Broome, Van 
Zandt, and Alner whom it added to its ticket, sacrificing 
"Sentinel's" selection of McDougall, Marston, and John 
Ray. In addition the Mechanics ruled out Comfort Sands 
and Thomas Randall, both of whom appeared on the other 
two lists, to make room for Isaac Sears and William Mal-
colm.53 All three slates had one thing in common; none 
of them named Duane. Still another handbill appeared, 
this time without signature, which adopted the whole city 
committee bloc but substituted Duane for Alner, who was 
a member of the Committee of Mechanics. 54 
At the height of the campaign a broadside by "A Sober 
Citizen" presented what was practically an ultimatum to the 
voters. He stated as if it were fact that the continental dele-
gates, if defeated, would withdraw from the revolutionary 
movement and would seek pardon from the British to save 
52 The political complexion of the "Sentinel" ticket was almost the same 
as the committee"s slate: five radicals, four conservatives, thirteen moderates. 
The deletion of the continental delegation may have reflected a desire to 
elect a bolder group of men as well as personal ambitions. Ibid., pp. 257·58; 
"Sentinel," April 13, 1776, Broadsides, NYPL. 
53 The Mechanics" ticket consisted of ten radicals (Malcolm, Ray, Sears, 
Lott, Rutgers, Scott, Broome, Prince, P. P. Van Zandt, and Alner), three 
conservatives (Roosevelt, Stoutenburgh, and Denning), eight moderates (J. 
Van Zandt, Hallet, Brasher, Van Cortlandt, Beekman, Anthony Rutgers, 
Bancker, and Randall). Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 257-58; 
"Mechanics in Union," April 16, 1776, Broadsides, NYPL. 
54 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 257-58. 
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themselves. Facing the probability of an invasion, the city 
could not afford the possible disruption of the revolutionary 
organization which might ensue from the defection of these 
leading Whigs. "A Sober Citizen" accompanied this advice 
with a diatribe against the Mechanics' candidates whom he 
regarded as the principal opponents of the continental dele-
gates. The Mechanics' nominees, he warned, possessed no 
property or virtue and, if elected, would bring both colony 
and continent into contempt.55 
The election results indicate that the electorate heeded 
the admonition of "A Sober Citizen," for the continental del-
egates and Duane won seats. Indeed, almost the whole of the 
city committee's ticket of twenty-one ran successfully. Alner 
and Prince, the exceptions, lost out to Duane and Remsen. 
Therefore, the principal men on the Mechanics' ballot, with 
one exception, suffered defeat. Henry Remsen, alone of 
their substitutes, won a seat, but he also had "Sentinel's" 
support. Furthermore, two radicals on the city committee's 
and Mechanics' slates, Broome and Van Zandt, defeated two 
of "Sentinel's" moderates. Even McDougall did not win.56 
The balloting, therefore, did not so much express a rejec-
tion of the moderates and radicals as it did a fear of dis-
unity in the face of the enemy. Duane's interpretation of 
these events perhaps reflects more his desire to prevent 
change than it does factual evaluation. 
The Whigs transformed opinions into deeds on May 24 
when the New York Provincial Congress took up the sub-
ject of government as recommended by the Continental 
Congress. Unable to evade the issue, some deputies sought 
refuge in further delay, advocating another polling of the 
people. Taking a different tack, Gouverneur Morris pleaded 
in a lengthy speech for the election of a special constitu-
tional convention.57 Since this would have meant bypassing 
55 "A Sober Citizen," April 16, 1776, Broadsides, NYPL. 
56 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 257-58. 
The Tide for Independence 
the Provincial Congress in which the moderates and con-
servatives prevailed, one author has said that "Morris un-
doubtedly represented the more radical views .... "58 No 
doubt many moderates and conservatives wished to prevent 
the writing of a radical charter and they believed the Pro-
vincial Congress to be the means of maintaining their polit-
ical supremacy. Morris, however, had carefully reassured 
the members on this point, when he said: "Nor do I think 
it quite proper for us all to abandon the Senate House and 
leave the business to entire new men, while the country 
continues in its present dangerous situation."59 Thus the 
election of a convention would not open the floodgates to 
the radicals. Practically, of course, Morris's procedure guar-
anteed postponement of any labor on a draft constitution 
until June or July, since the election would consume a 
month or more. 6o 
Actually Scott's plan represented the radical approach. 
His proposition would have served radical ends because it 
proposed that the Provincial Congress should draw up the 
57 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 460; Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 97-106; 
Gouverneur Morris papers, CUL. 
58 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 267. This judgment was 
probably influenced by Sparks's quotations from the speech which argued 
that the colonies were independent in fact and congress should acknowledge 
that fact. Despite this plea Morris's subsequent behavior was at variance 
with these ideas. For example, when the Committee of Mechanics presented 
a petition to the Provincial Congress on June 4, urging it to instruct the 
continental delegates to move for independence, it rejected the plea without 
recorded dissent. Although Morris was present, there is nothing to indi-
cate that he favored such instructions or even that he raised the subject of 
independence during the discussion of the petition. Again, when on June 
5 the Provincial Congress entertained the Virginia Provincial Convention's 
crucial letter on independence, Morris did not attempt to compel a debate, 
even though the Provincial Congress named him and .Jay a commitlee to 
draft a reply to the Virginians. The committee's draft, which the Provincial 
Congress approved without dissent, was polite but evasive. If Morris dis-
agreed with these sentiments, he did not bother to express his disapproval. 
:\foreover, even after his return from a visit in the middle of June to 
Philadelphia where the fateful debate had begun and been postponed 
to July I, Morris did not raise the matter on the floor of the Provincial 
Congress. jour. Prov. Cong., I, 474ff. 
59 Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 106. 
60 l'nder the modified plan actually adopted, the colony held elections in 
June and the new Provincial Congress met in July. 
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constitution and, once havmg the matter under consider-
ation, it could not shunt a question of such major im-
portance into obscurity and forget it. This procedure, 
therefore, would minimize delay. The united mechanics' 
association welcomed Scott's interpretation of the Provincial 
Congress's authority and expressed "astonishment" that any 
doubt should arise about the power of the house to frame 
the charter. 61 The record does not show that any disagree-
ment existed over the basic question of whether the Whigs 
should form a government; rather, both groups assumed 
the necessity of so doing but' differed over timing and, there-
by, procedure. 
Morris's speech and motion on May 24 opened the pro-
ceedings on the great question.62 Although Scott delivered 
a long counterargument, he closed his speech on an inde-
cisive note that weakened his position. When he argued 
for the Provincial Congress's constitution-drafting power, he 
put it negatively: "at least, it is doubtful whether they have 
not that power. . . . " Having conceded the existence of 
doubt, Scott recommended that the house refer this point 
to committee. Since Morris had moved previously for the 
appointment of a committee to draw up instructions for the 
election of a constitutional convention, Comfort Sands sub-
mitted an amendment that the suggested committee "take 
into consideration the Resolutions of the Continental Con-
61 N.Y.G., June 17, 1776; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 895-98. 
62 According to the journal Morris made two long speeches, the latter 
of which was his rejoinder to Scott. Sparks copiously quoted a fragment of 
one of them in Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 97ff. Unfortunately, Sparks 
omitted sections and altered phraseology without indicating the changes. 
The printed portion is in the Gouverneur Morris Papers, CUL, and may 
represent one-half the original, since its pages are numbered five through 
eight. Their theme is that New York is already independent in everything 
but name, that the Provincial Congress is in fact a legislature and that only 
an open avowal of independence can guarantee peace and security. Since 
the nature of the argument is such, it is questionable that Morris could 
have intended it as a rebuttal to Scott's contention on the Provincial Con-
gress's powers. It is more likely a part of the first address which preceded 
Scott's. 
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gress of the 15th May instant, and report thereon with all 
convenient speed." This substitute motion, which Scott 
seconded, carried with only two counties and Morris voting 
against. The Provincial Congress chose Scott, Jay, John 
Haring, Francis Lewis, Henry Remsen, John Broome, and 
Jacob Cuyler as the committee.63 
Referral of the motion transferred debate on the general 
question to the committee. If Scott expected the committee 
to limit itself to the single formulation he had proposed, he 
misinterpreted Sands's amendment. The general phrase-
ology of the motion placed no stipulations on the commit-
tee's labors. In the committee the opposing viewpoints ac-
cepted a compromise which sacrificed Morris's special con-
vention but salvaged the all-important time element. Per-
haps the congressmen's desire to be both legislators and 
constitution-drafters may have figured in the abandonment 
of the constitutional convention. If they adopted Morris's 
plan, the Provincial Congress would have to recess until 
after the convention had completed its work. That might 
entail the absence of any legislative body for several months 
in a period of rapidly increasing danger. If the Provincial 
Congress remained in session, the members could not serve 
in the convention. In order, therefore, to keep the reins 
in their own hands and to still the misgivings they them-
selves had raised, they recommended the election of a new 
congress whose members would specifically have the people's 
mandate to form a new government. Naturally the polling 
process would delay any constitutional action until the end 
of June or early July. 
In its report to the house on May 27, the committee pre-
sented a series of conclusions on which it based its recom-
mendations that new elections be held. This report is of 
the utmost importance because there is a major difference 
63 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 460. 
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between it and the final resolutions. The fourth clause of 
the report summarized the events that dissolved the royal 
government and concluded: "whereby, it hath become ab-
solutely necessary for the good people of this Colony to 
institute a new and regular form of internal Government 
and Police .... " The seventh and eighth clauses repeated 
this clear and unequivocal determination to replace the 
government. The seventh called on the people to declare 
the present members "competent for the purpose of estab-
lishing such new form of internal police and government" 
or to choose others "with express authority to institute and 
establish such new and internal form of government." The 
eighth reiterated the phrase, "with express authority to 
institute" a new government.64 Having approved the report 
without any modification, the Provincial Congress accepted, 
therefore, the concept that the mode of governing must 
be changed; it would not debate whether any change should 
be made. The house committed the report to Scott, Jay, 
and Haring to convert it into formal resolutions.65 
When the report emerged from the committee on May 
31, the key ideas expressed in the fourth, seventh, and eighth 
sections had undergone subtle but substantial modification. 
The resolves consolidated these sections into a single reso-
lution which ran: 
That it be recommended to the electors ... either to authorize 
(in addition to the powers vested in this Congress) their present 
Deputies, or others ... or either of them, to take into consider-
ation the necessity and propriety of instituting such government 
as in and by the said resolution of the Continental Congress is 
described and recommended. And if the majority of the Coun-
ties by their Deputies in Provincial Congress, shall be of opin-
ion that such new government ought to be instituted and estab-
lished, then to institute and establish such a government as 
64 Ibid., I, 462-63. 
65 Ibid. Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 269 incorrectly places 
Remsen on this committee. 
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they shall deem best calculated to serve the rights, liberties and 
happiness of the good people of this Colony .... 66 
Did the resolution mean that the newly elected congress 
would proceed immediately to the task of drafting a con-
stitution? Or did it mean that the newly elected congress 
would proceed immediately to debate whether or not they 
should draft a constitution?67 The phraseology implied 
that congress would consider first whether it ought to estab-
lish a new government. The drafting committee, therefore, 
had reopened the question, but the Provincial Congress 
passed the resolution without discussion and without a re-
corded vote. 68 In whatever manner the people interpreted 
this recommendation, they seem to have assumed that a new 
government would replace the committee system.69 
After the Provincial Congress published these resolves, 
public protest arose, but it did not strike out against the 
authority requested nor the procedure laid down. The 
sole organized criticism came from the Committee of Me-
66 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 469. Italics mine. 
67 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 269, considers the am-
biguity to be in the sentence beginning "And if .the majority of the Coun-
ties" and implies that this election was to be a referendum in which the 
possibility of a "no" vote existed. Taking the phrase in the context of the 
preceding sentence, it is apparent that the "majority of the Counties" 
referred to is the majority of county delegations voting on this question 
in the Provincial Congress. It is not a majority of the electors instructing 
their deputies. William Smith understood the resolution to mean that the 
deputies in the Provincial Congress would discuss the necessity for insti-
tuting a new government. Moreover, Jay, for example, had no doubt what-
soever that the people would grant the requested power to the Provincial 
Congress. William H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs from 16 March 
1763 to 9 July 1776 of William Smith (New York, 1956), p. 282; Jay to R. R. 
Livingston, May 29, 1776, Robert R. Livingston, American Art Association 
Catalogue, Revolutionary Letters of Importance: The Unpublished Corres-
pondence of Robert R. Livingston (New York, 1918), No. 25; Johnston, 
Correspondence of fohn Jay, I, 65. 
68 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 469. 
69 Two penmen, "Spartanus," letter II, and "Columbus," N.Y.]., June 13, 
1776, exhibited no doubts. The former commented, "As we are to assume 
a new mode of Government, I think it ought properly to be new." The 
latter said, "The subject upon which we are now to deliberate ... is the 
election of proper persons to form a new mode of Government for this 
Colony." 
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chanics, which sent to the Provincial Congress a discursive 
but provocative letter that throws some light on the political 
thinking of the lesser merchants, tradesmen, mechanics, and 
laborers.70 Admittedly, the communication stated, open op-
position to the resolutions by the Mechanics might offer a 
lever to the "indefatigable" emissaries of the British or 
might confuse numbers of the people and dangerously 
weaken popular support of the revolutionary cause. But, 
the Mechanics explained, they risked these consequences 
because they conversed daily "with numbers who have been 
deceived" by the misinterpretation of the resolutions. Many 
believed that the Provincial Congress would not submit a 
new charter to the people for ratification. "They are terri-
fied at the consequences, although a sincere zeal for the 
general cause inspires them to suppress their remonstrances, 
lest the common enemy should avail himself of that cir-
cumstance to undermine your [i.e., the Provincial Con-
gress's] authority." 71 "Impressed with a just fear of the 
consequences" which flowed from this misconception, the 
Mechanics pleaded with the Provincial Congress for a "full 
and timely explanation" to put an end to' the "groundless 
jealousies" of their "patriotick Resolve." 
Having justified their right to evoke the question, the 
Mechanics entered into a detailed exposition of the people's 
"inalienable right" to ratify a constitution. This was the 
"birthright of every man" which God had given to him. 
Although every individual did not possess the prerequisites 
for constitutional labors, God-given common sense would 
enable him to determine "what degree of safety and what 
advantage he is likely to enjoy, or be deprived of" under 
any proposed constitution. Should the people delude them-
70 See Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 270; Staughton Lynd, 
"The Mechanics in New York City Politics, 1774-1788," Labor History, 
\' (Fall, 1964), 225-46. 
71 N.Y.G., June 17, 1776; reprinted in ]our. Prov. Gong., II, 241-43; Force, 
American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 895-98. 
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selves into a renunciation of their right to ratification, such 
an "impious and frantick act of self-destruction" would 
cast them into "absolute slavery" and would destroy the 
Provincial Congress's "lawful power" over them. Of this 
dual outcome the committee observed: "It might probably 
accelerate our [i.e., the people's] political death; but it must 
immediately cause your own." 
The Mechanics also took cognizance of the empowering 
clause in the congressional resolutions. The ambiguity of 
the language did not trouble the Mechanics, but the impli-
cation that the Provincial Congress would establish the new 
government without submitting it to the people for con-
firmation did. The committee chose to believe, however, 
that since the Provincial Congress had stated the right of 
the people to determine existing doubts of constitutional 
authority, it could not have intended to obtain a surrep-
titious renunciation of that right: "Human nature, depraved 
as it is, has not yet, and we hope never will, be guilty of so 
much hypocrisy and treachery." On the contrary, the Me-
chanics deemed the questionable resolution to be "perfectly 
consistent with the liberal principles on which it is intro-
duced." In support of their interpretation they quoted a 
much-elided version of the clause: "if the majority of the 
Counties shall be of opinion that such new Government 
ought to be instituted, then to institute and establish such 
a Government." Although this was quoting out of context 
with a vengeance, it presented the Provincial Congress with 
an acute dilemma. If it denied this meaning of the passage, 
then the people could accuse it of "promoting the selfish 
views of ... oligarchy." On the other hand, if the Provincial 
Congress accepted the Mechanics' explication, the people 
would regard its acceptance as a pledge to refer the consti-
tution to the people for ratification.72 
72 They warned the Provincial Congress: "Posterity will behold that Re· 
solve as the test of your rectitude. It will prove that you have fully restored 
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By implication the Committee of Mechanics raised the 
question of class power and condemned rule by an elite. 
Expounding on the necessity and propriety of reliance upon 
the "sound judgment, integrity, and moderation of a free 
people," the letter confuted emphatically the idea that any 
man or men could draft a constitution to which a majority 
of the people would have no objections whatsoever. The 
people's free assent constituted the "only characteristick of 
the true lawfulness and legality that can be given to human 
institutions."73 Any other procedure smacked of the "illegal 
and tyrannical" and proceeded "from the selfish principles 
of corrupt oligarchy." Furthermore, fundamental law de-
rived in this arbitrary fashion "could be lawfully binding 
on none but the legislators themselves." 
There was a bold but ambiguous statement on the con-
sequences of British rule and this might have suggested to 
the elite that their worst fears of the "licentiousness" of the 
people were about to materialize. Asserting that the British 
had deprived the colonists of the right to determine their 
own laws, the Mechanics argued that existing laws "have 
but a relative legality, and that not one of them is lawfully 
binding upon us." They added, however, that most of 
these laws should be "tolerated" for "common convenience" 
until a new government "shall have been freely ratified by 
the co-legislative power of the people, the sole lawful Legis-
lature of this Colony." Allegations of this nature suggested 
to us the exercise of our right finally to determine on the laws by which 
this Colony is to be governed; a right of which, by the injustice of the 
British Government, we have till now been deprived .... " Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., VI, 895·98. 
73 These passages implied a concept of majority rule, a concept which 
the committee did not adequately define. Speaking of the ratification proc-
ess, the Mechanics argued for submission of a constitution "to the collec-
tive judgment of all the individuals who might be interested in its oper· 
ation." The words "interested in" are used in the sense of affected by. 
This interpretation is supported by a prior passage in which the authors 
spoke of the God·given right of the "inhabitants at large" to accept or 
reject the constitution. Ibid. 
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that Mechanics would not accept a return to the status quo 
ante and perhaps that they had changes to propose in polit-
ical and economic relations. 
Finally, the power to ratify connoted the power to amend 
the fundamental law whenever the majority should choose. 
Associated with this authority was the right of the people 
to recall their deputies to committees and congresses when 
a majori.ty in such "district shall think fit." 
Despite these strictures the communication welcomed the 
resolutions and extended to the Provincial Congress "that 
tribute of esteem and respect to which you are justly en-
titled for your zeal in so nobly asserting the rights which 
the people at large have to legislation, and in promoting 
their free exercise of those rights."74 At the same time the 
Mechanics pledged their continued support for the Pro-
vincial Congress. 75 
Its reaction to this letter was extraordinary. The Pro-
vincial Congress customarily read its correspondence and 
entered it in the journal. Indeed, a previous Mechanics' 
letter of May 29 did receive this treatment, but the congress-
men did not adhere to the precedent. 76 There is no notation 
in the journal of the receipt of the letter or of any discus-
sion of it. 77 Since the Provincial Congress did not ultimately 
submit the constitution to the people for ratification, it is 
perhaps possible that some of the deputies never intended 
to have the people affirm it and, therefore, managed to bury 
the letter of the Mechanics. 78 Failing to obtain any response 
14lbid. 
75 They maintained, likewise, their right to express their opinions "with 
propriety" and to rely "on public indulgence for any imperfection." The 
defensive and apologetic tone of the letter is an interesting expression of a 
consciousness of social inferiority. 
76.four. Prov. Cong., I, 474. 
77 The Provincial Congress must have received the letter, since it was 
found among that body's papers and published with its papers along with 
the .Journal. Moreover, it is quite likely that a group of leaders of the Com-
mittee of Mechanics presented their letter in person, since they had fol-
lowed this procedure with their first letter on May 29. Ibid., II, 241-43. 
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from the Provincial Congress, the Mechanics presumably 
sent their letter to the newspapers to place the issue before 
the people. In the city's military atmosphere in June, 1776, 
and with most of the populace evacuated, the Mechanics 
aroused little response from the people on the ratification 
dispute. 
Both inside and outside the Provincial Congress men 
saw the interrelationship of the issues of a new government 
and independence. It was impossible to discuss the one 
without implying the other; they were two sides of the same 
coin. 
Although the people read occasionally about some aspects 
of the government question in the newspapers, they read 
about, and probably discussed, even more frequently the 
correlative issue of independence. Even though no formal 
debate on this question had occurred in the Third Pro-
vincial Congress, New Yorkers had read the pros and cons 
of the subject in the newspapers for five months. "Lycurgus" 
introduced the topic in the press in late December, 1775, 
when he castigated the Pennsylvania Assembly for forbid-
ding their delegates to the Continental Congress to vote 
for independence.79 He did not espouse the opposing posi-
tion, but contended that the blank prohibition bound the 
delegation when no one could foretell what would be neces-
sary in the future. Although ''Lycurgus" discussed inde-
pendence obliquely, "Memento" confronted it squarely and 
unhesitatingly advocated separation rather than submission 
to the British "yoke."80 Paine's Common Sense inspired 
78 Subsequent events gave the advantage to the Mechanics' opponents. 
The rapid exodus of the population in June would have hampered any 
large-scale effort to bring pressure to bear on the Provincial Congress. Also 
the appearance of the British at the end of the month threw everything 
into turmoil; the Provincial Congress adjourned hurriedly and left the city. 
79 N.Y.]., December 21, 1775. 
80 N.Y.P., January 25, 1776. This appeared before publication of Paine's 
piece in New York. See also the anonymous piece quoted in John C. Ham-
ilton, The Life of Alexander Hamilton: A History of the Republic of the 
United States of America, as Traced in His Writings and in Those of His 
Contemporaries (IO vols.; Boston, 1879), I, 112. 
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other letters which advocated an end to colonialism. "Inde-
pendent Whig" saw nothing to lose and everything to gain 
by separation. The North administration is convinced we 
mean to be independent, he reasoned, and we shall lose no 
friends by asserting our intent. As for those in Parliament 
who have opposed the North measures, we shall experience 
small loss by their alienation. For all their friendship for 
America they have proved incapable of blocking the policies 
of the government. 81 "Candidus," assailing British regula-
tion of land, commerce, and manufactures, concluded that 
the colonial system sought to "milk rather than to suckle" the 
colonies. 82 Turning his wrath on colonial officialdom, he 
accused them of carrying on "their oppressions, vexations 
and depredations" under the color of royal authority. 
Hardly a week passed from late February through June 
in which the newspapers did not carry at least one contri-
bution to the great controversy. The writers reviewed the 
causes of the crisis and the constitutional relations of the 
colonists to crown and Parliament. 83 One of the authors 
disclosed the progress of the sentiment for independence by 
elaborating the stages which public opinion had traversed. 
Events compelled the people to abandon these positions as 
illusory: 
That the King can do no wrong; that the interests of Great 
Britain and the colonies were the same, reciprocal and insep-
erable; ... that the King was imposed upon by his ministers; 
that a change in administration would rectify the evils com-
plained of; ... that our friends throughout the nation would 
return a better parliament than the last; that the act declaring 
81 N.Y.]., February 22. 1776. See also anon., ibid., March 7, 1776; "Z. F.," 
N.Y.P., March 7, 1776. 
82Jbid., March 21, 1776. See also anon., ibid., April 18, 1776; Force, Amer-
ican Archives, 4th ser., V, 974-77. 
83 Anon., N.Y.]., April 4, 1776; anon., anon. "Queries," "Amicus Patriae," 
and anon., Canst. Gaz., March 9, 30, June 5, July 3, 1776; "Speech of A 
Farmer," "A. B.," "To the Freeborn Sons of America in General and of 
Connecticut in Particular," "Hector," anon., "Independent Whig," N.Y .P., 
March 14, 21, April 11, 18, 1776; "Cato" No. 3, April 20, 1776, Hamilton, 
Life of Alexander Hamilton, I, 113. 
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their right to tax us in all cases whatsoever, would not be carried 
into execution, ... that the several repeals and seeming alter-
ations in their plan of conduct, proved a relinquishment of any 
evil intentions; ... that we have no resources to carry on a war; 
that jealousies and opposition of interests would ever prevent 
a junction of the colonies.84 
A notable alteration of content in these polemics occurred 
toward the close of April. No writer any longer questioned 
the propriety of independence. When differences cropped 
up, they revolved around the timing of the separation. The 
letter writers pronounced the present as most propitious for 
independence and warned against delay. 85 
Notwithstanding the inaction of the Provincial Congress, 
the Tories feared the worst. "There is a great talk of inde-
pendence, and the unthinking multitude are mad for it; 
but how matters will terminate, I cannot judge, but believe 
great will be the opposition [in the Provincial Congress] to 
such a declaration. A pamphlet called Common Sense, has 
carried off its thousands; an answer thereto is come out, but 
instantly seized in the printer's shop, and burnt in the street, 
as unfit to be read at this time. I fear, from this line of 
conduct, the people here will shake you off, and, once gone, 
will never be regained." 86 
Try as some deputies might, they could not avoid the 
issue of independence. Gouverneur Morris spoke at length 
84 Anon., Const. Gaz., March 9, 1776. 
85 "Serious Questions Addressed to the Congress," Force, American Ar· 
chives, 4th ser., V, 1078-79; anon., Const. Gaz., May 8, 1776; "Hermina," 
"Columbus," N.Y.]., May 16, June 13, 1776. 
There is some evidence for believing that the prevalence of these pro· 
independence letters was directly proportional to the general sentiments 
of the populace. Britisher Ambrose Serle expressed amazement at the 
"incredible influence" of the newspapers in New York. "One is astonished 
to see with what avidity they are sought after, and how implicitly they are 
believed, by the great bulk of the people." Serle to Dartmouth, November 
26, 1776, Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European 
Archives Relating to America, 1773·1783 (25 vols.; London, 1889-1898), 
XXIV, No. 2059. 
86 Anon., Letter from New York, March 22, 1776, The Remembrancer, 
1776, p. 85. See also Joseph Bull to Henry Remsen, June 1, 1776, Force, 
American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 672. 
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upon the topic in May in the course of the debate on creat-
ing a new government, but the question of independence 
was not on the order of the day. The Committee of Me-
chanics, however, raised the question when it drew up an 
address to the Provincial Congress urging that body to 
instruct the delegates at Philadelphia to work for inde-
pendence. 87 Although the letter of the Mechanics bore the 
date of May 29, the committee did not present it to their 
representatives until June 4. Presumably, the Mechanics 
delayed delivery until they had word of the decision of the 
Provincial Congress on the matter of government. If so, 
an item in the New York Gazette of June 3, in which also 
appeared the government resolutions of the Provincial Con· 
gress of May 31, must have stirred them. The news was 
the text of the Virginia resolutions, which instructed the 
continental delegates of that colony to move for indepen-
dence.88 
The reaction of the Provincial Congress to the letter of 
the Mechanics revealed clearly the sensitivity of that body 
to the question of independence. When the delegation from 
the Mechanics in Union, led by its chairman, Lewis Thibou, 
entered the house and presented the address, the Chair first 
cleared the house of all spectators so that it might be de· 
termined whether it was "proper" to receive the memorial. 
Having "inspected" the document, the congressmen opened 
the doors and invited Thibou to read it to the house. Al-
though the journal neither mentioned any time lapse in 
the inspection process nor described what the Provincial 
Congress did, the house handed Thibou a formal, detailed 
reply when he finished reading the letter of the Mechanics. 89 
87 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 270. 
88 N.Y.G., June 3, 1776. 
89 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 474. The vagueness and brevity of the record sug-
gest abnormal procedure. Normally all motions and resolutions were entered 
in the journal. The Provincial Congress could not have drawn up the reply 
without some motion or order which it ought to have recorded, but none 
appears in the journal. 
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The answer betrayed resentment at the political activity 
of the Mechanics: "We flatter ourselves, however, that 
neither that association, nor their Committee, will claim any 
authority whatsoever in the public transactions of the pres-
ent times; but that, on the contrary, they will ever be ready 
to submit to that constitutional authority which, by a free 
election, has been vested in Congress and Committees."90 
The point was wholly gratuitous, since the Mechanics not 
only had not claimed such authority, but had been very 
deferential: "We as part of your constituents ... beg leave 
in a dutiful manner at this time, to approach unto you our 
Representatives, and request your kind attention to this our 
humble Address ... should you ... think proper to instruct 
our most honourable Delegates . . . it would give us the 
highest satisfaction; and we hereby sincerely promise to 
endeavour to support the same with our lives and for-
tunes."91 The Provincial Congress then declined to accede 
to the Mechanics' plea: 
We are of opinion that the Continental Congress alone have 
that enlarged view of our political circumstances, which will 
enable them to decide upon those measures which are necessary 
for the general welfare; we cannot presume, by any instructions, 
to make or declare any resolutions, or declarations, upon a so 
general and momentous concern; but are determined patiently 
to await and firmly to abide by whatever a majority of that 
august body shall think needful. We therefore cannot presume 
to instruct the Delegates of this Colony on the momentous ques-
tion to which your address refers, until we are informed that it 
is brought before the Continental Congress, and the sense of 
this Colony be required through the Congress.92 
90 Ibid. Since these remarks were completely irrelevant, they may have 
served the dual function of inhibiting the Mechanics' political aggressive-
ness and of obscuring the key issue, which was not any Mechanics' claim to 
authority but the Provincial Congress's refusal to move on the question of 
independence_ The Mechanics later asserted their right to speak up when 
they saw fit. Mechanics to Provincial Congress, June 14, 1776, ibid., II, 243. 
91N.Y.]., June 6, 1776; Canst. Gaz., June 5, 1776; Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., VI, 615. 
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The Third Provincial Congress's disinclination to act on 
independence seems to have dashed the hopes of the en-
thusiasts, who began to look toward the election of the 
Fourth Provincial Congress to remedy the colony's lag-
gardness.93 
Meanwhile the Virginia Provincial Convention, taking 
steps to win support for its decision to introduce an inde-
pendence resolution in Philadelphia, posted off a letter to 
New York which solicited the latter to give the Virginia 
resolves due "consideration." The New York Provincial 
Congress received this letter June 5, two days after the re-
solves had appeared in the Gazette. Drafted by Jay and 
Morris, the answer constituted a polite evasion. The firmest 
commitment in the message was a pledge that the resQlves 
"will be considered . . . with all the deliberation due to 
the importance of the subject." Perhaps to offset the in-
definiteness of its response, the Provincial Congress con-
cluded in a tone of affirmation: "the Congress of this Colony 
will invariably adopt and pursue every measure which may 
tend to promote the union and secure the rights and hap-
piness of the United Colonies."94 
92 Italics mine. The italicized passage does not appear in the letter ·as 
published in the press, but appears only in the Journal's version. This pass-
age and the following sentence are in fact mutually exclusive. Since the 
Continental Congress delegates could not act without instructions from 
their provincial congresses, a decision on independence could not be taken 
until colonies like New York instructed their deputies for it. It is incon-
ceivable that the Provincial Congress could have thought that the people 
did not know this fact. It is not unlikely that these words were the con· 
sequence of the haste with which it drafted its reply to the Mechanics. 
Perhaps some members noticed the inconsistency when they prepared copies 
of the letter for the newspapers and deleted the clause. four. Prav. Cong., 
I, 474; N.Y.]., June 6, 1776; Const. Gaz., June 5, 1776. 
93 Colonel Jedediah Huntington wrote Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, 
June 6, 1776. "The mechanicks of the city have voted independence; it is 
expected the new Congress will follow suit. There will be, I am told, a 
majority of Presbyterians, which will probably give the representation a 
different guise from what it has heretofore had." Force, American Archives, 
4th ser., VI, 725. 
94 The Journal is so cut and dried that it is impossible to determine 
whether there was any opposition to the substance. four. Prov. Cong., I, 
475, 481. 
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Unlike their colleagues at home, the New York delega-
tion in the Continental Congress could not avoid the ques-
tion of independence. Virginia presented its motion for 
independence June 7 and the debate flowed on through 
June 10. None of the New Yorkers seems to have sanc-
tioned independence, at least not at that juncture, but 
they divided as to whether they had the power to cast any 
vote or only a negative vote on the motion.95 Undaunted 
by his voteless status, Robert R. Livingston joined James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania, John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, 
and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina in the opposition 
to independence. Averring their approbation of the meas-
ure and admitting the impossibility of a return to the status 
quo ante, they insisted, nevertheless, that the most pro-
pitious moment had not arisen. Let "the voice of the people 
drive" Congress to it, they said. As for New York, Liv-
ingston maintained that the people of that province were 
not yet "ripe" for the break but that they were "fast ripen-
ing."96 Words, however, were not enough for the New York 
95 Edward Rutledge implied to Jay that Clinton, Floyd, Lewis, Wisner, 
and Alsop of New York opposed independence. The tone of the letter leads 
to the inference that Jay held similar views, an inference which Jay's reply 
buttresses: "Your ideas of men and things ... run, for the most part, 
parallel with my own .... " Rutledge to Jay, June 29, 1776, Jay to Rut-
ledge, July 6, 1776, Johnston, Correspondence of john jay, I, 67, 68; Ed-
mund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress 
(8 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1921-1936), I, 517. 
When the Continental Congress resumed the discussion July 1, the New 
Yorkers assured their colleagues that they approved the declaration and 
"were assured their constituents were for it." McKean of Delaware, long 
after the event, positively stated that Wisner voted for independence July 2. 
Since New York cast no vote, he may have meant that Wisner approved 
independence. Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York, 
1941), p. 184; Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas jefferson 
(16 vols.; Princeton, 1950---), I, 314; Burnett, Letters, I, No. 753, n. 3. 
The June 8 letter of the New Yorkers contained this interpretation of their 
authority: "Some of us consider ourselves as bound by our instructions not 
to vote on that question. . . ." Since none of them seems to have been 
thinking of voting "yes," the implication is that some thought they had 
the power to vote "no." ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 488. For a different view, see 
Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 271. 
96 Jefferson's Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, Boyd, 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, I, 309; Rutledge to Jay, June 8, 1776, 
Johnston, Correspondence of john jay, I, 66, n. I. 
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delegates; they felt keenly their inability to partlopate in 
the balloting on the Virginia resolve. Since the source of 
their authority was the Provincial Congress, on June 8 the 
Yorkers drafted a letter in urgent terms to that body in 
which they requested instructions on how to cast the col-
ony's vote on the motion for independence.97 
The plea from Philadelphia for directions produced a 
stir in New York. When the continental delegates' letter 
reached the city on the morning of June 10, the Third 
Provincial Congress promptly resolved itself into secret ses-
sion to deliberate on the matter, but it deliberated incon-
clusively.98 Late that afternoon the deputies wrestled again 
with the problem, wrangling over the interpretation of the 
New York Provincial Congress's powers, the continental 
delegates' powers, and the election resolutions of May 31. 
The last item provided Jay with a stratagem to postpone 
any decision until the Fourth Provincial Congress would 
meet in July. On the next day he introduced two resolu-
tions which the congressmen amended and passed unani-
mously. The first of these declared "that the good people 
of this Colony have not, in the opinion of this Congress, 
authorized this Congress or the Delegates of this Colony ... 
to declare this Colony to be and continue independent of 
the Crown of Great Britain."99 The second resolve pro-
posed that the people at the June election invest their rep-
resentatives with sweeping discretionary power "to delib-
97 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 271. In view of the supreme 
importance of the independence question, one would suppose that the rep-
resentatives would have explained to their colleagues in New York that the 
debate had begun. That would have been the fact of the matter, since 
they dated their Jetter June 8, the second day of disputation, and one of 
them had participated in the exchanges. Nevertheless, they gave no inti-
mation of this state of affairs: "Your delegates here expect that the question 
of Independence will very shortly be agitated in Congress ... and all wish 
to have your sentiments thereon. The matter will admit of no delay." ]our. 
Prov. Cong., I, 488. 
98/bid. The resort to secrecy was a cardinal indication of the majority's 
attitude toward independence. 
99Jbid., I, 489, 490. See Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 271-
72 and n. 103. 
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erate and determine on every question whatsoever that may 
concern or affect the interest of this Colony, and to conclude 
upon, ordain, and execute every act and measure which to 
them shall appear conducive to the happiness, security and 
welfare of this Colony. . . ."100 The final clause recom-
mended the electors to "inform" their deputies ·Of their 
"sentiments" on independence. 
Having chosen a means to prevent any positive action 
until the newly elected legislature met, the Provincial Con-
gress reversed itself and nullified its unanimous agreement. 
It voted to postpone publication of the resolutions until 
after the elections. Since the resolutions could not take 
effect without the elections, it would have to revise the reso-
lutions at a later date to provide for a special referendum 
on the matter of independence. If this were not true, the 
motion to postpone publication rendered the resolves mean-
ingless.101 The parliamentary meaning of the postponement 
was that the Provincial Congress had moved to reconsider 
the previously adopted motions. However, such immediate 
reconsideration was a violation of the house's rules of pro-
cedure: "That after the determination of any matter or 
thing, the same shall not be resumed but with the consent 
of such majority as aforesaid, upon notice of a motion for 
that purpose, previously given at least one day before the 
same is made."102 Nevertheless, after empowering Jay and 
Remsen to "draft an answer" for the direction of the Phil-
adelphia deputies, the house dropped the whole subject.103 
The Jay-Remsen draft denied the colony's delegates any 
authority to vote on independence. If the Provincial Con-
gress formally approved the letter, it did not record its action 
100 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 490. 
101 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 272, n. 103. The letter to 
Philadelphia specifically stated that a later election would be held on the 
question of independence. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 814. 
102 Italics mine. The rules adopted by the Third Provincial Congress are 
in the journal, I, 450. 
103 Ibid., I, 490. 
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in the journal. The reply reiterated the sense of the first 
resolution on the lack of power to act. It professed to see 
that the question of independence would be divisive within 
the province and would exercise "an unhappy influence" on 
the cognate question of a new government should both 
problems be submitted simultaneously to the electorate. 
Hence it would be "imprudent" to obtrude the first matter 
upon the people.l04 The Provincial Congress assured its 
representatives that "the earliest opportunity will, however, 
be embraced of ascertaining the sentiments of the inhabi-
tants of this Colony on that important question .... "105 
Since Livingston and his associates in Philadelphia knew 
that the Continental Congress would resume the subject 
of independence July 1, this information from New York 
must have made it clear that they would be without power 
to vote on the question. The delegates knew that the sched-
uled elections would occupy the third, if not also the fourth, 
week of June. Therefore, they could not receive their 
authorization to vote before July 1. Proof of the delegates' 
knowledge of the situation in New York derives from the 
following. Jay specifically promised Livingston that he 
should have the "earliest advice" of the May 31 resolutions 
on forming a government. Two of the Continental Con-
gress delegation, Alsop and Lewis, who had visited home, 
did not set out for Philadelphia until June 1, so they 
possessed all the necessary information. Moreover, Gouv-
erneur Morris arrived in Philadelphia June 10, so there was 
no dearth of news from the Provincial Congress.106 None-
theless, when the delegates acknowledged receipt of this 
104 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 814; Becker, The History of 
Political Parties, p. 271. Becker incorrectly uses "inexpedient" for "impru· 
dent." 
105 Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 814. 
106 Jay to Livingston, May 29, 1776, Johnston, Correspondence of john 
jay, I, 64, 65. On Morris's presence in Philadelphia, see Hancock to Pro-
vincial Congress, June II, 1776, Burnett, Letters, I, 484. Lewis, et al. to 
President of Provincial Congress, June 17, 1776, ]our. Prov. Gong., II, 197. 
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letter of instructions, they did not inform the Provincial 
Congress of their lack of time nor did they exhort that 
body to move swiftly to hold the referendum. 
The New York delegation's comportment contrasted un-
favorably with that of the Maryland delegation. Writing to 
their council of safety, the Marylanders observed that Con-
gress had delayed a vote on independence for three weeks 
in order to give some delegations an opportunity to consult 
their "constituents." They urged the council to call the 
provincial convention into session that that body might 
express the sense of the people on the subject. As late as 
June 27 the New Yorkers had occasion to correspond with 
their congress but made absolutely no mention of the im-
pending deadline.1o1 
If the Provincial Congress could have demonstrated its 
ignorance of the events in Philadelphia, it might have tech-
nically justified its actions, but the contrary was the case. 
Edward Rutledge, writing Jay on June 8 from Philadelphia, 
described the course of the arguments and told of his fear 
of being unable to block a victory for independence. It is 
even possible that Rutledge dispatched his letter in care of 
the same express rider who carried the New York delega-
tion's letter of the same date. In that event Jay would have 
received it June 10. Even if this were not true, there is other 
evidence to consider. When the Continental Congress sus-
pended discussion of the question, it appointed a committee 
to draft a declaration and set July for resumption of the 
argument. Since Gouverneur Morris was present in Phila-
delphia from the final day of debate, June 10, until June 
13, it is inconceivable that Livingston, a close friend, did not 
tell him of the whole business. Indeed, Morris may very well 
have attended Congress, since he bore a special letter from 
New York to the President of Congress. In view of the fact 
107 Maryland delegates to Maryland Council of Safety, June II, 1776, 
Burnett, Letters, I, 484; ]our. Prov. Cong., II, 238. 
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that in May Morris had urged the necessity of independence, 
it is remarkable that upon his return to New York on June 
15 he made no effort to reintroduce the matter in Pro-
vincial Congress. Thus at least two leading members of the 
New York Provincial Congress were cognizant of the crucial 
nature of affairs in Philadelphia but did nothing to enable 
their delegation to participate in the voting.l08 
Although the June elections came and went, no one in the 
Provincial Congress moved to reconsider the resolutions of 
June ll. Indeed June faded into July without a word on 
the subject. Whatever the intentions of the congressmen 
may have been, their conduct displayed a dubious standard 
of responsibility toward their constituents. It will be re-
called that they had implied to the people that they would 
instruct the colony's delegates when the question arose on 
the floor of the Continental Congress.109 But they did not 
fulfill their promise.110 When the British invasion fleet hove 
in sight, they voted to meet in White Plains July 2 and 
hastily adjourned. Jay, who was in Elizabeth Town, reacted 
angrily to this news: "to my great mortification am informed 
that our convention influenced by one of G. Morris vagrant 
Plans have adjourned to the White Plains to meet there 
Tomorrow. This precipitate ill advised Retreat I fear will 
be not a little injurious to the publick .... This Stroke of 
Morrisania Politics quite confounds me."111 Not being able 
to assemble a quorum on July 2, the Third Provincial Con-
gress expired without committing the colony to indepen-
dence. 
These Fabian tactics probably owed part of their success 
108 Johnston, Correspondence of john jay, I, 66, n. 1; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
I, 496. 
109 See above, p. 164. 
110 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 273; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
I, 512. 
111 Jay to Livingston, July 1, 1776, from john jay by Frank Monaghan, 
copynght 1935 by the Bobbs·Merrill Company, Inc., R. 1962 by Frank 
Monaghan, reprinted by permission of the publishers, p. 83; Livingston, 
Revolutionary Letters of Importance, No. 27. 
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to the disorganized state of the city and countryside. Wash-
ington had converted the port into an armed camp, and 
most of the able-bodied males were in the army. By June 
most of the noncombatant population had left the city for 
safer regions. In this abnormal state, the radicals could not 
have brought decisive pressure to bear on the Provincial 
Congress. Furthermore, the revelations of the Tory plot 
against Washington monopolized so much attention and 
energy that there was little opportunity to call public meet-
ings on the question of independence.112 Perhaps the lack 
of strong leadership by the Provincial Congress on this issue 
retarded any independent steps by the people elsewhere in 
the province. Be it noted, however, that in some districts 
in Albany County the people seized the initiative and voted 
for independence on June 24.113 Elbridge Gerry of Massa-
chusetts thought that the people of the colony had out-
stripped their political leaders: "I do not affirm that either 
of these [i.e., New York and Maryland] are of the neuter 
gender; but on the other hand am persuaded the people are 
in favour of a total and final separation, and will support 
the measure, even if the Conventions and Delegates of those 
Colonies vote against it." 114 
If popular opinion approved independence, why did the 
Provincial Congress shy away at the mention of the word?115 
112 Nettels, George Washington, pp. 291-94. 
113 At King's District "a full meeting of the inhabitants" voted unani-
mously for independence. A similar meeting occurred in Spencer Town. 
N.Y.P., July 4, 1776; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 1056. 
114 Gerry to James Warren, June 25, 1776, ibid., 4th ser., VI, 1067. 
115 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 272-73, sums up the 
situation in this manner: "The cause was simple: affairs in that province 
were directed by cautious and conservative politicians, who, in the face of 
an armed foe and surrounded by domestic enemies, were determined to 
preserve the essential features of their ancient political system from what 
they conceived to be monarchical encroachments on the one hand, as well 
as from rash democratic experiments on the other. And this achievement, 
if it could be effected, they were determined should be formally declared 
by the colony and not by the United Colonies. 
"How much weight the latter consideration had, it is impossible to say." 
By June of 1776 the threat of "monarchical encroachments" no longer 
had any bearing on whether to hasten or delay independence. As Becker 
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Many of the influential personages may have felt as did 
Livingston: "though at present I wish to join hands with a 
nation which I have been accustomed to respect, yet I am 
persuaded that the continuance of the war will break my 
shackles .... "116 Accompanying this reluctance to break 
with tradition was a realization of the cost of the war in 
lives and property. Furthermore, since their leaders asked 
the people to make these sacrifices for the sake of freedom, 
might not internal disturbances arise over questions of 
local reform? Some symptoms of discontent had appeared 
already.117 In the critical days of late June "Spartanus" had 
himself admitted (p. 266) the Continental Congress's resolutions of May 
15 "could have but one sequel, the declaration of independence. . . ." 
Thus when New York approved these resolutions May 31, the conserva-
tives accepted the same destiny. Furthermore, as the above pages have 
shown, the New York leaders privately had seen the logic of events, but 
other factors deterred them. The latter part of Becker's argument is dif-
ficult to follow. The only way in which New York could preserve for itself 
the right to declare independence would be to do so before the Continental 
Congress, as did Rhode Island in May. If the Yorkers thought that their 
opposition would prevent the Congress from acting, they ran the risk of 
isolating their colony. With the Continental Army occupying New York, 
such a policy would indeed have been rash, and rashness was not charac-
teristic of these men. 
116 Livingston to Duane, February 16, 1776, Bancroft Transcripts: Liv-
ingston Papers, NYPL. 
117 Some of the Dutchess County tenantry were demanding improved 
leases. Henry B. to R. R. Livingston, May, 1775, Livingston, Revolutionary 
Letters of Importance, No. 30. 
The method of choosing the continental deputies became a controversial 
matter. In 1775 some of the counties chose their own representatives for 
Continental Congress, bu~ the provincial convention overruled these choices 
and selected a representation for the whole province. The issue rose again 
in 1776 when the Mechanics demanded that right for the people. So bitter 
was the controversy in Ulster County that the Provincial Congress had to 
choose between the two sets of credentials: one that reserved the right to 
the people to elect continental deputies, another that authorized the pro-
vincial deputies to do so. None of these challenges succeeded. Becker, The 
History of Political Parties, p. 256; N.Y.]., August 24, 1775, April 4, 1776; 
Jay to McDougall, April 11, 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS; ]our. Prov. 
Gong., I, 460, II, 199-200. See below, p. 205. 
Some of the local committees ignored the property qualifications for 
voting. Sullivan, Minutes of the Albany Committee, II, 1030. On the same 
subject, Robert G. Livingston to Gilbert Livingston, January I, 1782, Gil-
bert Livingston Papers, NYPL. 
The practice of voting by secret ballot took root in some counties. New 
York General Committee to the People, N.Y.]., April 11, 1776; Robert Boyd, 
Jr. to Clinton, July 3, 1776, George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clin-
ton, First Governor of New York (10 vols.; Albany, 1899-1914), I, 244. 
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warned newspaper readers to beware of those who have 
dragged their heels but now "speak fair." Let them gain 
power, he wrote, and they will subject the people "to a 
tyranny and oppression ... not much better" than the 
British.l18 Early in 1775 William Smith cautioned Schuyler 
about the hazards of a Pandora's box: "Why raise a military 
spirit that may furnish unmanageable adventurers on this side 
of the water unfriendly to a province in which you and I 
have something else to lose?"119 James Duane expressed 
concern about "licenciousness" and the "means of assuring 
the Reins of Government when these Commotions shall 
subside."120 McDougall worried over the dual dangers of 
the "licentiousness of the people" and of the army. "The 
former feel their own liberty in the extreme," he wrote to 
Jay; a sentiment with which the latter concurred.121 
Probably one of the chief reasons for the excessive cau-
tion of the New Yorkers in the Provincial Congress was 
their fear that the consequences of an unsuccessful rebel-
lion would be confiscation of property and execution. John 
Adams, Richard H. Lee, and George Wythe accused New 
York of hanging back "that their particular prospect might 
be better even in the worst event."122 In a private conver-
118 Quoted in Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 267; "Spartanus," 
N.Y . .f., June 20, 1776; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 996. 
119 Smith to Schuyler, May 16, 1775, Schuyler Papers, NYPL; Benson J. 
Lossing, The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler (2 vols.; New York, 1873), 
I, 321·22. 
Two months later Schuyler incorporated a draft by Smith in orders 
issued to the troops in New York City. Among the ideas voiced was this: 
"Let us evince to the world that in contending for liberty we abhor licen-
tiousness .... " Smith. Memoirs, IV, July 3, 1775; Lossing, The Life and 
Times of Philip Schuyler, I, 346. 
120 Duane to Robert Livingston, Jr., June 7, 1775, quoted in Beverly 
McAnear, "Mr. Robert R. Livingston's Reasons against a Land Tax," 
.Journal of Political Economy, XLVIII (February, 1940), 76. 
121 McDougall to Jay, March 20, 1776, Jay to McDougall, March 23, 1776, 
John Jay Papers, CUL; Johnston, Correspondence of john jay, I, 49-50. 
Smith says McDougall told him in February that he opposed independence. 
Smith, Memoirs, V, February 12, 1776. 
Livingston once commented that the leaders must "yield to the torrent 
if they hoped to direct its course." Livingston to Duer, June 12, 1777, 
R. R. Livingston Collection, NYHS. 
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sation with McDougall, William Smith remarked in passing 
on the risks to which the Whig leaders exposed themselves, 
noting "the wrath manifested in the King's speech ag[ a ins] t 
them as the misleaders of his American subjects."123 Al-
though the British no longer exercised authority in the 
province by the summer of 1775, Admiral Graves wrote 
home that "there are many in [the violent party] who wish 
to keep the peace in New York on account of their prop-
erty."124 That fall a Tory merchant declared that the Whigs 
of "prosperity are afraid of their estates, and are coming 
about fast. "125 
Some patriots prudently left the danger zones at critical 
moments. \Vhen Howe appeared before New York, anum-
ber of Whigs departed hurriedly. Among others, Philip 
Livingston parted from the Third Provincial Congress 
rather abruptly. Jay said that Livingston gave no other 
reason than that he was going to Philadelphia. "The ways 
of some men like Solomons Serpent on a Rock, are past 
finding out," Jay concluded disgustedly.126 After the loss of 
New York in September, 1776, the conduct of Gouverneur 
and General Lewis Morris caused bitter complaint. Robert 
R. Livingston wrote to Edward Rutledge of South Carolina: 
"Gouverneur thro' what cause God alone knows has de-
serted in this hour of danger retired to some obscure corner 
of the Jerseys where he enjoys his jest and his ease while 
his friends are strugling with every difficulty and danger 
& blushing while they make those apologies for him which 
they do not themselves believe."127 Lewis Morris's behavior 
provoked comment in Westchester and in the state Con-
122 Jefferson's Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, Boyd, 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, I, 312. 
123 William Smith, Memoirs, V, January 8, 1776. 
1"24 Graves to Stephens, July 16, 1775, Cal. H. 0. Papers, p. 394. 
125 V. P. Ashfield to Isaac Wilkins, November 4, 1775, ibid., p. 482. 
1:26 Jay to R. R. Livingston, July 1, 1776, Livingston, Revolutionary Let-
ters of Importance, No. 27. 
127 Livingston to Edward Rutledge, October 10, 1776, Bancroft Tran-
scripts: Livingston Papers, NYPL. 
The Road to Independence 
vention. The Convention had granted him a few days leave 
to see to his family in Philadelphia upon his express promise 
to return promptly to his militia regiment. The general not 
only violated his word, but implied to the continental dele-
gates that he had come to Philadelphia on Convention 
business. Since he evaded the requests of the Convention 
to return to the state, that body peremptorily ordered him 
home. Rutledge gave this account of Morris's presence in 
Philadelphia: 
he left us near three weeks since from some hints which his 
friends here took the liberty of giving him, and declared he 
would never return until he had conquered it [i.e., fear]. Should 
he be worse than his word & pay us another Visit, I'll answer 
for him that he will not stay here above two Days to rest him-
self. Indeed I much doubt whether he will be able to call 
those, Days of rest, for I will immediately make a Party to 
plague his very heart out. Philadelphia shall not be a place of 
Safety for him I assure you.12s 
Having committed themselves to independence, the 
Whigs prepared themselves for misfortune. Robert R. Liv-
ingston explained, "I am amazed at the composure I feel 
tho' I have everything at stake, & the enemy are already 
in actual possession of one third of my income."129 The 
grim prospect of capture by the British induced fearsome 
thoughts among many. Gouverneur Morris in 1777, de-
scribing the impact on the first legislature of the American 
defeats in the mid-Hudson, which included the loss of Forts 
Constitution, Montgomery, and Clinton, confessed: "We 
128 Rutledge to Livingston, October 19, 1776, ibid.; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 
666; Morris to Convention, September 24, 1776, Force, American Archives, 
5th ser., III, 211. 
129 Livingston to Rutledge, September 27, 1776, Livingston, Revolutionary 
Letters of Importance, No. 95. In a later letter to Rutledge he depicted 
graphically the dangers of a revolutionary career: "Every day discovers new 
plotts a regular plan was formed to carry me off, headed by a relation and 
only defeated by a discovery that very night in which it was to have been 
executed. Bullets have been shot at night into the very beds of some of our 
active people & others been fired at & wound'd on the ambush." Same to 
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are hellishly frightened but don't say a word of that for we 
shall get our spirits again. . . ."130 One contemporary at-
tributed the caution of the great landed families to property 
considerations: "Such extensive property is perhaps too 
great a stake to be risked in a struggle with a bold in-
vader. ... "131 The fears deriving from the foregoing con-
siderations exercised a marked influence on the members 
of the Provincial Congress and manifested themselves in the 
advocacy of a go-slow policy. 
Since the militancy of public opinion in the colony outran 
that of the Whig leaders, the delaying tactics of the leader-
ship did not bring New York any closer to pacification. 
However much John Adams might rail against the timidity 
of the Yorkers, every important step they took, however 
halting, was a step farther down the road to independence. 
The Whigs understood that New York was "a nut in the 
jaws of a nutcracker."132 British military strategy centered 
upon the capture of the province by an attack from Canada 
as well as from the sea. With these military threats hanging 
over the province, it is understandable why New York was 
not in the van of the revolutionary movement. 
130 Morris to R. R. Livingston, October 8, 1777, R. R. Livingston Col-
lection, NYHS. 
131"The Real Farmer," N.Y.]., February I, 1779. 
132 Nettels, George Washington, p. 282. 
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Constitution of 1777 
,.......... ~ THE Provincial Congress was the nerve 
~ J J center of the revolutionary movement. Its 
formation greatly strengthened the Whigs in that it united 
under central direction the county and local committees 
who lacked overall authority. Since many of the leading 
patriots served in the Provincial Congress, the people looked 
to that body for direction. This support in turn enabled 
the provisional legislature to mobilize the citizenry and 
their resources. Furthermore, the Whigs now had the 
means to apply uniform policies throughout the counties. 
Equally important, the Provincial Congress could and did 
speak in the name of the whole colony, constituting the 
only significant group with whom the British could negoti-
ate. Lastly, the Provincial Congress replaced the royal 
administration as the governing authority. 
Although the Tories labored mightily to block the calling 
of a congress, they had toiled in vain even before the news 
of Lexington reached New York. When the colonial as-
sembly had refused to name representatives to the Second 
Continental Congress, the moderates and radicals in the 
city Committee of Sixty had cooperated to push through 
a call for the election in April of a provincial convention 
that would meet solely to choose the continental delegates. 
The Provincial Convention met in New York City April 
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20, 1775, completed its business, and dissolved April 22. 
When the news from New England arrived in town the 
next day, the conditions requisite for summoning a pro-
vincial congress had matured. 1 On April 28 the city com-
mittee appealed to the counties to elect deputies to repre-
sent them in a provincial congress to assemble in May. The 
committee's circular letter justified the call by painting a 
grim picture: "The distressed and alarming situation of our 
country, ... threatening to involve this Continent in all 
the horrors of a civil War, obliges us to call for the united 
aid and council of the Colony .... "2 
When the colony completed the balloting, either by direct 
choice or by the local committees, it had deputed 113 men 
to attend the First Provincial Congress. Not all of these 
counted themselves Whigs and eventually nineteen joined 
the loyalists. Although the election circular had set May 
22 for the opening of the First Provincial Congress, a ma-
jority of the county delegations did not appear until the 
next day. Some of the absentees came in later in the 
session, but Gloucester County did not send a deputation at 
any time. Individual attendance left much to be desired 
and the numerous absences impeded the legislature's effec-
tive operation. From May through July attendance ranged 
from a low of forty-two to a high of eighty-two.3 
According to the rules of procedure drawn up by the 
Provincial Congress, a majority of the counties constituted 
a quorum. Moreover, each county had to have a quorum 
of its delegation present in order to be able to vote. Defini-
tion of the quorum varied from county to county, some 
requiring a delegation majority, others from one to four 
men. Since the counties cast unit votes, each deputation had 
1 Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New 
York, 1760-1776 (Madison, 1909), pp. 193, 201. 
2 Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 4. 
3 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 208. 
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to decide the county's position first before voting. Debate 
and dickering among the counties preceded the apportion-
ment of voting strength. The resultant compromise gave 
New York four votes, Albany three, and the other counties 
two each.4 
Having established a framework within which to labor, 
the Provincial Congress began to tackle the multitudinous 
problems that led it to exercise the power forfeited by the 
royal government. Although the members wrestled with 
many pressing questions, they devoted most time to those 
which related to military preparations, the Tories, and 
finances. Plagued by decreasing attendance, the Provincial 
Congress adopted a suggestion of the Continental Congress 
to transfer its provincial authority to a committee of safety 
for a stated period. Each county had one vote on this com-
mittee except New York which had two. All of the com-
mittee's acts were subject to ultimate approval by the 
Provincial Congress. This device permitted it to adjourn 
for the months of July and September but to leave in its 
place a functioning executive. 5 
By October the First Provincial Congress prepared to 
end its life and passed resolutions for that purpose. It 
named November 7, 1775, election day for the choice of 
representatives to the Second Provincial Congress. It pro-
posed to dissolve November 14, the day its successor con-
vened. Having defeated a suggestion to use the written 
ballot, the majority relented and extended the suffrage to 
nonfreeholders who held lands assessed at £80. Notwith-
standing its November 14 deadline, the Provincial Congress 
broke up in confusion November 4.6 
However, it did not assemble on November 14. In 
4Jbid., pp. 207·8; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 8. 
5 Alexander C. Flick, ed., A History of the State of New York (10 vols.; 
New York, 1933·1937), Ill, 263; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 222. 
6 See above, pp. 109-11; Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 227. 
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fact, it did not have a quorum until December 6. Despite 
this inauspicious beginning, the Whigs congratulated them-
selves on the new membership of the legislature. The local 
committees had dropped thirty-nine former delegates in 
favor of more ardent patriots, or so they thought. During 
most of its life the Second Provincial Congress remained 
adjourned, having created a committee of safety to carry on. 
Thus it fell to the lot of the Committee of Safety to accede 
in the middle of April, 1776, to Washington's demand for 
the isolation of the British warships in the harbor. Al-
though some of the radical Whigs grumbled over the slow 
progress of military preparations, by spring they had less 
cause to complain as the presence of the Continental Army 
in New York pressured the Committee of Safety into more 
vigorous exertions. Before its March adjournment the Pro-
vincial Congress provided for the election of the Third 
Provincial Congress in April and its own dissolution 
May 14.7 
A further weeding-out process occurred in the April, 
1776, balloting; no less than thirty-two members of the 
Second Provincial Congress yielded their seats to new men. 
The number of Tories, however, remained almost constant 
at eight. All the counties chose deputies and revised down-
ward the number necessary to form a delegation quorum. 
Consequently, the Third Provincial Congress did not have 
to wrestle with the quorum issue. A change in the distri-
7 Ibid., pp. 232-35, 252. 
These decisions about sessions reflected the difficulties of congressional 
government. The revolutionary situation required protracted periods of 
meeting but most colonials had no prior experience with this kind of pro-
cedure. The provincial assembly usually met for three months and then 
adjourned. The executive organs enforced the laws. There was no revolu-
tionary executive and the Provincial Congress could not adjourn unless 
some agency could take the reins to prevent the Tories from reasserting 
control. The Whigs solved the problem by setting the life of a provincial 
congress at six months and by clothing the Committee of Safety with execu-
tive authority only. Therefore, the Second Provincial Congress in Decem-
ber, 1775, agreed upon April, 1776, as election date for the Third. ]our. 
Prov. Gong., I, 223. 
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bution of the unit votes increased New York's share from 
one-seventh to one-sixth of the total. The new arrangement 
gave New York eight votes, Albany six, Dutchess five, Suffolk 
four, Ulster four, Westchester four, Queens four, Orange 
and Tryon three each, Kings, Richmond, Charlotte, and 
Cumberland two each, and Gloucester one. 
Although the Third Provincial Congress had a brief exist-
ence, it considered three key problems: suppression of the 
Tories, instructions to its delegates at the Continental Con-
gress on the question of independence, and the formation 
of a new governmental structure for the colony. A ma-
jority deemed it best to refer the last issue to the people, 
calling for the election in June of a new Provincial Con-
gress with power to draw up a constitution. When General 
Sir William Howe appeared off New York at the end of 
June, the Third Provincial Congress adjourned June 30, 
1776, to reconvene July 2 at White Plains. Since it could 
not muster a quorum at White Plains, the Third Congress 
gave way to its successor.8 
Many of the changes in the personnel of the Fourth 
Provincial Congress were a result of a decrease in the size 
of the delegations. Whereas the Third had a nominal 
membership of 136, the Fourth had only 106. Fully thirteen 
of the thirty who did not serve again had represented the 
three counties (Kings, Queens, and Richmond) which the 
Tories largely controlled. Only eight of the congressmen 
were new members.9 Since the Continental Congress had 
declared independence, the Fourth Provincial Congress 
joined the other former colonies in independence on the 
first day of its meeting, July 9. In accordance with its new 
status, the Fourth Provincial Congress transformed itself 
8 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 259-61, 273. 
9 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 516-931; Edgar A. Werner, Civil List and Consti-
tutional History of the Colony and State of New York (Albany, 1888), pp. 
408-9. Becker mistakenly states that about one-third of the Fourth Pro-
vincial Congress were new men. The History of Political Parties, p. 274. 
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into the Convention of Representatives of the State of New 
York on July 10. 
Thus opened the most difficult period in the history of 
the state's provisional governments. The Convention had 
to govern the state, conduct the war, write a constitution, 
and stay out of the hands of the British invaders, all of this 
in the midst of a series of major American defeats and 
retreats from southern New York in 1776-1777. In this 
confusion the Convention appointed a committee of safety 
to assume its functions and the committee sat for most of 
the ten months of the Convention's life, July, 1776-May, 
1777.10 
The two years from May, 1775, to May, 1777, witnessed 
the steady elaboration of congressional government. The 
Provincial Congress, of course, worked out specific policies 
and often depended upon the county and local committees 
to execute them. At the commencement of the first session 
the Provincial Congress assumed the subordination of the 
local bodies to its authority when it directed the formation 
of committees where nonexistent to enforce the resolutions 
of the Continental and Provincial Congresses. 11 On numer-
ous occasions the deputies created special committees to 
carry through their plans, but sometimes, when key men 
served on more than one committee, this practice precipi-
tated a personnel crisis. For example, the Provincial Con-
gress appointed Jay, R. R. Livingston, and Robert Yates 
to a secret committee to obstruct the Hudson to the British 
but in August also put them on the constitutional commit-
tee. Since the trio neglected the latter for the former, the 
constitutional committee accomplished nothing for some 
time.l2 Using various methods, the Provincial Congress 
extended its authority over major areas of government. It 
10 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 579·824. 
11 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 212; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 18. 
12 See below p. 219. 
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exercised jurisdiction, for example, over raising, equipping, 
and supplying the army, finance, suppression of the loyalists 
and seizure of their property, confederal relations, and In-
dian affairs. 
Military preparations naturally absorbed much of the 
time and energy of the delegates. Raising an army involved 
the organization of three types of units. The Continental 
Congress directed the formation of the regular units, the 
line regiments, but the colonies nominated their officers and 
actually recruited them. New York authorized the first 
recruiting campaign June 28', 1775. The five regiments that 
resulted participated in the ill-fated Canadian expedition 
1775-1776. Since the men's enlistments expired December 
31, 1775, their units underwent reorganization after the 
campaign. When the Provincial Congress prepared to raise 
four more regiments in January, 1776, the deputies dif-
fered over the selection of the officers. They resolved their 
differences by circularizing the counties, requesting the 
county committees to nominate two persons for each posi-
tion. In their first efforts in February to raise the regular 
regiments the Provincial Congress worked out quotas for 
each county, but in December they revised their procedure. 
They appointed the officers, then assigned them recruiting 
districts in each county.13 
The militia comprised the second component of the 
armed services. Although the Continental Congress advised 
New York in May, 1775, to commence planning its militia 
organization, the First Provincial Congress did no more 
than to appoint a committee to consider the situation. Not 
until August 9 did the much-revised committee hand in a 
report which was approved. Five days later the legislature 
published its detailed resolutions, which governed the organ-
ization, training, discipline, and pay of the troops. They 
13 Alexander C. Flick, The American Revolution in New York (Albany, 
1926), pp. 133-34; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 268-69, 306-7, 712-13. 
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set the strength of the basic unit, the company, at about 
eighty-three officers and men. Five to ten companies joined 
to compose a regiment, and each county had one or more 
regiments. The regiments combined to form the colony's 
six brigades, each of which was under the command of a 
major general. In addition, there were previously in exist-
ence certain independent formations (hussars, artillery, and 
grenadiers) which retained their original structures. The 
men chose their own officers below the rank of major, leav-
ing to the Provincial Congress the appointment of the field 
ranks. When the companies had organized, one-fourth of the 
company's number volunteered as minutemen. These volun-
teers constituted minute companies which might be called 
into action immediately.14 
The Provincial Congress drew up a code of regulations 
for the militia. The rules required each man to provide 
himself with "a good musket or firelock and bayonet, sword 
or tomahawk, a steel ramrod, worm, priming wire and 
brush, ... a cartouch box, to contain twenty-three rounds 
of cartridges, twelve flints and a knapsack .... " The militia-
man had to supply his own ammunition, a pound of powder, 
and three pounds of bullets. Having accoutered himself, 
the part-time soldier had to train one day a month for four 
hours. Since the larger units needed experience also, the 
regiments would mobilize "at least two days in every year." 
Penalties for disobedience and refusal to serve ranged from 
fines to imprisonment. Those who would not enlist would 
suffer advertisements as enemies to their country.15 
The New York Provincial Congress dispatched circular 
letters of militia instructions in August to the county com-
mittees and the latter commenced the task of actual militia 
organization. Since the parent organ did not vigorously 
14 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 138-39; ]our. Prov. Cong., 
I, 16, 21, 69, 103, 104, 114-16. 
15 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 139; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 
114, 115. 
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press the matter, these activities proceeded at a very uneven 
rate. Suffice it to say that by the close of 1775 most of the 
counties had completed some part if not all of their assign-
ment. Many problems arose which compelled the Provincial 
Congress to amend the militia law in December, 1775. Some 
of the regulations in respect to the election of officers, 
training, brigading, and minutemen underwent modifica-
tion. This remained the basic statute until June, 1776, 
when the Provincial Congress again revised it, abolishing 
the minutemen.16 
The third component of the armed forces, denominated 
levies, did not have a separate organization. When the mili-
tary situation demanded it, the government ordered a por-
tion of the militia into the field for a specific period of time. 
These constituted the levies. If volunteers did not fill the 
quotas, the counties drafted the necessary numbers.17 
New York did not neglect the other branch of service, 
the navy. The colony had no ships of the line, but it did 
encourage privateering. A clear picture of the privateers' 
operations cannot be found, but about a dozen of them 
took to the seas in the period under consideration. One of 
them, the Montgomery, captured eight prizes by 1777 with 
a total value of £11,000.18 
When the Provincial Congress plunged into the intricate 
task of supplying and equipping the army, it encountered 
bewildering problems of every description. Not only did the 
state lack manufactured goods essential to the prosecution 
of the war but also it experienced great difficulties in pro-
curing and transporting its abundant agricultural commodi-
ties to the camps or supply bases. Furthermore, despite the 
16 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 140-41; Jour. Prov. Gong., 
I, 135, 139, 152; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 38, 61, 83, 84, 85, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 
127, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 158, 164, 169, 177, 193, 
198, 261. 
17 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 141-43. 
18Ibid., pp. 145-47; Jour. Prov. Gong., I, 859, 915. 
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heroic labors of devoted officials, a certain amount of pecula-
tion and speculation impeded the functioning of the supply 
services. Noting these circumstances, Schuyler remarked 
to Jay that military spending in the l~orthern Department 
alone ran at five times the annual rate of the most expensive 
year in the previous colonial war.19 
Since the Provincial Congress failed completely to grasp 
either the magnitude or the nature of the supply problem, 
the delegates reacted spasmodically, moved to action by 
especially urgent situations. It took the first step to create a 
commissariat at the direction of the Continental Congress. 
The latter body resolved to have New York furnish provi-
sions and stores for the newly captured forts at Crown 
Point and Ticonderoga. On June 2, 1775, the Provincial 
Congress offered the position of commissary to Peter T. 
Curtenius, New York merchant. The scope of the resolu-
tions implied that Curtenius would be employed to purchase 
other supplies as the New York Provincial Congress de-
sired.20 For his services the commissary received a 1.5 per-
cent commission if he spent his own funds, or a 1 percent 
commission if he expended congressional funds. If he spent 
his own money, the Provincial Congress would allow him 
lawful interest for its use. Finally, Curtenius would obtain 
reimbursement for all expenses.21 Having selected a purch-
asing agent, the Provincial Congress the next day presented 
him with a large order which they directed him to forward 
to Lake George. Among the items Curtenius set out to pro-
cure, 1,000 pounds of oakum represented the largest quan-
tity, but he also had to hire artificers and seamen for the 
same destination.22 
19 Schuyler to Jay, February l, 1777, John Jay Papers, Iselin Collection, 
CUL. 
20 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 27. 
21 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 181; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
I, 27. 
22 Ibid., I, 28. Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 182, refers to 
a later order as the earliest. 
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When occasion demanded, the Provincial Congress by-
passed the commissary and appointed a committee of its 
members to fulfill certain tasks. An incident of this nature 
arose during the first few weeks of Curtenius's tenure. The 
Continental Congress instructed the New Yorkers with ad-
monitions of secrecy to provide 5,000 barrels of flour for the 
army near Boston. The Provincial Congress promptly chose 
Isaac Sears, Abraham Walton, and Joseph Hallett to carry 
out the project.23 
Even though his staff grew commensurately, Curtenius's 
responsibilities multiplied so rapidly they exceeded his 
ability to discharge them effectively. He had under his 
direction one agent, three deputies, seventeen subcommis-
saries, eight commissaries of purchases, and numerous store-
keepers and clerks. Although the supply service had become 
complicated, the Provincial Congress did nothing to simplify 
its organization until events forced the legislators to do so. 
When General Charles Lee arrived in February, 1776, to 
fortify the city, apparently he or his staff "suggested" that 
the Committee of Safety appoint a special issuing military 
commissary to have charge of all army stores in New York 
County. The committee complied and instructed Curtenius 
to transfer such stores to Richard Norwood, whom they ap-
pointed to the new post.24 
When New York and continental troops began to pour 
into the city in February, 1776, the supply problem became 
very complex. The Provincial Congress requested Curtenius 
to supply the necessary rations, but the commissary de-
clined. Accepting Curtenius's explanation of the pressure 
of his duties, the New York legislature turned to Abraham 
Livingston to fill the gap. Livingston operated under a 
contract with the legislature, but his duties did not carry 
through until the end of the provisional government. Since 
23 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 39-40. 
24 Ibid., I, 290. 
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the colony's militia was under the command of the con-
tinental commander in New York City and since this was 
true later in the Northern Department, most of the vic· 
tualling contracts came under the jurisdiction of the Con-
tinental Army. When the militia remained under the state's 
authority, one of numerous commissaries contracted for the 
rations.25 
The difficulty of supplying the troops with adequate 
clothing provoked the Committee of Safety to take steps 
ultimately to reform that aspect of the service. Prior to this 
time Curtenius and others bought semifinished and finished 
goods. Late in 1776 the committee initiated tentative steps 
to establish a state clothing store, but its organization did 
not reach fruition until the appointment of John Henry 
as State Clothier in February, 1777, at a salary of 1 Os. per 
diem.26 
The Convention of Representatives further modified the 
system in May, 1777, when it charged John Lasher with 
complete authority over all military stores. To the rank of 
colonel the deputies attached a salary of £200 per annum 
and expenses and empowered him to impress teams and 
carriages if necessary. At the same time they chose David 
Currie to furnish the troops with items not supplied by the 
commissariat. In this category fell wine, beer, sugar, choc-
olate, coffee, tobacco, and staples. The Convention allowed 
Currie three dollars a day and expenses.27 
The acute shortage of guns, cannon, and ammunition 
compelled the Provincial Congress frequently to resort to 
various expedients to procure desired quantities. The state 
had few skilled gunsmiths upon whom to rely but did con-
tract with these few to manufacture specific quantities. The 
Provincial Congress sought to import arms and powder, ap-
25 Ibid., I, 303, 315, 360, 362, 365, 367, 388, 405, 436, 761. 
26 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 187; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 
695, 698, 807. 
27 Flick, History of New York, IV, 133; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 920. 
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propriating £4,000 for the purpose in September, 1775. 
Driven to seek other alternatives by the continuing short-
age, in March, 1776, it resolved to loan £200 without in-
terest to anyone who would produce the greatest number 
of gunlocks and to give a premium of 4s. on each piece to 
the producers. Similarly, the delegates sought to stimulate 
the manufacture of gun barrels and bayonets. Exertions to 
secure light and heavy cannon encountered similar ob-
stacles. On one occasion, despite the pressing need, the 
Provincial Congress rejected a contract for brass cannon 
because the price of 4s. a pound was too high. On the other 
hand, lack of skilled labor and uncertainty as to the needed 
quantity caused the Committee of Safety to forgo the em-
ployment of a foundry owned by Robert Livingston, Jr., 
for casting heavy cannon. Exorbitant prices did not always 
deter the Provincial Congress from accepting a contract. 
A critical lack of grapeshot caused the legislature to pay 
double the market price.28 
Insufficient quantities of two other products closely as-
sociated with munitions, lead and powder, plagued the 
revolutionaries. The Provincial Congress directed Curtenius 
to collect the lead window weights of private dwellings, 
promising later compensation. In this manner Curtenius 
received more than 100 tons. The state promoted the search 
for, and working of lead mines, but none of these attempts 
proved fruitful. Bounties and loans produced a more favor-
able situation in regard to powder. Venturous individuals 
erected a number of powder mills, but at first the mills 
could not manufacture rapidly because of the scarcity of 
sulphur and saltpeter. Again the state intervened to pro-
mote the location of sulphur deposits and the production 
of the latter. Both efforts succeeded. Sulphur mined in 
28 Flick, History of New York, IV, 135-36; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 148, 268, 
307, 358, 363-64: Peter Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.; Washington, 
D.C., 1837-1853), 4th ser., V, 278-79. 
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Tryon County became the mainstay and saltpeter from small 
shops and households tended to relieve the shortage in that 
article.29 
The state looked to its own resources for adequate sup-
plies of hemp, flax, and wool. Under the advice of the Con-
tinental Congress, New York in April, 1776, pleaded with 
its farmers to increase the acreage of hemp and flax and to 
increase and improve the breed of their sheep. Even prior 
to this action, the New York Provincial Congress had voted 
£1,333 to hire the poor of the city to spin flax. In Oc-
tober, 1776, the Convention selected a committee to provide 
work in weaving and spinning for the New York City 
refugees. Such improvisations produced a considerable 
quantity of cloth. The state imported hempseed in large 
quantity and distributed it to the farmers without charge.30 
Given the scope of the task and the inexperience of of-
ficials, it is no surprise that confusion and waste loomed 
large. A large portion of the provisional government's ex-
penditures for 1775-1777 went to pay for the huge quan-
tities of these supplies discussed above. In these two years 
the Provincial Congress spent at least £500,000 for all pur-
poses.31 It is to the credit of the government that it man-
aged to achieve what it did. 
From the outset the revolutionary government contended 
with two deficiencies, guns and funds. When the need for 
funds arose, the congressmen pledged their personal wealth 
as security. Obviously, the delegates would not bankrupt 
themselves to finance revolutionary operations, so they had 
to find an alternative. The financial question thrust itself 
to the fore on the second day of the First Provincial Con-
29 Flick, History of New York, IV, 138-41. Measures to import powder 
encountered price difficulties and occasional congressional reluctance to pay 
extravagant prices. See the case of Nicholas Low, ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 235, 
241, 254, 340, 502. 
30 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 184-85; ]our. Prov. Cong., 
I, 414-15. 
31 New York State, Treasurer's Accounts, 1775-1778, NYHS. 
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gress, May 23, 1775, when the delegates read a letter from 
the Continental Congress urging the removal of arms and 
stores from Fort Ticonderoga. After debating the matter, 
the delegates referred it to a committee for study. In its 
report the committee the next day suggested the appoint-
ment of a committee "to consider of ways and means for 
providing moneys" to accomplish the Ticonderoga task. 
The Provincial Congress approved this report but did not 
choose a committee of ways and means. The inaction was 
not equivalent to a death sentence, however. It would seem 
probable that private discussion continued because on May 
26, without a recorded motion or discussion, the house 
selected a committee to prepare a report on a continental 
paper currency.32 Simultaneously, the members drafted a 
letter to their representatives at Philadelphia in which they 
stated that they had the financial question under study. 
The letter and the later committee report are important, 
since they throw some light on attitudes toward taxation. 
The letter made two basic points. Considering the drift 
toward war, the authors declared "an uncommon levy" of 
money would soon be a necessity for the Continental Con-
gress and, therefore, the latter body would probably discuss 
the feasibility of paper currency. As to taxation, they wrote, 
"it is clearly impossible" to raise the requisite funds by 
this means. The committee reiterated this view in its report 
on May 30, insisting that the Continental Congress would 
have to issue some form of paper and that each colony would 
have to sink its own share. Significantly, the house approved 
the committee's recommendations unanimously.33 
There the matter rested for two months, when rapidly 
rising expenditures induced another plea to the men at 
Philadelphia. New York, the Provincial Congress asserted, 
had spent a large sum for continental purposes and an equal 
32 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 9, 10, 14. 
33 Ibid., I, 14, 19, 20. 
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amount for the province. Taxation, therefore, had become 
a necessity, but "prudence or policy" dictated the adoption 
of that mode which would be least liable to arouse "popular 
disgust or perhaps, opposition." The letter proposed an 
alternative which would have achieved two objectives. They 
asked that the Continental Congress repeal the ban on tea 
consumption, set a maximum price on it, and tax the vendor 
ls. a pound. Since New York tea merchants had "a con-
siderable quantity" of smuggled Dutch tea on hand, the 
ban's repeal would release their capital for investment in 
the importation of direly needed Dutch goods. Moreover, 
the brunt of this tax would fall on those who violated the 
association, the "obstinate consumers" of the brew.34 This 
overture came to naught because the Yorkers failed to rally 
any other colony to their view. 
Without waiting for a reply to their tea tax application 
of July 28, the delegates on August 5 voted another com-
mittee on ways and means to study financial measures. The 
Albany delegation informed its county committee that many 
congressmen favored an immediate tax, but it added that 
it could not say whether a levy would carry. Although the 
house listened to the committee's statement on August 11, 
it postponed a decision until August 15. It seems possible 
that the committee recommended a levy up to £ 30,000, 
but when recorded in the journal weeks later, the report 
specified a minimum of £15,000.35 Since the Provincial 
Congress did not discuss the matter again, despite its inten-
tion, until August 30, perhaps growing opposition to the 
34 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 217; Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Sr., The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763·1776 (New 
York, 1939), p. 583; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 92. 
35 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 218; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 
101, 105. The Albany delegates, writing home immediately after the action 
of August II, declared that the tax would raise a sum "not exceeding 
£30,000." J. Sullivan, ed., Minutes of the Albany Committee of Corres· 
pondence, 1775·1778 and Minutes of the Schenectady Committee, 1775· 
1779 (2 vols.; Albany, 1923, 1925), I, 185, 196. 
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levy caused its proponents to compromise on the lower 
figure. 
Led by Gilbert Livingston, the opponents successfully 
amended the report. They substituted an emission of 
£45,000 in paper for the tax, committing the Provincial 
Congress to fund by taxation one-third of the total each year 
over the next three years. Upon reconsideration the house 
voted to reduce the funding period to two years. The reso-
lution directed the creation of the necessary tax officials, 
providing for supervisors, assessors, and collectors. It granted 
the collectors authority to collect from defaulters by "dis-
tress upon the goods and chattels" thereof. Since the meas-
ure distributed the tax among the counties on a quota basis, 
the members sought to bargain for the lowest quota. The 
endless maneuvering brought on a deadlock which the 
First Provincial Congress never resolved.36 
It is difficult to interpret the significance of the paper 
money triumph solely on the basis of the voting record. 
The counties cast unit votes and it is impossible to deter-
mine from the journal how the members voted within the 
delegation to decide their county's ballot. Even though 
Albany, Ulster, and Richmond voted against the bills of 
credit, it is risky to conclude therefrom that these delega-
tions represented creditor groups.37 If one accepts the sin-
cerity of the deputies' avowed intention to fund the debt, 
then the problem resolves itself into one of timing. It 
should be noted also that by decreasing the funding span to 
two years, the house increased the tax funds for each year to 
£22,500, whereas the original committee recommendation 
had advocated a £15,000 levy. 
Having wet their feet, as it were, in the paper ocean, the 
36 Thomas C. Cochran, New York in the Confederation (Philadelphia, 
1932), p. 28; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 128, 133-34. 
37 Cochran, New York in the Confederation, p. 44 and n. 5. New York 
County divided evenly. 
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congressmen were not loath to return for another dip. The 
Provincial Congress voted two more emissions in January 
and August, 1776, which amounted to £255,000. These 
proved to be final, so that New York had mortgaged itself 
for £ 300,000 in all. Both of the last issues indicated the 
deterioration of the strength of the proponents of taxation. 
Although the January resolution laid down a three-year 
funding plan, it made no reference to the tax quotas essen-
tial to carry it out. By August even the funding operation 
disappeared from the resolution and the Provincial Con-
gress drew up a substitute: "That the public faith of this 
State be pledged for the redemption of the said bills of 
credit, and that this Convention, or some future Legisla-
ture of this State, will make effectual provision for that 
purpose."38 
Fortunately for the prosecution of the war, New York 
could borrow from the Continental Congress. When the 
latter organ struck off continental paper, it dispatched some 
£150,000 to the Provincial Congress, 1775-1777. In addi-
tion to this source, the New York legislature borrowed from 
individuals to an undetermined amount.39 
Whatever the reasons for the provisional Congress's hesi-
tation to lay .a tax, the creditor-debtor relationship and the 
fear of political opposition are not sufficient explanations.40 
John Jay long criticized the paper policy, prodding Mc-
Dougall occasionally to seek a change. On March 27, 1776, 
Jay adverted to the political effects of taxation in these 
words: "There is much money in the Province, the Produce 
of the Country retains its Price & a moderate Tax would be 
borne without a Murmur."41 McDougall revealed something 
38 Ibid., p. 38; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 223, 316, 326, 330, 336, 338, 339, 540, 
560, 571. 
391\ew York State, Treasurer's Accounts, 1775-1778, NYHS; ]our. Prov. 
Cong., I, 116; Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. ll4. 
40See Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 217; Cochran, New York 
in the Confederation, p. 44. 
The Road to Independence 
of the situation's complexity in his reply of April 16 to Jay: 
I have long been of your opinion on the subject of taxing, but I 
confess there are weighty difficulties in the way. The great stag-
nation of commerce, and the removal of the inhabitants out of 
this city were important reasons which induced my assent to 
delay that measure. If we had taxed, where should the rich men 
of this capital who have taken their flight be taxed? And how is 
the poor freeholder of it, to pay his, when he can receive no 
[rent]? I was determined & delayed the tax for these difficulties 
as the country members seem bent on saddling us with one third 
of the colony expence.42 
It is worthy of note that these reasons gave Jay pause and 
he confessed they had not occurred to him. 43 
The colonial treasurer's position was an ambivalent one. 
When the Provincial Congress needed funds in May, 1775, 
it called upon the treasurer of the colony, Abraham Lott, to 
lend the required money on the personal guarantee of the 
deputies. Although he was a royal official, Lott complied 
and this procedure obtained for a considerable length of 
time. Meanwhile, the First Provincial Congress appointed 
Peter Van Brugh Livingston as its treasurer' in July, 1775. 
The office proved too burdensome for Livingston, an elderly 
man, and he chose a deputy, Gerard Bancker, whom the 
house approved. Henceforth, Bancker bore the major 
burden of the office and in recognition the Convention 
changed his title in January, 1777, to Vice-Treasurer.44 
When Lott presented a memorial to the revolutionary 
41 Jay to McDougall, December 23, 1775, March 27, 1776, McDougall 
Papers, NYHAS; Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public 
Papers of John Jay (4 vols.; New York, 1890-1893), I, 40. 
42 John Jay Papers, Iselin Collection, CUL. 
43 Jay to McDougall, April 27, 1776, ibid. and McDougall Papers, NYHS; 
Johnston, Correspondence of john Jay, I, 57. 
44 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 108; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 
216, 774. In November, 1776, Bancker wanted to give up his subordinate 
position, but neither Livingston nor the Convention would listen to him. 
When Bancker repeated his intention on January 14, the Committee of 
Safety replied by making him Vice-Treasurer. Ibid., II, 316-17; Cal. Hist. 
Mss., I, 593. 
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legislature in March, 1776, he stimulated that body to ac-
tion. The substance of his letter concerned the funding of 
the 1771 bills of credit of which one-tenth fell due in April. 
A committee recommended that the payment of the prin-
cipal be suspended and that any sums paid in be loaned out 
again. Furthermore, the committee declared that the Pro-
vincial Congress must "attend to the proper application of 
the public moneys now in the hands of the said Abraham 
Lott, Esquire." Lott evaded the directive but the Provincial 
Congress did nothing. It is surprising that Governor Tryon 
did not instruct him to bring his papers out to the British 
warships in the harbor. In September, 1776, the Conven-
tion demanded an accounting and forbade Lott to act 
as treasurer. "\Vhatever expectations the Convention may 
have entertained as to the funds in his possession, the final 
outcome dashed those hopes. Although the records dem-
onstrated the existence of £25,000, Lott possessed only 
£3,000 and the Convention labored in vain to obtain that 
sum. Lott had invested the large balance in the Danish 
Islands.45 
The deepening rift between Whigs and Tories in the 
summer of 1775 posed one of the thorniest problems that 
ever confronted the New York Provincial Congress: the 
disposition of the Tories. It did not formulate a general 
policy for several months, leaving most action in the hands 
of the local committees. When a serious incident occurred, 
such as the enlistment of recruits for the British army, the 
deputies heard the evidence, then voted on the verdict. 
Those adjudged guilty might be imprisoned locally or 
shipped off to Connecticut.46 
The activities of the Tories in Brookhaven early m 
45 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 347, 350: Flick, American Revolution in New York, 
pp. IOB·IO. Flick confuses these events with a committee accounting with 
Livingston and Bancker in February. 
46 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 216; Flick, American Revo· 
lution in New York, p. 210; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 89, 93, 100, 127, 129, 135. 
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August caused the Provincial Congress to prepare its first 
overall measures against them. After much debate extend-
ing over three days, the deputies agreed upon several reso-
lutions. The resolves defined sundry forms of opposition 
and actions as punishable by imprisonment but placed 
their enforcement in the hands of the local committees. If 
the committees or militia apprehended any individuals who 
were in arms or enlisted in the British forces, they would 
hold the prisoners for disposition by the Provincial Con-
gress.47 
Since these first steps did nothing to quell the Tories 
in regions which they dominated, such as Queens, the 
Provincial Congress voted additional measures. The local 
"Whigs lacked the numbers and force to take effective action 
and pleaded with the Provincial Congress to intervene. By 
December, 1775, the open defiance of the revolutionaries 
by Queens and Richmond Tories constrained the Second 
Provincial Congress to strike at them. Fearing retaliatory 
bombardment by the British warships, the Provincial Con-
gress instructed its delegates in Philadelphia to ask the 
Continental Congress for aid. The latter obliged, ordering 
Jersey troops to Queens to disarm the Tories and appre-
hend the ringleaders. Approximately 600 residents sur-
rendered their weapons and 19 their persons. Early in 
February the New Jersey Provincial Congress complied 
with a request from New York to perform a similar sweep 
on Staten Island.48 
The Second Provincial Congress in the form of its Com-
mittee of Safety, prompted by a resolve of the Continental 
Congress, took an additional step against the Tories. It 
instructed the counties to disarm the "disaffected," employ-
ing, if necessary, the militia.49 
47 Ibid., I, 105, 127, 129, 131-32; Becker, The History of Political Parties, 
pp. 223·24. 
48 Ibid., pp. 238, 244-45. 
49 Ibid., p. 262; see above, pp. 143-45. 
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The Third Provincial Congress had scarcely organized in 
May, 1776, when Washington exerted pressure on it to 
take vigorous action against the Tories. The Commander-
in-Chief, taking the congressmen into his confidence, re-
vealed to them intelligence of a Tory plan to unite the 
disaffected on Long Island and adjacent Connecticut and to 
join the British. The Provincial Congress spent most of May 
19 as wel1 as the day and evening of May 20 discussing the 
evidence and remedies. It seems to have concluded its de-
liberations by referring the whole business to a committee 
headed by John Alsop.50 
When the committee reported May 21, the house ordered 
the secretaries to transcribe a fair copy. After three days 
of intermittent but prolonged debates, the deputies ap-
proved the lengthy report which recommended that the 
Provincial Congress cooperate with Washington to round 
up the most dangerous of the opposition and that the county 
committees apprehend not only all civil and military crown 
officials but also all those suspected of hostility to the Amer-
ican cause.51 
The following day, May 25, the congressmen charged a 
committee of Scott, Jay, Morris, Haring, and Remsen to 
draw up enabling resolutions, but the Provincial Congress 
did not approve the draft until June 5. The committee 
submitted its report on May 28 and the delegates immedi-
ately commenced consideration of it. Other affairs inter-
vened and prevented final disposition until a week later. 
The heart of the "laws" approved were those sections 
creating a committee to seize, try, and punish Tories. The 
committee consisted of seven men: Gouverneur Morris, 
John Ten Broeck, Henry Remsen, John Haring, Thomas 
Tredwell, Lewis Graham, and Joseph Hallett. Among the 
other resolutions, the Provincial Congress conferred similar 
50 Curtis P. Nettels, George Washington and American Independence 
(Boston, 1951), p. 290; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 450, 453. 
51 Ibid., I, 456-57, 459-60, 461. 
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powers on the county committees and authorized the local 
committees to arrest and hold any suspects until the county 
committees met to dispose of the cases. The resolutions 
directed the congressional committee to arrest about a hun-
dred of the leading Tories in the city, Richmond, Kings, 
Queens, and Westchester.52 
After some delay the "secret committee" set about its 
labors on June 15 with a slightly altered cast; the most 
important changes were the addition of Jay and Philip Liv-
ingston. Over the next two weeks the "inquisitors" exam-
ined numerous suspects, heard witnesses, and disposed of 
cases. In arriving at decisions, the committee voted in ac-
cordance with the voting rules of the Provincial Congress, 
that is by county unit. Most of those summoned, if con-
victed as no "Friend to the American cause," secured their 
release on parole or posted bond.53 
Scarcely had the secret committee begun hearings when 
Washington imparted fresh intelligence to the Provincial 
Congress which halved the committee's membership. On 
June 17 the legislators chose Jay, G. Morris, and Philip 
Livingston a "secret committee" to confer with the Com-
mander-in-Chief relative to this information and "take such 
examinations ... as they shall think proper." Thus began 
the unraveling of the celebrated Tory plot, a plot intended 
to unleash operations against Washington's army on the 
arrival of the British army. Governor Tryon planned to 
have Tories strike at ammunition stores, sabotage cannon, 
and destroy Dykeman's Bridge across Kingsbridge Creek 
which linked Manhattan with Westchester and New Eng-
land. Three days thereafter the Provincial Congress granted 
this second committee power to apprehend and secure 
certain persons in "such manner as they may think most 
prudent." The trio worked closely with Washington in 
52 Ibid., I, 461, 464, 476-78. 
53 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 213. 
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rounding up the ring, but whether they tried the prisoners 
or entrusted that task to the first secret committee (of 
which they were members) cannot be determined. 54 
The British arrival disrupted the work of the committee 
and prevented consideration by the delegates of the com-
mittee's report. On June 28 Jay requested and obtained 
leave for the committee to continue sitting, since it had not 
finished its task. He presented a report of his board's ac-
tivities with the supporting evidence, but the delegates de-
ferred even receiving it "as the House is very much engaged 
in other necessary business." The house did not return to 
the business because Sir William Howe's appearance dis-
rupted the proceedings. Before the Provincial Congress 
closed its session, it gave Washington power to "take such 
measures for apprehending and securing" dangerous per-
sons "as he shall think necessary." 55 
When the Fourth Provincial Congress or Convention as-
sembled on July 9, it merged the two "secret" committees. 
The Convention specifically repealed the broad powers to 
seize suspects Washington had received from its predecessor, 
resolving that "it would be unreasonable longer to burthen 
the General with matters for which this Congress ought to 
provide .... " Having taken this precaution to safeguard 
civil authority, the deputies instructed their committee to 
proceed in a manner "most agreeable to the dictates of 
justice and humanity," and "most advancive of the public 
good, the oath which they have taken notwithstanding." 
Just how this committee functioned is not clear, since the 
Convention itself heard numerous cases and prescribed 
punishments. Late in August the Convention directed the 
county committees to exercise their discretion in releasing 
minor loyalists whom the Convention had arrested but not 
to liberate any person confined for "treasonable practices."56 
54 Nette1s, George Washington, pp. 290-91; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 497, 500. 
55 Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 341, 348; ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 509, 512. 
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The deteriorating military situation and increased ac-
tivity of the loyalists caused the Convention on September 
19, 1776, to take a new look at its loyalist policy. During 
the subsequent debates the members hammered out more 
drastic resolutions, establishing a standing committee of 
seven with broad powers for "inquiring into, detecting and 
defeating all conspiracies." Jay, William Duer, Pierre Van 
Cortlandt, Leonard Gansevoort, Charles DeWitt, Zephaniah 
Platt, and Nathaniel Sackett composed the committee. The 
committee had troops at its command, either militia or 
special ranger companies, its own intelligence network, and 
express riders. During the four months of its existence 
this committee presided over perhaps 500 cases. Many 
prisoners incurred sentences of banishment to New Hamp-
shire jails. 57 
When Carleton in October, 1776, advanced down Lake 
Champlain toward Ticonderoga, the Committee of Safety 
established a new committee in response to Schuyler's ap-
peal for reinforcements. They detailed a special committee 
to repair to Albany to cooperate with Schuyler. The new 
committee possessed practically a blank check which in-
cluded authority to call out the militia of the northern 
counties. However, this special committee devoted an im-
portant portion of its time and energy to the apprehension 
of loyalists. It is highly unlikely that the labor of this special 
committee of "arrangement" duplicated that of the com-
mittee of seven to defeat conspiracies. The Committee of 
Safety's correspondence indicates that the committee on 
conspiracies did not lack for business elsewhere. Where 
circumstances warranted it, the house resorted to special 
56 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 218; ]our. Prov. Cong., 
I, 633, 634, 637-39. 
57 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 218-19; Minutes of the 
Committee and of the First Commission for Detecting and Defeating Con· 
spiracies in the State of New York, 1776-1778, New-York Historical Society 
Collections, LVII (1924), I, 3-5; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 693. 
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committees to supplement the work of the existing com-
mittee on conspiracies.58 
Driven by the pressure of innumerable problems, the 
Convention devised every conceivable stratagem to maintain 
adequate attendance by releasing members from committee 
assignments. On February 11, 1777, the Convention dis-
solved the committee on conspiracies and replaced it with 
a commission of three nonlegislators who drew 12s. per 
diem for their service. The deputies picked three men from 
Dutchess to fill the new posts: Egbert Benson, chairman of 
the county committee, Colonel Jacobus Swartwout of the 
militia, and local committeeman Melancton Smith. The 
commission seems to have inherited the rights of its pre-
decessor, although the journal does not specifically state that 
it did. When the Convention resolved on March 7, 1777, to 
offer political prisoners an act of grace and thereby clear 
the jails, it inundated the commission. The terms of the 
resolution extended to all offenders except those who had 
taken up arms against the United States, those who had 
recruited for the British or had supplied them with provi-
sions, and those who had conveyed intelligence to them. 
This meant that the commission interrogated not only those 
imprisoned in New York but also those incarcerated in other 
states. The prisoners' discharge depended upon their taking 
a special oath of allegiance. Failure to comply entailed 
banishment within the British lines or imprisonment as 
"open enemies." Although the Convention dissolved May 
13, 1777, the succeeding Council of Safety continued the 
commission. Similarly, when the Council of Safety expired 
September 10, 1777, a convention of members of the new 
senate and assembly authorized the commission to proceed 
as before.59 
58/bid., I, 684, 693, 694-95, 700, 910-11; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 525. 
59 Flick, American Revolution in New York, pp. 218-19; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
I, 803, 807, 827, 1061. 
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Having instituted measures against the persons of Tories, 
the Provincial Congress soon felt obliged to appropriate 
their property. The house embarked on a confiscation 
policy on September 1, 1775, when it voted seizure of the 
personal property of those who joined the British army or 
took up arms against America. The local committees as-
sumed trusteeship of such personalty, but the people tended 
to interpret the resolution as authorizing confiscation. The 
Declaration of Independence spurred some of the commit-
tees to wholesale confiscations of personalty and in some 
localities the committeemen sold the property. Later the 
Convention instructed the committee on conspiracies to 
sequestrate the effects of loyalists who broke their parole.60 
The military situation in Westchester helped to precipi-
tate further confiscations. A Convention committee cooper-
ating with the army in Westchester pleaded with the parent 
body to dispatch 600 to 700 militia reinforcements to hold 
the lower part of the county. William Duer, chairman, 
pointed out that if New York called in Connecticut troops, 
these would probably seize the property of loyalists who had 
fled or joined the enemy army. Two days afterward, Feb-
ruary 22, 1777, the Committee of Safety ordered the public 
sale of ·westchester loyalist personalty. The next month 
the Convention applied the Westchester action to the whole 
state. The resolutions created three commissioners in each 
county to dispose of the personalty of absentee loyalists 
by public sale, alloting to their families their apparel, furni-
ture, and three months' supply of food. Income from the 
sales went to the state treasury "to be hereafter paid to the 
respective owners thereof, or otherwise disposed of at the 
discretion of the legislature .... " Although the Convention 
marketed personalty, it did not deal with realty in the same 
fashion. All houses and estates seized with personalty re-
60 Flick, American Revolution in New York, p. 220. 
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mained in trust until further disposition by the legislature 
in 1779.61 
Since the distribution of powers between the Continental 
Congress and the states was not defined until the adoption 
of the Articles of Confederation, the Provincial Congress's 
interpretation of these relationships is difficult to ascertain. 
New York seems to have accepted without question the Con-
tinental Congress's primacy in the direction of the war, but 
from time to· time it challenged Congress or its agents on 
specific issues. 
Although the New York Provincial Congress depended 
in its relations with the Continental Congress upon dele-
gates chosen from among its members, opposition to this 
method of determining representation cropped up in the 
spring of 1776. Sentiment for having the people elect the 
continental deputies arose in New York City, and Orange 
and Ulster counties. In the city the mechanics sought to 
rouse popular support for direct election but with indif-
ferent success. The inhabitants of Goshen district, Orange 
County, deprived their provincial representatives of the 
power to choose continental delegates. A serious dispute 
occurred in Ulster on this question, but the county commit-
tee adhered to the current practice. Jay defended the New 
York Provincial Congress's position in the matter, arguing 
that all the colonies chose their delegates to the Continental 
Congress in this fashion. Furthermore, since the people 
gave their deputies that specific power in the elections for 
the Third Provincial Congress in April, 1776, Jay did not 
comprehend how the exercise of this power would injure 
the people's "right of election." After this incident, no 
further challenge developed.62 
61 Ibid., p. 221; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 808, 811. 
62 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 256-57, 259; ]our. Prov. 
Cong., I, 460, 467, 499, II, 199·200; Jay to McDougall, April 11, 1776, Me· 
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The question of continental-provincial relations arose 
early in the First Provincial Congress. In May, 1775, Isaac 
Low, seconded by Gouverneur Morris, presented a resolu-
tion: "Resolved, As the opinion of this Congress, that im-
plicit obedience ought to be paid to every recommendation 
of the Continental Congress, for the general regulation of 
the associated colonies; but that this Congress is competent 
to and ought freely to deliberate and determine on, all mat-
ters relative to the internal policies of this colony." After 
much debate, the opposition, led by Scott, carried a motion 
to table. Only Richmond County voted against tabling. 
·whatever the delegates may have said about the propriety or 
substance of Low's proposal, they did not entertain any idea 
of subordinating the colony to the authority of the Con-
tinental Congress. May 24, the day after this discussion, the 
house approved a letter to the Connecticut government in 
which it promised "that in this and all other matters, we 
will pay the highest attention to every recommendation of 
the Grand Continental Congress .... " This language hardly 
qualifies as unconditional acceptance of continental suprem-
acy.6a 
Having blocked the attempted definition of spheres of 
interest, Scott counterattacked on May 25 with a resolution 
"to fully approve of the proceedings of the [First Con-
tinental] Congress." This motion did not win approbation 
either, since the house tabled it without a formal division. 
However, a day later the members approved the General 
Association, signed it, and circularized the county commit-
tees to have every inhabitant sign it. One clause in the 
association pledged the deputies to "adopt and endeavour 
to carry into execution whatever measures may be recom-
mended by the Continental Congress or resolved upon by 
this Provincial Congress for the purpose of preserving our 
63 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 212; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
I, 8, II. 
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Constitution, and opposing the execution of the several 
arbitrary and oppressive acts of the British Parliament .... " 64 
Friction arose in January, 1776, when Washington or-
dered General Charles Lee to New York to fortify the port 
against a possible British attack. Fear that Lee might 
precipitate hostilities with the British men-of-war in the 
harbor drove the Yorkers to protest the expedition. Hearing 
of the New York reaction, the Continental Congress, under 
the prodding of the New York delegates, dispatched a com-
mittee to the city to investigate the expediency of the oper-
ation and to exert supervisory authority over it. The Com-
mittee of Safety assigned Scott and McDougall to wait upon 
the continental committee and to bring back a report. The 
committee informed the two Yorkers that the General came 
to take measures and to consult with the continental mem-
bers for the defense of the city and not to begin a battle. 
The continental committee also requested supplies and 
barracks for the first contingent of the troops, which would 
arrive that evening. In the course of the debate in the 
Committee of Safety which the request provoked, Comfort 
Sands moved that the troops be halted until the committee 
conferred with the continental emissaries. Sands's motion 
lost by a vote of 4 to 3 with Scott voting in the negative 
and McDougall in the affirmative. Scott then advocated that 
the troops be admitted upon condition that the Committee 
of Safety control them until the Yorkers met with the con-
tinental committee and General Lee and until "further 
order to be taken thereon, with the consent of this Com-
mittee ... or further direction of the Continental Con-
gress." This motion carried by 5 to 2 with McDougall 
shifting to support Scott. 65 
64 Becker, The History of Political Parties, p. 212; Jour. Prov. Gong., I, 
13, 15; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 86. 
65 Becker, The History of Political Parties, pp. 246-47; ]our. Prov. Gong., 
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The Committee of Safety achieved nothing by this last 
maneuver. The continental committee rejected these con-
ditions on two grounds: first, that its instructions from the 
Continental Congress precluded their acceptance and sec-
ond, that the assurances first given by it to Scott and Mc-
Dougall rendered the conditions superfluous. Furthermore, 
Colonel David Waterbury, commander of the Connecticut 
units which were enroute to the city, practically defied the 
Committee of Safety. He refused to submit the troops to 
the committee's command and insisted he would "march 
them into the barracks." Ih the face of this resistance the 
Yorkers asked the Philadelphia committee for an immedi-
ate conference. Taking refuge in a technicality, the Com-
mittee of Safety argued that since General Lee would not 
accompany the first contingent and since the troops entered 
the city without any particular order of the Continental 
Congress, the Committee of Safety ought to have command 
of them. The committee from Philadelphia silenced the 
Yorkers by producing their instructions from Congress 
which gave them authority over Lee's forces. The Com-
mittee of Safety yielded because it had no alternative. The 
issue lay not in the question of continental versus local 
command, since Stirling's succession to Lee's authority in 
March brought no protest from the Provincial Congress. 
Rather the Committee of Safety apprehended that Lee's 
rashness might induce him to attack the British ships.66 
Before quitting the scene, Lee stirred the wrath of the 
New Yorkers by ordering the imposition of test oaths on 
the Long Island Tories. He first hinted at the desirability 
of an oath on March 4, but the Provincial Congress did not 
reply. On March 5 Lee ordered his acting adjutant gen-
eral, Isaac Sears, to offer a test oath to a list of Tories and 
to arrest those who refused to take it. On the seventh the 
General asked the New York Provincial Congress for a reply 
66 Ibid., I, 278-79. 
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to his proposal on the Tories, but the provincial body 
ignored the request. Sears carried out his orders, but the 
Provincial Congress made no official protest, perhaps be-
cause Lee handed over his command to Lord Stirling on 
March 8. On March 12, Daniel \V. Kissam of the Great 
Neck Committee, Queens, presented himself before the 
house to complain of Sears's conduct. These proceedings, 
Kissam asserted, "tend to convert whigs to be tories." After 
hearing Kissam's account of these events, the Provincial 
Congress entertained a motion to summon Sears before 
it to explain his authority for his undertaking. The journal 
noted that the house expended a "considerable time" in 
debating the motion but came to no decision. Although the 
deputies postponed the business to the next day, they did 
not revive the matter.67 
This seeming oversight in connection with the test oath 
may have derived from action in the Continental Congress. 
The New York delegates in Congress heard of the affair 
and on March 8 won approval of a resolution which con-
demned the imposition of test oaths by military officers. 
Their letter to New York on the subject implied a rebuke 
to the province for not having protested to the Continental 
Congress, since the military had encroached upon the civil 
authority. 68 
A long-standing contest among New York, New Hamp-
shire, and Massachusetts over adjoining lands disturbed 
continental-state relations in 1777. Some of the inhabitants 
of these counties (variously denominated the Grants, New 
Connecticut, or Vermont) memorialized the Continental 
Congress to admit their representatives as delegates from 
an independent state.69 The New York Convention, having 
intelligence of this maneuver, prepared in April, 1777, 
67 Ibid., I, 336, 343, 354, 355, II, 148. 
68 Ibid., I, 379. 
69 See Chilton Williamson, Vermont in Quandary: 1763-1825 (Mont-
pelier, 1949), chaps. v-vi. 
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a forceful letter of instructions to their delegates in Phila-
delphia. If Congress should vote to seat the Vermonters over 
the opposition of the Yorkers, ran the letter, the Yorkers 
should protest in the state's name and "forthwith return 
to this state." The Convention added: "You are from time 
to time to oppose, ... all such resolutions of Congress, as 
may impliedly or expressly infringe the rights or jurisdic-
tion of this State." Lastly, the Convention threatened to 
withhold approval of any plan for confederation unless the 
Continental Congress upheld it on the Vermont question. 
Perhaps the threat of withdrawal from Philadelphia had 
its effect, for in June Congress vindicated New York, re-
fusing to recognize Vermont as a state.70 
The royal Indian Superintendent, Sir Guy Johnson, had 
aroused hostility toward the Whigs among the Indians and, 
as a result, the First Provincial Congress was forced to give 
its attention to Indian affairs early in its proceedings. After 
hearing disquieting reports from the Albany County Com-
mittee on Johnson's maneuvers, the congressmen in June, 
1775, discussed the feasibility of suggesting that the Con-
tinental Congress establish an Indian superintendency. They 
outlined their idea to the Yorkers in Philadelphia, giving 
them discretionary power to introduce the matter in Con-
gress. Ultimately, the Continental Congress appointed a 
number of Commissioners of Indian Affairs, three of whom 
came from New York. The Provincial Congress relied on 
its committee system to meet such Indian problems as came 
before it, although it frequently had recourse to the services 
of the Albany County Committee to hold conferences with 
the Six Nations.71 
In 1777 the Committee of Safety moved tentatively to 
revise Indian policy. A complaint from some of the Six 
Nations in Tryon County, alleging a land swindle by George 
70 jour. Prov. Gong., I, 778-79, 820-21, 854-55, 869, 998-99, II, 418. 
71 Ibid., I, 24, 30, 32-33, 39, 82, 95, II, 47-48, 56-59, 419. 
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Croghan of Pennsylvania, impelled the Committee of Safety 
in February to touch briefly on the general subject of Indian 
relations. Besides enjoining James Duane and Gouverneur 
Morris to investigate the complaint, the committee ordered 
them to draw up a proposal for regulating Indian affairs. 
Duane and Morris did not report back to the committee, 
nor did they make any presentation to the Convention when 
it reconvened in March. When the Convention dissolved 
itself in May, 1777, it "resolved and ordered" that the two 
men report to the succeeding Council of Safety. The com-
mittee did work out recommendations, but the Council of 
Safety never formally received them. The suggestions would 
have deposited authority to regulate Indian affairs in the 
hands of special commissioners who would "superintend, 
manage and direct all Publick Business" of this kind.72 
Although the Provincial Congress combined legislative 
and executive functions, it did not assume responsibility for 
the normal administration of justice. After the Declaration 
of Independence the Convention ordered all Whig judges 
to proceed as before, provided that "all processes and other 
their proceedings, be under the authority and in the name 
of the State of New York." The Convention, however, did 
intervene on two occasions to appoint judges. In July, 1776, 
the Convention instituted a court of admiralty and offered 
the seat to Richard Morris, a prominent judge. When he 
declined, the legislature commissioned Lewis Graham to 
fill the post. The second essay into judicial affairs origin-
ated in military necessity. Recruiting for the Continental 
Army regiments in \Vestchester centered around Peekskill, 
a supply base. William Duer complained that the lack of a 
justice of the peace in the vicinity to administer an oath 
hampered enlistments. The Convention responded by ap-
pointing William Paulding "with the like powers, privi-
72lbid., I, 801, 802-3, 930; Cal. Hist. Mss., II, 645. 
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leges and authority now or heretofore enjoyed and exer-
cised by a justice of the peace in this State."73 
The committee system was the mainstay of governmental 
procedure. The house did not grant its committees auton-
omy but maintained a close check on their operations. No 
doubt duplication of effort did occur. Possibly a more 
serious handicap for the government lay in the shortage of 
manpower, since most members divided their time and 
energies among a number of committees. Notwithstanding 
its inefficiencies and mistakes, government by committee 
did see the state through a most critical period and did pre-
vent a breakdown of the war effort. Equally important, the 
Convention wrote the first state constitution in the midst 
of great difficulties. 
73 ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 527, 550, 554, 556, 566, 765. 
SEVEN 
~aking Haste Slowly: 
Framing the Constitution 
r-' ~WHEN the Fourth Provincial Congress opened 
~.___.})its proceedings on July 9, the primary busi-
ness of the day was not a constitution but the Decla.ration 
of Independence. The Provincial Congress promptly adopted 
resolutions that heartily endorsed the Declaration and that 
made New York the thirteenth colony to vote approval. 
The next day the delegates converted themselves from an 
illegal, revolutionary body into the Convention of Repre-
sentatives of the State of New York; the Fourth Provincial 
Congress had but a fleeting life. 
If the people expected the Convention to plunge into the 
task of constructing new political foundations, they were 
disappointed. When the matter was first discussed on July 
10, the house agreed to defer consideration until July 16.1 
On the appointed day· an influential group blocked debate 
by pleading that "the present dangerous situation . . . de-
mands the unremitted attention of every member.· ... " 
This sentiment prevailed and the members consented to 
set aside debate until August 1,2 It is quite likely that the 
difference over this point concealed more profound disagree-
ment, indicating the marshaling of the hostile elements for 
the grand contest over the constitution. A Connecticut 
observer explained the circumstances this way: "the Toryfied 
in the House prevailed to have it postponed, the Whigs say 
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they were willing to have it so, as they [ expec ]t that by & by 
they shall have better grounds to build their new Constitu-
tion upon." 3 
On August 1, Gouverneur Morris opened the business 
with a motion to select a committee to draft a constitution. 
William Duer seconded it and the proposition passed unani-
mously. But here the unanimity quickly dissolved as Mat-
thew Adgate of Albany proposed that the house direct the 
committee to draw up first a bill of rights "as the foundation 
of such form of government." Morris sought to kill the 
measure by moving the previous question, but the house 
voted him down. An amendment by Duer to direct the com-
mittee to report simultaneously both drafts carried by a 
"great majority" and, thus amended, Adgate's proposal re-
ceived unanimous approval.4 
Turning to the selection of the committee's personnel, the 
Convention embroiled itself in controversy over General 
John Morin Scott's right to hold a seat in the house. The 
dispute had sprung up the previous day after some remarks 
by Scott on a matter of Westchester patronage.5 The patron-
age involved command of the drafted militia who had mobi-
lized for the defense of New York City. The Convention, on 
1 Jay described the fluidity of the situation: "We have a government, you 
know, to form; and God only knows what it will resemble. Our politicians, 
like some guests at a feast, are perplexed and undetermined which dish to 
prefer." Jay to Rutledge, July 6, 1776, quoted in William Jay, The Life of 
john .fay witiz Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers 
(2 vols.; :'l:ew York, 1833), I, 62: Peter Force, ed., American -Archives (9 vols.; 
\\'ashington, D.C., 1837-1853), 5th ser., I, 40. 
~.four. Prov. Cong., I, 519, 527. 
:l .Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, July 20, 1776, Connecticut 
Historical Society Collections, XX (Hartford, 1889), 312. 
4.four. Prov. Cong., I, 552. 
r. The rush for political plums in the power of the Provincial Congress 
had begun early in the conflict. An onlooker distastefully commented: "In 
the disposal of ollices, particularly in the military department the most 
shameful partiality prevails, all or most of the inferior commissioned officers 
being selected from the creatures and absolute dependents of the governing 
party. Indeed the conduct of our gentry & principal people has rendered this 
vile arrangement almost inevitable." Dr. John Jones to Duane, July 13, 1775, 
James Dnane, "The Duane Letters," Southern History Association Publica-
tions, \'II (Washington, D.C., 1903), 249. 
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Morris's advice, bypassed the senior colonel of the West-
chester militia, Joseph Drake, who normally would have 
received the post, in favor of a junior colonel, Thomas 
Thomas. Thomas's family, locally prominent, had allied 
itself with the Morrises. Drake's protest and resignation 
might have gone unheeded, but the officers and men of his 
regiment refused to serve under Thomas. The obduracy of 
the militia necessitated the Convention's intervention. Scott, 
as commander of this detachment of 3,000 militia, opposed 
Thomas's selection "lest it might injure the service by plac-
ing officers in service out of their proper tour of duty or 
rank." His comment gave umbrage to Morris who resented 
this interference in his own bailiwick.6 
Counterattacking from an unexpected quarter, Morris 
questioned Scott's right to his seat in the Convention. Morris 
demanded that Scott not be "permitted to speak or interfere 
in the debates of this Convention." He buttressed his chal-
lenge with a congressional resolution of June 15 which stated 
that no officer in the pay of the Continental Congress or of 
the colony ought to have a seat in the Provincial Congress. 
In rebuttal Scott "claimed his seat on behalf of his constit-
uents." Leaving aside these broad grounds of defense, Scott 
might have countered with some pertinent observations on 
generals in the Convention. When the Convention officially 
accepted the New York County delegation's credentials on 
July 10, Morris offered no objection to General Scott. The 
latter did not take his seat until July 31, but Morris did not 
object to Scott until after the latter had participated in the 
"\Vestchester imbroglio. Furthermore, two other generals had 
won election to the house without undergoing any scrutiny 
of their rights. In fact, the convention had chosen General 
Nathaniel Woodhull, commander of the Suffolk militia, as 
6 Henry B. Dawson, Westchester County, New York, During the American 
Revolution (Morrisania, 1886), p. 30; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 551; Force, Ameri· 
can Archives, 5th ser., I, 790, 1428, 1431-32, 1461, 1475. 
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its president. Also, Westchester had returned to the house 
General Lewis Morris, commander of that county's militia 
and Gouverneur's kinsman. It is possible that when he 
challenged Scott on July 31, Gouverneur Morris was thinking 
of the next day's debate on a constitution.7 
The Convention never resolved the issue raised by Morris. 
After a lengthy exchange of views the members voted to 
examine the merits of the challenge August 6. Not until the 
seventh did the Convention revert to the subject, but then 
it postponed it again to August 14. However, the Convention 
did not discuss the matter agaih. Perhaps informal discussion 
convinced Morris that he could not muster a majority for 
his contention. In the interim the city committee sent the 
Convention an irate letter which condemned this attempt to 
deprive the people of their right "to say who shall represent 
them" in convention. Pleading the "forlorn and deserted" 
condition of the city as the reason for not having collected 
signatures to protest petitions, it asked that Morris's motion 
be erased and "buried in eternal oblivion."8 
The Convention did select its constitutional committee on 
August l and did place Scott on it. Although Scott did not 
attend that day, Morris must have expected that his own 
constitutional views would differ basically from those of 
Scott. Consequently, he opposed Scott's nomination to the 
constitutional committee on the ground that the Convention 
had not yet determined his status. When the polling on 
Scott's nomination ended, the General narrowly prevailed 
through the support of the New York, Albany, Ulster, and 
Tryon delegations.9 In addition to Scott the committee 
comprised Jay, G. Morris, R. R. Livingston, Duer, John Sloss 
7 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 551. 
8/bid., I, 551, 557. 
9 The vote was 21 to 20. Westchester, Dutchess, Cumberland, Suffolk, 
Gloucester, and Queens supported Morris. Presumably Kings, Orange, and 
Charlotte lacked quorums and could not vote. Ibid., I, 552. Peter R. Living· 
ston to Colonel Robert Livingston, August 2, 1776, Livingston Redmond 
Papers, FDRL. 
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Hobart, Abraham Yates, Jr., Robert Yates, Henry Wisner, 
William Smith (of Suffolk), John Broome, Samuel Town-
send, and Charles DeWitt.10 The Convention ordered the 
committee to bring in a report August 26. 
Since three of the committee (Jay, Livingston, and R. 
Yates) were serving on a secret committee to obstruct the 
Hudson to the British, the Convention sent them a letter 
which informed the three men of their additional duties and 
directed them "to meet upon this important business as early 
as possible."11 Although Livingston hurried to the Conven-
tion in response to this news, so far as is known, no committee 
meetings occurred. 
Livingston's presence had some connection with the desire 
of certain members to have the Convention immediately 
elect a governor. Neither the precise details nor the persons 
involved are ascertainable, but Livingston's agency in the 
business is definite.12 He tendered the nomination, if not 
the office, to Philip Livingston then in Philadelphia. Declar-
ing his "unfitness" for the office, Livingston advised the 
Convention not to select him. Nevertheless, he added, if the 
Convention should pick him, he would not refuse the post. 
If this statement seems like the stock reply of the modern 
politician, it is an unhappy coincidence. His explanation has 
an honest ring to it. He feared a refusal might "be con-
strued by some as [a] desert[ion] of the righteous causes ... 
at a most dangerous crisis .... At so critical a moment it 
10 Of these thirteen men, two, Hobart and Townsend, never attended the 
committee; four, Smith, Scott, Morris, and Broome, were often absent. Jay, 
Livingston, and Duer were conservatives and Abraham and Robert Yates, 
Wisner, and DeWitt were moderates. For the definition of the terms "con-
servative" and "moderat," see below, p. 23l. 
11 The Convention had chosen Jay, Livingston, R. Yates, Christopher 
Tappen, Gilbert Livingston, and William Paulding to be a committee for 
that purpose in July. Ibid., I, 526-27, 555. 
John McKesson urged George Clinton to be present August 26 at all costs. 
George Clinton, Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New 
York (10 vols.; Albany, 1899-1914), I, 297. 
12 Since the matter was important, it was unlikely that R. R. Livingston 
acted without the foreknowledge of Morris and Jay. 
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might have a bad effect to have it even supposed that any 
one who has had an early part to act in this contest shd. 
not remain ready to step forward when called upon by the 
Public."13 
It would appear that word of either these negotiations or 
intentions reached the ears of Tory William Smith. Further-
more, Smith harbored the suspicion that a visitor, Peter R. 
Livingston, had come to offer him the candidacy: "I suspect 
that Mr. L came to sound me on the Design of tendring the 
Governor's Place to me & that he was silent upon discovering 
by my conversation, that I was opposed to the Disunion of 
the Empire."14 For whatever reasons, the plan, being still-
born, never reached the Convention floor. 
The constitutional committee did not meet during the 
month of August, probably owing to the absence of Jay, R. R. 
Livingston, and Yates who were exerting themselves on the 
secret committee. Livingston, however, did spend a week 
early in August in attendance at the Convention and ex-
pended some energy in persuading his colleagues that the 
work of the secret committee was more important than that 
of the constitutional committee. In fact this was the ground 
advanced to justify their absence and the Convention acqui-
esced in it.15 
13 Philip Livingston to R. R. Livingston, August 15, 1776, Miscellaneous 
Mss: Philip Livingston, NYSL. 
14 Smith, Memoirs, V, August 11, 17, 1776. It was perhaps with this inter· 
view fresh in his mind that Smith that same day scrawled an abrupt, incom· 
plete note to Schuyler: "I have ten Thousand Things to say to you, but must 
suppress at present, except that as a great Landholder, I think your Interest, 
at this tremendous moment of forming a new Government, calls you rather 
to the Cabinet than the Field .... " August 17, 1776, Schuyler Papers, NYPL. 
15 With Livingston present, the Convention drafted this letter to Jay and 
Yates: "As you are both of the committee for the framing a new government, 
the Convention think it highly proper that you should attend upon that 
business immediately, unless your presence is absolutely necessary in the 
secret committee [italics mine]. . . ." The following day the Convention 
formally resolved that it would be "improper" to recall Jay and Yates and 
gave Livingston leave to join them. However, private correspondence indi· 
cated that other motives were responsible. Livingston informed Clinton: "I 
wrote likewise to you on our political state & the necessity we are under of 
having your assistance, of which you would be fully convinced if you could 
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The Convention stressed the secret committee's priority 
over the constitutional committee and the necessity of 
attendance by Jay, Livingston, and Yates to insure a quorum 
on the secret committee, but the explanation lacks convic-
tion. Three months later when Washington was retreating 
in New Jersey, the secret committee received an important 
letter and survey from General George Clinton relative to 
blocking the Hudson. This was the committee's reaction: 
"Mr. Wisner put the survey in his pockett, Mr. Gil[bert] 
Livingston took the letter with him immediately on a visit 
to his wife & is not returned. There the obstruction slept till 
this afternoon [i.e., November 26, three days after] ."16 
Although the secret committee flatly stated that without a 
quorum "nothing further can be done," its letters belie it. 
On three occasions in July, August, and September it did not 
have quorums, but that did not impede its laborsP The 
conclusion seems inescapable that a powerful group, which 
included the Livingstons, Morris, Jay, and Duer, were striv-
ing to delay the drafting of a constitution. 
The constitutional committee successfully evaded several 
deadlines. When the day for the committee's report, August 
27, arrived, the Convention voted it a reprieve until Septem-
ber 4. Distracted by American military losses at the end of 
August, the Convention adjourned and journeyed up the 
attend to the manovers of some persons for one week. Let me hear from you 
on these subjects as soon as possible." jour. Prov. Gong., I, 568; Livingston 
to Clinton, August 18, 1776, Clinton, Public Papers, I, 312-13. 
16 Clinton to Convention, November 23 [?], McKesson to Clinton, Novem-
ber 26, 1776, ibid., I, 430-31, 432-33. In view of the urgency explicitly ex-
pressed by Clinton, Gilbert Livingston's action was odd. Yet this is the same 
Livingston who complained to the Convention in an oft-quoted letter; "not· 
withstanding the sense of the House appeared to be at the time we left it, 
first to endeavor to secure a State to govern, before we established a form to 
govern it by; yet that a day is fixed to take this important business when a 
part of its body is absent by the command of the House." ]our. Prov. Gong., 
II, 280. 
17 Secret Committee to Convention, August 13, 1776, Tappen and G. Liv-
ingston to Convention, August 26, 1776, G. Livingston to Convention, Septem-
ber 14, 1776, ibid., I, 575-76, II, 219, 293; R. Yates to Paulding, July 22. 1776, 
Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 426. 
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Hudson to Fishkill. For the second time the deadline lapsed 
and not until September 14 did the subject arise in the house. 
Then a complaisant Convention ordered its committee to 
report "with all convenient speed."18 
The representatives' failure to produce even a draft two 
months after the Declaration of Independence gave rise to 
uneasiness in certain circles. In a debate in the Albany 
County Committee Jeremiah Van Rensselaer led the way in 
criticizing the delay. "The public are impatient in the high-
est degree," he said, and contrary to earlier promises, some 
months have elapsed without visible progress. His conclusion 
depicted an alarming situation: "Suspicions are daily increas-
ing, the usual harmony is in a great measure rent in pieces, 
their [i.e., the people's] faith in the Representatives tot-
tering."19 Van Rensselaer moved that the county committee 
inform their deputies in the Convention that any further 
procrastination "will be attended with alarming Circum-
stances." Since Convention delegates Leonard Gansevoort 
and John Tayler attended this meeting of the county com-
mittee, there can be little doubt that these rumblings of 
impatience reached the ears of the Convention. 
The delay in drafting the constitution continued into 
October. Perhaps coincidentally, the day Gansevoort re-
turned to his Convention duties, September 28, that body 
directed its committee to report a draft "on or before" 
October 12 and ordered it to "sit every afternoon till they 
shall be ready to report."20 Although the obstructionists had 
18 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 594, 625. The Convention stood adjourned for much 
of this period, since its power was in the hands of a committee of safety. 
19 September 20, 1776, J. Sullivan, ed., Minutes of the Albany Committee of 
Correspondence, 1775-1778 and Minutes of the Schenectady Committee, 1775· 
1779 (2 vols.; Albany, 1923, 1925), I, 557-58. Van Rensselaer's motion to ap-
point a committee to draft formal resolutions carried, the committee consist-
ing of himself, Joseph Young, George Palmer, Leonard Gansevoort, and John 
Tayler. The minutes, however, do not indicate that the committee ever 
reported. 
20 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 649, 651. The journal records no formal division. 
The Convention added Duane to the committee and reduced the quorum to 
five, which made it easier to have meetings. 
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suffered a setback, they did not abandon the field,21 and 
Wisner complained a week after: "the formation of govern-
ment goes on very slow indeed; we have done Little or 
nothing about it."22 A short time after Wisner grumbled 
over the situation the committee did commence its business, 
although, insofar as the journal records, the Convention did 
not adhere to its resolution of September 28. So rapidly did 
the committee's labors proceed that by October 18 Secretary 
John McKesson proudly declared: "The plan of government 
and justice (a child of Heaven) is so far come to maturity 
that I had the honor yesterday to make a copy of it for some 
other members of the committee on government, and has not 
yet been further exposed to view."23 
Since McKesson seems to have transcribed a preliminary 
draft which contained incomplete or unsatisfactory sections, 
the drafting committee returned to its labors in November. 
Fragments of the committee's meetings, dated November 5 
and 6, indicate that the members were debating problems re-
lating to the election of senators and the governor. A proviso 
for the indirect election of the senators prevailed by a 4 to 2 
vote, but there was unanimous agreement to have the gover-
nor elected by the freeholders and the secret ballot.24 The 
committee's rate of progress encouraged the Committee of 
Safety to adopt a resolution November 12 which notified the 
county committees that the Convention was at work on the 
constitution and bade them to insure their county's prompt 
attendance.25 
It is instructive to note that the members deemed two weeks sufficient time 
for the committee to hammer out a draft. 
21 R. R. Livingston indicated the defeat to Schuyler: "The Convention have 
determined to take up the matter of government peremptorily on the 12th 
inst. You promised to write to me on that subject, let me hear from you as 
soon as possible." Livingston to Schuyler, October 2, 1776, Schuyler Papers, 
NYPL. 
22 Wisner to Clinton, October 4, 1776, Clinton, Public Papers, I, 368. 
23 McKesson to Clinton, ibid., I, 384. Other deputies informally discussed 
the committee's efforts. William Smith, Memoirs, V, October 18, 1776. 
24 Voting for the measure were Livingston, Scott, Duane, and Smith; 
opposed were R. Yates and Wisner. Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 552, 553. 
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At this juncture constitutional principles became en-
tangled in political maneuvering. The next day, November 
13, a move to postpone execution of the resolution provoked 
lengthy exchanges, but this proposal did not owe its inception 
to the desires of the obstructionists. On the contrary, it was 
the adherents of Scott and Clinton who argued for a stay of 
the proceedings. Since both men were with their army 
commands, they could not participate in this vital business. 
Their opponents, led by R. R. Livingston and Duane, 
countered by insisting that those officers had volunteered to 
take active command and that they must have expected that 
the Convention would write the constitution without their 
participation. If necessary, the opposition argued, the Con-
vention might request General Israel Putnam to give them 
leave when the draft was in the final stage. The Livingston-
Duane motives paralleled those of the Scott-Clinton ad-
herents. The former disclosed that the Dutchess County 
members (among them Livingston) would stand for reelec-
tion in December and, not having finished the constitution, 
might not win, especially since the county's freeholders were 
in the army "fighting the battles of the Convention" and 
could not vote. The exclusion of the Dutchess men, after 
they had been "steady" and "done great service to the pub-
lic," would be an injustice. "Justice to the freeholders" and 
those "heroes of the county" in arms demanded that the 
Convention brook no delay in forming a government. The 
Livingston-Duane leadership triumphed and copies of the 
resolution went out to the counties.26 
25 jour. Prov. Cong., I, 710. Duane indicated that most of the work had 
been completed but that one of the remaining major problems was the con-
stitution of a court of appeals in error. Smith, Memoirs, V, November 6, 
I ii6. Sec also Ebenezer Hazard to Pierre Van Cortlandt, November 6, 1776, 
lorcc, .·lmerican Archives, 5th ser., III, 548. 
The Committee of Safety governed until December 4 but under a stipula-
tion hv the Convention could not debate the constitution. jour. Prov. Cong., 
I, 677. 
211 The .Journal does not record any of this dispute. McKesson to Clinton, 
:\'0\·cmbcr l:i, 1776, Clinton, Public Papers, I, 424-26. The Convention did 
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In the ensuing weeks the constitutional committee alter-
nated between industrious labor and inaction. At times of 
inactivity the Committee of Safety had to prod the com-
mittee's members once again.27 Schuyler expressed his appre-
hension of the evil that would result from further pro-
crastination by the committee. It will be more difficult "to 
bring the unprincipled and licentious to a proper sense of 
their duty," he wamed.28 While the General was writing this 
warning, the committee resumed its meetings. Shortly there-
after, Chairman Abraham Yates, Jr., gave notice that the 
committee would submit the long-awaited draft to the Con-
vention on December 20.29 There followed two postpone-
ments in rapid succession on December 20 and 21, and two 
days later the chairman obtained permission to leave the 
Convention.30 Although both Yates and Duane unequivocally 
stated that the committee had completed the draft, it did not 
report the draft to the Convention.31 
not meet until December 5 and then only for the day. The Committee of 
Safety governed with some exceptions until March 6. 
The matter of the Dutchess elections is obscure. No evidence of a Decem-
ber election can be found. It is possible that the county committee extended 
the life of the delegation. 
McKesson said that at least one member opposed delay because "people 
had not Time to think or Criticize; they would greedily accept such form of 
Governm't as might be proposed. That in winter & more Leisure many more 
difficulties & of course delays might arise." Ibid. 
27 R. R. Livingston to E. Rutledge, November 13, 1776, Bancroft Tran-
scripts: Livingston Papers, NYPL: Gansevoort to Schuyler, November 17, 
1776, Schuyler Papers, NYPL: jour. Prov. Cong., I, 722. 
28 Schuyler to R. Yates, December 6, 1776, Force, American Archives, 5th 
ser., III, llOI. 
29 He wanted McKesson to transcribe the draft. jour. Prov. Cong., I, 737, 
741, 749; Smith, Memoirs, V, December 16, 1776. 
30 Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York (5 vols.; 
Rochester, 1906), I, 494. The Convention journal for December 14-31 is 
missing. 
31 Robert Yates to Duane, December 25, 1776, Force, American Archives, 
5th ser., III, 1421; Smith, Memoirs, V, December 27, 1776. The curious silence 
suggests further disagreement within the committee. Indirect support for this 
idea comes from the further revisions that were made in the draft after 
December. It would seem that the introductory section on the state's 
boundaries was one element in this situation. The sharp language in this 
paragraph was aimed probably at New Hampshire with whom New York 
had been entangled in a protracted contest for control of the Vermont lands. 
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For a brief time February gave promise of being the 
decisive month but it too joined the ranks of the months of 
unrealized expectations. The Committee of Safety in early 
February detailed Duane and Robert Yates to collect "sundry 
maps and materials" to enable the drafting committee to 
"describe the boundaries" of the state.32 On February ll in 
a one-day session the Convention stated its intention of 
opening its consideration of the constitution on February 19 
and voted to inform the county committees of its plan. 
Explaining this decision, Duane said that unless the govern-
ment acted, some of the delegates whose terms expired in 
May would have to face their constituents empty-handed.33 
Notwithstanding its intent, the Convention did not assemble 
February 19 and the matter lapsed. 
The end of the committee's work, however, was in sight. 
The members seem to have completed even the determina-
tion of the state's boundaries late in February. Copies of the 
draft constitution began to circulate outside the confines of 
the committee; some Convention delegates displayed it to 
friends.34 As a matter of fact, the obstructionists could not 
deny much longer the pressure for action. When the Con-
vention resumed sitting March 6, the house accepted without 
a division Gansevoort's motion ordering the constitutional 
committee to bring in its report on March 12. Thus on 
March 12 the long-awaited draft made its debut.35 
It will be useful to pause here to ascertain the stages 
through which the draft progressed. The committee's labors 
extended in uneven fashion over the months from October 
The territorial description was worked out in February. Lincoln, Constitu-
tional History of New York, I, 501. 
32 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 795. 
33 Ibid., I, 782, 802, 803; Smith, Memoirs, V, February 15, 1777. The noti-
fication to the counties was intended to procure a Convention quorum since 
the Committee of Safety could not debate the constitution. 
34 John H. Livingston to R. R. Livingston, February 28, 1777, R. R. Liv-
ingston Collection, NYHS. 
35 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 821, 823, 826, 833. 
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to March, but the members concentrated most of this effort 
in the first three months.36 The committee produced a first 
draft in two weeks but then took two months to revise and 
expand it. It should have presented this revised copy to the 
Convention in December. Although the constitution would 
go through four more revisions before reaching the house 
floor, none of these would drastically alter the December 
draft.37 Only two members of the committee, Hobart and 
Townsend, did not participate in its work during these three 
months. The Yateses, Smith, Duane, Livingston, Wisner, 
Jay, Duer, and DeWitt were present most frequently, while 
Scott, Morris, and Broome attended least.38 
Historians hitherto have given Jay principal credit for 
inditing the constitution, believing that the Convention 
produced only one copy.39 Charles Z. Lincoln, however, 
discovered in the State Library two drafts and addenda which 
he reprinted, thereby rendering students an invaluable 
36 The committee does not seem to have functioned at all in January but 
spent most of February and two weeks in March on revisions. 
37 See below, pp. 237-40. 
38 Since the constitutional committee sat as part of the Committee of Safety 
or of the Convention, the attendance recorded in the journal provides a clue 
to the committee's operation. However, the secretary did not always record 
latecomers as present .and some committee members did not always check in 
with the Committee of Safety before joining their committee. The journal 
consequently is not an accurate guide, but it does yield the minimum 
attendance of the committee members. The statement on attendance, there-
fore, is a minimum estimate based on the journal. Ibid., I, 661-750. 
39 The source for Jay's role has been the biography by his son, William 
Jay, The Life of john Jay, I, 68, which was written while the father still lived. 
George Pellew, john Jay (Boston, 1899), p. 68; Frank Monaghan, john Jay 
(New York, 1935), p. 94; Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris with 
Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers (3 vols.; 
Boston, 1832), I, 120; Howard Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris (New 
York, 1952), p. 32; E. Wilder Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 
1783-1789 (New York, 1932), p. 87; Alexander C. Flick, ed., A History of the 
State of New York (10 vols.; New York, 1933-1937), IV, 156; Alexander C. 
Flick, The American Revolution in New York (Albany, 1926), pp. 83, 85; 
DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York 
(3 vols.; New York, 1906), I, 14; Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, 
I, 496; Thomas C. Cochran, New York in the Confederation (Philadelphia, 
1932), p. 14; Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels: New 
York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948), p. 123; Allan Nevins, 
The American States During and After the Revolution (New York, 1924), 
p. 159. 
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service.40 Accepting the verdict on Jay, he concluded that 
these documents were working copies of the Convention's 
deliberations since one of them, draft B, seemed to be in 
McKesson's hand and to be a revised copy of draft A.41 
Fortunately, a third fragment of eighteen pages has survived 
among the Yates Papers, making possible a more precise 
identification of each.42 A careful collation of the three drafts 
and the debates in the journal reveals that Lincoln's copies 
were not working copies but were in fact committee drafts.43 
40 The capitol fire of 1911 destroyed the papers. Lincoln, Constitutional 
History of New York, I, 50lff. 
41 Ibid., I, 498-99. 
42 Evarts B. Greene and Richard B. Morris, A Guide to the Principal Sources 
for Early American History in the City of New York (1st ed.; New York, 
1929), p. llO; Flick, History of New York, I, 157; Minutes of the Convention 
which formed the Constitution of the State of New York, n.d., Abraham Yates, 
Jr., Papers, NYPL (hereinafter cited as Min. of Conv.). The first ten pages 
of the ms. are missing as are those numbered beyond 29. 
43 Since the debates proceeded clause by clause, it is possible to check the 
changes proposed and adopted against the drafts. For example, the house 
adopted the first paragraph without change. The final text, however, does 
not agree with the drafts. The latter had a section on the territorial limits 
of the state, which does not appear in the former. The draft under con-
sideration could not have contained this section, otherwise the journal would 
have noted its deletion. The same thing is essentially true for paragraph 
two. The word differences between Lincoln's drafts and the final text can 
be explained only by the conclusion that Lincoln's were not under debate. 
An important illustration can be found in the fifth paragraph. The changes 
proposed by Morris cannot be fitted into Lincoln's copies. The subject of 
this fifth paragraph was voting by ballot and in the drafts consisted of a long 
section of almost five pages. Morris's alterations would have eliminated 
voting by ballot in favor of the existing voice vote. As given in the journal 
he moved to strike out "by ballot" and substitute "according to," and to 
strike "shall continue to have their full effect." A comparison with the 
pertinent portion in Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 507-8, 
will make it apparent that Morris's substitutions do not pertain to the 
Lincoln drafts. "And this Convention doth further ordain that all Elections 
for representatives in General Assembly shall be made by ballot in every 
county out of the Freeholders personally residing in each respective county. 
That the laws in force in the colony of New York for regulating elections 
shall continue to have their full effect where they shall not be repugnant to 
the Constitution hereby established and until they shall be altered or repealed 
by a future legislature." Morris wanted to delete the italicized words. 
Furthermore, these changes would not have eliminated ballot voting since 
the following sections set out in detail the method to be adopted in balloting. 
Therefore, in order to complete the change, Morris would have had to move 
to strike out everything after the last line quoted above, but he did not. 
four. Prov. Gong., I, 834, 836. For other differences compare ibid., I, 836, 843, 
867, 869, 873, 886 (paragraphs 6, 8, 13, 15, 22) with Lincoln, Constitutional 
History of New York, I, 514, 515, 523, 524, 531. 
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There is a sequential order to these versions of the con-
stitution. An important clue for establishing the precedence 
of the various drafts is the preliminary section delimiting 
the territory of the state. Since the committee did not elabo-
rate this proviso until February, the territorial section must 
have been one of the addenda to draft A in Duane's hand-
writing which grew out of the revision in early February of 
the December copy.44 Therefore, draft A was probably the 
committee's December version.45 Draft B is not the corrected 
version of A but rather the revision of the fragment in the 
Yates Papers. The last work, which we may for convenience 
denote draft C, incorporated the changes in A and the 
addenda plus other minor variations. In effect then, C was 
the third revision and the committee finished it in February. 
Still not satisfied with their handiwork, the committee 
revised C, in some instances returning to the terminology of 
A. This was B and it reached completion by the end of 
February.46 
Although the committee had finished revision B, it chose 
to refine it further. Up to this point it seems clear that the 
constitution was the product of the joint labors of the com-
mittee, but it is also clear that the committee did not report 
the B copy to the House for debate. The committee sub-
mitted to the Convention a fifth copy which was very likely 
Jay's handiwork. Substantiation for the tradition comes from 
Chancellor Livingston and a pseudonymous writer who con-
sulted the Convention manuscripts then in the possession of 
John McKesson's nephew. This unknown author, "Schuy-
ler," stated that the draft of the constitution among these 
papers was in Jay's hand.47 It is possible that the committee 
44 ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 795. 
45 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 501, does not specify to 
which draft this quoted section pertains. Lincoln followed an earlier observer 
in attributing the addenda to Duane. Ibid., I, 498-99. 
46 John H. Livingston obtained his copy from Albany delegate Abraham 
Ten Broeck on February 27 or 28. John H. to R. R. Livingston, February 28, 
1777, R. R. Livingston Collection, NYHS. 
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assigned to Jay the task of polishing the draft, a task which 
he accomplished in the first twelve days of March.48 Jay 
seems principally to have contributed clarity and economy of 
language, for McKesson declared the day after the report 
that it "omitted the method which proposed for electing by 
Ballot & sundry other matters by which the report is much 
shorter than when it was last copied."49 A reconstruction of 
Jay's draft from the journal furnishes only a general skeleton 
of his labor, but it does reveal that he adhered closely to 
draft B, retaining the same topical order. He eliminated 
completely two sections, that describing the territorial bound-
aries and that prescribing oaths of office. Undoubtedly the 
most important alteration was the curtailment of the section 
on balloting for assemblymen in which was set forth in detail 
the requisite procedure. Jay retained that portion which 
enunciated the general principle of voting by ballots, deleting 
the several pages of minutiae.50 Other than these, there are 
47 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 498-99. This article by 
"Schuyler" appeared in the New York Columbian, June 16, 19, 1821 and is 
reprinted in part in Nathaniel H. Carter and William L. Stone, reporters, 
Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled 
for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New York 
(Albany, 1821), p. 692. 
The Chancellor in uncomplimentary fashion attributed a version to Jay 
amidst the scurrilous gubernatorial campaign of 1792. In an anonymous 
piece addressed "to --- M--, Esq., Representative of --- County" 
Livingston referred to "the constitution as first reported by Mr. Jay" as being 
in McKesson's possession. A later piece signed "Aristides" challenged Jay 
to name that proviso of his draft which would uphold his claim to eminence 
as a statesman. Internal evidence suggests "Aristides" is the Chancellor. "To 
--- M--, Esq.," N.Y.]. Extraordinary, March 31, 1792; draft dated March 
7, 1792 in R. R. Livingston Collection, NYHS. "To Timothy Tickler, Esq., 
C-- J-- of the U--S--" by "Aristides," N.Y.]., April 4, 1792. 
48 Morris moved in Committee of Safety on March 1 to direct the drafting 
committee to meet the following day, but the Committee of Safety rejected 
the motion. On March 4, however, the committee did order the constitutional 
committee to sit. It is likely that on this occasion the latter group discussed 
Jay's draft. On March 6 the newly assembled Convention set March 12 for 
the constitutional report. ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 821, 823, 826. 
49 McKesson to Clinton, March 13, 1777, Clinton, Public Papers, I, 657-58. 
50 If one takes into consideration the changes proposed on the Convention 
floor and the phraseology of draft B, this balloting paragraph may have 
resembled the following reconstruction: "That all elections for representatives 
in General Assembly shall be made out of the freeholders personally residing 
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no substantial differences in content between the two drafts. 51 
Although the Convention on August 1, 1776, had resolved 
unanimously to direct its committee to prepare simulta-
neously a constitution and a bill of rights, there is no 
evidence to indicate that the committee prepared the latter 
document.52 Furthermore, no one formally challenged the 
committee for contravening its explicit instructions. The 
house could not construe anything in the draft as a bill of 
rights, although separate paragraphs guaranteed voting rights, 
religious freedom, and trial by jury where currently prac-
ticed.53 The debates afforded full opportunity for amend-
ments and changes, but no one introduced anything that 
resembled a rights bill. Gilbert Livingston moved and the 
Convention adopted a limited guarantee that preserved to 
the individual all rights and privileges granted by the con-
stitution, unless removed by the "law of the land and the 
judgment of his peers."54 The failure of the more radical 
delegates to criticize the omission of these vital principles 
remains unexplained, even though they did strive to democra-
tize other sections of the draft. 
in each respective county by ballot; the laws in force in the colony of New 
York for regulating elections shall continue to have their full effect where 
they shall not be repugnant to the Constitution hereby established and until 
they shall be altered or repealed by a future legislature." Lincoln, Constitu-
tional History of New York, I, 507-8; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 836. 
51lt is possible that Jay's proposed amendments on the floor were the 
consequence of their rejection in committee. See Alexander, A Political 
History of New York, I, 14, for a different explanation. 
52 Robert Yates, writing in 1788 under the pseudonym "Sydney," threw 
some light on the fate of the bill of rights. Those who favored the bill based 
themselves on English precedents: the Petition of Right, 1628, and the Bill 
of Rights, 1689. Those opposed denied the analogy, comparing New York 
to a "state of nature" without any constitution; therefore, any new constitu-
tion would operate as a bill of rights. Moved by these considerations and the 
provisions for frequent elections and impeachment, the Convention dropped 
the idea. N.Y.]., June 13, 1788; Paul L. Ford, Essays on the Constitution of 
the United States, Published During Its Discussion by the People 1787-1788 
(Brooklyn, 1892), pp. 297-314. 
53 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 522, 541, 547. Although 
the old charter of 1683 had granted the right to indictment by grand jury, 
the revolutionaries did not adopt it. Ibid., IV, 69. 
54 Ibid., I, 522. 
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Historians frequently have ascribed the eight months' 
delay in producing a constitution to three factors: the 
proximity of the British army, the critical military situation 
which absorbed the energy of the delegates, and the long 
absences of more radical members who were fighting the war 
rather than attending the Convention. 55 No doubt on specific 
occasions any one or combination of these elements caused a 
postponement, but more than a century ago Sparks put 
forward a different explanation: 56 "There was a party, who 
thought this movement for a constitution premature, that 
it would be safer to wait for a period of more tranquillity, 
and a fairer prospect of calm reflection and deliberation 
among the members, and when the people likewise would be 
in a better condition to understand and receive the results 
of their labors." Documentation does exist to support 
Sparks's interpretation. As he pointed out, Jay was a pro-
ponent of this attitude: "The difficulty of getting any gov-
ernment at all you know has long been an apprehension of 
little influence on my mind; and always appeared to be 
founded less in fact, than in a design of quickening the pace 
of the House ... the birth of the constitution was in my 
judgment premature .... "57 The sharp political conflict in 
G5 Ibid., I. 491-92; Flick, The American Revolution in New York, p. 81: 
Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789, pp. 94, 95; Flick, His· 
t01y of New York, IV, 165: Monaghan, John Jay, p. 97; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 
74-75: Jay, The Life of John Jay, I, 68; Nevins, The American States During 
and After the Revolution, p. 160: Carl L. Becker, The History of Political 
Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (Madison, 1909),_ p. 275; Elisha 
P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights 
and Majority Rule During the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1955), 
p. 62. 
56 Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 120. Spaulding in Flick, His-
tory of Xew York, IV, 156, thought it likely that political differences delayed 
the drafting. 
ii7 Jay to Morris and Livingston, April 29, 1777, Sparks, The Life of 
Gouverneur Morris, I, 126-27: Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence 
and Public Papers of john jay (4 vols.; New York, 1890-1893), I, 135. 
Abraham Yates, Jr., writing under the pseudonym "Rough Hewer" in 1788, 
said of the drafting committee: "A diversity of opinion soon took place in 
this Committee· not whether the government should be of the republican 
form partaking of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy: but what proportion 
of ingredients out of each should make up the compound." Yates Papers, 
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Pennsylvania where the radicals had been instrumental in 
establishing a constitution in 1776 stimulated edifying com-
ments among New Yorkers. Responding to Duer's descrip-
tion of the conservative defeat in Pennsylvania, Livingston 
observed: "You know that nothing but well timed delays, 
indefatigable industry, and a minute attention to every favor-
able circumstance could have prevented our being exactly 
in their situation."58 The New York conservatives, fearing 
radical triumph in an immediate debate on a constitution, 
drew deeply and successfully on their political experience 
to avert a reversal. 
Any division of the Convention delegates vis-a-vis the con-
stitution into conservatives, moderates, and radicals entails 
the risk of creating a separation which had no reality. Never-
theless, an analysis of the sundry informal proposals of the 
members, the committee drafts, and the final document 
warrants the categorization of the membership into these 
three broad groups. For example, the conservatives divided 
the electorate, permitting broad participation in the choice 
of a lower house but imposing high property qualifications 
for voting for an upper house and chief magistrate. The 
radicals extended the ballot to all white, male taxpayers, 
making no differentiation as between various houses of the 
legislature and offices. The moderates adopted the tax-
paying qualification for the election of a lower house but 
insisted on a £40 freehold condition for the choice of an 
upper house and governor. The fact was, however, that the 
moderates had no commitment to any program and in the 
floor debates sometimes switched positions in order to vote 
for conservative propositions.59 
:\"YPL. See also Duer to Schuyler, June 19, 1777 and Duane to Schuyler, 
June 19, 1777, Schuyler Papers, :'1/YPL; Egbert Benson to Livingston, Decem· 
ber 3, 1777, R. R. Livingston Collection, NYHS. 
5S Duer to Livingston, May 28, 1777, Livingston to Duer, June 12, 1777, 
R. R. Livingston Collection, :'1/YHS. See also Philip Livingston, Duane, and 
Duer to President of :'1/ew York Convention, April 29, 1777, ]our. Prov. Gong., 
II, 428. 
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Writers have cast little light upon the constitutional ideas 
prevalent either among the populace or among the Conven-
tion members. Fortunately, the committee drafts were not 
the sole evidence of contemporary thought on the subject. 
While the press furnished suggestive material indicating the 
various political currents, hints have survived elsewhere as 
to the attitudes of the delegates. 
The newspapers at least partially mirrored the public 
discussion of the projected charter of government. Some of 
the contributors to the newspapers stressed the need to 
break with tradition, to build "a new form of government 
. . . without destroying private property."60 "Spartanus" 
would have dispensed with the colonial legislature in favor 
of a unicameral assembly, holding up the Roman Republic 
as the proof of bicameralism's fatal weakness.61 The legisla-
ture would exercise executive power also and during its 
recess would transfer this authority to a legislative committee. 
The house would choose provincial officials, but the people 
would elect local officials. In the former category were the 
provincial secretary, treasurer, attorney-general, and judges 
of the supreme court; in the latter were the county judges, 
justices of the peace, sheriffs and other officials, and all town 
officials. The people would vote annually for assemblymen 
and magistrates. The county election districts were to give 
way to small, equal election districts.62 Although "Spartanus" 
did not discuss the suffrage qualifications, "Essex" would 
have broadened the voting base by granting the right to 
landholders owning realty valued at £40, to £40 lease-
holders and renters, to those having personalty of £40, and 
to widows paying taxes on property in one of the foregoing 
59 For further discussion of moderate shifts on the Convention floor, see 
below, pp. 241-42. 
60 "The Interest of America," Letter II by "Spartanus," N.Y.]., June 13, 
1776. 
61 The conflict between patricians and plebeians destroyed the Roman 
Republic, "Spartanus" asserted. Ibid. 
62 Letter III, ibid., June 20, 1776. 
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classifications. Those unenfranchised by these regulations 
would not pay taxes for the support of the legislature.63 
Other commentators adhered to the customary forms of 
governor, council, and lower house. One writer suggested 
Connecticut's government as a model for the distribution of 
powers and for election requirements.64 Another, "Inde-
pendent Whig," would have had the council chosen by the 
house for three-year terms. He expressed uncertainty as to 
who was to elect the governor, first placing that power in the 
hands of the legislature but then offering it to the people at 
large. Both governor and house were to be selected annually 
by ballot. His prescription for the suffrage was vague, 
"sufficient property to connect him [i.e., the voter] with the 
community," but the ballot was to be a written one. Keeping 
the British system in mind, he ruled out dual officeholding 
("places of profit should be few, and profits of places should 
be small"). Furthermore, the governor and council would 
not have the authority to suspend laws.65 
Writers on the religious question proposed freedom of 
conscience exceJ?t for atheists. Every sect would have to 
finance itself by voluntary contributions. Although "Inde-
pendent Whig" conceded that the majority might enforce 
the sabbath as a sacred day, prohibiting business and pleasure, 
he discountenanced compulsory public worship. The use of 
force to win converts, he wrote, was not tolerable. The only 
method to which to resort was the employment of "good 
sense, rational and scriptural arguments." In this fashion 
America would not give people cause to look to the British 
for religious protection and would attract Catholics to the 
defense of American liberty.66 
63 Ibid., March 7, April 14, 1776. He proposed also that the people elect 
the delegates to the Continental Congress. 
64 Anon., "To the Freeborn Sons of America," N.Y .P., March 21, 1776. He 
proposed popular election of local officials in order to "shut the door against 
the mean, wicked arts of bribery and corruption." 
65 "Independent Whig," N.Y.]., February 29, 1776. 
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In a number of respects, where comparison with the 
committee drafts is possible, the preceding ideas are more 
radical than the committee's. Whereas the committee con-
ceived of a governor chosen by the .£ 40 freeholders for a 
four-year term, the essayists proposed a governor chosen 
annually by all voters.67 The committee first favored an 
upper house which the £40 freeholders elected for four years 
to operate as a check on the lower house, but some of the 
newspaper partisans simply dispensed with an upper house.68 
In the committee drafts the governor and legislature absorbed 
the appointive powers of the crown, but the polemicists 
urged the popular election of all county and town offi.cials.69 
Lastly, the committee adopted the existing practice of 
legislative appointment of delegates to the Continental Con-
gress, whereas the press argued for the right of the people to 
choose them.70 However, both committee and press held at 
least three concepts in common: religious freedom, ballot 
voting, and equal representation in the assembly.n On one 
very important issue, the franchise, the committee assumed 
a more radical position than the press, permitting those pay-
ing state or county taxes to vote for assemblymen.72 
Since the preparation of a constitution was a fundamental 
task of the Convention, the deputies engaged in extensive 
private discussion of the content to adopt. Evidence of this 
attention appears in the circulation among the members of 
no less than three plans unrelated to the committee's draft. 
Peter R. Livingston sent one of them to loyalist William 
Smith for his comments. Happily, Smith copied it into his 
66 "Independent Whig,'" No. 3. ibid., March 14, 1776; anon., N.Y.P., August 
15, 1776. 
67 In the last two drafts, B and Jay's, the committee raised the qualification 
to £100. Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 524-25. 
68 The last drafts raised the estate to £100. Ibid., I, 516. 
69 Ibid., I, 531-32, 535, 536. 
70 Ibid., I, 536-37. 
71 Ibid., I, 506, 507-12, 541. 
72 Ibid., I, 514. 
Making Haste Slowly 235 
Memoirs.73 Consisting of sixteen brief paragraphs, this con-
stitution represented a radical point of view. A council and 
house of deputies would share legislative authority and 
would be elected annually without regard to property by 
ballot by all taxpayers. The councilors would have executive 
functions also, which they exercised with a president. The 
president, chosen by ballot out of the legislature in joint 
meeting, would serve three years. The executive branch 
would enjoy no veto on laws. It would not possess, further-
more, much appointive power, unlike the colonial executive. 
The assembly would name all state officials to hold office 
during good behavior. The citizenry would elect triennially 
all county and local officials. Even where this plan did award 
appointive authority to the executive, it did so in very 
restricted fashion. The assembly would recommend to the 
president and council the appointment of military officers. 
The president would combine the duties of commander-in-
chief, chancellor, and ordinary. By prohibiting assemblymen 
from holding salaried offices, this plan preserved the assem-
bly's independence. Finally, the people would elect the 
representatives to the Continental Congress.74 No wonder 
Smith "reprobated" the whole document, complaining to 
Livingston: "The new Government will be intirely in the 
Hands of the Peasantry and the commercial Interests of the 
Capital derive no Safety from the petty Privilege of two 
members in the Council."75 
73 Dorothy R. Dillon, The New York Triumvirate: A Study of the Legal 
and Political Careers of William Livingston, john Morin Scott, William 
Smith, Jr. (New York, 1949), p. 145; Smith, Memoirs, V, October 14, 1776. 
74 Ibid. 
75 He sent P. R. Livingston his detailed objections to the draft, objections 
that could not fail to arouse misgivings among the great landholders. For 
example, on the question of the franchise, he wrote: "It is dangerous to 
Society to admit Persons with very small Property to participate in your 
Councils. The richest Member of the Community under a Government 
elective, annually elective and that too by Ballot is put upon the same Term 
with one who has scarce a Farthing to lose. What Security from such a 
Legislature against an agrarian law and all sorts of Rapine and Plunder! 
If every individual Legislator is not opulent, yet certainly they ought in 
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The conservatives, too, entered the contest for the depu-
ties' votes and briefly sketched the main outline of a con-
stitution. The author of this draft simply modified the 
colonial establishment to fit an independent state. Governor, 
council, and assembly would have the same powers each 
possessed under British rule. Contrary to past practice the 
people would elect assemblymen annually by ballot, but only 
freeholders might vote. Members of the assembly could not 
serve in any other office. The assembly would select out of 
itself or from another source a council of twenty to hold 
office during good behavior. Council eligibility depended 
upon the ownership of lands worth £10,000. The plan 
required the assembly to meet at least once a year, but the 
governor could not adjourn, prorogue, or dissolve it without 
the council's advice. Carrying the principle of indirect 
election further, the draft prescribed the choice of the gover-
nor from the councilors for a three-year term by joint 
legislative ballot.7 6 
Publication of this conservative plan of government pro-
voked a direct rejoinder to it. This alternative would enfran-
chise all taxpayers and permit them to be candidates for any 
office. The government would consist of an assembly of one 
hundred, a council of twenty, a president, and council of 
general to be above the Temptations of Indigence. The Poor being the 
Majority ought not to refuse a Security to others against the Spoil of their 
Property. They lose Nothing by being obliged to elect Men of Substance 
attached to the Territory." Ibid. 
76 This draft and the following one seem to be the products of the 
Suffolk County delegation, who divided sharply in their views. The con· 
servative plan specified "Barons of Exchequer" among the judges to be 
created, but the other draft rejected any "Barons." Although neither outline 
bears a date, it is likely that they were written in 1776, probably between July 
and October. The production of a committee first draft in the latter month 
renders any later date unlikely. Cal. Hist. Mss., II, 117-18. 
Robert Yates, twelve years after the event, declared that some delegates 
circulated this draft "to try ... the temper" of the members. It provoked a 
sharp off-the-floor debate, particularly over the suffrage qualifications. Yates 
allirmed that general agreement existed on the desirability of enfranchising 
the "middling" class, since rights and liberties were endangered by the two 
extremes, rich and poor. "Sydney," N.Y.]., June 13, 1788; Ford, Essays on the 
Constitution, pp. 297·314. 
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safety. The first two bodies would constitute the legislature 
and the latter two the executive, which lacked any legislative 
authority. All voters would choose the legislature by ballot. 
Although the president and council of safety might convene 
the legislative houses on special occasions, the former could 
never dissolve the legislature. Otherwise, the legislators 
themselves would control their meetings. The people would 
elect the executive council yearly in the same fashion as the 
legislature, but the two houses would select the president 
annually by joint ballot out of the council of safety.77 
Although there is a broad gulf between the conservative 
and radical concepts of fundamental law, there are a few 
places where they coincide. These-ballot voting, annual 
assembly elections, elimination of placemen from the assem-
bly-derive from their colonial experience. It is clear from 
the preceding information that the radicals among the 
Convention deputies not only had concrete proposals but 
also had evolved a coherent, general draft. However, the 
rna jor strife, in which the radicals played a peripheral role, 
was not between radicals and conservatives but between 
moderates and conservatives. 
Although few of the radical ideas won acceptance in com-
mittee, an examination of the generally analogous concepts 
in the drafts will clarify the extent of the radical influence. 
The chronological order of the four drafts is A, C, B and 
Jay's. Draft A, and probably C, stipulated semiannual 
meetings of the legislature, but B and Jay's lengthened the 
interval to one year.78 All versions adopted annual assembly 
elections, and A went so far as to authorize carving the 
counties into assembly districts. Since someone challenged 
this unorthodox step, the committee struck it out, adhering 
77 Cal. Hist. Mss., II, 117-18. 
78 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 501; four. Prov. Cong., 
I, 834. Since the first four articles are missing from draft C, their substance 
is guesswork. However, the content of the succeeding articles in most cases 
does not differ radically from draft A. Min. of Conv. 
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to the traditional county-at-large method.79 Although the 
committee elaborated a detailed procedure for the employ-
ment of written ballots which it retained through the first 
three revisions, Jay cut off everything after the opening 
paragraph, retaining only the principle.80 On the crucial 
issue of the electorate's nature, A and C set forth the payment 
of both state and county taxes as the prerequisite for assembly 
voting rights. The committee broadened the electoral base 
further in the last two revisions, extending the ballot to 
those who paid either state or county taxes. All four drafts 
confined candidacy to freeholders. 81 
Unlike the radicals, the committee envisaged the senate 
as a check for the great landowners on the popular assembly. 
As first conceived in A and C, Article IX conferred the 
senatorial ballot on the £40 freeholders, but the conserva-
tives narrowed this right in B and Jay's draft to the £100 
freeholders. They opened the candidacy, however, to all free-
holders.8~ Unanimity prevailed in the drafts on the four-year 
------------------------------------------------------------
7!1 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 505-6; ]our. Prov. Cong., 
I, 83-!, 8-!2, 884. Since A and B were practically identical, it is unlikely that C 
di lrered essentially. 
~o Lincoln, Co11stitutiorzal History of New York, I, 507-12; Min. of Conv., 
pp. 11-17; see above, p. 226, n. 43, and p. 228, n. 50. Robert Yates advanced an 
interesting hypothesis for the popularity of the secret ballot. Its origins 
arose out of the political battles prior to 1775 when both De Lanceyites and 
l.iYingstons expected that eventually the British would convert the governor's 
council into an hereditary house of lords. Therefore, election victory became 
mandatory, if the anti-De Lancey faction were to share in the spoils. They 
despaired of winning because the practice of voice voting enabled the De 
l.anceyites to pressure their tenants to cast their votes for them. The secret 
ballot was thus em·isaged as the key to success and the "outs" worked 
assiduously just prior to 1775 to win adherents to the idea of ballot reform. 
It was this opinion which forced the inclusion of the written ballot in the 
draft constitution. As to the reasons for its deletion on the floor of the 
ConYention, Yates is disingenuous. He suggested that either the proviso 
was too lengthy or the elimination of the Tories- as a political faction made 
it unnecessary. Of course, had there been no political differences among 
the \\'higs. it might have been deemed superfluous, but as Yates, a member 
of the drafting committee, well knew, the differences were many. "Sydney," 
.\'.}',/., June 13, 17R8; Ford, Essays on the Constitution, pp. 297-314; Milton 
\I. Klein, "Democracy and Politics in Colonial :\'ew York," New York History, 
XL (_Juh, 19:>~1), 2'11-232. 
81 Lincoln, Collslitutional History of Xew York, I, 505, 507, 514; Min. of 
Conv., p. 17; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 836, 843, 867. 
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term of office, but on the matter of the number of seats there 
were disagreements that had their origins in dissimilar means 
of election. In its initial version, the committee grouped 
the counties into four roughly equal districts, each district 
having four senators. Dissatisfied with this solution, the 
members discarded it in favor of an indirect choice. Increas-
ing the number of seats to twenty-four, the new provision 
directed the selection by county of electors who would chose 
the senators. Still not content with this device, the committee 
retraced its steps in the last two revisions to the principle of 
direct voting as in A but did not adopt the distribution of 
seats in the latter. Carrying over the additional eight mem-
bers from C, the committee redistributed the twenty-four 
senators unequally among four districts.83 
The striking fact about the office of governor was its 
weakness, a conspicuous contrast with the colonial governors. 
All the drafts specifically confined legislative power to the 
senate and assembly, excluding the governor from any voice 
in legislation. The suffrage restrictions for senator in A and 
C, both as to voting and candidacy, became valid for the 
governorship. When the committee revised upward the 
property requirements for senator in the B and Jay drafts, 
it applied the new yardstick also to the chief magistrate.84 
The nominal parallel between governor and senator ex-
tended in all copies to the term of office, four years. Although 
A and C did not confer prorogation powers on the governor, 
the later revisions invested him with authority to prorogue 
the legislature not more than sixty days in one year.85 As a 
further limitation on his executive power A and C estab-
82 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 516; Min. of Conv., p. 18; 
jour. Prov. Cong., I, 843. 
83 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 517·21; Min. of Conv., 
pp. 18, 22·25; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 843. 
84 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 501, 525; Min. of Conv., 
p. 19; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 834, 870, 871. 
85 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 525; Min. of Conv., p. 
19; jour. Prov. Cong., I, 870, 871. 
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lished a council of state to assist the governor in the 
administration of the state. The council of state was to 
consist of five freeholders chosen for five-year terms by joint 
ballot of the legislature. When the committee revised C, 
they accepted the new organ but then struck it out.86 The 
earlier versions distributed the appointive power between 
the legislature and the governor and council. Although the 
governor could only nominate civil officers to the legislature, 
he could appoint military officers with the advice and consent 
of the council of state. With the deletion of the council of 
state from the B and Jay drafts, the governor held the sole 
exercise of military appointment.87 A major exception to 
the governor's appointive authority was the state treasurer. 
Under the provisions of drafts A and C the assembly chose 
the treasurer by ballot. He remained in office "during their 
will and pleasure." In the succeeding revision the committee 
modified this method so that the assembly nominated the 
treasurer and appointment was by act of the legislature.88 
In most of the draft revisions cited above the committee 
tended to place limitations on popular participation in the 
electoral process. A major exception was the ultimate defeat 
of the clause for the indirect election of state senators. Since 
the committee had boosted the voting qualification for 
senator from the £40 to the £ l 00 freeholder, it did not see 
the need for further restrictions. 
Although the committee in later drafts had revised key 
sections to check popular influence in the government, the 
Convention further modified some clauses. The deputies 
basically altered the provisions which related to the qualifica-
tions of the assembly electors and voting procedures. Under 
86 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 525, 528; Min. of Conv., 
pp. 21-22. 
87 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 531-32, 535-36; Min. of 
Conv., pp. 25·26; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 873, 874, 877, 882. 
88 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 531; Min. of Conv., pp. 
20, 25; ]our. Prov. Cong., I, 871. 
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the new requirements three classes of voters emerged. First, 
the voter must have possessed a freehold valued at £20 
above and beyond all debts thereon. Or, second, he must 
have rented land whose annual value was at least 40s. Or, 
third, he must have been a freeman of Albany or have 
obtained freemanship in New York City on or before October 
14, 1775. Having reduced the number of electors, the 
Convention went on to circumscribe the exercise of the 
suffrage. The first amendment on voting that the Convention 
approved dropped the secret ballot in favor of the colonial 
voice vote. But, reversing themselves, the deputies provided 
for a trial of the written ballot after the war. The experi-
ment would govern legislative elections but the legislature, 
if it saw fit, might drop the secret ballot later by a two-
thirds vote.89 
When the Convention amended the paragraph which 
prescribed a broad suffrage for assembly elections, it did not 
act primarily to disenfranchise the poor farmer but to bar 
the New York City mechanics from the polls. Robert R. 
Livingston opened the piecemeal attack on the offensive 
prescription, moving the insertion of a land-renting qualifica-
tion for nonfreeholders who could vote. Since most rural 
taxpayers were either freeholders or tenants at will, this 
change in requirements did not affect them. Since most 
mechanics were neither freeholders nor tenants at will, they 
could not qualify under the land-rental provision. The dele-
gates saw that this was the underlying meaning of the 
amendment and only the New York City members and 
Leonard Gansevoort of Albany voted against it.90 Thus 
amended the paragraph stood for three weeks when Gouver-
89 However, the Convention provided for use of the secret ballot in the 
election of the governor. Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 
512-15. 
90 Even the Ulster moderates (Christopher Tappen, Matthew Rea, and 
Charles DeWitt) voted for the amendment. Other moderates (Matthew 
Adgate of Albany, Isaac Paris and Benjamin Newkirk of Tryon, Henry Schenk 
of Dutchess, and Henry Wisner, Sr., of Orange) also voted for the provision. 
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neur Morris renewed the attack. Morris moved to amend 
the unqualified freehold proviso to require that the freehold 
be of £20 value. Although this restriction sacrificed the 
very small freeholder, the sole rural delegation to vote nay 
was that of Ulster. The New York City members voted 
against the Morris amendment; in this instance at least, 
conservatives John Jay, James Duane, and Philip Livingston 
were opposed to a restriction of the suffrage. The moderates 
in the other counties joined with conservatives to adopt the 
proposal.91 There were occasions such as this one when it 
was difficult to distinguish a moderate from a conservative. 
The Convention did not deem it necessary to restrict 
further either senatorial or gubernatorial suffrage, but it did 
modify some of the provisions which set forth the governor's 
powers. It shortened the governor's term from four years to 
three. On the other hand, the more conservative members 
pushed through amendments that strengthened the gover-
nor's powers. Whereas the Jay draft had practically excluded 
the governor from the appointment power, the Convention 
relented and created a council of appointment which con-
sisted of the governor and four senators, but in which the 
governor could only cast a tie-breaking vote. The governor 
might fill positions "with the advice and consent" of the 
council. In a second major respect, the Convention reversed 
its committee and granted the governor a voice in legislation. 
It did not clothe him with an absolute veto but established 
a council of revision which consisted of the governor, the 
chancellor, and judges of the supreme court. The governor 
had a full vote in this body, which decided on a veto by 
majority vote. The legislature might override the council's 
veto by a two-thirds vote of those present.92 These changes 
91 Tappen, DeWitt, and Rea of Ulster voted against the restriction. 
Adgate, Gansevoort, and R. Yates of Albany, Henry Wisner, William Allison 
of Orange, Joseph Drake and Ebenezer Lockwood of Westchester, moderates, 
voted for the limitation. ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 836, 867. 
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obviously represented a compromise between the group who 
desired a strong legislature and a weak governor and those 
who desired a strong executive.93 
The Constitution of 1777 was a compromise but was 
weighted on the conservative side even though the defenders 
of the status quo did not attain some goals. Since some con-
servatives opposed direct election of the governor, acceptance 
of that official's popular election represented a concession by 
them. Also, there were conservatives who argued for life 
92 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 526, 529, 532-34; ]our. 
Prov. Cong., I, 894-96. 
The Convention had amended the governor's powers in March and had 
given him an absolute veto. Smith of Orange introduced the matter in the 
form of a declarative statement that there should be three branches of the 
legislature instead of two and that the governor shall have a "negative upon 
all laws." After debating the amendment, the Convention heard Duane 
move the previous question, i.e., whether the house should now vote on the 
motion. Since the house decided not to vote on the question, this in effect 
killed the motion. Gouverneur Morris took the floor to reintroduce Smith's 
amendment in altered form. The form of Morris's proposition suggests 
what had been the source of disagreement in the preceding debate. He added 
a proviso "that the governor shall have no power to originate or amend any 
law, but simply to give his assent or dissent thereto." Even with this modifica-
tion, some of the conservatives were uneasy and secured a postponement until 
the next day. March 14 the Convention accepted Morris's amendment by a 
vote which demonstrated an almost absolute conservative-moderate division. 
Those in favor of the motion were Gilbert, James and Robert R. Livingston, 
and Zephaniah Platt of Dutchess; Abraham Ten Broeck, Gansevoort, and 
John Tayler of Albany; Duane, Peter Pra Van Zandt, Philip Livingston, 
Anthony Rutgers, W. Denning, D. Dunscomb, and A. P. Lott of New York. 
Gansevoort and Lott usually voted with the moderates. Those opposed to 
the motion were Henry Schenk of Dutchess; Adgate of Albany; Tappen, Rea, 
DeWitt, and Arthur Parks of Ulster; Isaac Paris, Volkert Veeder, and Ben-
jamin Newkirk of Tryon. Two counties were evenly split: Westchester and 
Orange. In Westchester the conservatives were Morris, Pierre Van Cortlandt, 
and Lewis Graham; the moderates were Joseph Drake, Zebediah Mills, and 
Zephaniah Lockwood. In Orange the conservatives were Smith and Isaac 
Sherwood: the moderates were Wisner and William Allison. Since these 
counties divided, they could not cast a vote on the motion. 
It is apparent that some among the conservatives were not content to 
permit the governor to have an absolute veto because Jay, Morris, and R. R. 
Livingston, after having discussed the subject in April, moved to reconsider 
this paragraph. Their substitute was the council of revision. Ibid., I, 834, 
836, 843, 857, 860, 862; George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston 
of New York, 1746-1813 (New York, 1960), p. 90. 
93 John Adams thought his letter to Wythe on Virginia's constitution influ-
enced the Yorkers. Adams to Jefferson, September 17, 1823, quoted in Flick, 
History of New York, IV, 156; Charles F. Adams, ed., Works of fohn Adams 
(10 vols.; Boston, 1850-1856), X, 410. 
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terms in the upper house and a £10,000 qualification for 
candidacy. Furthermore, the conservative Suffolk plan car-
ried over the royal governor's absolute veto power. The 
moderates, on the other hand, gave up substantial ground 
when they dropped the almost universal male suffrage 
proviso for the assembly and agreed to raise the £40 freehold 
requirement for senatorial and gubernatorial balloting. Al-
though they excluded the governor from participation in 
legislation at first, they relented and allowed the chief 
magistrate to share the veto with the chancellor and judges 
of the supreme court. Similarly, the moderates proposed 
that the governor exercise his executive power jointly with 
a council of state, but they permitted amendments which 
abolished the council. In the reported draft the governor 
and council of state held the appointive power with the 
legislature but the moderates accepted as a substitute a 
council of appointment which consisted of four senators and 
the governor. Finally, the moderates surrendered the secret 
ballot until the war's end. 
If the conservatives were a minority, why were they so 
successful? One writer stresses the persuasive powers of the 
aristocracy and the magical aura of their past leadership.94 
The Convention votes on the suffrage question suggest rather 
political fluidity and an absence of sharp antagonism between 
conservatives and moderates. Moreover, the roster of Con-
vention members tends to belie the thesis of a radical 
majority but instead lends itself to the supposition of a 
narrow moderate plurality.95 Since voting was by county 
unit, totals of conservatives and moderates have little mean-
94 Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, pp. 92-93. 
95 See the list in Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 484-86. 
Estimates of political views are necessarily moot, since precise data are 
unavailable. In this case the generalization derives from what is known of 
the political careers of individuals, 1774-1778, and supposition. The journals 
of the several committees and congresses are helpful for the host of lesser 
figures, although there are some twenty-five of the 107 men about whom 
there is no information. 
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ing.96 What did matter was a majority within the county 
delegation to control its unit vote. A major obstacle to 
comprehension of this facet of the problem is the way in 
which the Convention recorded its ballots. If the members 
desired, the secretary noted their dissents to their counties' 
votes. Otherwise, the entire county vote appeared in one 
column and it is difficult to identify positively majority and 
minority. 
Examination of the recorded votes which the deputies cast 
on important political issues provides data for drawing 
tentative conclusions relative to the strength of each group.97 
A crude tally of moderate and conservative votes suggests 
96 The Third Provincial Congress formulated the distribution of county 
votes which the Convention retained for itself. Voting strength was Albany 
6, Charlotte 2, Cumberland 2, Dutchess 5, Gloucester l, Kings 2, New York 8, 
Orange 3, Queens 4, Richmond 2, Suffolk 4, Tryon 3, Ulster 4, Westchester 4 
which totaled 50. However, Richmond did not elect deputies, and during 
the debates in 1777 Queens, Kings, Cumberland, Gloucester, Suffolk had no 
quorums most of the time and could not vote. Suffolk managed to maintain 
a quorum for the last week of the debate. The effective maximum vote in 
the Convention, therefore, was 35. jour. Prov. Gong., I, 834-98. 
97 There were eight occasions which lent themselves to usage as political 
criteria. Three of these instances occurred on March 14 and included a 
motion to give the governor an absolute veto, a motion to delete the pro-
visions for voting by written ballot, a motion to narrow the suffrage base by 
requiring non-freeholders to be renters of land. A vote for these motions 
rated as conservative; a vote against them ranked as moderate. The fourth 
indicator which took place April 2 was a motion to strike out the governor's 
veto and substitute the Council of Revision. Categorization of the votes on 
this matter was complicated because some moderates probably voted for the 
Council as a lesser evil than the absolute veto. Yet some moderates rejected 
the Council because they desired a return to the original draft in which 
there was no veto whatsoever. Nevertheless, the tabulation rated a vote for 
the Council as conservative. Although he was a conservative, Jay moved 
April 5 to reinsert ballot-voting. The computation placed aye votes in the 
moderate column and nay votes in the conservative camp. Voting qualifica-
tions supplied the sixth and seventh criteria on April 6 when Gouverneur 
Morris proposed to restrict freehold suffrage to £20 holders and Philip 
Livingston advocated reduction of residence requirements to six months. 
An aye voted for a £20 qualification put it on the conservative side whereas 
a nay vote went to the moderate group. A vote for the Livingston motion 
was characterized as moderate and its opposite was conservative. The last 
event was the Abraham Yates motion of April 20 to make the written ballot 
permanent which the Convention technically did not decide because it voted 
on the previous question rather than the motion. A deputy's vote for the 
previous question was a vote to kill the Yates proposal and therefore it 
belonged in the conservative tally; a vote against the previous question was 
a score for the moderate position. Ibid., I, 835-92. 
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that the New York, Tryon and Ulster delegations cast more 
moderate than conservative ballots, that Albany, Dutchess, 
Westchester and Orange voted conservative more frequently 
than moderate.98 In terms of unit votes the moderates could 
have mustered only 14 to 18 of the opposition. Of course, 
this is hypothetical but it supports an hypothesis either of 
minority status for the moderates and radicals or a propensity 
of the moderates to accept conservative proposals. 
Two other affairs which took place on the same day, 
August 1, 1776, appear to corroborate this formulation. One 
was the dispute over the nomination of John Morin Scott to 
the constitutional drafting committee and the other was the 
selection of the additional members of the committee. 
Gouverneur Morris opposed Scott's nomination because he 
had previously challenged the General's possession of a seat 
in the Convention.99 Scott's supporters called for a division 
which sustained his right to serve on the constitutional 
committee. It was the votes of the New York, Tryon, Ulster 
and Albany delegations which gave Scott his victory.l00 With 
the exception of Albany these were the counties which voted 
moderate most often. 101 
The second matter, the personnel of the committee, 
presents a more complex problem. The thirteen men whom 
the Convention selected represented a cross-section of politi-
cal opinion. There were six conservatives, five moderates, 
us The tabulations are 
:'\ew York, 44 Moderate votes, 31 Conservative votes 
Tryon, 15 :\Ioderate votes, 3 Conservative votes 
t:lster, 24 Moderate votes, 6 Conservative votes 
Albany, 14 Moderate votes, 22 Conservative votes 
Dutchess, 17 Moderate votes, 22 Conservative votes 
\Vestchester, 10 Moderate votes, 34 Conservative votes 
Orange, 9 Moderate votes, 25 Conservative votes 
Ibid. 
99 See above, pp. 214·16. 
lOll Ibid., I, 552. 
101 Albany's switch can be accounted for by the county's attendance on 
.\ugust I. Two of the three men present, :\Iatthew Adgate and Robert Yates, 
were moderates and so determined the casting of the county's ballot. I bid., 
I, 552, 834-98. 
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one radical, and one of indeterminate views.102 Since the 
striking aspect of this distribution is its near-balance of 
conservatives and moderates, it is tempting to attribute these 
proportions to a similar allocation in the Convention. 
Unfortunately, the journal did not record any formal 
divisions over the nominations; indeed, all those nominated 
were put on the committee.103 Since there was no ascertain-
able vote, it is possible that each county chose its nominees in 
accordance with a pre-determined quota. The successful 
candidates were fairly consistent reflections of the political 
coloration of their delegations.104 Moderate influence in the 
committee was the prime element in the writing of a draft 
constitution which was less conservative than the amended 
version of April, 1777. 
Since the foregoing discussion implies the importance of 
the delegates' constant attendance in the Convention, and 
since attendance during March and April, 1777 averaged 
only 35 percent of the entire membership, an inquiry in this 
area has special relevance.l05 A tenable contention might 
hold that if all or most of the deputies had participated in 
the voting, the moderates might have prevailed and have 
102 The conservatives were Robert R. Livingston, Gouverneur Morris, 
William Duer, John Sloss Hobart, John Jay and Samuel Townsend. How-
ever, the last named fell into this group on the basis of his opposition to the 
nomination of Scott. Townsend was not in the Convention after August, 
1776. The moderates were John M. Scott, Abraham Yates, Jr., Robert Yates, 
Henry \Visner, Sr., and Charles DeWitt. The radical, an associate of Isaac 
Sears, was John Broome. Broome was not present in Convention in March 
and April, 1777. Although William Smith of Suffolk was in constant 
attendance, his county had quorums only on August I and April 20. On the 
former occasion Suffolk voted against Scott and on the latter supported Yates' 
moderate proposition for permanent use of the written ballot. Ibid. 
103 The deputies represented the major counties with the exception of 
Tryon. The exclusion of Tryon and the inclusion of Charlotte, a newer 
county, were possibly the consequence of an unrecorded, general agreement 
on the size and character of the committee. Ibid., I, 552. 
104 The exception was :\!ew York which chose a conservative, moderate and 
a radical. Perhaps this was the intent, since the deputies present reflected 
the three broad-gauge views. Dunscomb and Rutgers were conservatives; 
Beekman and Lott were moderates; Brasher and Harpur had radical proclivi-
ties. Ibid., I, 552, 834-98. 
105 Ibid., I, 834-98. 
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given the people a more democratic constitution. However, 
analysis of the county representation points toward an 
opposite conclusion. If all the men on the Albany, Dutchess, 
Orange, Westchester, Cumberland, Gloucester and Charlotte 
delegations had fulfilled their obligations as legislators, 
these counties would probably have had conservative majori-
ties with a total of 23 unit votes. Two counties, Ulster and 
Tryon, would have fallen into moderate hands with 6 unit 
votes. New York with 8 votes might have gone in either 
direction. Suffolk might have divided evenly and so lost its 
4 votes.106 It is not stretching the imagination to put Queens 
and its 4 votes among the conservatives even though these 
representatives' views are not clear. This tabulation ignored 
Kings and Richmond because neither county sent any 
members to the Convention.l07 The preceding estimate 
roughly corroborates the calculation of moderate and con-
servative votes within county blocs.108 
Although these considerations place the conservative char-
acter of the constitution in better perspective, they do not 
suffice to account for the course of the floor debates. Never-
theless, the evidence makes more meaningful the Jay and 
Robert R. Livingston comments relative to the uncertainties 
of the situation and to the employment of Fabian tactics 
prior to the committee's report in March, 1777.109 When 
the voting behavior of the moderates comes under scrutiny, 
the failure of these men to adhere rigorously to basic posi-
tions suggests the emergence of a moderate-conservative 
consensus. There are other factors as well. Nowhere is there 
any hint of effective organization among the moderates and 
106 An evenly divided delegation could not cast its county's votes. 
107 It is assumed that in some delegations a majority might have resulted 
from an alliance of moderates and radicals. 
108 Although the interpretation in the preceding paragraphs makes no 
claim to precision, it derives from a distillation of the deputies' votes in the 
several committees and congresses and of their political activities from 1773-
1777. 
109 See above, nn. 1 and 58. 
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radicals which might have enabled them to defeat the con-
servatives. Moreover, a comparison of leadership redounds 
to the advantage of the conservatives. The moderates and 
radicals did not have, with the exception of John Morin 
Scott, men of prestige and ability to compare with Jay, 
Robert R. Livingston and Gouverneur Morris.l1° Possessed 
of these solid benefits, the conservatives, seasoned wielders 
of power that they were, triumphed over a less able opposi-
tion. 
no The fact that this trio differed among themselves over primary clauses, 
such as balloting and the governor's veto, might have offered an exploitable 
weakness to an aggressive, keen opposition. The journal does not reveal any 
moderate efforts to profit from conservative differences. 
EIGHT 
'Rgonsiderations 
,---- ~EVEN though one cannot analyze statistically 
~ J J the Whig and Tory strength, the direction 
of events from 1774 to 1776 provides us with a crude index 
to the division of the people. After Lexington and Concord 
the New York Tories were unable to turn back or contain 
the upsurge of Whig opposition. The Tory failure was 
significant in two respects, as a commentary on the gov-
ernment's weakness and as an indication of inadequate 
popular support for the Tories in the rural districts. The-
oretically, the government possessed two advantages, power 
and prestige, but it was not able to maximize either one 
because in reality it had little of either. Tory paralysis in 
the countryside can be attributed neither to a deficiency of 
leaders, since there were numbers of Tory gentry, nor to an 
absence of will. Indeed the one county in which the Tories 
were at first successful became eventually the symbol of their 
defeat. The J ohnsons organized their tenantry to defend 
the crown but they could not rally the rest of Tryon County 
behind them. Throughout the province the unwillingness 
of the people to rebuff the Whigs manifested itself in the 
last elections for the General Assembly in January, 1776, 
when the electorate returned a Whig majority. The polit-
ical trends of 177 5-1776 suggest the desirability of a reexam-
ination of the Tory question. Perhaps some of the research 
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techniques in quantification could be fruitfully applied here. 
Unquestionably, the timid leadership of the Whigs need-
lessly handicapped the entire revolutionary movement. The 
vacillation of the leaders induced confusion, if not disgust, 
among the people and this in turn dampened the militancy 
of the population. A converse effect of the wavering policy 
was the temporary encouragement of the Tories in their 
covert and open resistance to Whig measures. Another dif-
ficulty which timidity compounded was the appearance of 
competition for leadership and position within the Whig 
group. The experience of Cumberland, Charlotte, and 
Dutchess suggests that this factor may have existed in other 
counties.1 The Whigs' lack of vigor was in no way a con-
sequence of their being in a minority position; in fact, they 
were a majority. If they were a conspiratorial minority, they 
could not have constructed a durable revolutionary organ-
ization. It was precisely because the Whigs mustered a ma-
jority that they were able to carry the colony down the road 
to independence and statehood. 
There was one sphere, polemical writing, in which the 
reluctant leadership was unable to quell the ardor of the 
militants. The newspapers played a vanguard role in pre-
senting to their readers a stream of pleas for independence.2 
The significant factor was the writers' abandonment in late 
April, 1776 of opposition to separation from Britain. Since 
none of the moderates found it desirable or expedient to 
rebut the arguments for breaking the ties, they may have 
wished to avoid exacerbating public sentiment because that 
opinion was far in advance of the moderate leadership. 
An implicit but nonetheless real theme of the revolution-
1 George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, of New York, 
1746·1813 (New York, 1960), p. 462, n. 13; Staughton Lynd, Anti-Federalism 
in Dutchess County New York: A Study of Democracy and Class Conflict 
in the Revolutionary Era (Chicago, 1962), pp. 57-58. 
2 For the continental situation, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Prelude 
to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1774-1776 (New York, 
1958), chap. xii. 
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ary years was class strife. This conflict was spasmodic and 
disorganized and did not produce a program or sense of class 
solidarity, nor did it clearly draw lines between classes. 
Furthermore, it occurred on multiple planes, embracing 
tenants at will and landlords on one level and mechanics and 
merchants on another.3 These were examples of a simple 
antagonism but there were others that involved complicated 
class coalitions. Thus, in May, 1776, the Committee of 
Mechanics warned the Provincial Congress against adopting 
a new form of government without submitting it to the 
people for ratification. The house, drawn from the large 
and middle landholders and commercial middle classes, 
buried the Mechanics' memorial.4 The constitution-drafting 
process in 1776-1777 reflected still another facet of class con-
flict. It is apparent that the reform group of middle-class 
farmers sought to broaden the base of popular participation 
in government but were defeated by a combination of the 
elite and middle freeholders. 5 Since the lesser-propertied 
classes neither controlled the revolutionary movement nor 
were able fundamentally to alter social relations, many his-
torians have denied that class struggle was a factor in the 
Revolution.6 
The Revolution in New York was not primarily a ques-
tion of which class would control the state. For the Whig 
leadership of landed magnates, merchants, lawyers, and 
middle-class freeholders, it was a war of liberation. Al-
though the necessity of maintaining a united front against 
3 The correspondence of Robert R. Livingston is replete with examples of 
tenant antagonism. Henry B. Livingston to R. R. Livingston, May, 1775, 
Robert R. Livingston, American Art Association Catalogue, Revolutionary 
Letters of Importance: The Unpublished Correspondence of Robert R. Liv-
ingston (New York, 1918), No. 30; Lynd, Anti-Federalism in Dutchess 
County, chap. iv; Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and the American 
Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIX Qanuary, 1962), 13. 
The attempts of mechanics to influence nominations to committees was 
one manifestation of this spirit. See above, pp. 149-50. 
4 See above, pp. 155-59. 
5 See above, chap. vii. 
6 See Morris, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIX, 3-29. 
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Britain was a powerful centripetal force among the leaders, 
the coalition evinced signs of strain when it confronted 
such major questions as independence and the constitution. 
By and large the prewar elite were preponderant in the 
revolutionary organs, but the very nature of the conflict 
with the parent nation opened the door to power to the 
middle-class farmers, who were learning political self-reli-
ance and independence. 
APPENDIX 
THE FOLLOWING examples of inaccurate or uncritical use of 
materials by Flick in his Loyal ism in New York During the 
American Revolution suggest that a new look at the New York 
loyalist problem might produce interesting material. 
One of Flick's sources, loyalist historian Thomas Jones, wrote 
that the British formed a New York City militia organization 
in 1779 of 6,000 men. All of these males, he said, were inhabi-
tants of the city prior to the British occupation. A little arith-
metic will demonstrate the unreliability of the latter statement. 
If 6,000 men between the ages of sixteen and fifty lived in the 
city, the city's population would be ca. 30,000 but this is a much 
larger number than any contemporary estimate. Moreover, this 
calculation excludes the Whigs, who, if added to the 30,000, 
would have made a total population greater than any city in 
America. Since thousands, a majority, did not return after the 
American defeat in 1776, the 6,000 militia could not be original 
inhabitants. Sir Henry Clinton explained that many of the 
militia were "persons attached to the different army and navy 
departments consisting of sailors, watermen and others."1 
According to Flick, "a large part of the 6,000 seamen in the 
metropolis were loyalists." The figure derives from one of 
Tryon's letters, but the Governor noted that they were not all 
Yorkers. He stated that 6,000 men, partly from New York, com-
posed of landsmen and seamen, partly drawn to the colony from 
the several provinces, had filled the crews of the royal ships. 2 
In July, 1776, Tryon allegedly began to enlist 1,300 men on 
Long Island and Staten Island. The source of this fact is the 
unsupported statement of an inhabitant who did not reveal how 
he acquired this information. Moreover, the informant in no 
way indicated how many actually enlisted. Howe remarked to 
Germain that the Governor participated in the Battle of Long 
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Island in August with two companies of New York loyalists. 
The maximum strength of the company was 57.3 
When Governor Tryon raided Danbury, Connecticut, in 
1777, his force supposedly comprised 2,000 Long Islanders. 
Jones, Flick's source, simply stated that the raiders numbered 
2,000 without identifying them. As it happened, all units were 
regular British army corps; no loyalists participated.4 
Although Flick quotes in part a Tryon County Committee 
letter to show that half the county was Tory, the implication 
is not accurate. The Tryon committee declared that half the 
people would not bear arms to defend the county against a 
British invasion because the state had neglected to send troops 
to aid them. Believing themselves abandoned by the state to the 
enemy, half the people were unwilling to sacrifice themselves, 
their families, and their property in vain and so would sur-
render. This can hardly be termed Toryism. In fact, when St. 
Leger did invade the county in 1777, between 700 and 1,000 
men sprang to arms and their determined resistance at Oriskany 
and Fort Schuyler blocked a union with Burgoyne." 
In 1779 William Axtell obtained a commission to recruit 500 
loyalists, but this did not prove he did so. Jones, Flick's source, 
notes that Axtell raised only 30 men, but drew pay and provi-
sions for the 500.6 
1 Thomas Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War, 
and of the Leading Events in the Other Colonies at that Period, ed. Ed-
ward F. de Lancey (2 vols.; New York, 1879), I, 322-23: General Sir Henry 
Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven, 
1954), p. 455; Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York During the Amer-
ican Revolution (New York, 1901), p. 112. 
2 Flick, Loyalism, p. 107; Tryon to Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, June 29, 
1779, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of the State of New York (15 vols.; Albany, 1856), VIII, 772. 
3 Flick, Loyalism, p. 105; Peter Force, ed., American Archives (9 vols.: 
Washington, D. C., 1837-1853), 5th ser., I, 120; Sir William Howe, A Schedule 
of Sir William Howe's Correspondence as Produced to the House of Com-
mons (extracted from the Parliamentary Register, XI, 1779) (London, 
1779), p. 342. 
4 Flick, Loyalism, p. 105; Jones, History of New York During the Revo· 
lutionary War, I, 177-78: Howe, Schedule of Correspondence, p. 391; Serle 
to Dartmouth, May I, 1777, Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manu-
scripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (25 vols.; Lon-
don, 1889-1898), XXIV, No. 2059. 
5 Flick, Loyalism, p. 110; Tryon Committee letter in Jones, History of 
New York During the Revolutionary War, I, 700-701. 
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Since Long Island, excluding Suffolk, was a Tory stronghold, 
there are numerous references in Flick to the enlistment of 
loyalists from the area. When added up, the result is curious. 
Omitting all numbers which do not give a specific county of 
origin, the total for Kings and Queens is 3,600. The 1771 census 
credited the two counties with 11,205, or ca. 7 percent of the 
colony's total. If we allow for a 1776 population of 208,000, the 
two counties with 7 percent would have 14,560. The age group 
between sixteen and sixty would number perhaps 3,640 men. 
We are led to believe, therefore, that the British recruited almost 
every male in this age bracket into their active units, leaving 
no militia. Difficult as this may be to accept, it becomes im-
possible when we consider that Flick also states that one-fifth 
of the Queens militia was Whig. And what about the Kings 
militia? Small as it was, there was more Whig sentiment in the 
latter county than in Queens. General Sir Henry Clinton 
doubted the loyalty of "a great part" of the Kings inhabitants.7 
Another example of New York's loyalism was the De Lancey 
brigade, which was to have 1,500 men from Kings and Queens. 
Jones was careful to say only that De Lancey held a commission 
to raise 1,500. The difference was important, since Howe cited 
the brigade's strength at 693 in November, 1777, and 707 in 
May, 1778. The unit records show that ca. 1,095 officers and men 
served in the brigade, but not all of them were New Yorkers.8 
In a vein similar to his comment on Tryon County, Flick 
tagged Lewis Morris's militia regiment as overwhelmingly loyal-
ist, as having only a "colonel's command" of Whigs in it. This 
is a misconstruction of what Morris wrote to the New York 
Convention. After the American defeat in Manhattan, Morris 
6 Flick, Loyalism, p. ll2; Jones, History of New York During the Revo-
lutionary War, I, 304-5. 
7 Flick, Loyalism, pp. 95-ll2; Clinton, The American Rebellion, p. 69. 
8 Flick, Loyalism, p. 106; Jones, History of New York During the Revolu-
tionary War, I, 264-65; Sir William Howe, Narrative of Lieutenant-General 
Sir William Howe in a Committee of the House of Commons on 29 April, 
1779 Relative to His Conduct During His Late Command of the King's 
Troops in North America: To Which Are Added, Some Observations Upon 
a Pamphlet Entitled, Letters to a Nobleman (London, 1780), p. 52; W. 0. 
Raymond, "Loyalists in Arms," New Brunswick Historical Society Collec-
tions, II (St. John, 1904), 220; Arthur W. Eaton, "New York Loyalists in 
Novia Scotia," The Grafton Magazine, February, 1910, p. 174. 
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stated that "not more than a Colonel's command was left" in 
his Westchester regiment. But this letter was part of a sorry 
affair which has to be seen in its entirety in order to evaluate 
Morris's judgment of his regiment. The Convention had called 
upon Morris to explain his desertion of his command and flight 
to Philadelphia. As justification he alleged the unit's decima-
tion and the disaffection of many of the survivors. The Con-
vention rejected his defense; indeed Morris had refuted himself 
in his correspondence. When the Convention ordered his regi-
ment on active service in August, Morris informed Abraham 
Yates, Jr. that the men reported with "cheerfulness," a most 
un-Torylike characteristic in this connection. In other areas 
Tories refused to serve when called up for duty. In a private 
exchange R. R. Livingston and Edward Rutledge bluntly at-
tributed Morris's action to fear, not to loyalists. Morris's as-
sessment of political loyalties then is highly suspect, since it 
directly involved his own reputation.9 
Referring to one of Governor Tryon's letters, Flick comments 
that Tyron believed the whole province would take up arms 
for the crown if the British drove out the rebel army. The 
letter itself does not bear out this interpretation. The Gov-
ernor described a sortie with 1,000 men into Suffolk in the 
course of which the people dutifully dissolved their committees 
and repudiated the resolves of the congresses. He then went on 
to declare that he thought the whole province would do like-
wise when the British would destroy the rebel army. Be it noted 
that both Howe and rebel John Sloss Hobart attributed the sub-
mission to compulsion. We may leave this aside, however. For 
a defenseless people to dissolve revolutionary committees under 
the menace of 20,000 to 30,000 guns of an army of occupation 
is not to be equated with voluntarily shouldering arms to de-
fend the King and Parliament.lO 
9 Flick, Loyal ism, pp. 108-9; Force, American Archives, 5th ser., III, 211; 
]our. Prov. Gong., I, 666, II, 281; Livingston to Rutledge, October 10, 1776, 
Rutledge to Livingston, October 19, 1776, Bancroft Transcripts: Livingston 
Papers, NYPL. 
10 Flick, Loyalism, p. 100; Tryon to Germain, November 28, 1776, O'Cal· 
laghan, Documents, Colonial, New York, VIII, 692; Hobart to Convention, 
October 7, 1776, ]our. Prov. Gong., I, 671; Howe, Narrative, p. 44. 
A Note on Sources 
STUDIES of revolutionary politics would be impossible without 
the great manuscript collections in the depositories of New 
York City and of course the indispensable lode-star to these is 
Evarts B. Green and Richard B. Morris, eds., A Guide to the 
Principal Sources for Early American History (1600-1800) in the 
City of New York (New York, 2nd ed., 1953). Among the riches 
of the New-York Historical Society the Robert R. Livingston 
Collection has much to offer those investigating political and 
economic history. There is also important correspondence in the 
Alexander McDougall Papers and James Duane Papers. Less 
useful for this study were the Livingston Family Papers, the 
John Lamb Papers and the William Duer Papers, although the 
Duer manuscripts contain significant economic data. Scattered 
items came from the John McKesson Papers and New York 
State Treasurer's Accounts, 1775-1778. 
Columbia University Library's Special Collections have two 
pertinent, major groups, the Gouverneur Morris Papers and the 
John Jay Papers. For these years, the sources of many of the 
quotations which, sometimes in altered form, appear in Jared 
Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris with Selections from His 
Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers (3 vols.; Boston, 
1832) may be found in the Morris Papers. Although many of 
Jay's letters are in Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence 
and Public Papers of john jay (4 vols.; New York, 1890-1893), 
the manuscript collection supplements the printed works and 
has many illuminating letters to Jay. 
The third major depository, the New York Public Library, 
has several groups of vital papers for this area of study. The 
Samuel Adams Papers and the Adams correspondence in the 
Bancroft Transcripts have exchanges between New Yorkers and 
Adams in addition to descriptions of New York affairs. The 
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Philip Schuyler Papers are a labyrinth, but the rewards are 
well-worth the necessary investment of time. Among the Wil-
liam Smith Papers the most important manuscripts are Smith's 
Historical Memoirs which are conveniently printed in William 
H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs from 16 March 1763 to 25 
july 1778 of William Smith (2 vols.; New York, 1956, 1958). 
There are very informative letters to and from Robert R. Liv-
ingston in the Bancroft Transcripts, a number of which are 
excerpted in the American Art Association Catalogue, Revolu-
tionary Letters of Importance: The Unpublished Correspon-
dence of Robert R. Livingston (New York, 1918). Three other 
Livingston groups, the Gilbert Livingston Papers, Livingston 
Family Papers and Philip Livingston Letters, have useful items. 
Although the correspondence in the Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers 
is disappointing, these papers contain a very rare draft of the 
Constitution of 1777. The huge loyalist collection, Transcript of 
the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission of En-
quiry into the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists 
Held Under Acts of Parliament of 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 of George 
III Preserved amongst the Audit Office Records in the Public 
Record Office of England, 1783-1790, is one of the sources for 
details about various Tories. 
Two other libraries, the New York State Library and the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, hold collections which provide 
relevant data. The Andrew Elliot Papers in Albany have a 
valuable account of the turbulent early months of 1775. The 
Legislative Papers and Dutchess County petitions in the Miscel-
laneous Manuscripts furnished isolated details. The Livingston 
Redmond Papers at Hyde Park were most valuable for events 
in the summer of 1776. 
One of the fortunate consequences of conflict among the 
political factions was the production of broadsides which often 
clarify otherwise obscure events. Both the New-York Historical 
Society and the New York Public Library have extensive hold-
ings of these flyers. 
Colonial newspapers are major repositories of political opin-
ion, contributing clues to trends of thought. All of the New 
York newspapers have essential data but recourse must be had 
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to some of the Connecticut and Philadelphia papers. Especially 
valuable for Sears' raid on Rivington's shop are the (Hartford) 
Connecticut Courant, (New Haven) Connecticut journal and 
(New London) Connecticut Gazette. Some important material 
is in the Pennsylvania Gazette, Pennsylvania journal and Penn-
sylvania Packet, all of Philadelphia. The researcher would be 
lost without Clarence S. Brigham's History and Bibliography of 
American Newspapers, 1690-1820 (2 vols.; Worcester, 1947) 
which identifies and locates all of the newspapers. 
Official records are fundamental to research about the Revo-
lution in New York. The most rewarding of these are the jour-
nals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Com-
mittee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New 
York, 1775-1777 (2 vols.; Albany, 1842); Charles Z. Lincoln, ed., 
State of New York, Messages from the Governors, 1683-1906 (11 
vols.; Albany, 1909); Berthold Fernow, ed., "Calendar of Coun-
cil Minutes, 1668-1783," New York State Library Bulletin 58 
(Albany, 1902). The Calendar of Historical Manuscripts Relating 
to the War of the Revolution, in the Office of the Secretary of 
State (2 vols.; Albany, 1868) has some Convention committee 
minutes. Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of 
New York (5 vols.; Rochester, 1906) prints copies of the de-
stroyed drafts of the Constitution of 1777. An important col-
lection of Vermont land warrants is in the Calendar of New 
York Colonial Manuscripts Indorsed Land Papers in the Office 
of the Secretary of State of New York (Albany, 1864). Compila-
tions of military service are in James A. Roberts, comp., New 
York in the Revolution as Colony and State (Albany, 2nd ed., 
1898) and Supplement (Albany, 1901). Tory sentiment may be 
traced in the Calendar of Horne Office Papers of the Reign of 
George In 1773-1775 (London, 1899). Insights into the local 
problems of revolutionary conflict are found in Samuel L. Frey, 
ed., The Minute Book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon 
County (New York, 1905) and J. Sullivan, ed., Minutes of the 
Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-1778 and Minutes 
of the Schenectady Committee, 1775-1779 (2 vols.; Albany, 1923, 
1925). Standing in a class by itself for more than a century is 
that wonderful melange of official and unofficial documents, 
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American Archives ed. by Peter Force (9 vols.; Washington, 
D.C., 1837-1853). Other useful compilations are Nathaniel H. 
Carter and William L. Stone, reporters, Reports of the Proceed-
ings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the 
Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New York 
(Albany, 1821); Washington C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds., 
journals of the Continental Congress (34 vols.; Washington, 
D.C., 1904-1937); J. Shannon, comp., Manual of the Corporation 
of the City of New York, 1868 (New York, 1868); U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1957). 
Much correspondence is accessible in printed form in several 
types of collections. Two groups of general correspondence are 
Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State 
of New York (4 vols.; Albany, 1850-1857) and Edmun:d B. 
O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
the State of New York (15 vols.; Albany, 1856). Two of the 
British Historical Manuscripts Commission's reports, Fourteenth 
Report, Appendix Part X (Manuscripts of the Earl of Dart-
mouth) and the Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. StoPford-
Sackville of Drayton House, Northamptonshire (3 vols.; Lon-
don, 1895, 1904, 1910), help to fill some gaps in American 
publications. There is a substantial amount of pertinent ma-
terial in The Letterbooks and Letters and Papers of Cadwallader 
Colden (ll vols.; New-York Historical Society Collections, 1876-
1877, 1917-1923, 1934, 1936) and Lee Papers (New-York His-
torical Society Collections, 1871). Although they are poorly 
edited, the Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of 
New York (10 vols.; Albany, 1899-1914) have important letters 
on politics and Tories. Additional valuable papers are in Clar-
ence E. Carter, ed., The Correspondence of General Thomas 
Gage with the Secretaries of State, and with the War Office 
and the Treasury, 1763-1775 (2 vols.; New Haven, 1931, 1933); 
Huntington Papers (Connecticut Historical Society Collections, 
XX, Hartford, 1889); "The Duane Letters," Southern History 
Association Publications, VII ( 1903), 170-85, 24 7-5 6, 362-68; 
Johnston, Correspondence of john jay,· New York City During 
the American Revolution. Being a Collection of Original Papers 
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(Now First Published) from the Manuscripts in the Possession of 
the Me1·cantile Library Association of New York City (New 
York, 1861); Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts 
in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (25 vols.; 
London, 1889-1898); Isaac N. P. Stokes, ed., The Iconography of 
Manhattan Island (6 vols.; New York, 1915-1928); John C. 
Hamilton, Life of Alexander Hamilton: a History of the Re-
public of the United States of America, as Traced in His Writ-
ings and in Those of His Contemporaries (10 vols.; Boston, 
1879). The most useful of the writings of major personalities 
are Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of the Members of the 
Continental Congress (8 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1921-1936); 
Charles F. Adams, ed., Works of john Adams (10 vols.; Boston, 
1850-1856); Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas 
jefferson (17 vols.; Princeton, 1950- ); John C. Fitzpatrick, 
ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original 
Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 (39 vols.; Washington, D.C., 
1931-1944); Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of james Madison 
(9 vols.; New York, 1900-1910); Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. 
Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (9 vols.; New 
York, 1960- ); Jared Sparks, ed., Correspondence of the Amer-
ican Revolution (4 vols.; Boston, 1853). 
In addition to the sources already cited there is abundant 
data on several aspects of the Tory problem in Minutes of the 
Committee and of the First Commission for Detecting and De-
feating Conspiracies in the State of New York, 1776-1778 (3 
vols.; New-York Historical Society Collections, 1924-1926); John 
Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before 
the House of Commons (London, 1780); M. K. Couzens, Index 
of Grantees of Lands Sold by the Commissioners of Forfeitures 
of the Southern District of the State of New York Situate in 
The Manor of Philipsburg, Westchester County, New York 
(Yonkers, 1880); Albert G. Greene, Recollections of the jersey 
Prison-Ship (Morrisania, 1865); Sir William Howe, Narrative of 
Lieutenant-General Si1· William Howe in a Committee of the 
House of Commons on 29 April, 1779 Relative to His Conduct 
During His Late Command of the King's Troops in North 
America: To Which Are Added, Some Observations Upon a 
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Pamphlet Entitled, Letters to a Nobleman (London, 1780); 
A Schedule of Sir William Howe's Correspondence as Produced 
to the House of Commons (London, 1779); Samuel Seabury, 
An Alarm to the Legislature of the Province of New York 
(New York, 1775) and What Think Ye of Congress Now (New 
York, 1775); David L. Sterling, ed., "American Prisoners of War 
in New York: A Report by Elias Boudinot," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, XIII (1957), 376-93; John A. Stevens, Jr., 
ed., Colonial Records of the New York Chamber of Commerce, 
1768-1784 (New York, 1867); Margaret W. Willard, ed., Letters 
on the American Revolution, 1774-1776 (Boston, 1925); Thomas 
Jones, History of New York During the Revolutionary War, and 
of the Leading Events in the Other Colonies at that Period, 
ed. by Edward F. de Lancey (2 vols.; New York, 1879). 
The investigator of revolutionary New York owes much to 
his predecessors who have made his task lighter by their labors. 
The one work which holds a unique place in this field because 
it is a brilliant piece of research is Carl L. Becker, The History 
of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 
(Madison, 1909). Studies which supplement Becker are Oscar 
T. Barck, Jr., New York City During the War for Independence 
(New York, 1931); Alexander C. Flick, The American Revolu-
tion in New York (Albany, 1926); Staughton Lynd, Anti-Fed-
eralism in Dutchess County New York: A Study of Democracy 
and Class Conflict in the Revolutionary Era (Chicago, 1962); 
Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the American Revolution 
(New York, 1939); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The Colonial 
Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 
1939); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Prelude to Independence: The 
Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776 (New York, 1958); 
Thomas J. \Vertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels: New 
York City During the Revolution (New York, 1948); Chilton 
Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 
1760-1860 (Princeton, 1960); Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Re-
volt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 (New York, 1955). 
Basic examinations of the Tory problem are Alexander C. Flick, 
Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution (New 
York, 1901); Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American 
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Revolution (New York, 1902); William H. Nelson, The Amer-
ican Tory (Oxford, 1961); Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Red-
coats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill, 
1964). Helpful biographies are Edward P. Alexander, A Revo-
lutionary Conservative: james Duane of New York (New York, 
1938); George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of 
New York, 1746-1813 (New York, 1960); Don R. Gerlach, Philip 
Schuyler and the American Revolution in New York, 1733-1777 
(Lincoln, 1964); Dorothy R. Dillon, The New York Triumvir-
ate: A Study of the Legal and Political Careers of William Liv-
ingston, john Morin Scott, William Smith, ]r. (New York, 
1949); Frank Monaghan, John Jay (New York, 1935). 
Renewed interest in the structure of colonial politics has re-
sulted in an expanding periodical literature. Among the recent 
articles are Milton M. Klein, "Democracy and Politics in Co-
lonial New York," New York History, XL (July, 1959), 22146; 
Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and the American Revolu-
tion," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIX (January, 
1962), 3-29; Nicholas Varga, "Election Procedure and Practices 
in Colonial New York," New York History, XLI (July, 1960), 
249-77; Staughton Lynd, "The Mechanics in New York City 
Politics, 1774-1788," Labor History (Fall, 1964), 225-46 and "The 
Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May, 1777," New-York 
Historical Society Quarterly, XLVIII (April, 1964), 163-77; 
three essays by Roger J. Champagne, "New York and the In-
tolerable Acts, 177 4," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, 
XLV (April, 1961), 195-207, "New York Politics and Indepen-
dence, 1776," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XLVI 
(July, 1962), 281-303, and "New York's Radicals and the Com-
ing of Independence," journal of American History, LI (June, 
1964), 2140. 
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Second Congress, ll6; voting power 
in Third Congress, 182 
Charlotte precinct (Dutchess County): 
vote for provincial convention in, 
86, 87 
Church party: description of, 6-7. 
See also De Lancey faction 
Clarkson, David, 72n21 
Class antagonism, 23n53, 29n71, 150; 
tenant vs. landlord, 103, 173nll7; 
Mechanics' petition as manifesta-
tion of, 163-64; as factor in de-
mand for political reform, l73nll7; 
"licentiousness" of people as form 
of, 174; as implicit theme of revo-
lution, 251-52 
Clinton, George, l3ln78, 217n, 218n 
15; describes militia response, 98-
99; said to oppose independence, 
l66n95; sends information to com-
mittee to obstruct Hudson, 219; 
postponement of constitutional re-
port advocated by adherents of, 
222 
Clinton, Sir Henry: loyalist troop re-
turns of, 94; panic induced by ar-
rival of, 101; comment on militia 
in New York city, 254 
Clopper, Cornelius, 72n21 
Clopper, Peter, 74n25, n26 
Clossy, Samuel, 64n6 
Coercive Acts: effects of, 24-29; 
measures to counter, 31-35 
Colden, Cadwallader, 8 and nil, 77, 
90, 124-25; acting governor during 
Tea Party, 20 and n45; approves 
land patents in Vermont, 48; uses 
land as reward for political loyalty, 
49-50; accused of being royal pen-
sioner, 52; declines to recall assem-
bly, 62-63; convenes council to con-
Index 
Colden, Cadwallader (continued): 
sider ]ames affair, 66; accused of 
asking ministry for troops, 74; de-
scribes collapse of government's 
authority, 76; boldness of, 80-81; 
meeting with council on Dart-
mouth's instructions, 81; asks for 
substantial numbers of troops, 83 
Colden family: directs disarming of 
Queens Whigs, 108 
Colonial system: assailed by 
"Candidus," 161 
Commissary: functions and authority 
of, 187; responsibilities exceed abil-
ities, 188; appointment of addi-
tional, 188-89 
Conciliation: proposals for in 
Provincial Congress, ll8-29 
Connecticut, 146, 206; source of loyal-
ist recruits, 95; place of imprison-
ment for Tories, 197 
Conscience, freedom of: newspaper 
discussion of, 233 
Conservatives: definition of, viii-ix, 
71 and n20, 231; social base of, 2: 
representation on Committee of 
One Hundred, 72-73; growing di-
vergence of views from moderates, 
140-41; oppose idea of constitution, 
148; ticket in election for Third 
Congress, 148-50: factors in reluc-
tance to accept independence, 172-
77; conception of constitution, 235; 
concessions in constitution to mod-
erates, 243-44; voting behavior on 
issue of governor's powers, 243n92; 
explanation of success in shaping 
constitution, 244-48 and nn, 249; 
emergence of moderate-conserva-
tive consensus, 248. See also Mod-
erates; Radicals 
Constitution: New Yorkers debate 
idea of, 146-48· idea of taken up 
by Provincial Congress, 150-55; Me-
chanics raise question of ratifica-
tion procedure for, 155-59; bill of 
rights, 214, 229; factors in delay in 
drafting, 219, 223n31, 230-31; un-
easiness at delay in drafting, 220, 
223; preliminary draft of, 221; 
committee debates on election of 
governor and senators, 221: identi-
fication of drafts of, 224-29; at-
tendance at constitutional commit-
tee meetings, 225; public concep-
tions of, 232-33; comparison of 
newspaper conceptions with com-
Index 
Constitution (continued): 
mittee drafts of, 234; Convention 
members' conceptions of, 234-37; 
comparison of committee drafts of, 
237-40; voting qualifications for as-
sembly in, 241; method of ballot-
ing in, 241 and n; conservative suc-
cess in shaping, 244-48 and nn. See 
also Convention of Representatives 
Constitutional monarchy: Whig claims 
to be defenders of, 137-38; argu-
ment that George III had deposed 
himself, 138 
Continental Army: influence of 
presence in New York, 181 
Continental Association: terms of, 36; 
Tory opposition to, 85 
Continental Congress, 103, llO, ll9, 
123, 127, 171, 178, 180, 182, 184, 
191; first session, 35-36; legislature 
refuses to choose delegates to, 43; 
Whig maneuvers to choose dele-
gates to, 43-44; sends committee to 
New York to supervise Lee expedi-
tion, 61, 207; election set for dele-
gates to, 81; opens ports to all na-
tions, 102; new propositions from 
New York to, ll8; authorizes New 
York to raise troops, 143; resolves 
to disarm Tories, 144; resolves for-
mation of revolutionary govern-
ments, 146; debates independence, 
166; requests New York furnish 
stores for Crown Point and Ticon-
deroga, 187; requests New York 
supply flour, 188; urges removal of 
stores and arms from Ticonderoga, 
192; lends paper money to New 
York, 195; orders Jersey troops to 
disarm Queens Tories, 198; ap-
points Commissioners of Indian Af-
fairs, 210 
Convention of Representatives: orders 
Lewis Morris to return to com-
mand, 175-76; difficulties confront-
ing, 183; creates Committee of Safe-
ty, 183; creates new commissary of 
provisions, 189; centralizes jurisdic-
tion over military stores, 189; spurs 
textile production, 191; antiloyalist 
policies of, 201-3, 204; reaction to 
Vermont's petition for recognition 
as independent state, 209-10; ap-
points judges, 2ll; creation of, 213; 
defers debate on new form of gov-
ernment, 213-14, 222, 224; debates 
constitutional procedure, 214; mem-
Convention (continued): 
bership of constitutional commit-
tee, 214-17, 246-47; meeting of con-
stitutional committee of, 217, 218 
and nl5, 219-20, 220-21, 223; secret 
committee to obstruct Hudson, 217 
and n, 218, 219; political ideology 
of constitutional committee mem-
bers, 217nl0; desire for immediate 
election of interim governor, 217-
18; debate on voting qualifications 
in constitutional committee, 241-
42; debate on governor's powers 
in constitution, 242-43 and n; com-
promises on constitution among 
moderates and conservatives, 243; 
voting behavior of members on 
constitution, 244-48 and nn. See 
also Constitution; Provincial Con-
gress; Safety, Committee of 
Cooper, Rev. Myles: receives royal 
annuity, 53; accused of asking min-
istry for troops, 74 
Correspondence, Committee of (New 
York city): formation of, 15; mem-
bership, 15n; management of tea 
party, 18-22; abandoned, 25 
Covenhoven, Nicholas, 127, 13ln78 
Crawford, James, 64n6 
Croghan, George, 210-11 
Crown Point, N.Y., 187 
Cruger, Henry, 8nll 
Cruger, John H., 17n32, 129n 
Cumberland County: formation of 
committee of inspection, 42; fac-
tors in delay of elections for Sec-
ond Congress, liS; voting power in 
Third Congress, 182 
Cumberland County Committee of 
Safety: factors in delay of elections 
for Provincial Congress, 115 
Currie, David: appointed commissary 
of provisions, 189 
Curtenius, Peter T., 34n86, 72n21; 
appointed commissary by Provin-
cial Congress, 187; difficulties as 
commissary, 188; collects lead win-
dow weights, 190 
Cuyler, Jacob, 122 and n, 127, 153 
Dartmouth, William Legge, 2d Earl 
of, 57, 105; uses land grants as 
reward for political loyalty, 49-50; 
accused of bribery, 50-51; prohibits 
:'-lew York from sending delegates 
to Continental Congress, 81; ap-
proves plan for armed loyalist 
Dartmouth, Earl of (continued): 
association, 90; offers forfeited land 
to enlistees, 110 
Deane, R., 74n25 
Defense Association, 75; substance of, 
63 
De Lancey, James: accused of 
receiving bribe, 51 
De Lancey, John, 26n64, 39n99 
De Lancey, Oliver, 8n11, l6n, l29n, 
l3ln78; Schenectady Church dis-
pute, 7; denounces Watson, 66; ac-
cused of asking ministry for regu-
lar troops, 74-75; source of recruits 
for brigade of, 95, 97 
De Lancey faction, l2n, 128; com-
position and role in 1773, 5-9; polit-
ical supremacy, 7-9; loss of ground, 
18, 22-24; reaction to Coercive Acts, 
24-29; purpose in use of Fifty-One, 
29-30; successes in Fifty-One, 31-35; 
disagreement over Continental As-
sociation, 36-37; defeat on Con-
tinental Association enforcement, 
38-40; beginning of dissolution of, 
40-41, 7l; defeat of Whigs in legis-
lature, 42-43, 52; charges of bribery 
against, 51; core of Toryism, 64; 
compromise in choice of Commit-
tee of One Hundred and delegates 
to Provincial Congress, 73-74. See 
also Tories; Loyalists; Political fac-
tions 
Delaware River, 142 
Denning, William, 72n21, l48n5l, 
l49n, 243n92 
Desbrosses, Elias, 39n99 
DeWitt, Charles, l3ln78, 202, 217, 
225, 243n92, 247nl02 
Dickinson, John, 166 
Drake, Joseph, 215, 243n92 
Duane, James, 26n64, 31, 39n99, 99, 
139, 211, 220n20, 22ln24, 227, 243n 
92; example of transition from 
conservative to moderate, 7ln20; 
insists upon delay until peace com-
missioners arrive, 1776, 140-41; op-
poses idea of constitution, 148 and 
n: excluded from nominations for 
Provincial Congress, 148, 149, 150: 
concerned about commotions of 
people, 174; opposes postponement 
of constitutional report, 222; re-
ports completion of draft constitu-
tion, 223; directed by Committee 
of Safety to gather data on state's 
boundaries, 224; attendance at con-
Index 
Duane, James (continued): 
stitutional committee meetings, 225; 
votes against £20 freehold restric-
tion on voting in constitution, 242 
Duer, William, 202, 214, 216, 219, 
231, 247nl02; appeals for militia 
reinforcements in Westchester, 204; 
complains of need for justice of 
peace, 2ll; moves to have constitu-
tional committee report simulta-
neously bill of rights and constitu-
tion, 214; attendance at constitu-
tional committee meetings, 225 
Dunmore, John, Lord: relations with 
De Lancey faction, 8; orders sei-
zure of Norfolk press of Holt, 58-
59; "Minos" proposes hanging of, 
135 
Dunscomb, Daniel, 72n2l, 243n92 
Duryee, Abraham, 34n86, 72n2l 
Dutchess County, 182; Tory associa-
tion in, 85-86; election for pro-
vincial convention in, 86-87; elec-
tion of Provincial Congress in, 90; 
formation of district committees 
in, 90; Convention delegation op-
poses delay in constitutional com-
mittee's report, 222; Convention 
delegation voting behavior on con-
stitution, 246 and n 
Dutch Reformed Church, 50 
Duyckinck, Gerardus, 39n99 
Dyer, Eliphalet: describes situation 
in New York, 106, 139 
Dykeman's Bridge, 200 
East India Company, 9, lO; and Tea 
Act, 3, 4 
Elections. See Convention of Repre-
sentatives; Provincial Congress; Con-
stitution 
Elliot, Andrew: seizes illegal cargo of 
weapons, 68-69 
Embree, Lawrence, 39n99 
Falmouth, Mass., llO 
Fanning, Edmund, 48, 122 
Fifty, Committee of: formation of, 26 
and nn, 27-28. See also Fifty-One, 
Committee of 
Fifty, Committee of: formation of, 26 
tion of, 26-29; consensus on need 
for congress, 30-31; strife over dele-
gation to Continental Congress, 31-
32; resolutions on Coercive Acts, 
32-35; dissolution of, 38; proposes 
enforcement of Continental As-
Index 
Fifty-One, Committee of (continued): 
sociation, 38-40; recommends for-
mation of county committees of 
inspection, 42. See also One Hun-
dred, Committee of; Sixty, Com-
mittee of 
Fishkill, N.Y., 220 
Flax: production encouraged by 
state, 191 
Floyd, William, 147, 166n95 
Fort Schuyler, 255 
Fort Stanwix, 98 
Fowler, Jonathan: seized by Sears, 59 
Franklin, Henry, 47 
Franklin family, 48 
French, Philip, 48 
French, Philip, Jr., 48 
Gage, Gen. Thomas, 58, 62, 83, 91, 
122, 128; enjoins Colden to silence 
on loyalist association, 90 
Gaine, Hugh, 53 
Galloway, Joseph, 99 
Gansevoort, Leonard, 122 and n, 124, 
202, 243n92; hears criticisms of de-
lay in drafting constitution, 220; 
moves to have constitutional com-
mittee make report, 224; votes 
against 40s rental voting qualifica-
tion, 241 
Gates, Horatio, 98, 99 
George III, 81, 124; proclaims colo-
nies in rebellion, 100; October 1775 
speech, 132; target of Whig criti-
cism, 137-38 
Germain, George, Lord, 97, 98, 107 
Gerry, Elbridge: believes people of 
New York desire independence, 172 
Gilbert, W. W., 39n99 
Gloucester County, 115, 141, 179, 182; 
factors in delay of election for 
Provincial Congress, 116 
Goelet, Peter, 39n99 
Goforth, William, 39n98, 72n2l 
Goshen, N.Y., 117; election for 
Second Congress in, 113 
Governor's council: meeting on tea, 
12, 14, 16; consulted on assembly 
session, 62-63; considers james af-
fair, 66; meets on Thurman-Hard-
ing affair, 67; meets in response to 
Lexington crisis, 76; criticizes ag-
gressive tone of Colden's speech to 
assembly, 81; hears Smith's plan 
for regaining control of province, 
121; discusses wisdom of assembly 
elections, 129, 132 
Graham, Lewis, 199, 211, 243n92 
Graham, Robert, Ill 
Grand jury: address to Court of 
Quarter Sessions, 66-67 
Graves, Adm. Samuel, 105; says prop-
erty holdings moderates views of 
Whigs, 175 
Gunpowder: state offers bounties and 
loans for production of, 190 
Guns: state offers bounties and loans 
for production of, 190 
Haldimand, Gen. Frederick, 82 
Hallett, Joseph, 72n2l, l48n5l, I49n, 
188, 199 
Hamilton, Alexander: Remarks on 
the Quebec Bill, 55; estimates 
Whig support, 99n92; possible au-
thor of "Monitor" letters, l36nl0 
Hamilton, Major Isaac: expresses fear 
of loss of garrison through deser-
tion, 77 
Hancock, John, 104 
Harding, Robert, 67 
Haring, John, 13ln78, 153, 154, 199; 
moves deletion of one of Smith's 
resolves, 126 
Harpur, Robert, 247nl04 
Haverstraw, N.Y., 109; election for 
Provincial Congress, 113-14 
Hemp: production encouraged by 
Provincial Congress, 191 
Henry, John, 189 
Heyer, Captain W., 74n25 
Hicks, Whitehead: orders arrest of 
Sears and Willett, 67-68; transmits 
warning from governor to Commit-
tee of Safety, 105 
Highlanders: membership in loyalist 
association, 90-91 
Hobart, John Sloss, 122 and n, 216, 
225, 247nl02; and William Smith, 
Jr.'s conciliatory resolves, 123, 124-
25, 126, 127' 128-29 
Hoffman, Nicholas, 39n99 
Holt, John, 53; pressured not to 
reprint Common Sense, 112-13 
Horsmanden, Daniel, 8n11, 129n 
Howe, Sir William, 58, 101, 145, 175, 
182, 201; loyalist troop recruitment, 
94, 95-96, 97' 254-55 
Hughes, Hugh: complains of militia 
situation, 109; account of pressure 
on Holt to prevent reprinting of 
Common Sense, 112-13; prods Jay 
and McDougall on creating new 
form of government, 140 
Huntington, Jedediah: describes ex-
pectation of change on indepen-
dence in new Provincial Congress, 
l65n93 
Imlay, J., 74n25 
Independence: suggested as solution 
to colonial crisis, 138; G. Morris on, 
15ln, 152n, 162-63: debated in 
newspapers, 160-62, 251; Mechanics' 
petition to Provincial Congress on, 
163-64: Virginia Provincial Con-
vention solicits New York support 
for resolutions on, 165; New York 
delegation to Continental Con-
gress and debate on, 166-67, 169; 
Provincial Congress debates ques-
tion of, 167-69, 171, 172-77: con-
duct of Maryland's delegation on 
question of, 170: Continental Con-
gress and, 170, 171; factors in suc-
cess of Provincial Congress's Fabian 
tactics on, 172: radicals unable to 
mobilize population for, 172: Pro-
vincial Congress adopts Declara-
tion of, 182, 213. See also Pro-
vincial Congress 
"Independent Whig," 161 
Intercolonial congress: proposal for, 
29-30. See also Continental Con-
gress 
Ivers, Thomas, 39n99 
james, 65-66 
Janeway, George, 39n99 
.Jauncey, James, 17n32, 26n64, 39n99 
Jauncey, James, Jr.: quarrel with 
De Lancey faction, 18-19 
.Jay, Frederick, 39n99 
.Jay, .John, 26n64, 31, 39n99, 99n, 109, 
13ln78, 147, 148, 153, 154, 170, 174, 
183, 187, 199, 200, 202, 216, 217, 
218, 219, 225, 247nl02, 248, 249; 
anxiety for ;\.lew York's reputation, 
61: and moderate group, 7In20, 
139-40, 139n20: confident of Whigs' 
strength, 139; and constitution, 147, 
225, 227-29, 230, 242: and inde-
pendence,l65, 166n95,167-68: prom-
ises Livingston earliest news on 
government, 169; mortified by ad-
journment of Provincial Congress, 
171: disgusted at Philip Living-
ston's departure from Provincial 
Congress, 17!>: urges Provincial 
Congress to levy taxes, 195, 196; 
obtains leave for committee on 
Index 
Jay, .John (continued): 
Tories to continue sitting, 201; de-
fends Provincial Congress's practice 
of choosing delegates to Conti-
nental Congress, 205; describes per-
plexity among deputies over prob-
lem of constitution, 213n 
.Johnson, David, 39n99 
.Johnson, Sir Guy, 210 
.Johnson, Sir John: recruitment of 
troops from tenantry, 91 
Johnson family: encourages loyalist 
declaration in Tryon County, 85; 
seeks to obstruct election of dis-
trict committees, 89 
Johnstown, N.Y., 91 
Jones, Samuel, 39n99 
Jones, Thomas: advocates calling out 
militia, 76 
Kelley, William, 10nl8 
Keteltas, Garret, 72n21 
Keteltas, W., 74n25 
Kings College, 50 
Kings County, 182; election for Pro-
vincial Congress in, ll6-17 
Kissam, Daniel \V.: complains to Pro-
vincial Congress about test oath 
on Tories, 209 
Laight, Edward, 39n99 
Lamb, John, lO and nl7, 27n66, 67, 
72n21; chairman of December meet-
ing, 15-17 
Lasher, John, 23n, 72n21, 189 
Lawrence, Captain, 9, 20n, 109-10 
Lead mines: search for promoted by 
state, 190 
Lee, Gen. Charles, 101, 132, 142, 207, 
208: doubts loyalty of New York, 
61: approaches city, 106; removes 
cannon from fort, 107; suggests 
appointment of issuing commis-
sary, 188: imposes test oath on 
Long Island Tories, 208-9 
Lee, Richard H., 174 
Lee, William: accuses assembly of 
bribery, 51-52 
Lelferts, .Jacobus, 72n21 
Lelfertse, .John, 13ln78 
Legislature: newspaper discussion of 
form of, 232, 233. See also Con-
stitution; Convention of Repre-
sentatives 
Le Roy, J., 74n2!l 
Lewis, Francis, I!in30, 27n67, 66, 72n 
21, 148, 153, l66n95, 169 
Index 
Lexington, skirmish at: effects of 
news of, 62, 69-71 
L'Hommedieu, Ezra, 122 and n; on 
need for constitution, 148 
Liberty Boys: initiation of opposition 
to Coercive Acts, 24-29; city's mili-
tia regiment described as, 76. See 
also Sons of Liberty 
Lincoln, Charles Z.: analysis of drafts 
of constitution, 225-26 
Lispenard, Leonard, 15n30, 26n64, 
72n21; asserts city militia mainly 
Liberty Boys, 76 
Livingston, Abraham, 188 
Livingston, Gilbert, 122 and n, 124, 
194, 21 7n, 243n92; receives data on 
blocking Hudson, 219 and n; moves 
for guarantee of individual's rights, 
229 
Livingston, Henry B.: comments on 
villainy of tenants, 103 
Livingston, James, 243n92 
Livingston, Peter R., 13ln78, 234; 
does not deliver instructions on 
disarming Tories to Albany Com-
mittee of Correspondence, 145; 
suspected by William Smith of 
wishing to nominate him for gov-
ernor, 218 
Livingston, Peter V. B., 26n64, 
72n21, 196 
Livingston, Philip, 12n, 14, 22, 26n64, 
31, 34n86, 66, 72n21, 13ln78, 148, 
200, 243n92; differences with Sears, 
15n: example of moderate group, 
7ln20: says Common Sense was 
written by Tory, 113; unexplained 
departure from Provincial Con-
gress, I 75; discusses nomination for 
governor with R. R. Livingston, 
217-18; votes against £20 freehold 
restriction, 242 
Livingston, Robert, Jr., 190 
Livingston, Judge Robert R.: com-
ments on Whigs in Tryon County, 
89-90 
Livingston, Robert R., Jr., l29n, 
l3ln78, 140, 170, 183, 216, 217, 
218, 219, 22ln24, 225, 243n92, 247n 
102, 248, 249: moves toward radical 
position, 139-40; and constitution, 
147-48, 218nl5, 222, 227 and n, 
231: and independence, 166, 169, 
176; expresses respect for Britain, 
173; comments on G. Morris's ab-
sence, 175; depicts risks of revolu-
tionary leadership, I 76nl29; role in 
Livingston, R. R., Jr. (continued): 
plan for immediate election of gov-
ernor, 217-18; proposes 40s rental 
qualification for voting, 241; ex-
plains L. Morris's action, 257 
Livingston faction: minority position, 
7-9; members among Sons of Lib-
erty, 12n; aids governor, 18; ad-
vantage from tea party, 22-24; re-
action to Coercive Acts, 24-29; and 
Committee of Fifty-One, 31-35 and 
nn, 38-40; maneuvers to capitalize 
on Continental Association, 37; 
transformation into Whigs, 41; re-
alignment within in response to 
Lexington, 71; gains in representa-
tion on Committee of One Hun-
dred, 73-74_ See also Political fac-
tions; Whigs 
Lloyd, Henry: question of confiscation 
of property, 145 
Lloyd, John: forbidden by Commit-
tee of Safety to sell uncle's prop-
erty, 145 
Locke, John, 136 
Lockwood, Zephaniah, 243n92 
Lockyer, Capt. Benjamin, 18; arrives 
with tea, 19; departs New York 
with tea, 21-22 
Lott, Abraham, 195; resigns as tea 
agent, 12; delays handing over pub-
lic money to Provincial Congress, I 97 
Lott, Abraham P., 72n21, 149 and n, 
243n92 
Low, Cornelius, Jr., 48 
Low, Isaac, l2n, 26n64, 31, 39n99; 
visit to William Smith, Jr. about 
tea, 13; conference on tea with 
governor's council, 14; differences 
with Isaac Sears, 15n; chairman of 
May 16 meeting, 26-27; chairman 
of May 19 meeting, 28; example of 
conservative group, 72n20; pre-
sents resolution to define distribu-
tion of powers between New York 
and Continental Congress, 206 
Loyalists: manpower for British army, 
91-99 passim, 110, 256; resurgence 
in province, I 03, II 3-17; Provincial 
Congress resolution to disarm, 144; 
sent to New Hampshire jails, 202; 
offered act of grace, 203; estimates 
of in Queens and Kings, 256; in L. 
Morris's regiment, 256-57. See also 
Tories 
Ludlow, Gabriel H., 39n99 
Ludlow, William W., 39n99 
272 
"Lycurgus": castigates Pennsylvania 
Assembly on question of indepen-
dence, 160 
McAdam, William, 39n99 
McDougall, Alexander, 10nl7, 12n, 14, 
15n, 2ln, 23n, 26n64, 31, 34n86, 72n 
21, 13ln78, 147, 149, 150, 175, 207, 
208; dissatisfied with New York's re-
action to tea news, 13; on vote at tea 
rally, 17n32; leadership of opposi-
tion to Coercive Acts, 24-29; op-
position to De Lanceyites in Fifty-
One, 31-35; chairman of meeting 
on Boston Port Act, 32; desires to 
send troops to Queens to disarm 
Tories, 108; complains of militia 
situation, 109; describes hasty dis-
solution of Provincial Congress, 
Ill; urges Holt not to reprint 
Common Sense, 112; explains poor 
attendance at Provincial Congress, 
ll7; opposes assembly's considera-
tion of North's resolution, 122; and 
Smith's conciliatory resolves, 123, 
125-27; worries about licentiousness 
and army, 174; explains legisla-
ture's decision not to levy taxes, 
196; on Lee's movement to New 
York, 207 
McEvers, Charles, 39n99; censures 
activists, 33n85 
McKesson, John, 226; urges G. Clin-
ton to attend Convention, 217n; 
makes copy of constitution draft, 
221; describes Jay's draft of con-
stitution, 228 
Maclean, Col. Allen: sponsors armed 
loyalist association, 90-91 
Malcolm, William, 149 
Mamaroneck, N.Y., Ill 
Marschalk, A., 74n25 
Marston, Thomas, 39n99, 149 
Martin, Josiah, 48; proclamation in 
Rivington's Gazetteer, 57-58 
Maryland: delegation's conduct on 
independence question, 170 
Massachusetts, 13, 24, 30, 31, 32, 78, 
103, 104, 209 
Matthews, David, 48 
Mechanics: role in tea party, 2ln; 
political role, 23n; voting qualifica-
tions aimed at, 241 
Mechanics, Committee of, 23n; ap-
pearance of, 27 and n66; opposes 
De Lancey faction in Committee 
of Fifty-One, 31-32; objects to Fifty-
Index 
Mechanics, Committee of (continued): 
One's proposal for enforcement of 
Continental Association, 38-40; elec-
tion slate for Provincial Congress, 
149; worried by lack of provision 
for ratification of new constitution, 
155-59; petitions Provincial Con-
gress on independence, 163-64; de-
fends right to petition Provincial 
Congress, 164n90 
"Memento": advocates independence 
before appearance of Common Sense 
in New York, 160 
Merchants: commercial ties with Brit-
ish, 48-49; and Tories, 64. See also 
Political factions; De Lancey fac-
tion 
Messier, P., 74n25 
Militia: organized by Provincial 
Congress, 184-85, 186 
Mills, Zebediah, 243n92 
Moderates, 128· definition of, viii-ix, 
71 and n20, 231; representation on 
Committee of One Hundred, 72-73; 
shift toward radical position, 139-
40; and constitution, 147-48, 24ln90, 
242 and n91, 243-44, 243n92, 244-
48 and nn, 249; ticket in election 
for Provincial Congress, 148-50: fac-
tors in reluctance to accept inde-
pendence, 172-77. See also Con-
servatives: Radicals 
Mohawk district (Tryon County): 
election for First Provincial Con-
gress, 89 
"Monitor," 139nl6; criticizes Provin-
cial Congress, 135-36; letters reflect 
hardening of opinion, 136-37; iden-
tification of, 136nl0 
Montague, Captain James, 76 
Montreal, Canada, 91, 127 
Moore, John, 39n99, 13ln78 
Moore, John B., 39n99 
Morris, Gouverneur, 199, 200, 206, 
211, 216, 219, 225, 243n92, 247nl02, 
249: comments on May 19 meeting, 
28n71: and independence, 150-51, 
165, 169, 170, 171: and constitu-
tion, 150-51, 152, 214, 242, 243n92; 
responsible for adjournment of Pro-
vincial Congress to White Plains, 
171; unexplained absence from Pro-
vincial Congress, 175; comments on 
fright among legislators at British 
advance up Hudson, 176-77; chal-
lenges Scott's right to seat in Con-
vention, 214-15, 216, 246 
Index 
Morris, Lewis, 13ln78, 175-76, 216; 
refuses to return to regiment, 175-
76, 256-57 
Morris, Richard, 211 
Morris, Roger, 8n11 
Mulligan, Hercules, 39n98, 72n21 
Munitions: procurement of, 190-91 
Murray, Lindley, 39n99 
New Connecticut. See Vermont 
New Hampshire, 202, 209 
New Hampshire grants: conflict over 
as factor in revolutionary organiza-
tion, 115-16. See also Vermont 
New Jersey, 142 
Newkirk, Benjamin, 243n92 
New Paltz, N.Y., 99 
Newspaper opinion: expresses de-
termination to resist Great Britain, 
134-38 
New York (city), 180, 182; commit-
tee of correspondence chosen in, 
15; tea party in, 18-22; strength of 
Whigs in, 65-79; events following 
news of Lexington in, 69-75; evac-
uation of British garrison from, 
77; migration and loyalty of people 
of, 78-79; population statistics of, 
78-79 and nn; threat of bombard-
ment by British of, 105-6; demand 
for right to elect delegates to Con-
tinental Congress, 205; Convention 
delegation voting behavior on con-
stitution, 241, 242, 246 and n 
New York (province): political struc-
ture in 1773, 5-9; significance for 
British of, 45; royal administrative 
machinery in, 45-46; influence of 
royal administration in legislature, 
46-47; royal administration's use of 
pressure tactics in, 47-48, 49-52: 
merchants' connections with royal 
administration, 48-49; other colo-
nies' suspicions of, 60-61; strength 
of Whigs in, 79-99 passim; military 
service as criterion of political 
ideology, 91-99 and nn; population 
statistics of, 93 and n73; loyalist 
reaction in, 103, 113-17; assembly 
election of 1776, 130-31 
New York Assembly: refuses approval 
of Continental Association, 42-43; 
royal influence in, 46-47, 51-52; De 
Lancey discussion of probable vot-
ing behavior of members of, 52; 
Whig maneuvers to obtain appro-
val of Continental Congress, 79-80; 
273 
:\'ew York Assembly (continued): 
election of 1776, 130-31; proroga-
tion, 1776, 132 
;\! icoll, Charles, 39n99 
Nicoll, Francis, 122 and n 
:\!onimportation: proposal for, 25 and 
n; discussion of circumvented, 28. 
See also Continental Association 
:\!orth, Frederick, Lord, 4, 103, 118, 
122, 128, 135, 137, 140; conciliation 
resolution of 63; faith of ques-
tioned in press, 138 
Norwood, Richard, 188 
One Hundred, Committee of: seeks 
to suppress charge of bribery, 51; 
formation of, 72-75; ticket in elec-
tion for Provincial Congress, 148-
50; condemns Morris's attack on 
Scott's right to seat in Convention, 
216. See also Fifty-One, Commit-
tee of; Sixty, Committee of 
Orange County, 116, 182; elections 
for Provincial Congress, 113-14; de-
mand for right to elect delegates 
to Continental Congress, 205; Con-
vention delegation voting behavior 
on constitution, 246 and n 
Orange Town, N.Y.: election for 
Provincial Congress, 113-14 
Oriskany, battle of, 255 
Outwater, Thomas, 114 
Paine, Thomas: Common Sense, 112, 
137, 138, 160 
Palatine district (Tryon County): 
election for First Provincial Con-
gress, 89 
Palatine district committee: denounces 
loyalist declaration, 85 
Paper currency: Provincial Congress 
considers feasibility of, 192; Pro-
vincial Congress votes to emit, 194; 
New York and Continental bills, 
I 95. See also Provincial Congress; 
Taxation 
Paris, Isaac, 114, 13ln78, 243n92 
Parker, Capt. Henry, 106 
Parks, Arthur, 243n92 
Parliament, I 32, 137; role in William 
Smith's proposals, 119-20; "Inde-
pendent Whig" dismisses friends of 
America in, 161 
Parliamentary supremacy: colonial 
ideas on, 137 
Paulding, William, 211-12, 217n 
Peace commissioners, 138, 147 
274 
Pearsall, Thomas, 39n99 
Peekskill, N.Y., 2ll 
Pell,John, 74n25 
Pennsylvania Assembly: castigated by 
"Lycurgus" on independence, 160 
Philadelphia, Pa., 10, II, 13 and n, 
15, 17, 19, 31, 35, 142, 167, 169, 170, 
171; resignation of tea agents in, II 
Philipsburg, Manor of: tenants and 
provincial convention election, 88 
Philipse, Frederick, 51, 86, 88 
Phoenix, David, 72n21 
Platt, Jeremiah, 39n98, 72n2l 
Platt, Zephaniah, 202, 243n92 
Political factions: anatomy of, 5-6; 
composition of, 6-7; imperial dis-
pute as an issue for, 22; reaction 
to Coercive Acts, 24-29; shifting 
grounds of hostility among, 40-41. 
See also De Lancey faction; Liv-
ingston faction; Tories; Whigs 
Political ideology. See Conservatives; 
Moderates; Radicals; Convention of 
Representatives; Provincial Con-
gress 
Post, W., 74n25 
Poughkeepsie, N.Y., 99; vote for 
provincial convention, 86, 87 
Poverty: colonial ideas on, 134-35 
Power, distribution of: newspaper 
discussion of, 232, 233 
Presbyterian church: political con-
siderations in charter request, 50 
Presbyterian party, 6-7. See also 
Livingston faction 
Prince, Samuel, l48n5l, 149n 
Prohibitory Act, 101 
Provincial Congress: elections of, 62, 
89-90, ll3-17, 148-50, 179, 181; pro-
motion of Defense Association, 63; 
elaborates governmental structure, 
63, 183-84, 194, 196, 2ll; vacillation 
of, 102-6, 109-10, lll-12, 142, 171; 
fails to reassure governor, II 0; and 
Tory problem, Ill, 143-44, 145-46, 
197-201, 204; military supply prob-
lems of, Ill, 186-91 passim; con-
siders Smith's resolutions on con-
ciliation and assembly, ll8-29; pas-
sim; June 1775 instructions to dep-
uties at Continental Congress, 118n 
48; criticized by "Monitor," 135-36; 
election of Third as indicator of 
political mood, 141: quorum prob-
lem, 141, 179-80, 181; recruitment 
of line regiments by, 143, 184; and 
constitution, 150-59 passim; and in-
Index 
Provincial Congress (continued): 
dependence, 163-64, 165, 166-69, 
170-71, 172-77, 182-83; nerve center 
of revolutionary movement, 178; 
problem of length of session of, 
180, 181 and n, 182; county voting 
power in Third, 180, 182; change 
in composition of, 181, 182; con-
sideration of key problems by 
Third, 182; organization of militia 
by, 184-85, 186; encourages priva-
teering, 186; sources of funds, 191-
92, 193-94, 195, 196, 197; and paper 
currency, 192, 195; proposes Con-
tinental Congress tax on tea, 193; 
power relationship with Continen-
tal Congress, 205, 206-10; and In-
dian affairs, 210. See also Con-
stitution; Convention of Represent-
atives; Provincial Convention; Safe-
ty, Committee of; Tories; Whigs 
Provincial Convention: election of, 
44, 86-88; chooses delegates to Con-
tinental Congress, 44; meeting of, 
178-79 
Pseudonyms: "Mohawks," II; "Bru-
tus," lln21; "Plain English," 69; 
"Citizen," 130; "Philo-Demos," 130; 
"Poor Man," 130, 134-35; "Philo 
Patriae," 134; "Occasional Remark-
er," 134; "Monitor," 134, 135-36, 
139nl6; "Minos," 135; "Plain Man," 
136; "Amicus Constitutionis," 137-
38; "Lucius," 137 and n; "Oba-
diah," 137 and n; "H.Y.," 139nl6; 
"Americanus," 139nl6; "Observer," 
139nl6; "American Patriot," 139n 
16; "Salus Populi," 146; "Free Citi-
zen," 146-47; "Spartanus," 147n45, 
155n69, 173-74, 232; "Sentinel," 149; 
"Sober Citizen," 149-50; "Colum-
bus," 155n69, 162n85; "Memento," 
160; "Lycurgus," 160; "Candidus," 
161; "Independent Whig," 161 and 
n83, 233; "Z.F.," 16ln8l; "Cato," 
16ln83; "Amicus Patriae," 16ln83; 
"A.B.," 16ln83; "Hector," 16ln83; 
"Hermina," 162n85; "Real Farmer," 
177; "Essex," 232 
Putnam, Israel, 222 
Queens County, ll5, 141, 182; forma-
tion of district committees in, 42; 
refusal to elect delegates to Pro-
vincial Congress, 117; Whigs win 
assembly seats in, 131 
Queens Village, N.Y_, 145 
Index 
Radicals, 128; definition of, vm, 1x, 
71 and n20, 231; social base of, 2; 
role in opposition to Coercive Acts, 
24-29; resolutions on Boston Port 
Act, 32 and n; resignation from 
Committee of Fifty-One, 33-34; 
compromise with Fifty-One, 35 and 
nn: representation on Committee 
of Sixty, 39 and nn; frustrated at-
tempt to break Continental As-
sociation, 65-66; free Sears from 
arrest, 67-68; representation on 
Committee of One Hundred, 72-73; 
ticket in election for Provincial 
Congress, 73-75, 148-50; advocate 
seizure of Tryon, 104; city warned 
against by "Sober Citizen," 149-50; 
and constitution, 158, 235, 236-40, 
249; attitudes in newspapers toward 
independence, 160-62; inability to 
bring pressure to bear on Provin-
cial Congress, 172. See also Con-
servatives; Mechanics, Committee 
of; Moderates; Sons of Liberty 
Randall, Thomas, 72n21, 148n5l, 149 
and n 
Rapalje family, 48 
Ray, John, 149 
Ray, Robert, 72n2l, 149 and n 
Rea, Matthew, 243n92 
Reade, Joseph, 8nll 
Refugees: Convention provides weav-
ing and spinning for, 191 
Remsen, Henry, 39n99, 149, 150, 153, 
168-69, 199 
Revolution: contradictory image of 
New York in, I; historiography of, 
2; dynamics of, 2, 252-53 
Revolutionary government: newspaper 
debate on, 146-47. See also Provin-
cial Congress; Safety, Committee 
of; Sixty, Committee of; One Hun-
dred, Committee of; Convention of 
Representatives 
Rhinelander, Frederick, 47 
Rhinelander, William, 47 
Rhinelander family, 48 
Rhode Island, 146 
Richardson, James, 77 
Richmond County, ll5, 182, 194, 206; 
refusal to elect delegates to Provin-
cial Congress, ll7; Tories win as-
sembly seats in, 131 
Ritzema, Rudolph, 72n2l; urges harsh 
anti-Tory policy, 108 
Rivington, James: prints word of 
Tryon's tea decision, 18; receives 
Rivington, James (continued): 
royal annuity, 53; denounced by 
Whigs, 53-54; incurs anger of Sixty, 
54; flight from Whigs, 55; revises 
tone of paper, 55; Tory flavor of 
newspaper, 55-56; wreckage of press 
of, 56-60 
Robertson, Brig. Gen. James: testi-
fies before governor's council, 67; 
estimates population of city, 79; 
testimony of loyalists, 99 
Rogers, Robert, 48 
Roome, John, 39n99 
Roosevelt, Isaac, 72n21, 127, 148n5l, 
149n; and T. Smith's resolves, 125, 
126 
Roosevelt, Nicholas, 72n21 
Rutgers, Adrian, 149 
Rutgers, Anthony, l48n5l, l49n, 
243n92 
Rutledge, Edward, 166, 175, 176; im-
plies New York Continental Con-
gress delegation opposes indepen-
dence, l66n95; informs Jay of course 
of arguments over independence at 
Philadelphia, 170 
Rye, N.Y., Ill 
Sackett, Nathaniel, 202 
Safety, Committee of: warned by 
Tryon of possible bombardment, 
105; alarmed by Lee's approach, 
106; examples of timidity of, 108-9; 
and Tories, 108, 144, 145; warn-
ing to county committees on as-
sembly election, 130; checks on sup-
plies for British ships, 142; charges 
British with bad faith in molesting 
city vessels, 142; origin of, 180; 
functions of, 181; and military ad-
ministration, 188, 189; creates com-
mittee to draft regulations for In-
dian relations, 2ll; prods constitu-
tional committee, 223. See also 
Convention of Representatives; Pro-
vincial Congress 
St. Leger, Barry, 98, 255 
Saltpeter: manufacture promoted by 
state, 190-91 
Sands, Comfort, 72n21, l48n51, 149, 
207; moves deletion of one of 
Smith's resolves, 126; moves amend-
ment to Scott's motion on constitu-
tion, 152-53 
Sandy Hook, 142 
Schenectady Dutch Reformed 
Church, 7 
Schenk, Henry, 243n92 
Schoharie, N.Y., 99 
"Schuyler": on Jay's role in drafting 
constitution, 227 
Schuyler, Philip, 111, 129n, 143, 174; 
opposes seizure of Tryon, 104; com-
ments on cost of war, 187; requests 
reinforcements, 202; apprehensive 
over delay in drafting constitution, 
223 
Scott, John Morin, 15n30, 22, 72n21, 
124, 148n51, 149n, 153, 154, 199, 
207, 208, 216, 22ln24, 225, 247n102, 
249; attacks resolutions of Fifty-
One, 34n87; castigates Tryon, 123; 
not invited to Simmons Tavern 
conference, l23n; amends Smith's 
resolves, 125-26; presents resolu-
tion to oppose assembly's consider-
ation of Lord North's motion, 126; 
analysis of actions in Provincial 
Congress by William Smith, Jr., 
127; suspicions of Thomas and 
William Smith, 128-29; proposes 
Provincial Congress draft consti-
tution, 151-52; presents resolution 
to approve proceedings of Conti-
nental Congress, 206; moves to 
allow Lee expedition into New York, 
207; right to seat in Convention 
challenged, 214-15; postponement 
of constitutional report advocated 
by adherents of, 222; right to seat 
in constitutional committee chal-
lenged, 246 
Seabury, Rev. Samuel: seized by Sears, 
59; appeals to legislature to smash 
revolutionary committees, 84-85; 
leads Tories to polls, 88 
Seaman, Benjamin, l3ln78 
Sears, Isaac, 10 and nl7, 12n, 2ln, 
26n64, 31, 34n86, 48, 72n21, 102, 
105, 149, 188; dissatisfied with New 
York's reaction to tea news, 13; 
leadership of tea rally, 14-15; on 
vote at tea rally, l7n32; leadership 
of opposition to Coercive Acts, 24-
29; opposes De Lanceyites in Fifty-
One, 31-35: destruction of Riving-
ton's press, 56-60; arrested by mayor, 
67-68; proposes capture of Tryon, 
104; desires strong action against 
Westchester Tories, Ill; praised for 
role in defensive preparations, 139 
and n: carries out Lee's orders for 
imposition of Tory test oath, 209 
Sears, Isaac, Jr., 48 
Index 
"Sentinel": urges isolation of British 
ships, 106-7; nominates slate for 
Provincial Congress, 148-49 
Serle, Ambrose: describes newspapers' 
influence in New York, 162n85 
Sharpe, Richard, 39n99 
Shaw, Charles, 39n99 
Sherbrook, Miles, 39n99 
Sherwood, Isaac, 243n92 
Six Nations, 210 
Sixty, Committee of, 46; formation 
of, 38-40; calls for election of pro-
vincial convention, 44, 178; clashes 
with Rivington, 54; calls for elec-
tion of Provincial Congress, 62, 179; 
fames affair and, 65-66; forbids 
shipment of supplies to Gage, 67; 
reaction to news of Lexington, 69-
70; conflict over election of succes-
sor committee, 72-75; promulgates 
Defense Association, 75; calls meet-
ing to clear White and De Lancey 
of accusation, 75. See also Fifty, 
Committee of; Fifty-One, Com-
mittee of; One Hundred, Commit-
tee of 
Skene, Philip, 50nl8, 52 
Smith, John W., 74n25 
Smith, Melancton, 111, 203 
Smith, Thomas, 72n21, 117, 243n92; 
negotiates with Scott for new in-
structions for Continental Congress 
delegates, 121; arranges meeting of 
congressional deputies and William 
Smith, Jr. at Simmons Tavern, 122; 
introduces conciliatory resolves to 
Provincial Congress, 122-23; moves 
to instruct New York delegation to 
Continental Congress on concilia-
tion, 124: resolves basically amended, 
124-25; factors in defeat of resolves 
in Provincial Congress, 128-29 
Smith, William (of Suffolk), 13ln78, 
217, 22ln24, 225, 247nl02 
Smith, William, Jr., 8 and nil, 48, 
117; Schenectady Church dispute, 
7; visit by Sons of Liberty about 
tea, 12-13, 14; comments on Tryon's 
decision on tea ship, 18n; prevails 
on council to investigate Thurman 
and Harding affair, 67; opposes 
calling out militia, 76: describes re-
ceptions of Tryon and Washing-
ton, 78; comments on Colden's 
boldness, 80; at council meeting on 
Dartmouth's instructions, 81; letter 
to Haldimand quoted, 82; con-
Index 
Smith, William, Jr. (continued): 
suited by Schuyler about plan to 
seize Tryon, 104; plan to break 
continental union and restore royal 
control of New York, liS; solution 
for problem of colonial taxation, 
119-20; motivation in advocacy of 
assembly petition to Parliament, 
l20nn; desires to have assembly 
consider North's conciliatory pro-
posal, 120-21; launches effort to 
restore royal control, 121; private 
meeting with congressional depu· 
ties, 122; analyzes defeat of broth· 
er's resolves in Provincial Congress, 
127; advises Tryon to call for elec· 
tion of new assembly, 129; notes 
impact of news of King's speech, 
132; cautions Schuyler about mili-
tary adventurers, 174; remarks on 
risks of Whig leadership, 175; sus· 
pects P. R. Livingston offers guber· 
natorial nomination to him, 2IS; 
advises Schuyler to attend Conven· 
tion, 21Snl4; copies radical pro· 
posal for constitution, 235 
Smith, William, Sr., 4S 
"Sober Citizen": warns of split in 
revolutionary movement, 149-50 
Sons of Liberty: reaction to news of 
tea shipment, viii, 9-IO; movement 
to boycott tea, ll-12; demand resig· 
nation of tea agents, 12 and n; 
leadership of, l2n; opposition to 
storage of tea, 12-13: committee on 
tea confers with William Smith, 
Jr., 12-13; discord among over tea, 
13-15; role in formation of com-
mittee of correspondence, 15-17; 
use of name by radicals, 73-74. 
See also Radicals 
South Carolina General Committee: 
comments on royal influence in 
New York, 46 
Sparks, Jared, 230 
Stirling, William Alexander, Lord, 
144, 20S 
Stoutenburgh, Isaac, 74n25, l4Sn51, 
l49n 
Suffolk County, 42, IS2 
Sulphur: search for deposits promoted 
by state, 190-91 
Swartwout, Jacobus, 203 
Tappen, Christopher, 217n, 243n92 
Taxation: colonial ideas on, 136, 137; 
Provincial Congress declines to re· 
Taxation (continued): 
sort to, 192; Provincial Congress 
suggests Continental Congress in· 
stitute, 193; defeated in Provincial 
Congress, 193-94; factors militating 
against, 195-96. See also Provincial 
Congress 
Tayler, John, 243n92; hears criticisms 
of delay in drafting constitution, 
220 
Tea: Act of 1773, 3-4; colonial con-
sumption of, 4 and n; political 
ramifications of Act of 1773, 4-5; 
plans for shipment of, 9; difference 
of opinion over tax on, IO; re· 
sponse to news of shipment of, 10· 
II; boycott movement against, ll-
12; Governor Tryon's proposal to 
store, 12, 13, 14; resignation of 
agents, 12; rally to oppose landing 
of, 14-17; reaction to news of Bos-
ton Tea Party, 17-lS; result of vote 
at rally, l7n32; New York Tea 
Party, lS-22. See also East India 
Company; Sons of Liberty 
Tenantry: new leases demanded by, 
103, l73nll7 
Ten Broeck, Abraham, l3ln7S, 
243n92 
Ten Broeck, John, 199 
Ten Eyck, Andrew, 4S 
TenEyck, Peter, 4S 
Thomas, John, Jr., Ill, l3ln7S 
Thomas, Thomas, 215 
Thompson, William, 139 
Thurman, John, 39n99 
Thurman, Ralph, 67 
Ticonderoga, S3, IS7, 202 
Tories: usage of term, 40-41; check 
formation of county committees, 
42; supported by Rivington's news· 
paper, 53-60 passim; and De Lancey 
faction, 64; socio-economic compo· 
sition of, 64; defeated in contest 
over ]ames, 65-66; successfully de-
fend Elliot in arms incident, 6S-69; 
estimated strength in New York 
city, 7S-79, 254; worried over pos-
sible defeats in assembly, 79-SO; 
tactics against Whigs, S3-S4; efforts 
to rally popular support, S5-S6; op· 
position in elections, S6-S7, SS, S9, 
90, ll7, 130-31; attempt formation 
of armed loyalist association, 90-91: 
military service as criterion of 
strength of, 91-99 passim; disarmed, 
91, lOS, 131, 144, 145-46, 19S; esti· 
Tories (continued): 
mates of military manpower of, 
94-95 and nn; recruitment of from 
prisoners by duress, 95-96; report 
Whig vacillation, 112; strive to 
detach New York from continental 
union, 118-29 passim; decision on 
permitting legislature to meet, 132; 
accused of desire for absolute mon-
archy, 137; confiscation of property 
of, 145, 204; fear coming of inde-
pendence, 162; in Third Provincial 
Congress, 181 ; arrest and trial of, 
198, 200; plots of, 199, 200; activity 
around Albany, 202: test oath for, 
208-9; minority position of, 250. 
See also Loyalists; De Lancey fac-
tion 
Totten, Joseph, 39n99 
Totten-Crossfield purchase, 50 
Townsend, Samuel, 13ln78, 217, 225, 
247n102 
Tredwell, Thomas, 199 
Troops: recruited by Provincial Con-
gress, 143, 184-85. See also Provin-
cial Congress 
Trumbull, Jonathan, 60 
Tryon, Gov. William, 13, 55, 103, 
109, 122, 123, 124, 197; independent 
of De Lancey faction, 8; and tea 
shipment, 12 and n, 16-18; departs 
for Britain, 19; approves land 
patents in Vermont, 48; instruc-
tions from Dartmouth on land, 50; 
discusses destruction of Rivington's 
press, 57; popular acclaim upon 
return from Britain, 77-78: on 
royal strength in New York, 82, 83, 
254, 257: seizure of proposed by 
radicals, 104: warns Committee of 
Safety of possible bombardment of 
town, 105, 106, 107; permits Lee 
to remove cannon from fort, 107; 
demands Provincial Congress guar-
antee safety, 110: approves William 
Smith, Jr.'s idea for election of 
assembly, 121; urged to return to 
city by Provincial Congress, 123: 
letter to people discussed, 128: con-
sults council about calling elections 
for assembly, 129; and decision on 
permitting legislature to meet, 132; 
plans partial blockade of port, 142; 
plans use of Tories against Wash-
ington, 200: recruitment of loyal-
ists, 254-55. See also Governor's 
council 
Index 
Tryon County, 99, 182; formation of 
district committees in, 42; election 
to Provincial Congress in, 89, 114; 
source of sulphur, 190-91; Conven-
tion delegation voting behavior on 
constitution, 246 and n 
Tryon County Committee of Safety: 
formation of, 89; difficulty of en-
suring attendance at Provincial 
Congress of, 114; comment on loyal-
ist strength, 255 
Tucker, T., 74n25 
Ulster County, 182, 194; formation of 
county committee of inspection in, 
42; seizure of Tory arms in, 144-45; 
demand for right to elect delegates 
to Continental Congress, 205; Con-
vention delegation voting behavior 
on constitution, 242, 246 and n 
Underhill, Nathaniel, 59 
Ustick, William, 39n99 
Van Cortlandt, .John, 72n21, 122 and 
n, 148n51, 149n 
Van Cortlandt, Pierre, 86, 13ln78, 
202, 243n92 
Vandeput, Capt. George, 105 
Van Derbilt, John, 127 
Vandervoort, Peter, 74n25 
Van Horne, David, 15n30, 39n99 
Van Ranst, L., 74n25 
Van Rensselaer, Jeremiah, 220 
Van Rensselaer, Robert, 122 and n, 
13ln78 
Van Schaack, Peter, 39n99 
Van Voorhees, Jacob, 38n97, 39n99 
Van Wyck, Theodore, 74n25 
Van Zandt, Jacobus, 39n9S. 72n21, 
127, 148n51, 149n 
Van Zandt, Peter Pra, 74n25, 148n51, 
149 and n, 150, 243n92 
Vardill, Rev. John, 50nl8 
Veeder, Volkert, 243n92 
Vermont: land grants in, 47, 48: land 
controversy with New York as fac-
tor in revolutionary organization, 
115-16: petition to Continental 
Congress for recognition as inde-
pendent state, 209-10. See also 
Provincial Congress 
Virginia: resolutions on independence, 
163, 165, 166 
Voting qualifications: for Provincial 
Congress, 180: newspaper discussion 
of, 232-33. See also Constitution; 
Convention of Representatives 
Index 
Wallace, Alexander, 26n64, 39n99 
Wallace, Hugh, 8nll 
Walton, Abraham, 15n, 26n64, 39n99, 
188 
Walton, Jacob, 112 
Walton, William, 26n64, 39n99 
Washington, George, 55, 101, 104, 
172, 181, 207, 219; reception in New 
York city, 78; orders Lee to de-
fense of New York, 101; interdicts 
traffic between city and British 
vessels, 107, 143; warns Provincial 
Congress of lack of prospect of 
conciliation, 109; communicates in-
telligence of Tory plots to Provin-
cial Congress, 199, 200; given tem-
porary authority by Provincial Con-
gress to seize Tories, 201 
Waterbury, David, 208 
Watson, Capt., 65-66 
Watts, John, 8nl1, 14, 16n, 52, 74, 75 
Westchester, Borough of, 131 
Westchester County, 182; Tory as-
sociation in, 85-86; election for 
provincial convention in, 87-88; 
Convention delegation voting be-
havior on constitution, 246 and n 
Whigs: usage of term, 41; stimulate 
formation of county committees, 
42, 141; failure of efforts in legisla-
ture, 42-43; decision to call for 
election of provincial convention, 
43-44: socio-economic composition 
of, 65; strength in New York city, 
65-79; weakness in arms incident, 
68-69: encourage desertions among 
royal troops, 77; maneuvers in as-
sembly to obtain approval of Con-
tinental Congress, 79-80; strength 
outside New York city, 79-99 pas-
sim; employment of troops to sup-
press, 83; election compaigns of, 
86-87, 88, 89, 90, 113-17; military 
service as criterion of strength of, 
91-99; estimates of military man-
power of, 92-94 and nn · discourage-
ment and fear of, 100-12 passim, 
135-36, 251; vacillation in Provin-
cial Congress, 102-6; alarmed by 
279 
Whigs (continued): 
Lee's measures, 107; and Tory plot 
in Westchester, 111; proposals in 
Provincial Congress for election of 
new assembly, ll8-29; vigorous 
campaign in assembly elections, 
130-31; claim as champions of con-
stitutional monarchy, 137-38; ma-
jority position of, 250, 251. See 
also Livingston faction 
White, Henry, 8nll, 12 and n, 18; ac-
cused of asking ministry for troops, 
74-75 
White, John, 38n97, 39n99 
White Plains, N.Y., 171; election 
incident, 88 
Wilkins, Isaac, 88, 112 
Willett, Marinus, 67 
Wills, William, 114 
Wilson, James, 166 
Wisner, Henry, 166n95, 217, 22ln24, 
225, 243n92, 247nl02; receives data 
on blocking Hudson, 219; com-
plains about lack of progress in 
constitutional committee, 221 
Woodhull, Nathaniel, 122 and n, 
13In78, 148, 215 
Woodward, John, 59, 74n25 
Wool: production encouraged by 
state, 191 
Wooster, David, 60-61, 104 
Wythe, George, 174 
Yates, Abraham, Jr., 13ln78, 217, 225, 
247n102: comments on land grants 
and administration favors, 47 and 
n; notifies Committee of Safety of 
completion of draft constitution, 
223: attributes delay in drafting 
constitution to politics, 230n57 
Yates, Christopher, 13ln78 
Yates, Richard, 39n99 
Yates, Robert, 183, 217, 218, 219, 
221n24, 225, 246n101, 247n102; di-
rected by Committee of Safety to 
gather data on state's boundaries, 
224: explains failure to draft bill 
of rights, 229n 
Young, Hamilton, 39n99 
